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Introduction
Simone Zurbuchen
During the past thirty years, the history of public international law has become 
an important field of research in various disciplines. New discussions of the 
origin, growth and evolution of international law from the fifteenth century 
to the present are at the origin of different proposals for reinterpreting the 
history of international law and legal discourse, mainly from the perspective of 
those who were largely excluded from participating in this discourse, such as 
colonized nations, indigenous peoples and religious or cultural minorities. By 
questioning the classical narrative of international law as a story of progress, 
the new de- centred interpretations aim at showing how international law was 
used by the centre as a means to dominate and exploit the periphery, and how 
different kinds of moral universalism have accompanied imperial expansion. 
Much of the recent literature testifies to an overall attempt to reinterpret the 
history of international law and legal discourse in terms of an ideology legiti-
mizing European colonialism and imperialism.
While revisionist history covers a much longer time- span, references to mor-
al and legal discourse in the seventeenth and eighteenth century form a crucial 
element of it mainly for two reasons. First, critical accounts of international 
law require questioning of the narrative inherited from the nineteenth centu-
ry, which attributed a central role to the Peace of Westphalia or, rather, to what 
is considered today as the ‘myth’ of Westphalia. According to this myth, inter-
national law proper – that is, law exclusively applicable to states as such and 
regulating the relationships between them – was first developed in Europe, in 
the context of a system of sovereign and independent states, which consider 
each other to be free and equal. According to the formerly dominant story of 
international law, this system of states was founded in the treaties of West-
phalia, and it was concluded, as Jennifer Pitts put it, that ‘this essentially Eu-
ropean system gradually came to incorporate other states as they reached the 
appropriate “standard of civilization”, or, as more recent language would have 
it, as they entered the state system or decolonized and became  independent’.1 
A historically more accurate account of the peace settlements of 1648 shows, 
 1 Jennifer Pitts, ‘Empire and Legal Universalisms in the Eighteenth Century’, American Histor-
ical Review, 117 (2012): 92– 121, at 93. I forgo here any attempt to account for the relevant liter-
ature. A broad overview is presented in Bodo Fassbender and Anne Peters (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of the History of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
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however, that the so- called ‘Westphalian system’ was, rather, an ideal- type in-
terpretation of the European legal order as it was proposed by Emer de Vattel 
around the middle of the eighteenth century – an interpretation which did not 
accurately reflect the positive European law of nations. The development of 
international law thus needs to be studied against the background of the com-
plex and shifting legal order within and among the European states, including 
conflicts connected to imperial expansion.
The second reason why the period from 1625 to 1800 plays an important 
role in deconstructing the ‘progress’ story of international law has to do 
with the very concept of international law. The term ‘international law’ was 
coined by Jeremy Bentham, to designate the body of legal rules and norms 
which apply between sovereign states and other entities that are legally re-
cognized as international actors.2 The term was eventually to replace the 
older phrase ‘law of nations’ (jus gentium, droit des gens, Völkerrecht),3 which 
was still used in the context of modern natural law. For a long time, there 
was no clear distinction between the jus intra gentes and the jus inter gentes, 
and the law of nations could not be conceived independently from the law 
of nature. Hugo Grotius has famously been credited with the foundation of 
a ‘dualist’ account of the law of nations – consisting of the ‘natural’ law on 
one hand and the ‘voluntary’ law of nations on the other – and thus with the 
pulling apart of the formerly tight relationship between the law of nations 
and natural law. This move is held to mark the birth of international law in 
its modern sense. This was, however, a complicated story, which needs to be 
explored on the basis of a wide range of sources and taking into consideration 
the competing definitions of the law of nations. Grotius’ ‘dualist’ account of 
the law of nations, which was later taken up by Christian Wolff and Emer de 
Vattel, was, for instance, challenged by Samuel Pufendorf and his numerous 
followers, who maintained that there was no such thing as a ‘voluntary’ law of 
nations.4 These rival accounts of the law of nations were especially important 
 2 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. by H.J. Burns 
and H.L.A. Hart (London: Athlone Press, 1970), 296: ‘The word international, it must be ac-
knowledged, is a new one; though, it is hoped, sufficiently analogous and intelligible. It is 
calculated to express, in a more significant way, the branch of law which goes under the 
name of the law of nations: an appellation so uncharacteristic that, were it not for the force 
of custom, it would seem rather to refer to internal jurisprudence’.
 3 There is no unified spelling of the word ‘ius’ in seventeenth- and eighteenth- century editions. 
Depending on the publisher, the spelling is either ‘ius’ or ‘jus’. In the present volume, ‘ius’ will 
appear only where the reference is to a specific edition.
 4 Stephen C. Neff, Justice among Nations: A History of International Law (Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press, 2014), chap. ii.
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Introduction 3
in relation to the law of war, where the ‘dualist’ account allowed that ques-
tions of intrinsic justice, which referred to ‘natural’ law, could be relegated to 
the conscience of sovereigns, whereas the ‘voluntary’ law, which regulated 
the formal conduct of war, was a flexible tool for adapting the strict rules of 
justice to practical necessities. This had important consequences with regard 
to issues such as the declaration of war, rights in war, peace- making, and 
neutrality.5
One of the questions addressed in this volume is whether and to what ex-
tent the law of nations, as it was conceived within the tradition of modern 
natural law, beginning with Grotius’ De jure belli ac pacis (1625), fits into the 
counter- narrative of the history of international law described above. This 
question merits attention since specialists in the field have argued that the 
justification of colonization and imperial expansion was by no means the cen-
tral aim of the modern law of nature and nations.6 Unlike Grotius, the main 
representatives of this tradition in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
paid comparatively little attention to the antagonism between ‘civilized’ Euro-
peans and ‘barbarian’ others. They were more concerned with the ‘barbarians’ 
within Europe and sought to develop a code of conduct suitable to regulate the 
European nations. The main question after the Peace of Westphalia was how 
to ensure peaceful coexistence among the European states by means of diplo-
macy, alliances, arbitration, guarantees and (threat of) intervention, the last 
being often linked to the idea of the balance of power. Such legal and political 
devices were theorized within the framework of the law of nature and nations, 
albeit never from a single, unified perspective. Quite to the contrary, doctrines 
of the law of nations were forged and developed in various contexts, where 
questions of power and state interest intermingled with attempts to conform 
with natural- law rules of justice.7
 5 Stephen C. Neff, War and the Law of Nations: A General History (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2015), part ii.
 6 Emmanuelle Jouannet, ‘Des origines coloniales du droit international: à propos du droit des 
gens moderne au 18e siècle’, in The Roots of International Law – Les fondements du droit inter-
national, ed. by Pierre- Marie Dupuy and Vincent Chetail (Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 
2014), 649– 671. For a nuanced account of the law of nations see also Georg Cavallar, ‘Vitoria, 
Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolff and Vattel: Accomplices of European Colonialism or True Cosmo-
politans?’, Journal of the History of International Law 10/ 2 (2008): 181– 209.
 7 In his study of the historical evolution of occupation, Andrew Fitzmaurice shows, for exam-
ple, in an exemplary way, how the intellectual contexts and the contexts of imperial prac-
tice shaped different theories of occupation and the uses that were made of these theories: 
Andrew Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, Property, and Empire, 1500– 2000 (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2014).
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4 Zurbuchen
So far, accounts of the history of the modern law of nations have main-
ly focused on a restricted number of classic treatises, such as the published 
works of Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, Christian Thomasius, Cornelius van 
Bynkershoek, Christian Wolff or Emer de Vattel. While lesser known figures 
have occasionally been dealt with in the specialized literature, we still know 
comparatively little about this very rich tradition of moral and legal thinking 
and its influence on the law of nations and legal practice in various European 
countries. In this context, the fact that the law of nature and nations consti-
tuted, from the late seventeenth until the middle of the nineteenth century, 
an academic discipline that was taught at a great number of universities and 
other institutions of higher education throughout Europe no doubt plays a 
crucial role.
This volume explores, for the first time, a wide range of formerly obscure 
literature related to the law of nature and nations. The volume presents studies 
conducted by participants in the international research network ‘Natural Law 
1625– 1850’, many of whom are currently working on archival materials related 
to the teaching of the law of nature and nations in various European countries. 
These case studies show how the conception of the law of nations varied in in-
tellectual content and practical function, depending on the contexts in which 
it was developed and applied. They are supplemented by new interpretations 
of classic texts in the field and by studies of figures and theories hitherto large-
ly neglected in research.
The volume comprises three sections. In the first, ‘Teaching the Law of Na-
tions’, the studies show by way of examples what can be gained from exploring 
the law of nature and nations on the basis of specialized academic texts on the 
subject (dissertations, textbooks, programmatic writings, etc.) and general in-
troductory courses. This literature emerged in several European countries and 
in a variety of educational institutions, often addressed to specific audiences. 
One example is that of the Ritterakademie, a particular kind of institution in 
the Holy Roman Empire aimed at preparing the sons of the nobility for their 
future functions as civil servants. Several programmatic writings connected 
with the short- lived Ritterakademie at Erlangen (1701– 1741), in the Franconian 
magravate of Brandenburg- Bayreuth, show the significance of the law of na-
ture and nations not only in the education of this social class but also how it 
was used to keep ministers and magistrates at German courts informed about 
developments in international law, such as diplomatic immunity.
Two further chapters deal with the law of nature and nations in the Danish 
context, which is rarely considered in historical accounts of international law 
in the eighteenth century. One study focuses on the inaugural dissertation of 
Andreas Hojer, who was appointed as first ex officio professor of the law of 
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nature and nations at Copenhagen University in 1734. By discussing the disser-
tation against the political and polemical background of Denmark- Norway’s 
participation in the Great Northern War, the author shows how expertise in 
the law of nature and nations was used to defend the political interests of the 
Danish monarchy. At the same time, he explains why there had been ongo-
ing concerns with improving the teaching of the law of nature and nations 
at Copenhagen University for decades before Hojer was appointed: Denmark- 
Norway needed an academic expertise in the field comparable to that of the 
university in Kiel, which had been among the first universities to create a chair 
in natural law and appointed teachers able to defend the interests of the rivals 
of the Danish kings in the Great Northern War. Yet another chapter explores 
how Danish interest in the law of nations was reinvigorated by the outbreak of 
the French Revolutionary Wars and the events leading to the foundation of the 
Second League of Armed Neutrality in 1800. The chapter shows how teaching 
at Copenhagen University was adapted in a textbook used to teach the law of 
nations at the Royal Danish Naval Academy at the very beginning of the nine-
teenth century. The work included thoroughgoing reflections on the different 
applications of the universally valid law of nations to morally and  culturally 
‘developed’ European nations on the one hand and ‘barbarian’ and ‘savage’ na-
tions on the other. Not surprisingly, the textbook also deals extensively with 
trade and shipping, the laws of war, and the rights and duties of neutral na-
tions  – subject matters Danish- Norwegian naval officers had to be familiar 
with at the time.
The second section of this volume, ‘The Law of Nations from the Peace of 
Westphalia to the Enlightenment’, presents chapters on continuing disputes 
about the alleged Hobbesianism of a highly influential classic in the field, name-
ly Pufendorf’s The Law of Nature and Nations, and on lesser known successors of 
Pufendorf and Thomasius such as Johann Jacob Schmauss and Johann Gottlieb 
Heineccius. The focus is on how these authors judged the problems inherent in 
the antagonistic European state system, how they reformulated the notion of 
state interest and to what extent they believed that the latter could be pro tected 
by the balance of power. Yet other studies in this section take up some of the 
key questions raised above in connection with the challenges that the revision-
ist history of international law faces with regard to the tradition of modern nat-
ural law. On the one hand, there is the question of how the distinction between 
‘civilized’ and ‘savages’ or ‘barbarian’ nations featured in Vattel’s treatise on the 
law of nations. It is suggested that the Swiss author did not use this distinction 
to demarcate Europeans from non- European ‘others’. He distinguished rather 
‘men’ from ‘monsters’ on the basis of a specific history of progress, a vision of 
the advancement of humanity driven by enlightened monarchs, who had a 
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correct understanding of enlightened self- interest and true glory, as exempli-
fied by Tsar Peter the Great. On the other hand, this section offers a novel un-
masking of the ‘myth’ of Westphalia by showing how  natural lawyers writing on 
the law of nations dealt with the guarantees and interventions in the domestic 
affairs of the Holy Roman Empire that had been laid down by the Peace of 
Westphalia. It turns out that while some natural lawyers did welcome interven-
tions to protect foreign subjects in accordance with the guarantee of the peace 
treaties, others proved to be highly critical of interventions because of concerns 
that the guarantee would be instrumentalized by France under Louis xiv.
The chapters in the third section deal with ‘The Law of Nations and the école 
romande du droit naturel’. The idea here is to shed new light on the intellectual 
context in which Emer de Vattel developed his highly influential treatise on 
the law of nations. The main representatives of the Swiss school of natural law 
before Vattel, Jean Barbeyrac and Jean- Jacques Burlamaqui, inaugurated natu-
ral law as an academic discipline in the French- speaking part of the old Helvet-
ic confederation and their works had a decisive influence all over Europe. This 
is generally well known, but the academic and historical background to their 
teaching, the publishing strategies they and their disciples adopted, and the 
debates their publications triggered in various European countries, especially 
with regard to the law of nations, have so far not been studied in their own 
right. Such questions are addressed in a chapter on the definition of the law of 
nations in the Swiss context, which takes into account the multi- volume Latin 
edition of Grotius’ De jure belli ac pacis, published in Lausanne in 1751– 1752. 
The novel feature of this edition consists in the integration of the extensive an-
notations and commentaries to Grotius’ work by Heinrich and Samuel Cocceji 
(father and son), which had previously been published in Breslau as Grotius 
illustratus. While the reasons Barbeyrac’s disciples had for preparing this edi-
tion are not wholly clear, there is no doubt that the Coccejis’ radical critique 
of Grotius’ ‘voluntary’ law of nations strengthened the ‘naturalist’ position of 
Pufendorf and his successors, which was largely predominant in the Swiss con-
text before Vattel resumed the Grotian ‘dualist’ account of the law of nations 
in his Law of Nations. This study is supplemented with a broad overview of the 
reception and use of Barbeyrac’s, Burlamaqui’s and Vattel’s works on the law 
of nature and nations in eighteenth- century Italy. Despite  – or perhaps be-
cause of – its political fragmentation and the influence of the Roman Catholic 
Church, the Italian peninsula provided the context for enlightened debates on 
natural law, diplomacy and the law of nations, and the école romande du droit 
naturel had a major influence on these debates.
Albeit from very different angles, two further chapters in this section deal 
with the function Swiss natural lawyers ascribed to the enlightened self- interest 
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of rulers in making them comply with the natural- law rules of justice. One 
study takes up Jean- Jacques Rousseau’s radical critique of the idea that young 
people, and princes, should be educated by means of books on law and eth-
ics – which would be filled with prejudices instead of true knowledge of hu-
manity. This is confronted with Jean- Jacques Burlamaqui’s actual practice of 
educating a prince (Frederick ii, Landgrave of Hessen- Kassel, was his pupil 
from 1732 to 1737) and his idea that an enlightened prince could be educated 
according to the law of nature and nations that he would be subject to as a rul-
er, in the same way as any other man. Since in Burlamaqui’s view the sovereign 
had to become an interpreter of natural law instead of legislating arbitrarily, 
the prince needed to be provided with the appropriate tools for this through 
education. Yet another study in this part of the volume is devoted to Vattel’s 
doctrine of the customary law of nations  – a subject that has so far never 
been studied in the scholarly literature. The focus on custom and practice pro-
vides an interesting link between this chapter and the one on Burlamaqui. The 
author shows that the function Vattel attributed to custom in his account of 
the law of nations needs to be assessed in light of his critique of Wolff ’s idea 
of perfectio as foundation of natural law, which Vattel replaced with a ‘noble’, 
anti- Hobbesian, concept of self- interest. Based on this finding it is possible to 
show how Vattel conceived of custom as a peaceful means for states to pursue 
their own interest without necessarily conflicting with the law of nations. It 
is also shown that Vattel installed custom as a tool for mediating between the 
natural and the voluntary law of nations, by providing states with a flexible and 
dynamic source of obligation.
While the chapters in this volume take issue with questions linked to the 
revisionist turn in the history of international law, it does not by any means 
aim to compete with the specialized literature in the field, which accounts for 
the history of international law over a much longer period. Neither does it seek 
to make an overall argument about the role of international law in justifying 
European exceptionalism. The goal is, rather, to show how specialists in the 
field of modern natural law, who work on a wide range of formerly unknown 
sources, can contribute to a better understanding of the law of nations in the 
period which was decisive for its origin and constitution as a discipline which 
eventually emancipated itself from natural law.
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 chapter 1
Natural Law for the Nobility? The Law of Nature and 
Nations at the Erlangen Ritterakademie (1701– 1741)
Katharina Beiergroesslein and Iris von Dorn
1 The Matveyev Incident
By the middle of 1708, Europe’s newspapers were full of reports of a diplomatic 
incident between Great Britain and Czarist Russia. Because of its unpredict-
able consequences, this so- called Matveyev (also Matveev or Metveyev) incident 
not only caused a great sensation all over Europe, but also put great diplomatic 
pressure on the relationship between the British Queen Anne and Czar Peter 
the Great of Russia. In the end, however, it helped to clarify the issue of dip-
lomatic immunity: how it was to be understood and what practical impact it 
had on the interaction with envoys sent by foreign princes or states. It thus 
contributed ‘to shape an important component of modern international re-
lations’.1 Hence the event also reveals that the right of diplomatic immunity – 
understood as inviolability of the ambassador’s person, his home and vehicles, 
his luggage and letters, and including the exemption of the ambassador and 
his staff ‘from both civil and criminal litigation’2 – was, by the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, far from being interpreted in completely the same manner 
at European courts, even though the principles of extraterritoriality and dip-
lomatic immunity had been discussed at least since the fifteenth century and 
put in writing by Hugo Grotius during the 1620s.3
On the evening of 21 July 1708, while on his way to a soirée with other foreign 
diplomats at Somerset House, Andrey Artamonovich Matveyev (1666– 1728),4 
special envoy of Peter the Great to Queen Anne, ‘was stopped by three men who 
 1 James Cracraft, The Revolution of Peter the Great (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard Univ. Press, 
2003), 73.
 2 De Lamar Jensen, ‘Diplomacy,’ in Europe 1450 to 1789. Encyclopedia of the Early Modern World, 
vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Dewald (New York: Thomson- Gale, 2004), 147– 152, here 149.
 3 Jensen, ‘Diplomacy,’ 149; Anuschka Tischer, ‘Diplomatie,’ in Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit Online, 
ed. Friedrich Jaeger, accessed 15 April 2017. http:// dx.doi.org.emedien.ub.uni- muenchen.de/ 
10.1163/ 2352- 0248_ edn_ a0774000, first published online: 2014.
 4 Vladimir E. Grabar, The history of international law in Russia 1647– 1917: a bio- bibliographical 
study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 47.
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dragged his footmen down and beat them, and then pulled him out of the coach, 
seizing his sword and forcibly taking possession of the vehicle’.5 Shortly after, 
Matveyev, who had been injured by the attackers, found himself locked up in 
prison. Four hours later, and after several foreign diplomats had intervened on 
his behalf, Matveyev was set free.6 But what had caused this embarrassing event? 
At first, Andrey Matveyev’s mission to Great Britain seemed to have been normal 
diplomatic business. In May 1707, prior to which time he had been delegated to 
The Hague, he was sent to London. And only ten days after his arrival at Green-
wich he had an audience with the Queen. As with a former (unsuccessful) mis-
sion to Paris, where he had stayed from September 1705 to October 1706,7 Mat-
veyev’s legation had been designed to try to break the hegemony of Charles xii 
of Sweden in the Baltic. Its main task was to persuade Anne to mediate in peace 
negotiations between Sweden and Russia; since 1700, Russia and Sweden had 
been fighting over outlets to and control over the Baltic Sea region.8 Addition-
ally, Matveyev was supposed to express Peter’s readiness to join the Grand Alli-
ance (also known as League of Augsburg), which had been founded in 1686 as a 
counterbalance to France’s expansionist policies.9 Furthermore, Britain was to 
be restrained from acknowledging the new Polish king, Stanislaus i Leszcynski, 
as the appointment of Stanislaus was completely against Peter’s interests. First, 
this was because Stanislaus had become king by the grace of Charles xii and the 
Polish opposition and was thus regarded as a Swedish puppet monarch. Second-
ly, Russia had lost an important ally when the former Polish king and elector of 
Saxony, Augustus ii, had lost the Polish throne to Stanislaus with the Peace of Al-
transtädt in 1706.10 Finally, Matveyev was to offer a British– Russian trade agree-
ment concerning British trade via Baltic ports, especially the new Russian city of 
St Petersburg, instead of Archangel. This was supposed to aim at challenging ‘the 
intermittent Swedish blockade of Russia’s new outlets in the Baltic’.11
 5 Andrew Rothstein, Peter the Great and Marlborough: Politics and Diplomacy in Converging 
Wars (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), 90.
 6 For more details on the Matveyev incident see:  Aleksander Wierzbicki, Peter the Great 
of Russia: an English Historiography of the XVIII and XIX Centuries (London:  Athena 
Press, 2004), 62– 66; Rothstein, Peter the Great, 79– 94; Cracraft, Peter the Great, 73; Janet 
M. Hartley, Charles Whitworth: Diplomat in the Age of Peter the Great (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2002), 69– 79.
 7 Rothstein, Peter the Great, 68.
 8 Ibid., 34– 37.
 9 Ibid., 80.
 10 Heinz Duchardt, Europa am Vorabend der Moderne 1650– 1800 (Stuttgart: Eugen Ulmer, 
2003), 293– 294; Rothstein, Peter the Great, 61– 63.
 11 Rothstein, Peter the Great, 50.
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Unfortunately, Matveyev’s mission was a complete failure. It was not only 
because of the British government playing for time and putting the Russian 
envoy off several times and thus prolonging his stay and testing not only his 
but also Peter’s patience. But Queen Anne let him know that because of her 
long- standing friendship with Charles xii of Sweden, she would not inter-
fere between the two main opponents of the Great Northern War. However, 
what she did not mention was that concerning Britain’s engagement in the 
War of the Spanish Succession, it suited Britain that Charles maintained an 
army in the Holy Roman Empire.12 Hence she had no interest in displeasing 
the Swedish monarch. Consequently, the commercial agreement failed also. 
On top of that Britain recognized the new Polish king a few months later. 
As a result, Matveyev’s mission ended and he was called back to Moscow. 
But as already mentioned, matters became even worse, indeed disastrous, 
for the Russian envoy. The reason for Matveyev’s arrest was a debt of £50, 
which he had not been able to settle immediately. Apparently, the creditor 
had feared the envoy might leave England without paying him, and he had 
gained an official arrest warrant for Matveyev. But as Matveyev had not had 
his farewell audience with the Queen yet, the stated reasons for the arrest 
seem likely to have been fabricated. Matveyev himself, for example, suspect-
ed the Swedish envoy at St James’s of having plotted against him. The day 
after the insult, the Russian envoy complained to Queen Anne about the way 
he had been treated and demanded severe punishment of the offenders as 
compensation for infringing on his inviolable dignity. Eight days later he left 
the British Isles. Anne, being afraid that the incident would redound upon 
the British in Czarist Russia, was in turn very much concerned to straighten 
the affair out quickly. Therefore the attackers were arrested and the Queen 
commissioned one of her most experienced diplomats to resolve the dispute 
amicably. She chose Charles Whitworth (1675– 1725), who had already served 
at Vienna and the Imperial Diet at Ratisbon. Moreover, he was known to the 
Czar and his ministers through an earlier embassy to Russia. Nevertheless, 
the mission was a very delicate task. Peter the Great had demanded the death 
penalty for Matveyev’s attackers, a requirement the Queen was not able to 
meet. First, ‘she could not do such a thing by her own authority, less than 
seventy years after the great Revolution’. Secondly, was there no ‘provision 
in law for the punishment of the offenders by death’.13 Therefore Whitworth 
was to present a ceremonial apology to the Czar and to inform him of the 
 12 Wierzbicki, Peter the Great, 63.
 13 Rothstein, Peter the Great, 92.
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Diplomatic Privileges Act which had, in consequence of the Matveyev in-
cident, been passed by the British Parliament in 1708. As it ‘contributed im-
portantly […] to the final elaboration in Europe of the law on diplomatic 
immunity’,14 the Act was probably the most important outcome of the affair. 
The Act ‘for preserving the Privileges of Ambassadors, and other Public Min-
isters of Foreign Princes and States’ not only acquitted Matveyev of all charg-
es but also defined how the term diplomatic immunity henceforth was to be 
understood in Britain. Namely, ‘all Writs and Processes that shall […] be sued 
forth or prosecuted, whereby the person of any Ambassador, [etc.] author-
ised and received as such by Her Majesty […] may be arrested or imprisoned, 
or his or their goods or chattels may be distrained, seized, or attached, shall 
be deemed and adjudged to be utterly null and void, to all intents, construc-
tions, and purposes whatsoever’.15 In short, accredited and officially received 
envoys now enjoyed absolute immunity in Britain. Following this, the affair 
was settled to mutual satisfaction.
Because of its importance for the interpretation of the law of nations, and 
thus for international relations in general, princely courts – and especially the 
princes’ magistrates dealing with foreign affairs – were very much interested 
in detailed descriptions of the incident. For example, a ‘vornehme[r] Königl. 
Ministre’16 asked for a close analysis of the affair. Probably shortly after the 
incident had been resolved in 1709, a minister of King Frederick i of Prussia, 
who is not mentioned by name, commissioned Dietrich Hermann Kemmerich 
(1677– 1745) ‘to investigate the whole affair more precisely, because this matter 
was rather curious and caused a great deal of attention at various European 
courts; at the same time it would testify to the manner in which the law of 
nations was treated by the Muscovites’.17 Kemmerich, who had studied theo-
logy, history and law at the universities of Rostock, Leipzig and Halle, was, at 
that time, teaching natural law, law of nations and constitutional law at the 
 14 Cracraft, Revolution, 73.
 15 7 Anne Cap. 12, § iii.
 16 Dietrich Hermann Kemmerich, Grund=Sätze des Völcker=Rechts von der Unverletzlichkeit 
der Gesandten. Samt einer Relation von dem Affront, welcher dem Moscowitischen 
Abgesandten in Engelland Anno 1708 erwiesen und der darauf erfolgten Satisfaction, Wie 
auch einer kurtzen Untersuchung dieser Affaire nach solchen Grund=Sätzen (Christian- 
Erlangen: Johann Andreas Lorber, 1710).
 17 Kemmerich, Grundsätze, 1: ‘[…]weil nun diese Sache ziemlich merckwürdig ist / und an 
verschiedenen Europaeischen Höfen grosses Aufsehen verursachet hat / auch zugleich 
ein Zeugniss giebt / wie auch bey den Moscowitern anjetzo das Völcker=Recht excoliert 
werde […] die gantze Affaire etwas genauer zu untersuchen’.
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newly founded Ritterakademie18 at Erlangen. In 1716 he became director of the 
Ritterakademie at Brandenburg, in 1719 first professor of natural law and law of 
nations at the University of Wittenberg and finally in 1730 Fürstlich Sächsischer 
Gemeinschafftlicher Hofrath and professor at the law faculty of the university 
at Jena.19 As asked by the Prussian minister, Kemmerich in 1710 published a 
52- page treatise in which he analysed ‘die Affaire wegen des dem Moscowi-
tischen Gesandten Mantuesof [sic] in London vor einiger Zeit angethanen 
Affronts’.20 The introductory part deals with 40 questions concerning the con-
temporary theory of diplomatic law, focusing on different aspects of diplomatic 
immunity. In a second step, Kemmerich applies these basic principles to the 
Matveyev incident. First, he recaps in a descriptive, non- judgemental way the 
course of events. He complements this with German translations of three rel-
evant documents: the oration of the British ambassador Charles Whitworth21 
which he gave when being received by Peter the Great in public audience; 
Anne’s letter of apology to the Czar, which Whitworth was to deliver; and Pe-
ter’s formal answer. Kemmerich is thus giving background information as well 
as some of the essential primary sources before he starts his analysis of the case.
Although the Grund=Sätze des Völcker=Rechts was not in the first instance 
meant for teaching purposes at the Ritterakademie, but for keeping the 
 ministers and magistrates at the German courts informed about these new 
developments in international law, the context of the treatise is nonetheless 
the teaching of natural law and the law of nations at Erlangen. First, Kemme-
rich wrote them explicitly in his function as professor of the law of nature and 
 18 Instead of using alternative, not completely adequate English translations like ‘knights’ 
academy’ the German term Ritterakademie will be used throughout the text to denote this 
special type of educational institution.
 19 Teichmann, ‘Kemmerich, Dietrich Hermann,’ in Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie 15 (1882), 
599, https:// www.deutsche- biographie.de/ gnd10017731X.html#adbcontent [29.05.2017]; 
Franckesche Stiftungen zu Halle (Saale), Datenbank zu den Einzelhandschriften in den 
historischen Archivabteilungen:  ‘Kemmerich, Dietrich Hermann’ (Stand 29.03.2016), 
http:// 192.124.243.55/ cgi- bin/ gkdb.pl [31.03.2017]; Johann Jacob Moser, Lexicon derer 
jetzlebenden Rechts=Gelehrten in und um Teutschland, welche die Rechte öffentlich lehren 
oder sich sonsten durch Schriften bekannt gemacht haben, so viel ihrer damalen zu erkundi-
gen gewesen seynd (Züllichau: Gottlob Benjamin Frommann, 21739), 116– 122.
 20 Kemmerich, Grundsätze, 1.
 21 Hartley, Charles Whitworth, 1– 13; Rothstein, Peter the Great, 3– 11; D.D. Aldridge, 
‘Whitworth, Charles, Baron Whitworth (bap. 1675, d. 1725),’ Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography (Oxford University Press, 2004); online ed., Jan 2008, accessed 15 April 2017, 
http:// www.oxforddnb.com.odnb.emedia1.bsb- muenchen.de/ view/ article/ 29336.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simone Zurbuchen - 978-90-04-38420-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 09/19/2019 09:19:14AM
via University of Lausanne
16 Beiergroesslein and Dorn
nations as well as public law at the Erlangen Ritterakademie.22 Secondly, the 
work provides an insight into Kemmerich’s methods of teaching. The 40 ques-
tions concerning the theory of diplomatic law show his preference for teaching 
dialogues; the application of the discussed aspects of diplomatic theory and 
law to the particular case of Andrey Matveyev, as well as the translation of the 
documents, reveal how much he, most likely influenced by Christian Thoma-
sius,23 emphasized a practical approach to teaching. Finally, the outcome of 
the Matveyev incident, and thus the conclusions he drew from it, affected the 
relevant chapters of his textbook Neu=eröffnete Academie der Wissenschaf-
ten (Newly Opened Academy of Sciences) for the teaching at Ritterakademien, 
which he published in 1714, and thus also the contents of the lessons in natural 
law and law of nations at the Erlangen Ritterakademie.
2 Natural Law and Law of Nations at the Erlangen Ritterakademie
The Ritterakademie was founded in 1701, at the small, still young, Franconian 
town of Erlangen (at that time Christian- Erlangen). The purpose of this special 
type of school was to educate and prepare the sons of the nobility for their 
future duties and functions at princely courts. Christian- Erlangen had been 
founded at the end of the seventeenth century by Christian Ernst, Margrave of 
Brandenburg- Bayreuth, to receive Huguenot refugees from France. Because of 
its strong French influence in terms of language and lifestyle as well as its grow-
ing importance as a secondary residence of Brandenburg- Bayreuth, which of-
fered the opportunity for young nobles to take part in courtly events, the town 
appeared to be highly appropriate for such an educational institution. Besides 
the exercitia (subjects like riding, dancing and fencing) and several foreign lan-
guages (Latin, French and Italian), the so- called studia (religious education, 
arithmetic, geometry, techniques of fortification, history, chronology, geogra-
phy, ethics, politics, logic, physics and jus naturae, civile et publicum) were to 
be part of the curriculum.
The Ritterakademie was designed for a maximum of 50 pupils (who were 
housed and catered for there, as well as educated). It was provisioned with 
annual funds from Margrave Christian Ernst’s coffers. Around half of the stu-
dents – preferably from families of the Franconian nobility – were to be given 
 22 Kemmerich, Grundsätze, Titlepage:  ‘Juris Nat. Politic. & Juris Publ. Prof. auf der 
Ritter=Academie zu Christian=Erlang’.
 23 Hans- Christof Kraus, Englische Verfassung und politisches Denken im Ancien Régime 1689 
bis 1789 (München: R. Oldenbourg, 2006), 374.
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free admission, financed by a donation from Baron Christoph Adam Gross von 
Trockau (1649– 1724), who had, since 1692, been Oberpräsident of the French 
colony at Erlangen and virtual initiator of the Ritterakademie. Additionally, 
three or four of the most capable pupils should be enabled to go on a Grand 
Tour, limited to a maximum duration of four years; the tour should incorpo-
rate trips to France, Italy, England and the Netherlands, and the courts of Han-
nover, Wolfenbüttel, Berlin and Dresden, as well as visits to other universities 
and internships at the Reichskammergericht (Imperial Chamber Court) or the 
Reichshofrat (Aulic Council). Being without a male heir, Gross von Trockau had 
decided to invest his assets in the education of the children of the Reichsadel 
(nobility of the Holy Roman Empire), as he regarded the lack of an appropriate 
education as the main cause of the decline of many once distinguished and 
powerful noble families.24
At first, the educational project at Erlangen, originally called Academia 
Practica, then renamed Academia Equestris, was rather popular. But only a few 
years later major difficulties occurred, mainly due to underfunding. Although 
the Ritterakademie formally existed until 1741, not a single student lodged there 
or attended its public lessons over the course of many years. However, a num-
ber of young noblemen on Grand Tour resided at Erlangen and attended pri-
vate lessons given by the academy’s teachers.25 In view of this, it is difficult to 
determine when, how and by whom natural law and the law of nations was 
actually taught at Erlangen. Nevertheless, it is at least possible to spotlight a 
few aspects of this teaching. Because of a lecture announcement26 of the new-
ly appointed professor of Philosophia Moralis & Civilis as well as Eloquentiae, 
Dietrich Hermann Kemmerich, who later became professor of natural law, law 
 24 Grossische Stifftung. Die unter der Protection dess Durchleuchtigsten Fürsten und Herren, 
Herrn Christian Ernsten, Marggrafen zu Brandenburg … zu errichtende Academia Practica 
in Neu Erlang (Erlangen: [1702]); ‘Ansprache an junge Standes- Personen,’ in Christoph 
Adam Gross von Trockau, Recreationes Academicae Grosianae, Oder:  Anleitungen 
Junge Stands=Personen Auf eine leichte und biss dato noch unbekannte Art zu einer 
Standes=mässigen Erudition nach dermaliger Welt=Art und dann zu Erlernung der vier 
Occidentalischen Sprachen zugleich und ohne Confusion in der Erlanger Ritterakademie 
anzuführen. … Meistens in denen vier Occidentalischen Sprachen als Französisch, Italienisch, 
Spanisch und Lateinisch beschrieben samt einer Teutschen Vorrede von Einrichtung und 
Endzweck dieses Wercks (Christian- Erlang:  Daniel Michael Schmatz, 1713), n.p; Ernst 
Mengin, Die Ritter- Academie zu Christian- Erlang. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Pädagogik 
(Erlangen: Palm & Enke, 1919).
 25 Mengin, Ritter- Academie, 34– 57.
 26 Dietrich Hermann Kemmerich, Praeliminar- Discours von der Weissheit und Beredsamkeit, 
deren sich ein Junger von Adel oder auch höhere Standes- Person zu befleissigen … (Erlangen: 
Johann Friedrich Regelein, 1706).
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of nations and public law, we know that lessons in natural law were taught at 
least from 1705. Kemmerich’s teaching was based on Johann Franz  Buddeus’s 
Elementa Philosophiae Practicae, on which he lectured for several hours a 
week, in German. Additionally, during another lesson at the end of the week, 
the subject matter was repeated and the knowledge of it deepened by a Latin 
exam or an exercitium disputatorium. Furthermore, Kemmerich referred to the 
topic in his courses on rhetoric, using for instance Cicero’s De officiis to illus-
trate the principles of jus naturae & gentium. Moreover, it can be noted that 
in 1741 natural law was still part of the Erlangen curriculum. It was taught as a 
part of lessons in philosophy and based on Johann Christoph Gottsched’s Erste 
Gründe der gesamten Weltweisheit.27
Although the surviving archival material is not sufficient to analyse in detail 
how education at the Ritterakademie took place, an impression of how natural 
law and the law of nations fit best into the overall educational pattern of the 
Ritterakademie can be gained by three programmatic writings, by von Trockau, 
Johann Christoph Vetter and Kemmerich. The essays show the subject’s rela-
tion to other disciplines, its significance as part of the education of young no-
bles, as well as the specific contents thought important by the contemporaries 
in charge. Certainly, one has to keep in mind that these are normative texts 
which do not necessarily tell anything about the reality of the teaching at the 
Erlangen Ritterakademie.
2.1 Baron Christoph Adam Gross von Trockau
Christoph Adam Gross von Trockau, spiritual father of the Erlangen 
 Ritterakademie, outlined his ideas concerning the programme, methods and 
contents of an appropriate noble education in his Recreationes Academicae 
Grosianae, published in 1713. His intention was to provide the students with 
a ‘standesmässige doch reale Erudition nach jetziger Welt- Art’.28 In short, this 
meant a threefold approach:  the teaching of several foreign languages (‘der 
heut im Flor stehenden Sprachen’), of a courteous and general real- life schol-
arliness – ‘eine[r] galante[n], anbey reale[n] und solide[n] Gelehrsamkeit’ as 
he calls it – as well as of well- formed behaviour.29 It seems clear that Gross von 
Trockau devised his teaching system in contrast to the usual higher education 
 27 Nachricht von der gegenwärtigen Verfassung der Ritter- Academie und des Seminarii zu 
Christian Erlang ([Christian Erlangen]: 1741), 6– 8.
 28 ‘Ansprache an junge Standes- Personen,’ in Gross von Trockau, Recreationes Academicae 
Grosianae, n.p.
 29 ‘Fernere Anmerckungen. Und zwar in specie über das Studiren und Education junger 
Standes- Personen,’ in Gross von Trockau, Recreationes Academicae Grosianae, n.p.
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at grammar schools and universities, where – in his opinion – young people 
spent too much time on unnecessary and useless matters.30 The teaching 
seems to have been some kind of crash course, with a slimmed version of each 
subject covered in less time, and only subjects and lessons geared to actual 
requirements and absolutely necessary for the pupils’ future activities and 
occupation. And the pupils should be tutored in a clear, vivid and practical 
way. This included – in contrast to lessons at university – the possibility to ask 
questions. Instead of applying the method of memorizing, teachers were sup-
posed to train their students in rational thinking. The underlying idea was that 
a young noble, when finished with his education, would not end up merely a 
learned parrot (‘gelehrte[r] Papagay’),31 only able to learn things by heart but 
with no ability to reason.
However, the Recreationes Academicae Grosianae contains much more than 
Gross von Trockau’s ideas for realizing his educational project. The work was 
intended to serve as the main textbook for the Ritterakademie: approximately 
1500 pages long, it collects a variety of texts, written by different authors, which 
were supposed to form the basis of the teaching at the Ritterakademie. The 
baron not only edited the texts but also translated some of them. The textbook 
reflects his intention for all lessons to have at least a dual benefit: in  addition to 
conveying specialized knowledge and skills in a specific subject, they were also 
supposed to serve as exercises in different languages, and vice versa. The chap-
ters destined for imparting language skills comprised texts in various lan guages, 
including French, Italian, Spanish and Latin. Other chapters were, however, also 
written either in one of these so- called occidental languages (‘ occidentalischen 
Sprachen’), or in German. As the acquisition of language skills was not seen 
as an end in itself but as vehiculum rerum, the choice of language usually de-
pended on the information to be conveyed. The same teaching method was 
favoured by Kemmerich.32 The chapter titled ‘Vorgeschmack vom Jure Civili 
und Jure Feudali’ (foretaste of civil and feudal law),33 for example, was written 
in Latin, still the common language of lawyers and law. An attached glossa-
ry – Lexicon Juridicum Verbale & Reale – explained the Latin legal terminology 
in German; this was likely to make the subject matter more accessible. While 
 30 ‘Vorrede,’ in Gross von Trockau, Recreationes Academicae Grosianae, n.p.: ‘zu viel Zeit mit 
unnöthigen und zu jetziger Welt=Art undienlichen Sachen zu [bringen]’.
 31 Ibid.
 32 Gunter E.  Grimm, Literatur und Gelehrtentum in Deutschland. Untersuchungen zum 
Wandel ihres Verhältnisses vom Humanismus bis zur Frühaufklärung (Studien zur 
deutschen Literatur 75) (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1983), 452.
 33 Gross von Trockau, Recreationes Academicae Grosianae, Part 4, 1– 408.
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Gross von Trockau stuck to Latin for these legal subdisciplines, he chose French 
when it came to public law34 as well as natural law and law of nations.35
The baron’s educational programme aimed at introducing the young nobles 
to studies much earlier than usual. This applied especially to the teaching of 
the languages he saw as indispensable for a nobleman of the day (‘eine Standes- 
Person nach jetziger Weltart’).36 Ideally a boy should have acquired the basics 
of Latin as early as by the age of eight and additionally he should be able to 
understand a little Italian and Spanish. He was also expected to have already a 
good command of the French language. According to Gross von Trockau, both 
the French and their language were exemplary: he saw a strong connection be-
tween learning French and acquiring contemporary – that is gallant – norms 
of communication and interaction. Additionally, he regarded the French lan-
guage culture as being worthy of imitation because the French would tend to a 
plain and clear linguistic style. Moreover, all good books would be available in 
French translation.37 One reason for the rapid increase in French translations 
during the so- called siècle classique was most likely to demonstrate France’s 
cultural superiority by cultivating and enhancing the French language. Yet 
the aim of making complex matters easily accessible could also be the driving 
force for translations. This is at least what Jean Barbeyrac points out in the 
preface to his translation of Pufendorf ’s De jure naturae et gentium in 1706.38 
Barbeyrac particularly aimed at reaching young people who were preparing 
for ecclesiastical or political posts and ‘who, due to their poor Latin, are unable 
to read with pleasure and profit from a work in the style of Pufendorf ’s’.39 In 
the first instance, he was thinking of those whose mother tongue was French, 
but he might also have had in mind the pupils of the Ritterakademie in Berlin, 
which had been founded shortly before, in 1705, and which he praises in his 
dedication letter to Frederick i of Prussia as an institution ‘where the young 
 34 Ibid., Part 3, 343– 411.
 35 Ibid., Part 3, 416– 448.
 36 Ibid., ‘Vorrede,’ n.p.
 37 Ibid., ‘Vorrede,’ n.p.
 38 Samuel Pufendorf, Le Droit de la Nature et des Gens, transl. Jean Barbeyrac, 2  vols. 
(Amsterdam:  Kuyper, 1706). See also:  Sieglinde C.  Othmer, Berlin und die Verbreitung 
des Naturrechts in Europa. Kultur- und sozialgeschichtliche Studien zu Jean Barbeyracs 
Pufendorf- Übersetzungen und eine Analyse seiner Leserschaft (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 
& Co., 1970) and Fiammetta Palladini, Die Berliner Hugenotten und der Fall Barbeyrac. 
Orthodoxe und ‘Sozinianer’ im Refuge (1685– 1720) (Leiden: Brill, 2011).
 39 Pufendorf, Le Droit de la Nature et des Gens, lxxxiv– lxxxv:  ‘qui, avec le peu de Latin 
qu’ils savent, ne peuvent pas lire avec plaisir & avec fruit un Ouvrage du stile de celui de 
Pufendorf ’.
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noblemen […] come to acquire early on the exercises necessary for the nobil-
ity, and all they need to know of useful skills, mainly those serving to regulate 
their conduct and enabling them to fulfill the offices they may be appointed 
to one day’.40 With his translation of and commentary on Pufendorf ’s work 
and his Traité du jeu (1709),41 Barbeyrac became the most famous figure of the 
Berlin Huguenot community dealing with natural law and contributing to its 
dissemination. However, he was not the only one: since the early 1690s several 
members of the French Colony, for example Charles Ancillon, Antoine Teissier 
and Etienne Chauvin, participated in the debate on natural law. The doctrine 
of natural law according to Grotius and Pufendorf provided them with the 
tools they needed to defend their political and religious existence as well as to 
declare the revocation of the Edict of Nantes and its outcomes null and void.42
Baron Gross von Trockau’s Praegustus Juris Naturae & Gentium might be re-
lated to the writings of the Berlin Huguenots, who virtually initiated the study 
of natural law in the French language, although that study was pre- dated by 
a translation of Grotius’s work by the French diplomat Antoine de Courtin, 
first published in 1687.43 In any case, Gross von Trockau adds to his general re-
marks on the law of nature and nations a few annotations – ‘tirée d’un Auteur 
François Refugié’44 – on the ongoing wars of Louis xiv. On the basis of that cur-
rent example, pupils were supposed to learn about natural law or rather single 
aspects of the law of nations in a practically oriented way. The author Gross 
von Trockau refers to is not known by name. But, as exiled French Protestants 
in particular were taking part in the contemporary discourse, which strong-
ly condemned Louis xiv’s warfare, many Huguenots are worth being consid-
ered. Indeed, many of them referred, besides the relevant medieval  theories 
on bellum justum, to modern natural law as a practical norm.45
 40 ‘EPITRE A SA MAJESTÉ LE ROI DE PRUSSE,’ in Pufendorf, Le Droit de la Nature et des 
Gens, n.p.: ‘où les Jeunes Gentilshommes […] viennent apprendre de bonne heure, & les 
exercises nécessaire à la Noblesse, & tout ce qu’ils doivent savoir des connoissances utiles, 
sur tout de celles qui servent à regler leur conduite, & à les rendre capables des Emplois 
auxquels ils peuvent être élevez un jour’.
 41 Jean Barbeyrac, Traité Du Jeu, Où l’on examine les principales Questions De Droit Naturel Et 
De Morale qui ont du rapport à cette Matiere, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: Humbert, 1709).
 42 Othmer, Verbreitung des Naturrechts, 42– 53.
 43 Hugues Grotius, Le droit de la guerre et de la paix, transl. [Antoine] de Courtin 
(Paris: Arnould Seneuze, 1687).
 44 Gross von Trockau, Recreationes Academicae Grosianae, Part 3, 446– 448, here 446.
 45 Émilie Dosquet, ‘Die Verwüstung der Pfalz als (Medien- )Ereignis: von der rheinländischen 
Kriegshandlung zum europäischen Skandal,’ in Krieg und Kriegserfahrung im Westen des 
Reiches 1568– 1714, ed. Rutz Andreas (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2016), 333– 
369, here 361– 366, with further reading.
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2.2 Johann Christoph Vetter
The Unpartheyische Gedanken von der Alt- und Neuen Gelehrsamkeit (Impar-
tial thoughts about ancient and new erudition)46 appeared under the pseudo-
nym Orontes in 1712. The author of the treatise was the Protestant clergyman 
 Johann Christoph Vetter (1676– 1736), who had presumably been teaching at the 
 Erlangen Ritterakademie since 1708. By the time of his death he had been pro-
fessor at the institution for 28 years.47 It thus seems reasonable to suggest that 
the book, which had been drafted as Anweisung zu den Nöthigst- und Nützlichs-
ten Wissenschaften vor Junge Edelleute (Instruction to the Sciences Most Nece-
ssary and Most Useful for Young Noblemen), was derived from practice and expe-
rience in the field. However, Vetter’s 264- page work should not be mistaken as a 
schoolbook for young nobles, nor as a manual for teachers and professors at the 
Ritterakademie on how to conduct the lessons. Rather, as suggested by the let-
ter of dedication to the Franconian nobles Ernst Friedrich and Johann Wilhelm 
Gottfried von Seckendorff, it constituted a guide for members of the nobility 
on how, for their own and their rank’s sake, their children should be educated: 
By serious studies they make an effort to provide the high nobility with new 
luster, and thus by their own ability and merits to exalt what they inherited. 
Already in their youth they recognize which arts, languages and sciences are 
most useful if one wishes to serve great masters and republics. This is what 
encourages me to dedicate to your highness this little treatise, aimed at the 
best for the nobility, who already more or less know and practice what it 
contains, but are also laudably determined to practice in the future.48 
Moreover, the text also seems to function as some kind of advertising brochure 
or ‘image booklet’ for the Erlangen Ritterakademie.
 46 Orontes (= Johann Christoph Vetter), Unpartheyische Gedancken von der Alt- und Neuen 
Gelehrsamkeit. Nebst einer Unvorgreifflichen Anweisung zu den Nöthigsten- und Nützlichsten 
Wissenschaften vor Junge Edelleute ans Licht gegeben (Frankfurt, Leipzig: Johann Andreas 
Lorber, 1712).
 47 UniA Erlangen, D1/ 1 Nr. 15, Supplik Felicitas Barbara Vetters an Markgraf Friedrich von 
Brandenburg- Bayreuth, 09.03.1736.
 48 Orontes, Unpartheyische Gedanken, 4a- 5a:  ‘Sie bemühen sich durch warhaffte studien 
Dero hohen Adel einen neuen Glantz zu geben / und das / was Sie ererbt / durch eigene 
Geschicklichkeit und Verdienste noch mehr zu erheben. Sie erkennnen schon in Dero 
Jugend/ was nützliche Künste / Sprachen und Wissenschaften / emsten helffen können / 
wann man grossen Herren und Republiqven dienen will. Und dieses eben ist es / was mich 
kühn macht / dieses kleine der Noblesse vornehmlich zum Besten abzielende Tractaetgen 
Dero hohen Nahmen zu dediciren / als die theils schon selbst das / was darinnen enthalten / 
ziemlich eingesehen und practiciret / theils aber noch zu practiciren rühmlich entschlosse’.
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Consequently, Orontes includes little in the way of concrete contents for 
teaching and no recommended reading on which the lessons should be based. 
In fact, he sketches more of a general overview on which subjects and issues 
should receive priority in educating the sons of the nobility. He suggests that 
the main purpose of their education should be to prepare and to equip them 
exclusively with the knowledge and skills they would need for their presumed 
future duties at court and in the field.49 In practice, this results in targeted 
studies and a reduced range of subjects, strongly utilitarian in their orienta-
tion. By this way of teaching and sensible studying (‘vernünfftiges studiren’50 
as he puts it), Orontes wants to avoid young noblemen’s minds being stuffed 
and cluttered with unnecessary and useless details and knowledge:  ‘as if he 
were decorated at the front and back, like brother Jacob is with shells, with 
unnecessary and useless school disciplines’.51 The idea was that a ‘Cavalier’, in 
order to exercise his office and attend his duties in a Christian, just and wise 
manner, has no need for school, but rather for ‘state erudition’ (‘Schul= son-
dern Staats=Erudition’).52 Good knowledge of religion and ethics, of natural 
law and the law of nations, history and statecraft as well as basic knowledge 
of different natural sciences like mathematics and physics are seen as prereq-
uisite for this. Additionally, the command of several languages, but especially 
of French, is regarded as advantageous.53 A strong religious focus or rather the 
text’s embedding in a religious context, presumably resulting from Orontes’ 
training as a clergyman, is noticeable. In particular, negligence of the faith,54 
or, even worse, atheism,55 are a thorn in his side.
Natural law and the law of nations are in a prominent position within 
the drafted curriculum. According to Orontes, following ethics, this is the 
second most important subject a person of rank should occupy himself 
with.56 Within the framework of the teaching, natural law and the law of 
nations, the latter again being interpreted as a component of natural law,57 
are part of the so- called philosophia practica, which Orontes subdivides into 
three sections, namely: moral theory, or ethics; natural law and the law of 
 49 Ibid., 92.
 50 Ibid., 88.
 51 Ibid., 86: ‘als wann er mit allen unnöthigen und unnützen Schul=Diszipilinen hinten und 
fornen / wie der Jakobs=Bruder mit Muscheln / behänget wäre’.
 52 Ibid., 92.
 53 Ibid., 92– 93.
 54 See for example, ibid., 148– 149.
 55 See for example, ibid., 145.
 56 Ibid., 142.
 57 Ibid., 143.
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nations; and politics – ‘Aus angeführten Stücken bestehet nun die Philoso-
phia Practica, ohne welche der Adel=Stand ein wahrhafftiger Ubel=Stand 
zu nennen: Es begreifft dieselbe aber vornehmlich drey Theile in sich / die 
Moral- oder Sitten=Lehre / […]; Das Natur= und Völcker=Recht / […]; Und 
dann die Politic, […]’.58
The great significance of natural law, which in Orontes’s view originates di-
rectly from the nature of God, is to provide man with universal, unalterable 
guiding principles for his activities.59 In contrast, law made by men could be 
changed or even abolished.60 Still, the purpose of all laws should be human 
salvation.61 As a result, Orontes regards scholarly debates on the primary ob-
jects of natural law as being fruitless and superfluous.62 To him it seems clear 
that natural law consists of three main rules: ‘honour God; preserve yourself; 
do everything necessary to sustain sociality’ (‘Ehre GOtt; Erhalte dich selbst; 
Thue alles / was zu Unterhaltung einer Socialität nöthig ist’).63
Finally, as peoples and nations are interconnected by the principle of ‘so-
ciality’ and thus mutually obliged, Orontes also touches on the law of nations 
in his remarks on natural law. Here he is concentrating on diplomatic law and 
especially on the ambassador’s inviolability. Although he does not explicitly 
mention the Matveyev incident, he nevertheless seems to account for it. Thus 
he points to the sacred character of the person of the ambassador  – from 
which originates the inviolability of the ambassador’s person, his staff, home 
and goods. Moreover, he explicitly mentions the question of how to deal with 
debts accumulated by foreign envoys,64 which, as explained above, had been 
the stumbling block and cause of the diplomatic crisis between Russia and 
Great Britain in 1708/ 1709.
2.3 Dietrich Hermann Kemmerich
Shortly after he had been appointed professor of Philosophia Moralis & Civilis 
and Eloquentiae, Dietrich Hermann Kemmerich left Erlangen again to obtain 
a licentiate in law. He matriculated at the University of Halle in March 1705.65  
 58 Ibid., 125.
 59 Ibid., 142.
 60 Ibid., 143– 144.
 61 Ibid., 144.
 62 Ibid., 146.
 63 Ibid., 147.
 64 Ibid., 151– 154.
 65 Franckesche Stiftungen zu Halle (Saale), Datenbank zu den Einzelhandschriften in den 
historischen Archivabteilungen:  ‘Kemmerich, Dietrich Hermann’ (Stand 29.03.2016), 
http:// 192.124.243.55/ cgi- bin/ gkdb.pl [31.03.2017].
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Two years later he asked for reappointment to the Ritterakademie at  Erlangen. 
As his former position had already been taken, he was assigned to the 
 professorship in Jus naturae et gentium and Jus publicum, the first and the last 
person ever appointed to this chair at the Erlangen Ritterakademie. In his let-
ter of reapplication at Erlangen he mentions for the first time his monumen-
tal  compendium for the education of noblemen, the Neu=eröffnete Academie 
der Wissenschaften.66 It is most likely that those parts of the work published 
in 1711 and 1714 had already been written, or at least drafted in 1707 and be-
came the basis of his upcoming further teaching at the Ritterakademie. Initially 
Kemmerich had intended to publish the compendium in 13 parts.67 But in the 
end only three parts appeared in print, those dealing with the education of 
noblemen in general,68 with logic69 and with morals or ethics (‘morale oder 
 sitten=lehre’) as well as natural law and the law of nations.70
The first part of the Neu=eröffnete Academie der Wissenschaften can be re-
garded as a general introduction to the whole compendium. Kemmerich gives 
an introductory overview of all the subjects he plans to deal with, virtually 
the whole compendium in a nutshell, in which he emphasizes the significance 
and value of each subject or topic for the education and thus the professional 
advancement of young nobles; he also includes some basic bibliographic refer-
ences as well as some advice for the tutors concerning elementary teaching in 
each subject. Additionally, he discusses how young noblemen as well as young 
ladies should be educated and how they should conduct their studies. In his 
opinion their education should include travel to foreign countries. Moreover, 
in his preface to the first part of the Academie der Wissenschaften Kemme-
rich gives a quick insight into his favourite method of teaching. As in the lec-
ture announcement mentioned above, it is evident that he prefers teaching 
through dialogue, ‘since the best method for informing young people consists 
in reasoning with them through continuous questioning and answering, there-
by loosening their tongue and examining whether the intellect has a proper 
 66 Mengin, Ritter- Academie, 27.
 67 Dietrich Hermann Kemmerich, Neu=eröffnete ACADEMIE Der Wissenschaften, Zu welchen 
vornemlich Standes=Personen nützlich können angeführet, und zu einer vernünfftigen und 
wohlanständigen CONDUITE geschickt gemacht werden (Leipzig: Thomas Fritsch, 1711), 
c4b– c5b.
 68 Kemmerich, Neu=eröffnete Academie, vol. 1.
 69 Kemmerich, Neu=eröffnete Academie, vol. 2.
 70 Dietrich Hermann Kemmerich, Neu=eröffnete ACADEMIE Der Wissenschaften, Zu welchen 
vornemlich Standes=Personen nützlich können angeführte werden. Dritte Eröffnung 
Welche die MORALE und das Natur=und Völcker=Recht in sich begreiffet (Leipzig: Thomas 
Fritsch, 1714).
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concept of the thing’.71 What is more, Kemmerich favours teaching in German 
instead of Latin. Albeit he is not objecting to Latin as a common academic lan-
guage as well as European lingua franca, ‘like some kind of universal language, 
which enables one to get along almost in the entirety of Europe, though not in 
the whole world’,72 he still thinks it more convenient to use the young nobles’ 
mother tongue when explaining complex issues to them. Otherwise they might 
not only struggle with understanding the language but also with fathoming the 
teaching contents. Hence, to enhance their command of Latin and thus to kill 
two birds with one stone, he recommends explaining things in German first. 
But as soon as the students have understood the subject matter and can cope 
with it, they are to translate it into Latin. Finally, exams are to be held in Latin, 
too. We may conclude from this that Kemmerich wrote the compendium in 
German mainly for didactic reasons.73 Lastly, Kemmerich was no doubt moti-
vated to undertake that huge project out of a feeling of necessity. If the sons of 
the nobility still wanted to obtain positions of responsibility at court and avoid 
the risk of being beaten to those positions by well- educated commoners, they 
needed to be properly educated. Consequently, it proved insufficient for them 
to master the so- called exercitia, namely riding, fencing, dancing and singing; 
in addition, they also needed to study useful sciences. According to Kemme-
rich, academic studies were, however, held in low esteem by the nobility of 
the Holy Roman Empire, particularly because of the ‘wrong instruction and 
pedantic method of teaching, […] by which people are tortured with grammar 
and Latin, or with logic and metaphysics, or by pointless longwindedness’.74 
Actually, Kemmerich makes the same point as Orontes before him:  usually, 
young noblemen are strained with too many details they have no need for 
and which prolong their studies unnecessarily – ‘scholastischen formalitäten 
und unnützen grillen’ (scholastic formalities and unnecessary whimsies).75 
To avoid this and to make education at a Ritterakademie more attractive to 
 71 Kemmerich, Neu=eröffnete Academie, vol. 1, c1b: ‘[…]weil die beste methode junge leute 
zu informiren ist, durch continuirliches fragen und antworten mit ihnen raisonniren, und 
dadurch so wohl die zunge lösen, als den verstand prüfen, ob er einen rechten begriff von 
der sache hat’.
 72 Kemmerich, Neu=eröffnete Academie, vol. 1, b8a.: ‘[…] gleichsam eine universal- sprache 
[…], damit man, wo nicht durch die gantze welt, doch zum wenigsten fast durch gantz 
Europa kommen kan’.
 73 Kemmerich, Neu=eröffnete Academie, vol. 1, b8b– c1b.
 74 Ibid., b4a: ‘[…] verkehrte anführung und pedantische lehr=art, [… .] indem man leute […] 
entweder mit der Grammatic u. dem lieben latein oder der Logic und Metaphysic gar zu 
sehr martert oder durch unnöthige weitläuffigkeit’.
 75 Ibid., b4b.
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them than a university education, Kemmerich drafted his impressive work, 
providing in his words a ‘rigorous, orderly, distinct, concise but nevertheless 
adequate and complete concept of the most eminent sciences’ (‘gründliche[r] , 
ordentliche[r], deutliche[r], kurtze[r], aber dennoch zulängliche[r] und voll-
ständige[r] begriff von den vornehmsten wissenschaften’),76 which should be 
sufficient to prepare young members of the nobility for their future life.
Like Orontes, Kemmerich deals with the law of nature and nations as part of 
philosophia practica. He places strong emphasis on the teaching of this subject, 
because in his opinion people with no command of it lack ‘a great part of hu-
man reason’ (‘ein gross theil der menschlichen vernufft’)77 and are thus unable 
to properly distinguish right from wrong, just from unjust. Secondly, natural 
law is regarded as forming the basis for all other fields of law, especially the jus 
civilis. Additionally, natural law plays an important role in the interpretation of 
law; plus, when it comes to international relations, there is no other way to deal 
with legal matters among sovereigns. Thus it is vital for all who are preparing 
for a career at court, or who will have to deal with lawyers and lawsuits, to gain 
a deeper knowledge of the subject.
Although Kemmerich does not think it necessary to refer to authors in the 
sciences themselves (‘in den wissenschaften selbst [Autores] zu allegiren’), 
he nevertheless recommends, in the general introduction to each subject of 
study (‘General- einleitung bey einem ieden studio’),78 what students might 
best read, depending on their level of knowledge. For beginners he suggests 
Johann Franz Buddeus’s Historia juris naturalis (1704) and Gottlieb Gerhard 
Titius’s Observationes in Pufendorffii libros ii de officiis hominis et civis (1703), or 
the French translation of Pufendorf ’s book by Jean Barbeyrac. More advanced 
students should deal with Christian Thomasius’s Institutiones jurisprudentiae 
divinae (1688) and, in addition, as well as for comparative purposes, with his 
lately published Fundamenta juris naturae et gentium (1705). Next, students 
could turn to Samuel von Pufendorf ’s De jure naturae et gentium (1672) and 
finally to Hugo Grotius’s De jure belli ac pacis (1625). Concerning Grotius, 
Kemmerich also recommends the textbook adaptations by Caspar Ziegler, 
Johann Georg Kulpis and Philipp Reinhard Vitriarius. To make things as easy 
as possible for young people (‘der jugend die sache so leicht […], als immer 
möglich’),79 and in view of his preference for German or French as teaching 
languages, Kemmerich recommends the use of editions or translations of 
 76 Ibid., b5a.
 77 Ibid., 218.
 78 Ibid., b6b.
 79 Ibid., b8b.
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the classical texts which include introductions and notes, for example Bar-
beyrac’s French translation of Pufendorf or the German translation of Grotius 
by Philipp Balthasar Sinold (von Schütz) with an introduction by Thomasius. 
Additionally, as an exercise, and to get a notion of the practical relevance of 
the subject, he encourages teachers and students to test their knowledge by 
studying historical cases.80
With the third volume of his Neu=eröffnete Academie der Wissenschaf-
ten, published only in 1714, though it had been written for quite a while, 
 Kemmerich finally presented his own compendium on the subject.81 In this 
so- called Dritte Eröffnung Welche die Morale und das Natur= und  Völker=Recht 
in sich begreiffet (Third Introduction Which Comprises Morals as well as the 
Law of Nature and Nations), the influence of Christian Thomasius is evident. 
After a general introduction, in which he explains the subject of natural law 
as well as the origin and history of it, Kemmerich elucidates how the law of 
nature can best be treated.82 He considers it appropriate to divide jus natu-
rae et gentium into three domains, namely private law (Von dem allgemeinen 
Recht der Privatpersonen),83 public law (Von dem allgemeinen Staatsrecht)84 
and the law of nations (Von dem allgemeinen Völkerrecht).85 All three parts 
are systematically structured, again in the form of a teaching dialogue, start-
ing with general, universal aspects of the topic and moving down to more 
specific issues. With regard to the law of nations, one of Kemmerich’s main 
aims seems to be to show  – as he already had in his little treatise on the 
Matveyev incident – that there is no need to follow Grotius in inventing a 
separate law of nations, distinct from the law of nature (‘mit Grotio ein be-
sonderes Völcker- Recht zu erdencken’).86 He argues that this would be su-
perfluous because international relations are regulated either by provisions 
of natural law in general or by contract law. Everything else in terms of inter-
national relations is administered by the principles of courtesy and friend-
ship or by the customs of decorum, and thus does not involve binding rules 
anyway. On this issue Kemmerich thus seems to follow a very heterogeneous 
 80 Ibid., 212– 223.
 81 Initially, Kemmerich had envisaged natural law and the law of nations to form the fourth 
part of the Neu=eröffnete Academie. For this see ‘Verzeichnis der wissenschaften / so in 
dieser Academie sollen tractiret werden,’ Kemmerich, Neu=eröffnete Academie, vol. 1, 
c4b– c5b.
 82 Kemmerich, Neu=eröffnete Academie, vol. 3, 1577– 1613.
 83 Ibid., 1613– 1766.
 84 Ibid., 1766– 1854.
 85 Ibid., 1855– 1906.
 86 Kemmerich, Grund=Sätze, 18.
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school of thinkers on natural law, which ‘denied in principle the existence of 
a “positive” law of nations’.87
3 Conclusion
Baron Christoph Adam Gross von Trockau, Johann Christoph Vetter and Diet-
rich Hermann Kemmerich were not the only ones trying to reform the educa-
tion of young nobles by introducing new subjects, contents and methods. In 
fact, they were able to draw on various tracts dealing with reformist education-
al ideas and concepts which had been published across Europe during the last 
decades of the seventeenth century. Among the authors they relied on were 
Bernard Lamy,88 John Locke and Christian Thomasius. Also, the establishment 
of a school focusing on the needs of the nobility was not an isolated occur-
rence. From the late sixteenth until the end of the eighteenth century several 
new Ritterakademien were founded all over the Empire as well as in other parts 
of Europe. These institutions offered an education and teaching programme 
exclusively aligned to the requirements of the nobility, especially to its need for 
aristocratic socialization, and functioned as supplements and alternatives to 
the universities. Influenced by ideas of Renaissance humanism and provoked 
by the growing competition at court with commoners holding legal degrees, 
ideals of education and of educating the nobility had changed since the six-
teenth century. On the one hand, this new form of aristocratic education had 
to serve the purpose of professional competence and modernization; on the 
other hand, it had still to be distinctive and prepare noble offspring for their 
special social role. Until the sixteenth century it had been quite uncommon 
for the nobility to attend university. In most cases, the few noblemen who 
did  attend were preparing for an ecclesiastical career. But as requirements in 
 education were also changing for aristocrats, the institutions of higher educa-
tion became increasingly important for them, too.89 The emergence of newly 
 87 Wilhelm Greve, The Epochs of International Law (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2000), 351.
 88 His treatise Entretiens sur les sciences dans lesquels on apprend comment l’on doit étudier 
les sciences et s’en servir pour se former l’esprit juste et le cœur droit, mentioned by Gross 
von Trockau, was first published in 1683. During the eighteenth century it became a very 
popular book of methodology and was held in high esteem, for example by Montesquieu 
and Rousseau.
 89 Norbert Conrads, Ritterakademien der frühen Neuzeit. Bildung als Standesprivileg im 16. 
und 17. Jahrhundert (Göttingen:  Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982); Simone Giese, 
‘Adelsstudium,’ in Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit Online, ed. Friedrich Jaeger, accessed 29 May 
2017, http:// dx.doi.org.emedien.ub.uni- muenchen.de/ 10.1163/ 2352- 0248_ edn_ a0036000, 
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founded Ritterakademien was paralleled by some universities also trying to 
adjust to the new requirements. In fact, at the beginning of the seventeenth 
century there are some examples of universities expanding their teaching pro-
grammes to meet the needs of noble students. For instance, the University of 
Strasbourg offered a range of exercises such as riding, dancing, fencing, mod-
ern languages and fortification.90 After a period of stagnation and decline dur-
ing the Thirty Years’ War and its aftermath, the idea of academies exclusively 
for the nobility turned up again and they peaked in the decades between 1680 
and 1730.91 It seems that, in this context, the law of nature and nations became 
an integral part of aristocratic education, indeed an ever- present part of the 
curriculum.92 For example, in Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1693), 
John Locke’s tract on the education of gentlemen, which was much noticed 
by the European Republic of Letters and quickly translated into several lan-
guages, the English philosopher recommends that, after having imparted the 
principles and precepts of virtue on the young noble on the basis of Cicero’s De 
officiis, the pupil could go on with further reading regarding the ‘general Part of 
Civil- Law’. Further, ‘it may be seasonable to set him upon Grotius de Jure Belli 
& Pacis, or which I think, is the better of the two, Puffendorf de Jure naturali & 
Gentium; wherein he will be instructed in the natural Rights of Men, and the 
Original and Foundations of Society, and the Duties resulting from thence’.93 
first published online:  2014; Katrin Keller, ‘Standesbildung,’ in Enzyklopädie der 
Neuzeit Online, ed. Friedrich Jaeger, accessed online on 29 May 2017, http:// dx.doi.org .eme-
dien.ub.uni- muenchen.de/ 10.1163/ 2352- 0248_ edn_ a4118000, first published online: 2014.
 90 Anton Schindling, ‘Die Strassburger Hochschule zur Zeit des Späthumanismus um 1600,’ 
in Universität Würzburg und die Wissenschaft in der Neuzeit, ed. Peter Herde and Anton 
Schindling (Würzburg:  Ferdinand Schöningh, 1998), 95– 107, here 105– 106; Anton 
Schindling, Humanistische Hochschule und freie Reichsstadt. Gymnasium und Akademie 
in Strassburg 1538– 1621 (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1977), 383; Arthur Schulz, Die örtliche und 
soziale Herkunft der Strassburger Studenten 1621– 1793 (Frankfurt: [Selbstverlag], 1926); 
Gustav C.  Knod (ed.), Die alten Matrikel der Universität Strassburg 1621– 1793, vol. 1: 
Die allgemeine Matrikel und die Matrikel der Philosophischen und Theologischen Facultät 
(Strassburg: Trübner, 1897), xxiv– xxvi.
 91 An overview is provided in ‘Bibliographie der Ritterakademien’ in Conrads, Ritter-
akademien, 345– 400.
 92 There is a short reference to this in Michael Stolleis, Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts in 
Deutschland, vol. 1: Reichspublizistik und Policeywissenschaft 1600– 1800 (München: Beck, 
1988), 145. See also Friedrich Debitsch, Die staatsbürgerliche Erziehung an den deutschen 
Ritterakademien (PhD diss. University of Halle an der Saale, 1927), 19– 51. An extensive 
survey dealing with this issue is not yet available.
 93 John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education (London: Churchill, 1693), § 175, 221. 
Until his death in 1704 John Locke revised the treatise several times. In the last, fourth 
edition, published in 1699, he also recommends ‘Puffendorf de Officio hominis & civis’; he 
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Also in 1693, the Licentiatus Juris and court tutor Anton Wilhelm Schowart94 
published a treatise in which he emphasized the importance of jus naturae and 
jus gentium in general and especially of the works of Hugo Grotius and Samu-
el Pufendorf for the education of young nobles.95 August Hermann Francke’s 
1698 idea of an educational institution especially for the nobility, where the 
pupils should, among other things, be taught ‘in Philosophia moralis, Politica, 
Jurae Naturae, und in denen ersten fundamentis Juris publici & Juris Civilis’,96 
was indeed never realized. Still, at the Paedagogium regium, which was part of 
the Franckeschen Stiftungen (Francke Foundations) at Halle, pupils – mainly 
sons from wealthy families of the bourgeoisie as well as young nobles97 – had 
lessons in ‘Philosophia moralis samt den Fundamentis juris naturae und politi-
cae’ as soon as they reached the fourth grade, which was regarded as a prepara-
tory course for university; the lessons were mainly based on the writings of 
Johann Franz Buddeus, though only in strongly condensed form.98 Finally, in 
1704 Christian Schröter, deputy headmaster of the Ritterakademie at Liegnitz 
(Legnica), stated in his Kurtze Anweisung zur Information Der Adlichen Jugend 
that a young noble should let himself explain at the academy ‘Jus Naturae und 
Gentium, Publicum und Privatum’.99
sees it, however, as basic reading in ethics. See John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning 
Education (London: Churchill, 1693), § 186, 330.
 94 In 1691 Schowart, Licentiatus juris of the University of Frankfurt an der Oder, applied 
to the Ritterakademie at Lüneburg. According to himself, he had served as tutor for sev-
eral noble families. See Klaus Bleeck, Adelserziehung auf deutschen Ritterakademien. Die 
Lüneburger Adelsschulen 1655– 1850 (Frankfurt am Main, Bern, Las Vegas:  Peter Lang, 
1977), 133.
 95 [Anton Wilhelm Schowart], Der Adeliche Hofemeister/ Oder Wahrhafftige und deutliche 
Vorstellung was ein Adelicher Hofemeister vor Eigenschafften an sich haben: Wie derselbe 
sich in allen vorfallenden Begebenheiten klüglich verhalten/ seine Untergebene so wohl auff 
Universitäten als andern Orten treulich anführen und endlich mit ihnen nützliche peregri-
nationes anstellen solle (Frankfurt: Hartmann, 1693), § 6, 230– 234.
 96 Projecte, Wie die Anführung Herren- Standes/ Adelicher und anderer fürnehmen Jugend 
veranstaltet/ Und guten Theils wircklich eingerichtet und angefangen (Halle:  Christian 
Henkel, 1698).
 97 Concerning the intensive relationship between Halle pietism and the nobility of the Holy 
Roman Empire see Andreas Pečar, Holger Zaunstöck and Thomas Müller- Bahlke (eds.), 
Wie pietistisch kann Adel sein? Hallescher Pietismus und Reichsadel im 18. Jahrhundert 
(Halle: Mitteldeutscher Verlag, 2016).
 98 ‘Verbesserte Methode des Padagogii Regii zu Glaucha vor Halle 1721,’ in August 
Hermann Francke’s Pädagogische Schriften. Nebst der Darstellung seines Lebens und seiner 
Stiftungen, ed. Gustav Kramer (Langensalza: Hermann Beyer & Söhne, 21885), 287– 368, 
here 338.
 99 Christian Schröter, Kurtze Anweisung zur Information Der Adlichen Jugend (Leipzig: 
Johann Friedrich Gleditsch, 1704), 5.
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During the second wave of Ritterakademien, which the Holy Roman Empire 
underwent around 1700, the Ritterakademie at Wolfenbüttel, founded in 1687, 
provided an example for others to follow.100 At Wolfenbüttel, natural law was 
among the most important subjects.101 All later projects – either arrangements 
for or reforms and foundations of Ritterakademien – included dissemination of 
basic knowledge in natural law and the law of nations; this applies for example to 
the institutions founded shortly after, at Erlangen, Brandenburg,102 Berlin103 and 
Liegnitz (Legnica)104 as well as those founded in Vienna during the late 1740s.105
A closer look at the new foundations as well as the reforms undertaken at 
Ritterakademien makes it clear that many were influenced by existing insti-
tutions and vice versa; this mutual intellectual impact usually resulted from 
personal contacts. Baron Gross von Trockau for example admits that his  ideas 
concerning the concrete planning and arrangements for the Ritterakade-
mie at Erlangen followed the Ritterakademie of the Dukes of Braunschweig- 
Wolfenbüttel.106 Additionally, the Erlangen project was strongly influenced 
by Halle and particularly its newly founded university. Gross von Trockau as 
well as his personal environment had good and long- standing relations with 
the scholarly world connected to Halle. Over time, these relations were even 
 100 Conrads, Ritterakademien, 273– 322.
 101 Friedrich Koldewey (ed.), Braunschweigische Schulordnungen von den ältesten Zeiten bis 
zum Jahre 1828, vol. 2: Schulordnungen des Herzogtums Braunschweig (mit Ausschluss der 
Hauptstadt des Landes) (Berlin: Hofmann, 1890), 235, 262– 263.
 102 Johannes- Matthias Graf von der Schulenburg, ‘Die Gründung der Ritterakademie zu 
Brandenburg im Jahre 1704,’ in Berichte und Forschungen aus dem Domstift Brandenburg 
4 (2011), 5– 99, here 62 and 85.
 103 The first professor in natural law was Johann Heinrich Hertenstein, who also published 
a little tract on natural law and the law of nations: Kurtzer Vorbericht Das Natürliche Und 
Völcker- Recht betreffend, Mit welchem Denen Durchlauchtigen, Hoch- und Wohl- Gebohrnen 
Herren Academicis Seine bey der Von Ihro Königl. Majestät in Preussen etc. Allergnädigst 
angerichteten Fürsten- und Ritter- Academie, Über gedachte beyde Rechte Dieses Erste halbe 
Jahr über zu haltende Lectiones anzeiget (Cölln an der Spree: Ulrich Liebpert, [1705]).
 104 Ihro Röm. Kayserl. Auch zu Hungarn und Böheimb Königl. Majest. … Josephi I.  Neu auf-
gerichtete Academie Oder Ritter- Schul Zu Liegnitz in Schlesien. Wie solche von Höchst 
gedachter Kayserl. und Königl. Maj. mit Privilegiis und Ordnungen in diesem 1708ten Jahr 
Allergnädigst approbirt und confirmirt worden ([n.p.], 1708).
 105 Ivo Cerman, ‘Habsburgischer Adel und Theresanum. Wissenvermittlung, Sozialisierung 
und Berufswege,’ in Adelige Ausbildung. Die Herausforderung der Aufklärung und ihre 
Folgen, ed. Ivo Cerman and Luboš Velek (München: Martin Meidenbauer, 2006), 143– 
168; Olga Khavanova, ‘Official Policies and Parental Strategies of Educating Hungarian 
Noblemen in the Age of Maria Theresa,’ in Adelige Ausbildung, ed. Cerman and Velek, 
95– 115.
 106 Mengin, Ritter- Academie, 105.
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intensified as scholars who had graduated at Halle University were preferred 
as professors for the Erlangen Ritterakademie. Dietrich Hermann Kemmerich, 
for example, had been studying law at Halle before he became professor of 
natural law and the law of nations at Erlangen. The influence of Halle was most 
likely due to Christian Thomasius’s writings, especially his works on the idea of 
gallantry, which emerged between 1687 and 1694.107
The influence of Thomasius is most evident in Gross von Trockau’s project of 
a courteous, real and solid erudition (‘galante und reale und solide Gelehrsam-
keit’).108 Additionally, it is mirrored by the Ritterakademie’s self- conception as 
an Academia Practica, characterized by the abolition of the teaching methods 
of scholasticism and the introduction of new teaching techniques as well as a 
teaching programme focusing, unlike at universities, on the practical relevance 
of the subject matters.
One key issue in such an up- to- date education for young nobles was the 
knowledge of natural law and the law of nations, as this was crucial for politi-
cal counselling at court. The conception of the Erlangen Ritterakademie shows 
clearly the nobility’s need to acquire these qualifications. Otherwise, they 
risked being replaced at court by learned commoners and thus losing their tra-
ditional role of counselling elite. As a consequence, they would lose one vital 
possibility of participating in ruling.
For members of the gentry, the possibilities of education offered by Ritter-
akademien were of great importance. Many of them had been thrown into 
financial crisis during the Thirty Years’ War.109 Subsequently, they could no 
longer afford an education befitting their social status, including preceptors, 
tutors and attendance at universities as well as travel to foreign countries. This 
situation can be seen as a framework, not only for Gross von Trockau’s foun-
dation at Erlangen, but also for the other schools for the nobility which were 
founded around 1700. These aimed to educate young members of the local no-
bility as quickly as possible, at advantageous prices, which meant the syllabus 
was focused and condensed. Especially time spent at foreign courts and uni-
versities should be shortened. The idea was not only to save money but also 
to stop  – in accordance with mercantilist thinking  – the drain of money to 
 107 See Jörn Steigerwald, Galanterie. Die Fabrikation einer natürlichen Ethik der höfischen 
Gesellschaft (1650– 1710) (Heidelberg: Winter, 2011), 17– 46, 220– 246.
 108 ‘Ansprache an junge Standes- Personen,’ in Gross von Trockau, Recreationes Academicae 
Grosianae, n.p.
 109 Including some Franconian examples: see Andreas Flurschütz da Cruz, Zwischen Füchsen 
und Wölfen. Konfession, Klientel und Konflikte in der fränkischen Reichsritterschaft nach 
dem Westfälischen Frieden (Konstanz: uvk, 2014).
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foreign territories or at least to limit it.110 Additionally, the education of young 
nobles at Ritterakademien was regarded as serving the territory’s welfare, as it 
aimed at the education of those who were supposed later to serve the country, 
as civil servants, at court or in the military. While at a Ritterakademie, they 
received the set of necessary tools and knowledge for these future tasks and re-
sponsibilities. Also in ideological terms, they were set on the desired track. By 
offering natural law and the law of nations for the nobility the Ritterakademien 
made it possible for the nobility to maintain their traditional role as prince-
ly courtiers and political advisors. That this was necessary is reflected in the 
fact that the institutions were soon open also for commoners, indeed, some of 
them had admitted bourgeois students from the beginning.
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Serving Danish Foreign Policy: Andreas Hojer’s 
De eo quod iure belli licet in minores (1735)
Mads Langballe Jensen
1 Introduction
Andreas Hojer (1690– 1739) is arguably one of the most fascinating but under-
studied figures in the early enlightenment in Denmark. Hailing from Schleswig- 
Holstein, Hojer studied in Halle under Christian Thomasius (1655– 1728), where 
he became fascinated with the new teachings on natural law and the law of na-
tions. His first published works were an academic exercise on the (non- )prohi-
bition of incestuous marriage by divine law, the De nuptiis propinquorum iure 
divino non prohibitis [...] diagramma, and a short history of Denmark.1 Both 
works led him into polemics and rivalry with Ludvig Holberg (1684– 1754), who 
is now widely considered the (only) major figure of the early Danish enlight-
enment. Having successfully weathered a storm over his work on marriage, 
Hojer was employed in a string of positions, including royal historiographer 
and Justitsråd, before being appointed the first ex officio professor of the law of 
nature and nations at Copenhagen University in 1734.2
No substantive account of his natural law theorizing and its political and 
intellectual significance has thus far been attempted. An informative and de-
tailed biography of Hojer was published in 1961, and Hojer is mentioned in 
the standard histories of jurisprudence in Denmark.3 But in neither case is 
there any detailed discussion of his teachings on natural law.4 This is perhaps 
 1 Andreas Hojer, Kurtzgefasste Dännemärckische Geschichte vom Anfang dieses mächtigen 
 Reichs bis zum Ausgang des XVII. Seculi (Flensburg: Bosseck, 1719); Andreas Hojer, De nuptiis 
propinquorum iure divino non prohibitis [...] diagramma (n.p.: n.n., 1718).
 2 Troels G. Jørgensen, Andreas Hojer, jurist og historiker (København: Arne Frost- Hansens For-
lag, 1961), 134. For the university statutes, see William Norvin, Københavns Universitet i Refor-
mationens og Orthodoxiens Tidsalder, vol. 2 (København: Gyldendal, 1940), 114.
 3 Jørgensen, Andreas Hojer, jurist og historiker; Ditlev Tamm, Juraen på Københavns Universitet 
1479– 2005 (København: Københavns Universitet, 2005), 66, 70ff, 92ff.
 4 There is, however, a brief but indicative discussion of Hojer’s natural law theory in Knud 
Haakonssen, ‘Holberg’s Law of Nature and Nations,’ in Ludvig Holberg (1684– 1754): Learning 
and Literature in the Nordic Enlightenment, ed. Knud Haakonssen and Sebastian Olden- 
Jørgensen (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 59– 79, at 68–70.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simone Zurbuchen - 978-90-04-38420-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 09/19/2019 09:19:14AM
via University of Lausanne
40 Langballe Jensen
because the sources are rather disappointing. According to a lecture catalogue, 
Hojer lectured publicly on ‘the law of nature as well as the precepts of mor-
al philosophy’ in 1736– 1740.5 But seemingly no notes from Hojer’s lectures on 
natu ral law survive. Instead, the most important sources for Hojer’s teaching 
on natural law are his programme or manual for Danish students of law from 
1736, the Idea iurisconsulti danici (with a Danish translation the following 
year), and his inaugural dissertation at the occasion of his appointment to the 
professorship of natural law, De eo quod iure belli licet in minores, published the 
year before.6 Of these two, the latter provides the most substantial view of his 
mature thoughts on the law of nations and natural law. To this might be added 
his early Diagramma, which was, however, published eighteen years before he 
started lecturing.
This chapter offers a characterization of Hojer’s theory of natural law and 
the law of nations on the basis of his inaugural dissertation De eo quod iure 
belli licet in minores and its intellectual and political significance in early- 
eighteenth- century Denmark- Norway. The following section briefly outlines 
the intellectual context of natural law theorizing in Copenhagen around 1700. 
The chapter then proceeds to outline the political context of the conflict with 
the dukes of Holstein- Gottorp over the dominion of Schleswig, followed by a 
discussion of the polemics on this question during the Great Northern War. 
This provides the background for a detailed analysis of Hojer’s inaugural dis-
sertation, on the basis of which the chapter offers a concluding interpretation 
of Hojer’s natural law profile and its significance.
2 Natural Law in Copenhagen in the Early Eighteenth Century
Although Hojer was the first to hold a professorship in Copenhagen in the law 
of nature and nations, he was not the first to work on the discipline or teach 
it. The subject had been taught there since the 1690s, by the Kiel- educated 
 5 ‘Jus Naturæ nec non Moralis Philosophiæ Præcepta,’ Lectiones publicae Professorum in Uni-
versitate Hauniensi (Hafniae: Ex Typographeo Regiae Majest. & Universit., 1604–1786). See 
also Holger Rørdam, ed., Historiske Samlinger og Studier vedrørende danske Forhold og Studier 
især i det 17. Aarhundrede (Kjøbenhavn: Gad, 1891– 1902), IV: 146.
 6 Andreas Hojer, Dissertatio iuris publici universalis de eo quod iure belli licet in minores, Vom 
Recht des Krieges gegen die Minderjährige (Hafniae: Typis Reg. Majest. & Universit. Typogr. 
Joh. G. Höpffneri, 1735); Andreas Hojer, Ideae Icti Danici partem 1. disputatione anniversaria 
expositam publico eruditorum examini subiciit Andreas Hoier (Hafniae: Typis Reg. Majest. & 
Universit. Typogr. Joh. G. Höpffneri, 1736); Andreas Hojer, Forestilling paa en Dansk Jurist, den 1. 
Part (Kjøbenhavn: Kongl. Majests. priviligerede Bogtrykkerie, 1737).
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Henrik Weghorst (1653– 1722) and by Christian Reitzer (1665– 1736), who had 
conducted much of his studies under Christian Thomasius in Halle before 
being appointed professor of law at Copenhagen University. Each published 
several shorter works on natural law.7 In addition, in 1716 Ludvig Holberg had 
published the first compendium on natural law in the Danish language, draw-
ing on Hugo Grotius, Christian Thomasius and especially Samuel Pufendorf.8 
Finally, the likewise Halle- educated Christoph Heinrich Amthor (1678– 1721), 
professor of natural law, public law and politics at Kiel University, had pub-
lished works in favour of the Danish monarch Frederick iv during the Great 
Northern War. For this service he was awarded positions as Justitsråd and royal 
historiographer. Although he published little on natural law in Copenhagen, 
where he died in 1721, he published several polemical works on the conflict 
with Holstein- Gottorp during the war, and his lectures on ethics, natural law 
and decorum were published posthumously in 1738.9
In the years before receiving the professorship in natural law, Andreas Ho-
jer had in more than one way taken up the mantle from Amthor. Apart from 
continuing Amthor’s work on the history and life of Frederick iv, he had also 
defended Danish interests to the south. When Denmark- Norway came into 
conflict with the free imperial city of Hamburg, as a consequence of the lat-
ter setting up a new exchange bank and refusing to accept Danish currency 
on equal rates, Hojer advised the Danish government on the best measures 
to take in accordance with the law of nations, and also published anonymous 
polemical works on the conflict intended to sway public opinion towards 
 7 For a discussion of the natural law profiles of these first teachers of the subject in Copenha-
gen, see Mads Langballe Jensen, ‘Contests about Natural Law in Early Enlightenment Copen-
hagen,’ History of European Ideas 42 (2016): 1027– 1041.
 8 On Holberg’s natural law theory, including its different uses, see Knud Haakonssen and Se-
bastian Olden- Jørgensen, eds., Ludvig Holberg (1684– 1754): Learning and Literature in the Nor-
dic Enlightenment (London and New York: Routledge, 2017); Jørgen Sejersted and Eiliv Vinje, 
eds., Ludvig Holbergs naturret (Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk, 2012).
 9 Christoph Heinrich Amthor, Philosophia moralis seu doctrina de justo, honesto et decoro. 
Hierbey ist statt einer Vorrede vorangesetzet Authoris unvorgreiffliche Gedancken von der be-
qvemsten Methode, deren sich ein academischer Lehrer bedienen kan (Hafniae, Lipsiae:  Joh. 
Nicol. Lossius, 1738). For Amthor’s biography, see Heiner F.  Klemme and Manfred Kuehn, 
eds., Dictionary of Eighteenth- Century German Philosophers (London: Continuum, 2010), 17f.; 
Carl Frederik Bricka, ed., Dansk biografisk Lexikon tillige omfattende Norge for Tidsrummet 
1537– 1814 (Kjøbenhavn:  Gyldendalske Boghandels Forlag, 1887), 1:  197f., available online at 
http:// runeberg.org/ dbl/ . For Amthor’s work on decorum, see Kasper Risbjerg Eskildsen, 
‘Print, Fashion, and the Making of the Enlightenment Philosopher,’ in Northern Antiquities 
and National Identities. Perceptions of Denmark and the North in the Eighteenth Century, ed. 
Knud Haakonssen and Henrik Horstbøl (København: Det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes 
Selskab, 2008), 126–1 44.
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Denmark- Norway.10 It is thus not surprising that when, in a letter of May 1735, 
Hojer mentioned a desire to choose a topic for his inaugural dissertation that 
would please the king, Danish political interests to the south were predomi-
nant. The first potential topic concerned what was allowed in war against mi-
nors, the second that Denmark had never been a feudal vassal of the  German 
Empire, the third concerned the Emperor’s rights to mint coins (against 
Moser), the fourth the Emperor’s rights over the river Elbe, which had been 
 bestowed on Hamburg, and the final one concerned the east Frisians’ status by 
public law. Of these, Hojer eventually chose the first.11
To understand why Hojer chose that particular topic, we need to look into 
the larger intellectual and political context. All of Hojer’s suggested topics 
concerned Denmark- Norway’s political interests to the south, and his final 
choice of subject tapped directly into the political- legal debates of the Great 
Northern War.
3 Denmark- Norway in the Great Northern War
In the Great Northern War of 1700– 1721, Denmark- Norway was allied with 
Saxony- Poland and Russia against Sweden. To the south of Denmark was the 
ducal house of Schleswig- Holstein- Gottorp. The Gottorp family was a cadet 
branch of the Oldenburg family in Denmark, which had been vassals of the 
Danish crown until the mid- seventeenth century, when Sweden had forced the 
Danish king to accept the sovereignty of Gottorp.12 For most of the war, the ruler 
of Gottorp was the underage duke Charles Frederick (1700– 1739), and although 
Gottorp had adopted a position of neutrality it did not escape being drawn into 
the war. At the outset of the war, Frederick iv of Denmark- Norway invaded and 
occupied the ducal lands in Schleswig- Holstein.13 Initially, Frederick iv was 
 10 Jørgensen, Andreas Hojer, jurist og historiker, 103f.
 11 Andreas Hojer, ‘[Letter to an unnamed “Monseigneur”]’, 28 May 1735, Royal Library, 
Copenhagen: MS Kall 383, 4to. The letter, as well as (very briefly) the inaugural disserta-
tion, is summarised in Jørgensen, Andreas Hojer, jurist og historiker, 246– 248.
 12 For a brief overview of Danish- Gottorp- Swedish relations in the seventeenth and early 
eighteenth century, see Otto Brandt, Caspar von Saldern und die nordeuropäische Politik im 
Zeitalter Katharinas II., etc. (Erlangen; Kiel: Palm & Enke; Walter G. Mühlau, 1932), 3ff. The 
most detailed history is still Edvard Holm, Danmark- Norges Historie fra den store nordiske 
Krigs Slutning til Rigernes Adskillelse, 1720– 1814, 7 vols. (Kjøbenhavn: Gad, 1891– 1912). 
I will be drawing on both these works in my discussion of the Great Northern War below.
 13 In the following, I am relying on the accounts in Holm, Danmark- Norges Historie; Brandt, 
Caspar von Saldern.
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forced to withdraw and sign the Peace of Travendal in 1700, promising not to 
engage in further hostilities against Sweden and to respect the sovereignty of 
Holstein- Gottorp over its lands.
Frederick iv re- entered the war in 1709, however. When Stenbock, the 
 Swedish field marshal, led a Swedish army into northern Germany in 1712, the 
war took a decisive turn. Hard pressed by united Danish, Saxon and Russian 
forces, Stenbock retreated northwards into Schleswig- Holstein. At this point, 
the ministers and ‘administrator’ (guardian) of the young Charles Frederick 
decided to offer Stenbock protection in the main Holstein- Gottorp fortifica-
tion at Tønning at the mouth of the river Eider, in southern Schleswig. This was 
done in secret, as it was arguably contrary to Holstein- Gottorp neutrality in 
the war, declarations of which were simultaneously given to King Frederick iv. 
Danish forces besieged Stenbock’s forces at Tønning, forcing them to surrender 
in 1713. This led to the discovery of documents allegedly proving the duplicity 
of the Holstein- Gottorp ministers, and subsequently to Danish occupation and 
sequestration of the Gottorp lands in Schleswig and Holstein.
At the end of the Great Northern War, the peace treaty of Frederiksborg 
(1720) confirmed Danish dominion over Schleswig, while the German Emper-
or Charles vi, to whom duke Charles Frederick had appealed as his supreme 
liege lord, secured the restitution of the Gottorp possessions in Holstein.14 This 
would not be the end of the matter, however, for Charles Frederick would con-
tinue campaigning, now from Russia, for the restitution of his lands in Schles-
wig as well, a question in which most of the major European powers would 
regularly become involved.15
While Denmark concluded a treaty with both Russia and Vienna in 1732 ac-
cording to which Denmark would pay Charles Frederick two million Rigsdaler 
(Rdl.) in return for Gottorp renouncing its claims to Schleswig, neither Russia 
nor the German Emperor had been able to persuade Charles Frederick to give 
his consent to this.16 As such, the question of the legitimacy of the Danish se-
questration of the Gottorp lands became a bargaining chip in the negotiations 
during the Polish War of Succession (1733– 1735/ 1738), and the Danish crown 
sought assurances for its possessions from all of the powers involved, each giv-
ing or questioning such assurances in turn, according to their own interests 
and expediencies.
 14 The circumstances and drafting of the peace treaty of Frederiksborg, as part of his 
detailed account of the Danish- Norwegian participation in the Great Northern War, can 
be found in Hojer, König Friederich des Vierten glorwürdigstes Leben, II: 19.
 15 Holm, Danmark- Norges Historie, I: 48.
 16 Ibid., II: 53.
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4 Amthor’s Legitimation of the Danish Conquest
There clearly was a great deal of power politics involved in the question of the 
recognition of the Danish sequestration of Schleswig, but since any recogni-
tion had to take the form of treaties, there was equally a question of legal and 
moral legitimation.17 The first wave of polemics came immediately after the 
Danish conquest of Tønning and occupation of Schleswig in 1714– 1715, while 
Hojer’s intervention came in August 1735, two months before the peace prelim-
inaries of the Polish War of Succession in October 1735 and three years before 
the final settlement in 1738.
During the pamphlet war following the fall of Tønning and the Danish se-
questration of Gottorp lands, the Danish case was chiefly made (anonymously) 
by Christoph Heinrich Amthor, the former professor of natural law at Kiel Uni-
versity. In the In iure et facto Gegründeter Beweis der vielfältigen Treulosigkeiten 
(1715), Amthor answered two Holstein- Gottorp pamphlets:  the Succincte De-
duction and the In facto gegründete umbständliche Nachricht from 1714.18
Central to the Danish case was the argument that Gottorp had broken its 
treaties and reneged on its promise of neutrality by giving Tønning over to 
Stenbock and the Swedish army. In so doing, Gottorp revealed itself to be an 
enemy of Denmark- Norway, a fact further corroborated by the secret treaty 
and articles that had been concluded between the House of Gottorp and field 
marshal Stenbock as representative of the Swedish king, and that had duly 
been published when they fell into Danish hands.19 This in turn justified the 
 17 For another study of the interplay between power politics and moral- legal legitimiza-
tion, see Pärtel Piirimäe, ‘The Capitulations of 1710 in the Context of Peter the Great’s 
Foreign Propaganda,’ in Die baltischen Kapitulationen von 1710: Kontext – Wirkungen – 
Interpretationen, eds. Karsten Brüggemann, Mati Laur, and Pärtel Piirimäe (Köln: Böhlau 
Verlag, 2014), 65– 86.
 18 [Christoph Heinrich Amthor], In iure et facto Gegründeter Beweis der vielfältigen 
Treulosigkeiten, So das Jetzt- regierende Allerdurchlauchtigste Königl. Dähnische Haus von 
dem Fürstl. Holstein- Gottorfischen bisher erlitten / Worin … ausführlich gezeiget wird, Daß 
das Hertzogthum Schleswig durch offenbahre Rebellionen … von der Krohne Dennemarck 
zum erstenmahl abgerissen, hernach durch gleich wenig zugelassene Felonien … zur 
Souveraineté erhaben … (Kopenhagen, 1715); [Anonymous], Succincte Deduction daß 
Seine König Majest von Dennemark des Hoch- Fürst. Hauses Holstein- Gottorp Aggressor 
seyn, 1714; [Anonymous], In Facto Gegründete umbständliche Nachricht, Wie Der Königl. 
Dänische Hoff Des Fürstl. Holstein- Gottorpischen Hauses Untergang und Ruin beständig 
gesuchet, auch aus einer solchen absicht weder Verträge, noch Friedensschlüsse jemahln 
gehalten … / Auff Gnädigsten Befehl publiciret Im Jahr 1714, 1714.
 19 [Anonymous], Wahrhafter Abdruck Des In Händen habenden Original- Tractats nebst den 
Separat- Articuln / So Zwischen dem Fürstl. Hauße Gottorff und Dem Königl. Schwedischen 
Raht und Feld- Marschall Graffen von Steenbock unterm 21ten Januarii Anno 1713. im 
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occupation and eventual sequestration of Gottorp lands by Frederick iv. As 
Amthor argued, when Gottorp assisted the Swedish army and let it into Tøn-
ning, ‘His Royal Majesty of Denmark was given most necessary cause, accord-
ing to all laws of nature and of nations, to seize the Ducal lands, and defend 
himself as far as possible against this new approaching enemy together with 
the old’.20 As such, Frederick iv was further justified in sequestrating the Got-
torp lands not just in Schleswig but also in Holstein, to prevent further Gottorp 
aggression and ensure the security of his realm.21
Faced with the occupation and sequestration of their lands following the 
defeat of the Swedes and the fall of Tønning, and the uncovering of documents 
supposedly proving their duplicity, the Gottorp ministers and pamphleteers 
adopted several arguments. First and foremost, they argued  – mainly on 
the basis of the legal, political and military history of Denmark- Norway and 
Holstein- Gottorp – that Gottorp had not violated its obligations of neutrality 
in admitting Stenbock’s Swedish army into Tønning. It was in fact Denmark 
that was the true aggressor, declaring war against Sweden in contradiction of 
existing treaties with Gottorp. The authority of Hugo Grotius was cited to ar-
gue that Gottorp was thereby absolved of obligations towards Denmark.22 At 
the same time, it was also denied that Stenbock had been invited into Tønning 
and asserted that it had happened without the knowledge and consent of duke 
Charles Frederick. These assertions were marshalled to argue that the seques-
tration was illegal and that although Frederick iv might think himself injured 
by the guardian of Charles Frederick, he, the Danish king, should neverthe-
less restore the lands to the young duke, ‘an entirely innocent young lord’. To 
achieve this purpose, the Gottorp ministers appealed to the Imperial Diets and 
the care of the Emperor as the ‘supreme guardian’ (Ober- Vormündische Für-
sorge) of Charles Frederick.23 Another pamphlet referred to a treaty concluded 
Rahmen Sr. Königl. Mayst. von Schweden getroffen und geschlossen worden, umb Dadurch, 
… das Gegen Ihre Königl. Majest. zu Dennemarck, Norwegen [et]c. und Dero Alliirte von 
Dem Fürstlichen Hauße Gottorff begangenes treuloses und wieder alle Conventiones und 
Verträge, unverantwortliches und Friedbrüchiges Verfahren der gantzen unpartheischen 
Welt an den Tag zu legen (Kopenhagen: Königl. Maj. und Univ. privilegirten Buchdr., 1714).
 20 ‘Hiedurch bekahmen nun Ihro Königl. Majest. von Dännemarck nach allen Natürlichen / 
und Völcker- Rechten / höchstgemüssigten Anlasz / die Fürstlichen Länder einzuziehen /  
und so viel möglich sich dieses neuen zudringlichen Feindes mit dem Alten auf eins 
zuentschütten.’ [Amthor], In Iure Et Facto Gegründeter Beweis, 70.
 21 Ibid., 74.
 22 Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis 2.15.§15, cited in In Facto Gegründete umbständliche 
Nachricht, para. 215.
 23 Succincte Deduction, 11f.
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between Gottorp and Prussia as well as other declarations to show that the ‘un-
biased powers’ (ohnpartheyische Puissancen) guaranteeing the Westphalian, 
Northern and other recent peace treaties were sympathetic to the plight of 
a ‘still minor prince facing utter ruin’ and regarded the Danish occupation as 
‘unjust and insufferable’.24
In his replies, Amthor constructed a section- by- section rejection of the Got-
torp case. This included a detailed legal interpretation of the initial division 
of Schleswig- Holstein between Denmark and Gottorp as well as subsequent 
treaties. He also argued in detail that Gottorp’s actions in Denmark’s war with 
Sweden were in contradiction of its obligations as a neutral party, according 
to the laws of nature and nations, drawing on Hugo Grotius’s De iure belli ac 
pacis, as well as more recent discussions by Johann Heinrich Boeckler.25 What 
is particularly interesting for our purposes, however, is Amthor’s treatment of 
the Gottorp pamphleteers’ appeal to and use of the minority status of Charles 
Frederick. As we have seen, Gottorp used the minority of Charles Frederick to 
argue that he was not party to the administrator’s actions, and in particular 
to appeal to the protection of the Emperor (as supreme guardian) and other 
major powers within the legal framework of the imperial constitution and Eu-
ropean peace treaties. This had the further effect of constituting Frederick iv’s 
status in the conflict as a fellow vassal of the Emperor rather than sovereign 
king of Denmark- Norway. In contrast, Amthor construed the issue strictly as 
one pertaining to the law of nature regulating the conduct of war between two 
independent states.
At first, Amthor argued that while the minority of the Gottorp duke had been 
used to create sympathy for his case, the Gottorp pamphleteers had avoided 
the actual status controversiae in an attempt to conceal the injustice (Unfug) 
of their claim. The real issue or ‘status’, according to Amthor, was ‘whether an 
underage prince or ruler duly has to answer for what has happened during 
 24 ‘Dasz hingegen auch andere ohnpartheyische Puissances des Fürstl. Hauses gegen-
wertige zerrüttung und Seiner unschuldigen lande verheerung ebenfalls vor ungerecht 
und unleydlich ansehen / wie ingleichen den für augen liegenden eussersten ruin eines 
annoch minderjährigen Fürsten höchstrühmlich behertzigen / ist theils aus dem sub 
lit. D. beygehenden art. 8. des zwischen Jhr. Königl. Majest. in Preussen und des Herrn 
Administratoris Durchl. errichteten tractat, theils aus einiger hohen Puissancen, welche 
die Westphälische / Nordische / Fontainebleauische / Altonaische und Travendahlische 
Friedensschlüsse zu garantiren übernommen haben / desfalls gegebenen Declarationen 
zu ersehen.’ In Facto Gegründete umbständliche Nachricht, para. 220.
 25 The reference is to Boeckler’s Quies in turbis sive societatis bellicae declinatio. [Amthor], In 
Iure Et Facto Gegründeter Beweis, para. 50.
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his minority, if he thereby suffers considerable damage’.26 In other words, the 
issue was whether the young Charles Frederick should be obliged to accept 
the sequestration of his lands by Frederick iv as a consequence of the Got-
torp violation of neutrality during his minority. Those who might be inclined 
to answer in the negative should be considered, asserted Amthor, to be led 
by their passions or careless ignorance of the common law of nations (allge-
meines Völcker- recht).27
Amthor argued that the fundamental error of this position was to assume 
that since there were provisions in civil law (in foro civili) protecting minors 
against damages resulting from the actions of their guardians, this would apply 
to an underage prince as well. But this was to mistakenly confuse the civil state 
of citizens with the state of nature in which rulers exist with regard to one an-
other.28 Reason itself showed, he argued, that to accept the non- responsibility 
of underage princes (exceptio minorennitatis) would be to adopt a principle 
that was contrary to the entire sociality of states (Völcker- Socialität). It would 
endanger the security of all states neighbouring a state which had a minor rul-
er, for the latter would be able to do whatever it wanted without fearing the 
consequences.29 In short, whatever was done by the guardian of a minor ruler 
would have to be considered done by the ruler himself. Otherwise, Amthor 
argued, citing Pufendorf and Barbeyrac, ‘there would be no true and faithful 
trust between such a prince and his neighbours, and consequently, as no rea-
sonable moral philosopher can deny, no one would have anything to do with 
him’.30 ‘These natural reasons of rational morality’, would, Amthor trusted, suf-
fice to show that the ‘present minority’ of Charles Frederick of Gottorp ‘can in 
no way release him from having to give satisfaction’ for breaching the peace 
against Denmark.31
 26 ‘Ob ein minderjähriger Printz / oder Potentate / desjenigen / was währender siner 
Minderjährigkeit geschehen / wann ihm daraus ein empfindlicher Schaden erwächset / 
billiger Weise zu entgelten habe?’ Ibid., para. 63.
 27 ‘Leuthe / bey denen die Passion, oder eine nachlässige Unwissenheit des allgemeinen 
Völcker- rechts prævaliret’. Ibid.
 28 Ibid.
 29 Ibid., para. 64.
 30 ‘Weil sonst bey der- gleichen Fällen / so lange der Fürst die Regierung nicht selber 
anträte / zwischen ihm und seinen Nachbahren keine Treu und sicherer Glaube mehr 
vorhanden seyn / einfolglich / wie kein verständiger Moraliste wird läugnen können /  
niemand mit einem jungen Fürsten würde zu schaffen haben wollen (gg).’ Citing 
Pufendorf, De Iure Naturae et Gentium, iii, 10, §§2– 3, and Barbeyrac’s commentary in 
his French translation. Ibid.
 31 ‘Diese natürliche Gründe der vernunfftmässigen Morale sind verhoffentlich zwar 
zulänglich gnug darzuthun / dass Ihrer Durchl. Hertzog Carl Friedrichs bisherige 
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Whether Amthor’s intervention on Danish side proved significant or not is 
difficult to say. Regardless, the debate indicates the significance of academic 
natural law and law of nations in early- eighteenth- century Denmark- Norway, 
as elsewhere in Europe. Academic expertise in the law of nature and nations 
was absolutely essential in maintaining Danish political interests against the 
arch- rival Sweden and its close ally to the south. The peace treaty of Fred-
eriksborg in 1720 confirmed the Danish sequestration of the Gottorp lands in 
Schleswig. But, typically of such treaties, this was not, as we saw, the final word 
in the matter, and Hojer would return to the subject fifteen years later, under 
Christian vi, Frederick iv’s son and successor.
5 Hojer’s Choice of Topic
This, then, was the background to Andreas Hojer’s choice of the topic for his 
inaugural dissertation. Appeals to Charles Frederick’s minority had been one 
of several arguments drawn upon by Gottorp pamphleteers in trying to estab-
lish the illegitimacy and illegality of the Danish sequestration of Gottorp lands 
and in seeking to secure international support for their restitution. In this 
connection, Gottorp had primarily appealed to the imperial constitution and 
prior treaties; it was Christoph Heinrich Amthor who first established Charles 
Frederick’s minority as an issue specifically of the law of nature and nations, 
in order to prove – in brief – its irrelevance on those grounds. As such, Hojer’s 
dissertation simply took up in greater detail a topic established by Amthor.
Hojer knew the history of the Great Northern War very well and was most 
likely conscious that he was taking up a topic first established by Amthor, even 
if he did not say so explicitly. One of Hojer’s first official appointments by the 
Danish monarch had been as royal historiographer, in 1721, replacing Amthor; 
this was, on Amthor’s request, to continue the latter’s history of Frederick iv.32 
Hojer finally completed a history of King Frederick iv’s reign under his son, King 
Christian vi, around 1734.33 Much of the work dealt in detail with Frederick iv’s 
Minorennitæt das Haus Gottorff auf keinerley Weise von der Satisfaction dispensiren 
könne / die es Seiner Königl. Majest. von Dännemarck wegen des letzteren zudringlichen 
Friedens- Bruchs zu leisten schuldig ist.’ Ibid., para. 65.
 32 Jørgensen, Andreas Hojer, jurist og historiker, 76, 89ff. See also documents in Rørdam, 
Historiske Samlinger og Studier, I: 375f and II: 375ff.
 33 Jørgensen, Andreas Hojer, jurist og historiker, 116; Rørdam, Historiske Samlinger og Studier, 
iii:495. Although it would not be printed until 1829: Hojer, König Friederich des Vierten 
glorwürdigstes Leben.
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role in the Great Northern War and the conflict with Gottorp. Hojer had con-
ducted extensive archival studies for his work, and described, among much else, 
Gottorp’s duplicity in simultaneously assisting Sweden and giving assurances 
of neutrality to Frederick iv, the Danish siege of the fortress Tønning and the 
subsequent conflict over the justification of the Danish occupation, including 
appeals to the minority of the Gottorp ruler.34 He was clearly familiar with 
Amthor’s role as anonymous polemicist for the Danish side and his writings in 
this capacity. The causes of the war, Hojer explained, ‘can easily be understood 
from the published declarations and the Amthorian writings’, as well as from 
the Swedish intrusions in recent years. In this connection it was particularly un-
fortunate that ‘it had not been common in Denmark to call upon people know-
ledgeable of the law of nature and of nations, of public law, as well as of history 
and good policy, in controversies over matters of state [Staats- Deductionen]’.35
These were precisely the topics on which Hojer had worked to establish his 
expertise, from his early work on marriages and the history of Denmark to his 
later defences of Denmark in the conflict with Hamburg. The passage was a 
forthright call for the necessity of expertise in natural law and history, and at 
the same time of Hojer’s own usefulness, for pursuing the political aims of the 
Danish monarchy. The inaugural dissertation thus gave Hojer the opportunity 
to demonstrate this. That the dissertation demonstrated an expertise in natural 
law was emphasized explicitly in the preface. The topic, what the right of war 
allowed against minors, was most appropriate for the discipline but had been 
discussed inadequately and by few. That it was also a question of the highest 
political interest (as he had emphasized in a private letter) was only hinted at – 
an ‘illustrious’ issue ‘among others, that are discussed in our time’36 – but was 
quite obvious to anyone with just a minimum of political awareness.
6 Hojer on the Right of War against Minors
The dissertation itself can be divided into four parts. Befitting an aca demic 
disputation, Hojer began by specifying the questions that must first be 
 34 Hojer, König Friederich des Vierten glorwürdigstes Leben, I: 249ff., for Hojer’s account of 
Gottorp’s appeals to the duke’s minority status, see p. 253. For a brief summary of the 
work, see Jørgensen, Andreas Hojer, jurist og historiker, 117– 123.
 35 ‘Allein zum Unglück war man in Dännemark von vielen Jahren her nicht gewohnt zu 
Staats- Deductionen Leute, die der Natur- Völker- und Staatsrechte, wie auch der Ante 
actorum und der rechten Politik kundig, aufzusuchen.’ Hojer, König Friederich des Vierten 
glorwürdigstes Leben, I: 182.
 36 Hojer, De eo quod iure belli licet in minores, fol. Ar.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simone Zurbuchen - 978-90-04-38420-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 09/19/2019 09:19:14AM
via University of Lausanne
50 Langballe Jensen
answered in order to determine the rights of war against minors: first, what is 
the right of war (ius belli); and second, what does it mean to say that someone 
is a minor? On this basis, Hojer then discussed the rights of war against minor 
subjects and finally the rights of war against minor princes. Throughout the 
dissertation, Hojer amply demonstrated his expertise in the ‘modern’ natural 
law pioneered by Hugo Grotius and particularly Samuel Pufendorf and Chris-
tian Thomasius, making use of the theoretical innovations and distinct meth-
ods of the latter two on critical and fundamental points. However, he followed 
neither of them slavishly, siding with thinkers such as Gottlieb Gerhard Titius 
and Christian Gottlieb Schwarz against Pufendorf, and betraying influences 
also of others of his own generation, such as Michael Heinrich Griebner, on 
the categorization of the parts of natural jurisprudence.
Hojer began by defining the right of war (ius belli) in line with the Pufen-
dorfian conception, according to which it was derived from natural law, or 
ius universale. ‘The right of war is that part of universal law which defines 
the duties of those waging war according to the dictates of right reason’ 
concerning what is necessary for conserving human society.37 This was, as 
Hojer saw it, now the consensus of the learned community.38 It was a position 
that departed from Grotius’s conception of the law of nations as distinct from 
the law of nature and a part of human voluntary (‘positive’) law. The latter 
had been the position of Samuel Rachel in Kiel and later his student Henrik 
 Weghorst in Copenhagen, and it was not the only view explicitly singled out 
for criticism in Hojer’s dissertation.39 To Hojer it was an equally serious mis-
take to try to define this law on the basis of Roman law, or indeed that of other 
people.40 This did not mean that the inquiry into the laws of various states 
did not play a role in Hojer’s argumentation, but, as we shall see, this did and 
could not serve the purpose of determining the laws or rights of war. Hojer 
then explained that the ius which governs the ‘human race’ is of a twofold 
kind: perfect and imperfect, according to which the resulting duties were ei-
ther commanded or merely permitted. Thus the ‘right of war’ consisted of the 
precepts of universal jurisprudence determining the perfect and imperfect 
 37 ‘Ius belli illa pars Iuris universalis, quae officia belligerantium ex dictamine rectae rationis 
definit.’ Ibid., 2.
 38 Compare Hojer’s comments on ius gentium in Hojer, Ideae Icti Danici partem 1., 27f.
 39 For Rachel, see Tetsuya Toyoda, Theory and Politics of the Law of Nations:  Political Bias 
in International Law Discourse of Seven German Court Councilors in the Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth Centuries (Leiden; Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), chap. 3. For 
Weghorst, see his Compendii juris naturæ, Dissertatio prima (Hafniae: Joachim Smetgen, 
1696), 22f.
 40 Hojer, De eo quod iure belli licet in minores, 2.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simone Zurbuchen - 978-90-04-38420-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 09/19/2019 09:19:14AM
via University of Lausanne
Hojer’s De eo quod iure belli licet in minores (1735) 51
duties of those waging war, that is, what was prescribed or forbidden and 
what was allowed or licit.41
Hojer went on to discuss the definition of minority. He presented a wide- 
ranging survey of the status of minors in various European laws, quoting pas-
sages from Greek and Roman law, ancient Germanic law, including Frankish 
and Anglo- Saxon law, old Danish and Jutish law, as well as the laws of vari-
ous northern German cities.42 All European laws, Hojer observed, agreed in 
viewing minority as an age between childhood and adulthood (legitima aetas), 
where a person was in need of a guardian because of a certain defect of reason 
and inconstancy of will. As such, the minor person could not legally decide 
his own affairs independently of a guardian. What these laws did not agree on, 
however, was exactly what age constituted this minority status.43 This showed, 
argued Hojer, that it was impossible to determine minority on the basis of rea-
son alone, that is, by natural law. It was a matter decided solely by the authority 
of the legislator, that is, positive law.44
In other words, for Hojer the historical investigation of (the incongruence 
of) positive laws served to show that there was no ‘innate norm’ stipulating 
minority status, but that it was a status instituted by human law or convention. 
The most that could be said of the ‘intentions’ of the lawgivers, argued Hojer, 
was that they aimed to ensure that no harm was done to the state as a result 
either of the impunity of minors or of their defencelessness without guardians. 
While natural law prescribed this end, namely the security of the state and of 
minors, it left open the means to secure this end. However, in this as in so many 
other matters, the lawyers had started to confuse positive and natural law. They 
had thus, erroneously, concluded that the Roman and canon law stipulations 
were part of natural law, so that minors should receive restitution according to 
natural law irrespective of how they had been injured.45
This all necessitated a more careful examination of the question ‘Are there 
minors according to the discipline of natural law?’ This Hojer could confi-
dently deny by summarizing his argument from the preceding pages, and 
confirming it with references to Grotius, Pufendorf and Thomasius, as well as 
Ulrik Huber and M.H. Griebner.46 Hojer further strengthened his argument 
 41 Ibid., 3f.
 42 Ibid., 3– 13.
 43 Ibid., 5.
 44 ‘Utpote subnixae, hac quidem in materia, solo legislatorum arbitrio, nequaquam autem 
stabili & immota iusti & aequi ratione, quam innata nobis norma subministret.’ Ibid., 10.
 45 Ibid., 13.
 46 Ibid., 13f.
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by distinguishing between different parts of natural or universal law. In the 
part dealing with the internal constitution of states, the ius civitatis universale, 
there could be said to be a place for minority. But this was precisely in the civil 
state and determined by positive law, as Hojer had previously explained.47 His 
topic was, however, a different part of the ius universale, that dealing with rela-
tions between states and as such the state of nature.
In the remainder of his argument, Hojer drew on the conceptual apparatus 
pioneered by Pufendorf, with its distinction between physical and moral enti-
ties and its discussion of different moral personae and moral states, to develop 
a consistent and rather radical position on the rights of war against minors. 
Simply put, Hojer argued that neither the physical constitution nor the civic 
status as child, minor or adult within a state was relevant when it came to inter- 
state relations and the rights of war. Rather, what was relevant was, in the case 
of rulers, the moral persona they carried as office- bearers (sovereigns) in their 
states, and, in the case of private persons, their moral persona as subjects of 
an enemy state and even their status as full enemies if engaged in hostile acts.
Hojer began by clarifying the characteristics of the natural state as opposed to 
the civil state. Following again the Pufendorfian position, he defined the natu ral 
state as one obtaining between free and equal persons. As such, the rights and 
duties of persons in a state of nature concerned only the conservation and pres-
ervation of themselves and their goods. From this it followed that there could 
be no minority status in the natural state, for minority entailed a relationship 
of dependence, and this would mean entering into a ‘relationship either famil-
ial or civil, which would take the place of the earlier state of liberty’. In their 
mutual relations, rulers and states were precisely ‘moral persons’ in the natural 
state, enjoying the liberty, rights and duties constituting this state. The conclu-
sion was, therefore, that such a moral person could not be considered a minor. 
‘Again, concerning complete societies and their rulers it is beyond any doubt 
that, although a king or a prince himself is a minor, considered together with his 
state and as its head, he cannot be considered by other free states as a minor’.48
Having recounted a number of historical examples confirming his argu-
ment, Hojer went on to argue that the natural state’s ‘ignorance of minority’ 
was even greater in case of war, so that the rights of war could show no respect 
for whatever minority status a person might have in their own state. Rather, 
‘disregarding any difference of age or authority, whoever is an enemy may be 
 47 Ibid., 15.
 48 ‘De integris Societatibus earumque Rectoribus adhuc magis est indubium, quantumuis 
Rex aut Princeps ipse sit Minor, eum tamen vt caput suæ reipublicæ vna cum illa spec-
tatum non posse ab aliis liberis statibus pro Minori haberi.’ Ibid., 16.
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pursued by right of war’.49 The rights of war were determined by the justice 
and intention of the party waging war. Whoever was waging a just war could 
rightfully do whatever was necessary to obtain the end of the war and the se-
curity of their own state. ‘In short, whatever our safety or public security de-
mands, or whatever can hasten peace or make it more constant and stable, all 
that not only may but even should be done by right of war to the enemy, even 
if a minor’.50
The only exception Hojer was willing to make was that of infants, ‘who in 
no way can inflict harm’. Other than that, the only relevant distinction was 
according to the ‘status’ of the enemy, that is, whether he was a subject or a 
ruler.51 Accordingly, Hojer went on to discuss the rights of war against those 
two different classes of enemies. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to fol-
low Hojer’s argumentation in all details in this regard. Suffice it to say that he 
allowed fairly widespread licence to rob, abduct or kill even unarmed enemy 
subjects insofar as they could assist the enemy’s war effort, or if it was a ‘war 
of extinction’, which Hojer held to be a legitimate form of war.52 Thus Hojer 
argued with Caspar Ziegler against Grotius that a ‘right of retaliation’ was jus-
tified not only against the person who had transgressed, but against his whole 
people or state as members of a ‘moral person’.53 Armed minors were simply 
to be considered enemies: ‘here we should consider arms and the intention to 
harm us, not age’.54 In short, ‘a person is an enemy when he can rightly be con-
sidered to be in the position of an enemy, regardless of age [ ... ]. He who assists 
the army of the enemy with arms, military works or advice, or who causes us 
injury, cannot be considered a minor’.55
Turning to the case of a minor prince, Hojer reiterated the fundamentals 
of the universal right of war. He argued, first, that ‘the natural state of equal 
liberty, the rights of which princes exercise among themselves, does not know 
minority or its benefits’; second, that, in war, whoever intends and is able to 
 49 ‘Adeoque ante omnia notandum est, Ius belli nullum nec habere nec admittere respec-
tum Minorum, sed absque ullo vel aetatis vel auctoritatis discrimine, quotquot inter 
hostes sunt, iure belli persequi.’ Ibid., 17.
 50 ‘quicquid vel salus nostra vel publica securitas postulat, aut ad pacem vel acceleran-
dam vel eo constantius stabiliendam facere potest, id omne ex belli iure in hostem vtut 
Minorem recte & absque iniuria fieri non potest modo, sed debet etiam;’ ibid., 18.
 51 Ibid., 19.
 52 Ibid., 20.
 53 Ibid., 21.
 54 ‘Arma hic & nobis nocendi animus spectandus est, non anni.’ Ibid., 22.
 55 ‘Hostis qui est, hostis loco recte habetur, in quacunque sit aetate […] Minor denique non 
habetur, qui hostium exercitium vel armis, vel militari opera vel conciliis firmat, aut nobis 
damna infert.’ Ibid., 23.
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harm another should not be considered a minor but ‘a perfect enemy’; and 
finally, that as far as actions are concerned which affect other rulers, ‘a ruler, as 
the head of his state and considered one moral body together with it, should 
always be considered of age (maior), as acting by his own right and wholly 
master of his own affairs, even if everything – in domestic and foreign affairs – 
is carried out in his name by guardians or administrators’.56
This position, Hojer argued, could not be denied without destroying all the 
principles of natural jurisprudence, as well as ‘its end and foundation, the peace 
of the human race’.57 Hojer emphasized that this was evident particularly from the 
characteristics of the natural state, but he also proceeded to prove his case, as had 
Amthor, from the necessity of ensuring order and safety in international  affairs. If 
a prince or his successors could not be held responsible for what had happened 
during his minority, he would be able to act with impunity and no neighbours 
could be safe.58 This would endanger the security not only of neighbouring states 
but also of the minor prince himself and his state, as the neighbours would seek to 
remove him from the throne in the interest of their own security.59
Continuing to discuss the more specific rights of war against a minor prince, 
Hojer once again emphasized that such rights and obligations pertained not just 
to the prince but to the whole moral person of the state.60 No doubt with a view 
to the contemporary situation, Hojer argued that one could justifiably take into 
possession, exact tribute from and otherwise ravage the ‘dominions and lands’ 
of a prince who waged war against oneself, insofar as this was demanded by the 
reasons of war.61 Such rights of war also resulted, Hojer argued, from a prince 
aiding one’s enemy even if this fell short of actual outright aggression. This was 
of course precisely what Charles Frederick had done by giving Stenbock’s army 
shelter in Tønning. In this case, Hojer cited Grotius’s quotation from Agathias 
that ‘he is an Enemy who does what pleases an Enemy’.62 Against the objec-
tion that it would be more virtuous to conserve a minor prince, and restore his 
lands after hostilities had ended than to ruin him completely, Hojer answered 
 56 ‘Principem ut caput suae reipublicae & unum cum illa corpus morale spectatum, in acti-
bus, qui alios status aut Principes attingunt, semper haberi pro Maiore; qui sui iuris, sua-
rumque rerum plenus sit arbiter, etiamsi omnia domi forisque ipsius nomine a Tutoribus 
aut administris gerantur.’ Ibid., 24.
 57 Ibid.
 58 Ibid., 25.
 59 Ibid., 30f.
 60 Ibid., 35.
 61 Ibid., 37.
 62 Ibid., 39. I am here citing from the English translation in Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War 
and Peace, ed. Richard Tuck (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2005), book iii, chap. 17, §3.
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that these were considerations of virtue and political prudence, not of justice or 
natural law. Natural law demanded that a state look to its own security also 
in the future, and in fact both virtue and prudence dictated that one should 
deprive an enemy of weapons and lands by which he could do one harm.63
Hojer concluded his inaugural dissertation by turning to the question of 
whether the rights of the victor resulted solely from the consent of the van-
quished. This was again implicitly addressing the contemporary situation, for, as 
we saw, Charles Frederick had refused to consent to both the peace treaty of Fred-
eriksborg and the settlement brokered by Russia and Vienna and thereby Danish 
dominion over his former possessions in Schleswig. According to Hojer, ‘the victor 
enjoys the rights of victory and retains what he has justly occupied, even if the mi-
nor objects’.64 Hojer explicitly disagreed here with Pufendorf and Hobbes, accord-
ing to whom the rights of the victor resulted only from ‘a pact with the defeated’ 
who submitted to the will of the victors. Instead, he argued with Johann Friedrich 
Horn, G.G. Titius and C.G. Schwarz that by ‘the victory itself’ and the law of nature 
‘arise supreme rule’ over the vanquished and the occupied things, ‘apart from any 
preceding pact’.65 This is because otherwise there would be no end to war, or war 
would be renewed on the pretext that consent had not been truly given, which 
would be contrary to the natural right of war. In fact, Hojer presented Pufendorf 
as having come to much the same conclusion, quoting a longer passage from De 
officio hominis et civis, where it was argued that a party engaging in war was held 
to have ‘tacitly consented’ in whatever condition the war resulted in.66 All that 
therefore remained according to the law of nature was that the victor ensured his 
security and satisfaction, retaining as far as necessary the goods, lands and domin-
ions of the enemy, defending and fortifying them to prevent further hostilities. 
That is: the Danish king should retain his possessions in Schleswig to pre- empt 
further danger arising from Charles Frederick allying with Sweden.
7 Conclusion: a Radical Pufendorfian in the 
Service of Denmark- Norway
On the basis of the preceding discussion and by way of concluding, we are now 
in a better position to address two questions. First, why was a professorship in 
 63 Hojer, De eo quod iure belli licet in minores, 41– 43.
 64 ‘fruitur tamen victor iure victoriae, & retinet, quae iuste occupavit, etiam reclamante 
Minore’. Ibid., 44.
 65 Ibid. Reading ‘naturae’ for ‘natura’.
 66 Ibid., 45.
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natural law and the law of nations created at Copenhagen University and why 
was Hojer appointed? Second, why did Hojer choose for his inaugural disserta-
tion the topic he did, and what does that tell us about his natural law profile?
Although the professorship in natural law and the law of nations was cre-
ated with the new university statutes of 1732 and filled with the appointment 
of Hojer in 1734, there had been ongoing concerns with improving the teaching 
of that discipline for decades. There was thus a clear sense of the need to offer 
this new and popular subject to students in Denmark. What Hojer’s career and 
remarks emphasize is that an expertise in the subject was a political necessity. 
The Danish monarchs Christian V (grandfather of Christian vi) and Frederick 
iv needed to draw on experts in the field to justify their political interests do-
mestically and abroad, particularly against Sweden and the dukes of Gottorp, 
but also vis- à- vis Hamburg and the German Empire more broadly.
Both of these needs could only have been accentuated by the Gottorp uni-
versity in Kiel. Although the university of a very minor power, it was both 
geographically and, in many ways, intellectually closer than Copenhagen to 
the new developments in Germany. It had been one of the first universities 
to create a chair in natural law, which had been held by Samuel Rachel, who 
had used this expertise to defend Gottorp interests against the Danish kings in 
the later seventeenth century. Denmark- Norway simply lacked a comparable 
academic tradition and expertise, and accordingly had to draw on foreigners to 
supply this: that both Weghorst and Amthor were called from Kiel should not 
be explained only by its geographical proximity.
It would seem that both these concerns were present in creating the new 
chair in natural law. That Hojer was appointed to the position has been cred-
ited to his activities and writings on behalf of Danish interests in a conflict 
with the city of Hamburg over its refusal to accept Danish currency.67 Hojer’s 
eagerness to demonstrate the political utility of his expertise in natural law 
is evident from the topics he suggested for the dissertation. The topic of the 
rights of war against minors allowed Hojer to address both concerns. First, it 
held immediate relevance as the Danish dominion over Schleswig became a 
matter of discussion in the Polish War of Succession. Second, it was also the 
subject most suited to demonstrate his expertise in the field. It was the only 
topic that he himself characterized as pertaining to ‘the law of nature and na-
tions’, the others being topics of ‘ius publicum’.68
 67 Rørdam, Historiske Samlinger og Studier, IV: 135f., see also iii: 516; Jørgensen, Andreas 
Hojer, jurist og historiker, 143.
 68 ‘Disp. Juris Nat. & G.’ Hojer, ‘[Letter to an unnamed “Monseigneur”]’, [2] .
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As we have seen, Hojer drew fully on the Pufendorfian conceptual frame-
work of moral personae, and what has been termed Pufendorf ’s conventional-
ist conception of natural law and morality. This indicates his personal interest 
in taking up the topic, as well as the distinctive characteristics of his natural 
law profile within the larger context of natural law theorizing and enlighten-
ment thought in early- eighteenth- century Denmark- Norway. Hojer seems to 
have been particularly interested in the conventionalist theory of morality and 
politics suggested by Pufendorf ’s theory of natural law, as well as its potential 
to fundamentally undermine contemporary ‘naturalist’ conceptions of moral-
ity.69 During his studies in Halle, Hojer seems to have adopted Thomasius’s 
interest in criticizing this naturalistic theory of morality, which Thomasius had 
characterized as the scholastic doctrine of perseitas, as well as an interest in 
pushing the Pufendorfian conceptual framework to its limits. In his disserta-
tion on the rights of war against minors, and particularly in his work on the 
non- prohibition of incestuous marriages, Hojer was developing this agenda, 
reaching conclusions that, while perhaps serviceable to Denmark’s absolute 
monarchs, went far beyond the moral commonplaces of his day, and even 
ours.70 That he could do so and still hold such influential positions in early- 
eighteenth- century Denmark is arguably what makes Hojer such an interest-
ing figure and the question of his significance for the early enlightenment in 
Denmark so pressing.
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 chapter 3
The Law of Nations at the Naval Academy 
in Copenhagen around 1800: the 
Lectures of Christian Krohg
Thor Inge Rørvik
1 Introduction
Recent scholarship has no doubt contributed to a better understanding of the 
law of nature and nations by no longer regarding it exclusively as a topic de-
veloped in a limited number of classical works forming a single identifiable 
tradition, and, further, by identifying it as a subject of academic teaching es-
tablished in the late seventeenth century and ending well into the nineteenth. 
As a consequence, the law of nature and nations should not only be measured 
by its theoretical coherence or originality, but also be understood by the way it 
was received, appropriated and transmitted in various institutional, legal and 
political contexts. Moving forward from this angle, it is, however, important 
to realize that we still know comparatively little about the workings of this 
tradition of moral and legal thinking and that we – in order to gain a better un-
derstanding of the matter – will need a more comprehensive mapping of the 
territory. The scope of this chapter is to contribute to such a mapping, by in-
troducing a Danish- Norwegian textbook that has remained virtually unknown 
until today. The book in question is Forsøg til en Ledetraad ved Forelesninger 
over Folke- Retten (An Attempted Guide to Lectures on the Law of Nations), pub-
lished in Copenhagen in 1803; its author is Christian Krohg (1777– 1828) and the 
lectures on which the textbook is based were held at the Royal Danish Naval 
Academy in 1801 and 1802.
To introduce a textbook is, in many ways, a different enterprise from pre-
senting an innovative theoretical work where one can highlight its contribu-
tion to an ongoing debate or focus on the way it makes established ways of 
thinking obsolete. A textbook will always remain anchored in a tradition that 
must be accounted for in order to understand its content. Before turning its 
attention to Krohg’s lectures, this chapter will therefore begin with an attempt 
to sketch a contextual background against which they must be understood. 
Two contexts are particularly important here: 1) the way the law of nations was 
treated as an academic subject at the University of Copenhagen; and 2)  the 
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emergence of a different understanding of the subject in the 1790s that put its 
mark on a generation of Danish- Norwegian jurists.
2 The Law of Nations as an Academic Subject
Three years after entering the University of Copenhagen as a student,  Christian 
Krohg passed the final degree examination in the faculty of law in 1797. He 
belonged to a circle of talented jurists who in the years to come would find 
themselves in important positions, both within and outside of the academic 
world. Inspired by their teacher, Professor Johan Friedrich Wilhelm Schlegel 
(1765– 1836), the circle held the Kantian philosophy of law in high esteem, both 
as a key to the relation between moral philosophy and law and as a foundation 
upon which a scientific legal edifice should build. But despite his veneration of 
Kant, Schlegel had in his textbook on natural law refuted the idea of a distinct 
Weltbürgerrecht (cosmopolitan law), because this topic should be treated as a 
part of public law or the law of nations.1 That Schlegel was too much of a jurist 
to fall prey to what he believed to be philosophical chimeras is also evident in 
the way he outlines in his textbook the principles of the natural law of nations 
before moving on to what he referred to as the positive law of nations. This 
sub- discipline did not quite fit into his larger system, but he had included it 
because it was an important issue and no presentation of it was yet available 
to a Danish- Norwegian audience. Schlegel hoped that this amendment to what 
had hitherto been considered a sufficient outline of the law of nations would 
be appreciated, even if it involved a different way of looking at things and put 
new demands on the way a textbook should be written.
As a historical science the positive law of nations relies on facts. It is 
therefore necessary to provide the reader with references to where fur-
ther information can be found concerning the different topics in ques-
tion, whereas this is not necessary in the other parts of the book which 
deal with the exposition of truths of reason.2
If one looks at his predecessors’ lectures, Schlegel was no doubt right to regard 
the positive law of nations as a neglected topic. And the reason was obvious. 
 1 J.W.F. Schlegel, Naturrettens eller den almindelige Retslæres Grundsætninger (Copenha-
gen: Johan Frederik Schulz, 1798), i, 20 and ii, 321.
 2 Ibid., ii, preamble (not paginated). Translations from Danish original works here and below 
are by the present author.
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The university statutes of 1732 and the regulations of the formal examina-
tion for a degree in law, introduced in 1736, stated that students aspiring to 
the higher level of the grading scale (laudabilis or haud illaudabillis) should 
account for the principles of the law of nature and nations. The textbooks in 
use were, however, more or less Pufendorfian, and according to Pufendorf the 
law of nations ‘is nothing other than the law of nature, insofar as different 
nations, not united with another by a supreme sovereignty, observe it, who 
must render one another the same duties in their fashion, as are prescribed 
for individuals by the law of nature’.3 Regarding the law of nature as the guid-
ing principle also in matters of interstate relations, Pufendorf found it unnec-
essary to conduct a special treatment of the law of nations, because what he 
had already said about the law of nature and the duties of individuals could 
be applied either to whole states or to nations, which he considered to be 
moral persons. In the textbooks used at the University of Copenhagen until 
the middle of the eighteenth century, the law of nations was therefore treated 
only briefly, in connection with war and peace, alliances (treaties), and the 
holiness of envoys.4
The first attempt to give a comprehensive introduction to the law of nations 
and point out its place in the theoretical edifice of the law of nature came in a 
Wolffian textbook in 1776. According to its author, Professor Lauritz  Nørregaard 
(1745– 1804), the law of nations was a part of jus naturae sociale – i.e. the natural 
law which deduces the rights and duties characterizing different social orga-
nizations. Because these organizations are either small (the household) or big 
(the state), jus naturae sociale must be divided into 1) jus naturae oeconomicum 
sive familiarum and 2)  jus naturae politicum sive jus universale civitatum. The 
duties and rights imposed upon a state are either such that they concern only 
the state itself or they signify its rights and duties towards other states. In the 
first case they are a part of jus naturae politicum sic dictum; in the second they 
belong to jus gentium.5
 3 Samuel Pufendorf, Elementorum Iurisprudentiae Universalis Libri Duo (1660), book i, chap. 
xiii, § 24. Here quoted from the English translation by W.A. Oldfather: Two Books of the Ele-
ments of Universal Jurisprudence, ed. Thomas Behme (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2009), 
225. See also De jure naturae et gentium (1672), book ii, chap. iii, § 23.
 4 The textbooks were Ludvig Holberg, Introduction til Naturens- og Folke- Rettens Kundskab 
(Copenhagen: Johan Kruse, 1716) and a Danish translation of De officiis hominis et civis made 
in 1735. See Knud Haakonssen, ‘Holberg’s Law of Nature and Nations,’ in Ludvig Holberg 
(1684– 1754). Learning and Literature in the Nordic Enlightenment, ed. Knud Haakonssen and 
Sebastian Olden- Jørgensen (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 59– 79.
 5 Lauritz Nørregaard, Natur- Rettens første Grunde, 2nd ed. (Copenhagen: Gyldendals Forlag, 
1784), §§ 164– 167.
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Presented as a part of the system of natural law, the law of nations continued 
to be assessed with regard to the system’s founding certainties. Throughout the 
eighteenth century, Danish- Norwegian jurists understood this system as a frame-
work that could not itself be captured in legal terms and as a tacit philosophi-
cal foundation of contemporary legislation. In a more practical sense it was also 
considered to be a supplementary legal system. According to Nørregaard, natural 
law ‘was the only subsidiary law that one can and should follow’, and Schegel 
later stated that ‘all positive laws should be founded on natural law, and where 
these are either silent or ambiguous, the jurists must take recourse to natural law 
as a jus subsidiarum’.6 According to the university statutes of 1732, the professor 
responsible for lecturing on Danish- Norwegian law had to demonstrate how this 
law ‘complied with the law of nature and nations’. The purpose of this demon-
stration was to show that the absolutist state’s legislation was in accordance with 
moral maxims and hence an expression of the dictates of reason. In the absence 
of an international legal system, the law of nations could not serve as a bench-
mark in the same sense as other parts of natural law. What it could do was provide 
general guidelines for wise statecraft and the handling of international relations. 
But the way the law of nations was taught at the University of Copenhagen until 
the late 1790s simply ruled out the idea that it could be anything more than a 
part of a larger system. The idea of a discipline that took current international ar-
rangements as its vantage point and also realized that binding agreements could 
modify the general maxims of natural law was never presented to the students. 
The professors on their part could hardly have been unfamiliar with this idea, 
because it was put forth in the works of Hugo Grotius and Emer de Vattel.
In the prolegomena to his great work, Grotius declared that as the laws of 
each state respected the benefits of the state, ‘so amongst all or most States 
there might be, and in Fact there are, some Laws agreed on by common Con-
sent, which respect the Advantage not of one Body in particular, but of all in 
general. And this is what is called the Law of Nations’.7 The difference between 
natural law and the law of nations amounted to more than the fact that the 
first was a just inference from the principles of nature whereas the second 
origi nated in a universal consent, because ‘that which cannot be deduced from 
certain Principles by just Consequences, and yet appears to be everywhere 
observed, must owe its rise to a free and arbitrary Will’.8 Grotius here identified 
 6 Ibid., § 158; see also Schlegel, Naturrettens, § 15.
 7 Hugo Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis (1652), Prolegomena, 18, 41. Here quoted after the English 
translation from the edition of Jean Barbeyrac, ed. by Richard Tuck: The Rights of War and 
Peace (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2005), 96.
 8 Ibid., 112.
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the law of nations as an existing body of law that, on the one hand, differed 
from jus naturae by being a result of the human will, and, on the other hand, 
differed from civil law by not being enforceable by a court. By regarding the law 
of nations as more flexible or adaptable to local conditions than the universal 
timeless principles of natural right, Grotius had thus admitted state interests 
into the picture.9 Although Vattel wrote his major work under different histor-
ical conditions and with other problems in mind, there is a similarity between 
the Grotian understanding of jus gentium and Vattel’s distinction between the 
necessary law of nations and the positive law of nations, consisting of a volun-
tary, conventional and customary law. What distinguished the positive law from 
the necessary was the fact that the three kinds of law of which it consisted ‘pro-
ceed from the will of nations, – the voluntary from their presumed consent, the 
conventional from an express consent, and the customary from tacit consent’.10 
What characterized the voluntary law was that, despite being a part of the pos-
itive law of nations, it was, like the necessary law of nations, established by 
nature, but in a different manner. The necessary law is ‘a sacred law which na-
tions and sovereigns are bound to respect and follow in all their actions’, while 
the voluntary law is ‘a rule which the general welfare and safety oblige them to 
admit in their transactions with each other’.11 And whereas the necessary law 
is based on the natural principle of self- perfection, the voluntary law accounts 
for what nations need to tolerate by necessity in order to avoid greater evils. 
In the hands of Vattel, the law of nations became what Grotius had suggested 
when submitting it to a free and arbitrary will, that is, more an issue of political 
prudence than a part of the system of natural law.12 In interstate relations there 
 9 For a more thorough account of this point, see Ian Hunter: ‘The Law of Nature and Na-
tions,’ in The Routledge Companion to Eighteenth Century Philosophy, ed. Aaron Garrett 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 578; see also Stephen C. Neff, War and the Law 
of Nations. A General History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 96– 102.
 10 Emer de Vattel, Le droit des gens (1758), preface (not paginated). Here quoted from the 
anonymous English translation of 1797, ed. Béla Kapossy and Richard Whatmore, The 
Law of Nations (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2008), 78.
 11 Vattel, The Law of Nations, 14, 17. Regarding the voluntary law of nations, see also Simone 
Zurbuchen: ‘Emer de Vattel on the Society of Nations and the Political System of Europe,’ 
in System, Order, and International Law, ed. Stefan Kadelbach, Thomas Kleinlein and 
David Roth- Isigkeit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 263– 282.
 12 This transition from Grotius to Vattel is outlined in Koen Stapelbroek, ‘Universal 
Society, Commerce and the Rights of Neutral Trade,’ in Universalism in International 
Law and Political Philosophy, ed. Petter Korkman and Virpi Mäkinen (Helsinki: Helsinki 
Collegium for Advanced Studies, 2008), 63– 89, here 77– 78. See also Ian Hunter, 
‘Vattel’s Law of Nations:  Diplomatic Casuistry for the Protestant Nation,’ Grotiana 31 
(2010), 108– 140, and T.J. Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 180– 182.
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are no higher principles of justice, only the conscience of a sovereign ruler 
well aware that in matters concerning the prosperity of the state he is the sole 
arbitrator.
This can explain the lack of references to Grotius or Vattel in the Danish- 
Norwegian tradition until Schlegel introduced the positive law of nations in 
the 1790s. By turning jus gentium into a matter of political statecraft or diplo-
matic casuistry, they had made it unfit as a topic for university lectures. But as 
long as these lectures were based on the conviction that the law of nations was 
part of natural law, it was possible to maintain a necessary distance to the ar-
cana imperii. It is also worth noticing that until the end of the century lectures 
on the law of nations did not present it as an independent topic, but always in 
conjunction with jus publicum.13 This was the discipline where different kinds 
of governmental potestas were treated, including the right and power to en-
gage in matters external to the state, which was part of potestas executoria – as 
were also jus foederum publicorum and jus belli et pacis.14 In its general form, jus 
publicum was supposed to show how things ought to be, regardless of how they 
actually were. In an introduction to the study of law, Professor Peder Kofod 
Ancher (1710– 1788) bluntly denied the existence of a jus publicum particulare 
pertaining to Denmark- Norway, because the limitations that the Royal Law of 
1665 put on the sovereign power were not sufficient to form a separate juri-
dical discipline; and the purpose of it all would only be to show the absolutist 
state’s ‘proper nature and its correspondence with the principles of general 
public law’.15 However, with the publication of a series of lectures on jus publi-
cum by the late Professor Andreas Hojer (1690– 1739), something akin to what 
Kofod Ancher found unnecessary actually turned up. According to Hojer, an 
understanding of the Danish- Norwegian constitution required knowledge not 
only of law, but also of geography, pragmatic history and genealogy as well as 
knowledge of the alliances that throughout history had been made with other 
governments. Two topics treated by Hojer were the Sound dues at Øresund and 
Denmark’s jus dominium over the Baltic Sea. The right to the dues rested on 
‘[t] he consent of all sea powers, that is: Holland, France, England, Spain’ and 
‘the Danish King’s willingness and ability to defend vessels passing through the 
 13 The last series of lectures on jus publicum and the law of nations joined together was 
held at the University of Copenhagen in the winter of 1795– 1796 by professor C.U.D. von 
Eggers (1758– 1813). The lectures were published under the title Institutiones juris civita-
tis publici et gentium universalis (Copenhagen: Proft et Storch, 1796).
 14 Ibid., §§ 98– 111.
 15 Peder Kofod Ancher, Anviisning for en Dansk Jurist angaaende Lovkyndigheds adskillige 
Deele, Nytte og Hielpemidler, 2nd ed. (Copenhagen: Ludolpf Henrich Lille, 1777), 20.
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Sound against pirates’. The jus dominium over the Baltic Sea was likewise due 
to the successful fight against pirates, which had made other sovereign powers 
recognize Denmark as the Baltic Sea’s ‘defender and master’.16
What Hojer covered here was not current international law; it was still a 
part of jus publicum and the practice of wise government. Apart from the king’s 
duty to promote salus populi in accordance with proper rules, there was still no 
autonomous international legal system in existence and no legal sources inde-
pendent of what the king himself regarded as a reasonable way to exercise his 
sovereignty. Nevertheless, it was the results of such  exercises – i.e. treaties and 
interstate agreements, or more precisely, conventional and customary law  – 
that eventually became the backbone of the positive law of nations. Whereas 
the foundation of the discipline was the conviction that the practice of diplo-
macy was also an important part of the law of nations, as Vattel had suggested, 
its content was the compilation of the newest European state practice, which, 
from the 1770s on, had been a part of German Staatsrecht.17 Christian Ulrich 
Detlev Von Eggers still anchored his lectures on jus publicum and the law of na-
tions in the traditional frame of natural right, but when he explained the differ-
ent kinds of potestas he pointed to the Allgemeines Gesetzbuch für die Preußi-
schen Staaten (1792). In his presentation of the positive law of nations, Schlegel 
augmented the German connection by numerous references to Johann Jakob 
Moser (1701– 1787), Karl Gottlob Günther (1752– 1832) and Georg Friedrich von 
Martens (1756– 1821). In the textbook he later wrote as a guide to his lectures 
at the Naval Academy, Christian Krohg took the matter one step further by 
including excerpts from treaties and agreements in order to explain what the 
positive law of nations was all about.
3 Towards a New Understanding of the Law of Nations
The late 1790s witnessed a growing interest in the law of nations at the Univer-
sity of Copenhagen. Whereas the decade had begun with the introduction of 
Kant’s moral and legal philosophy, attention now turned to issues concerning 
international relations. This change of focus was, no doubt, due to the outbreak 
 16 Andreas Hojer, Jus Publicum det er Stats- Ret eller Statsforfatning og Rettigheder for 
Danmark, Norge og Fyrstendommene forklaret ved private Forelæsninger eller Kollegio 
(Christiania: Jens Ørbek Berg, 1783), 9– 12.
 17 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Into positivism:  Georg Friedrich von Martens (1756– 1821) and 
Modern International Law,’ Constellations 15 (2008):  190– 191, and ‘The Advantage of 
Treaties: International Law in the Enlightenment,’ Edinburgh Law Review 13 (2009): 27– 67.
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of the French Revolutionary Wars and the events leading to the founding of 
the Second League of Armed Neutrality in 1800. The problems now confront-
ing the jurists were a matter of public interest in the same way that the hotly 
debated Kantian philosophy had been. But whereas this debate had gained 
momentum because the philosophy in question challenged an established in-
tellectual culture, international matters were strictly legal and political. The 
most important agent of this change of focus was Professor Schlegel. As editor 
of the leading legal periodical Astræa, he filled its pages with issues of legal 
philosophy until 1799, when an increase in space given over to matters con-
cerning the law of nations became noticeable.18 And although his textbook on 
natural law was at the outset an attempt to found the scientific legal edifice on 
philosophical principles, he had ended it with an introduction to the positive 
law of nations – a discipline that was not only unknown to the broader public, 
but also at odds with the philosophical principles he had introduced at the 
beginning of the book. But Schlegel was not alone in his quest for a new under-
standing of the law of nations in Denmark- Norway.
In the summer of 1796 the University’s faculty of law announced that it 
would offer, for the first time, lectures on the law of nations, without men-
tioning jus publicum. That these lectures were not delivered by any of the fac-
ulty’s professors, but by the adjunct Frederik Theodor Hurtigkarl (1763– 1829), 
might suggest that the subject was not considered too important. It was not 
among the main subjects at the students’ final exam, and it was, rather, Dan-
ish law, Roman law and jus publicum that primarily occupied the professors 
as part of their official duties in a faculty that remained understaffed. It was 
therefore decided that the adjunct at the faculty of law should no longer be 
occupied with only administrative tasks, but also lecture. The position of ad-
junct thus became a recruitment position at a time when the doctoral degree 
was still reserved for those who already belonged to the upper echelons of the 
civil service. Between 1798 and 1800 three new adjuncts were employed; two 
of them, Christian Krohg and Mathias Hastrup Bornemann (1776– 1849), were 
later appointed as extraordinary professors. All applicants for the position of 
adjunct had to undergo a series of trial lectures and several of these were later 
published. In 1798 the applicants had to explain the concepts of right and duty 
and the means at their disposal was the Kantian philosophy. In 1799 they had 
to answer the following question: ‘What is the holiness of envoys – and what 
is its extent according to both the natural and the customary law of nations?’ 
 18 Dag Michalsen, ‘Legislators, Journals, and the Public Legal Sphere in Scandinavia around 
1800,’ in Eighteenth- Century Periodicals as Agents of Change, ed. Ellen Krefting, Aina 
Nøding and Mona Ringvej (Leiden and Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2015), 207– 208.
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The answer provided by the winner of the competition shows that the problem 
was approached from two angles. What the natural law of nations said about 
the matter called for a systematic presentation, with references to Grotius, 
Pufendorf, Wolff and Vattel. What the customary law of nations said about the 
matter was shown in a historical account, starting with Livy and ending close 
to the present. The candidate also presented some reflections on the relation 
between the two types of law: in comparing the customary law of nations to 
the natural law one should be cautious, he argued, because even if there are 
similarities between interstate relations and the state of nature, the former 
contain at least ‘an analogon of juridical security’. The mixture of ‘juridical 
wisdom, politics and coutumes’ that is normally referred to as the customary 
law of nations is a result of sound human reasoning that could be traced back 
to the ancient conception of jus feciale, ‘without which no dealings between 
nations was possible’.19 There had to be a way to approximate the two parts of 
the law of nations. The same eagerness to dissolve problems or discrepancies 
through philosophical formalization was also present in Bornemann’s later 
attempt to sketch a set of rules for the visitation of neutral vessels and the 
rights of convoys in wartime. Although Krohg recommended this work to his 
students at the Naval Academy, its content was too abstract for the practical 
needs of future naval officers.20
Few details are known about Krohg’s appointment to adjunct in 1800; and 
although trial lectures were once again held, none were published. It is also 
far from clear why the University sent the new adjunct to lecture at the Naval 
Academy and not Bornemann, who had already proven himself capable of 
dealing with issues of the law of nations. The most probable answer is that 
Krohg possessed comprehensive knowledge of foreign legislation and hence, 
unlike Bornemann, who was inclined to abstract speculations, was consid-
ered better suited to teach at an institution where the students needed to 
learn how to find their way through repositories of diplomatic and treaty 
practice. How to provide the cadets at the Academy with the necessary skills 
was, however, a question that Krohg had to solve on his own, because the 
 19 Mathias Hastrup Bornemann, ‘Prøveforelæsning over det Spørgsmaal: Hvad forståes ved 
Gesandteres Hellighed, og hvorvidt strækker den sig, saavel efter den naturlige som sæd-
vanemæssige Folkeret?,’ Minerva (1800): iv, 36, 52, 63.
 20 Mathias Hastrup Bornemann, Over den brugelige Visitation af neutrale Skibe og kon-
vojen, og et Middel til at hæve begge ved en almindelig og garanteret Søhandelsfolkeret 
(Copenhagen: Thiele, 1801), translated into German as Über die gebräuchliche Visitation 
der neutralen Schiffe, und über die Convoi, nebst einem Mittel, beyde durch ein allgemeines 
garantirtes Seehandels- Völkerrecht zu heben (Copenhagen and Leipzig: Schubothe, 1801).
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law of nations had not previously been among the teaching subjects at the 
institution.
The Royal Danish Naval Academy was established in 1701 and soon be-
came the single avenue to a naval officer position in Denmark- Norway. In 
order to understand the role of the Academy, one must take into consider-
ation that from the end of the Great Northern War (1721) and until the Bat-
tle of Copenhagen (1801) the Danish- Norwegian state had enjoyed a period 
of relative peace.21 And although the decision to introduce the law of na-
tions at the Academy predated the recent hostilities, it was clearly called for 
by international political events. Thanks to its position as a neutral power, 
Denmark- Norway had throughout the eighteenth century expanded its com-
mercial interests, and its merchant fleet was about to become a main Euro-
pean carrier. As a result, stronger demands were put on the navy to protect 
merchant ships from pirates or belligerent nations. This need for protection 
had to do with the fact that, despite a great number of legal and diplomatic 
attempts to solve the problem, there was no generally acknowledged practice 
concerning the rights of neutral vessels.22 From a Danish- Norwegian point of 
view, the core of the problem was the way Britain handled neutral shipping. 
In the 1790s the British attitude hardened, triggered by the suspicion that 
neutral vessels were supplying France with much- needed goods. In 1798 two 
Swedish convoys were arrested by the British Royal Navy in the Channel and 
in 1800 a Danish convoy and the naval ship guarding it were led to a British 
port.23 In his response to a verdict passed by the High Court of Admiralty in 
Britain in one of the Swedish convoy cases, Professor Schlegel defended the 
rights of neutrals according to what he regarded as the established princi-
ples of the law of nations. He hoped that his investigation would ‘render the 
rights of neutral commerce more respected by the belligerent Powers, and 
the voice of justice in the clamour and tumult of war more intelligibly heard 
in cases where the whole property of industrious and peaceable citizens is 
 21 For an account of the Naval Academy and a comparative study of naval education in 
Denmark, Sweden and England, see Evan Wilson, Jacob Seerup and Anna Sara Hammar, 
‘The education and careers of naval officers in the long eighteenth century: an interna-
tional perspective,’ Journal for Maritime Research 17 (2015): 17– 33.
 22 Silvia Marzagalli and Leos Müller, ‘In apparent disagreement with all law of nations in the 
world: Negotiating neutrality for shipping and trade during the French Revolution and 
Napoleonic Wars,’ International Journal of Maritime History 28 (2016): 112.
 23 Ibid., 116. See also Pierre Pourchasse, ‘Danish shipping in the Mediterranean during 
the Revolutionary wars (1793– 1795),’ The International Journal of Maritime History 28 
(2016): 165– 179, and Ole Feldbæk, ‘The Anglo- Danish Convoy Conflict of 1800: A study 
of small power policy and neutrality,’ Scandinavian Journal of History 2 (1977): 161– 182.
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probably at stake’, but he doubted that the counter- party would pay heed to 
his  arguments.24
As he did with Bornemann’s treatise on visitation, Krohg also recommended 
Schlegel’s work to his students at the Naval Academy. But whereas Bornemann’s 
work was too abstract and philosophical, Schlegel’s resembled the work of an 
expert, treating the relevant parts of the natural law of nations since Groti-
us and revealing an intimate knowledge of current treaties and agreements. 
 Krohg’s objective as teacher at the Academy had to be more modest and take 
into account the level of instruction already provided in subjects of a non- 
technical character. The naval articles for the shore service (1756) stated that 
scientific knowledge was paramount for being a good officer, and the Academy 
had to provide the cadets with sufficient knowledge not only of tactics, navi-
gation, gunnery and applied mathematics, but also of (modern) history and 
geography. According to Carl Frederik Dichmann (1763– 1806), teacher of histo-
ry and geography at the Academy from 1796 to 1806, the purpose of these two 
subjects, joined together, was to provide knowledge of the contemporary world 
and its historical prerequisites – geography by describing territories belonging 
to different states, history by outlining the origins of various territorial rights.
4 Krohg’s Lectures 1: the Founding Principles
Whereas history and geography provided knowledge about the distinctiveness 
of modern states, Krohg started his lectures from the opposite angle, by ex-
plaining what a state or a nation is. A state is an association that individuals had 
entered into for protection and security and this association was also a legal 
state, involving enforceable rights and duties. But this legal state is internal to 
the state and hence not binding on other states or individuals not counted as 
citizens. To believe otherwise would, according to Krohg, ‘in most cases contra-
dict every independent nation’s original purpose of founding the state’.25 This 
is not to say that interstate relations were devoid of legal regulations, only that 
these were different from those pronounced in a state’s positive legislation. In 
order to understand the nature of these regulations, natural law had come to re-
gard the state as a moral person and the relationship between states as akin to 
 24 J.W.F. Schlegel, An Examination of the Sentence in the Case of the Sweedish Convoy 
Pronounced in the High Court of Admiralty of England on the Eleventh of June, 1799 
(London: W. Wilson, 1800), 115.
 25 Christian Krohg, Forsøg til en Ledetraad ved Forelsninger over Folke- Retten (Copenhagen: 
Andreas Seidelin, 1803), § 3.
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the relationship between individuals in the state of nature. But this application 
of natural law is not sufficient. Rather than being content with the commands 
of natural law as a guide to interstate relations, one must realize that these re-
lations are of a more complicated character. Hence they need a more thorough 
treatment than what can be provided by a ‘general legal science’.26
Even if nations are not living under any human superior and do not ac-
knowledge a common legislator or regent, they are by human reason itself en-
titled ‘by interrelated consent to decide certain rules for their actions, that as 
laws will bind them either forever or for a certain time and whereby their orig-
inal legal relationship, established by reason itself, is more exactly determined 
or even changed insofar as this change does not exceed the limits that the 
purpose of the state and human dignity have declared to be unchangeable’.27 
These arbitrary provisions are the subject of the positive law of nations; and 
according to the different means whereby nations announce their consent, 
this discipline can be divided into a) the law of treaties, i.e. consent founded 
on real agreements, and b) the law of custom, i.e. consent founded on previ-
ously repeated actions. These were also two of the three sub- disciplines that 
according to Vattel made up the positive law of nations. As for the third one, 
the voluntary law, Krohg never uses the term nor does he seem to regard the 
content treated under that term as an issue of its own. It is, however, worth 
noticing Vattel’s remark about how and why the decisions of the necessary law 
of nations ‘must be modified by the voluntary law’28 – and in one of his later 
lectures Krohg paid due attention to the way treaties and agreements put limi-
tations on the commands of the natural law of nations, as will be seen below.
Concerning the difference between the natural and the positive law of 
nations, Krohg points to the definitions presented in an encyclopedia of the 
sciences by the German philosopher Wilhelm Traugott Krug (1770– 1842): a sci-
ence is natural when its content and scope are determined by ‘the nature of the 
objects themselves to which they refer, and by the nature of the human intel-
lectual capacity as such’, whereas it is positive when ‘in regard of its truth and 
validity it is conceived as depending on any kind of arbitrariness’.29 Besides 
this formal difference Krohg also underlines a difference in content:
The natural law of nations takes place as soon as we imagine the found-
ing of states – and must be applied to all, and between all, nations; the 
 26 Ibid., § 4.
 27 Ibid., § 6.
 28 Vattel, The Law of Nations, 78.
 29 Wilhelm Traugott Krug, Versuch einer Systematischen Enzyklopädie der Wissenschaften. 
Zweiter Theil (Jena: J.G. Voigt, 1797), § 228.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simone Zurbuchen - 978-90-04-38420-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 09/19/2019 09:19:14AM
via University of Lausanne
72 Rørvik
positive law of nations can only oblige nations that have already entered 
an association that must be regarded as binding or to the extent that they 
acknowledge the binding power of customs. The commands of the natu-
ral law of nations are, like its very foundation, reason itself, eternal and 
unchanging.
The commands of the positive law of nations are, on the contrary, 
changeable, depending on what the will and the needs of nations decide 
or demand.
The natural law of nations is not dependent on the positive, but the 
positive on the natural. The natural law of nations is a philosophical sci-
ence; the positive is a purely historical science. The former decides what 
ought to happen without regard to what has happened; the latter most 
often derives the rules for what ought to happen from what has hap-
pened (through treaties, customs).30
Krohg admits a lack of certainty in the system of the natural law of nations, 
but this is due to a disagreement between different authors on specific topics 
and not a flaw of the system itself. Even if the natural law of nations is as old as 
the nations themselves, its commands have been interpreted in different ways. 
It would therefore be beneficial for students to get acquainted with various 
authors’ treatment of the matter, because adherents of different philosophi-
cal opinions are inclined to understand certain topics in a one- sided manner. 
 Krohg then turns his attention back to the positive law of nations, this time as 
the result of historical development. Almost all nations we know from history 
have had some kind of relation with neighbors or strangers, and these rela-
tions have been subject to regulations. War and peace, trade and intercourse 
have made rules of conduct all the more necessary because increased contact 
between nations also raises the possibility of conflict. The purpose of this his-
torical sketch is twofold: Krohg wants to show that, unlike the natural law of 
nations, the positive law of nations is the result of a certain cultural and his-
torical development; and even if we find positive regulations between nations 
far back in history, these are not the subject of the positive law of nations. As 
an academic discipline the positive law of nations is concerned only with the 
treaties or associations which are still binding.
What these treaties and associations show us is the European nations’ 
state of law, and in its systematic treatment the positive law of nations 
 30 Krohg, Forsøg, § 4. 
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restricts itself to these states and their connections between themselves 
as well as their relations to other powers outside of Europe.
But not all of the associations known from history are of interest to 
us in a legal sense; only those that are still valid – and in a direct or indi-
rect manner concern us. We rarely need to move further back than the 
seventeenth century when we investigate the still binding power of the 
treaty- bound law of nations. There are no examples of a common treaty 
joined by all European powers, but there are some that come close; there-
fore there is no common treaty- based European law of nations. We can, 
however, by comparing the principles upon which the main parts of the 
treaties are based, deduce a certain similarity – and thus presume that 
certain rules have been followed. Likewise we can to a certain extent de-
duce some common customs from the different nations’ similar behavior 
under identical circumstances.31
The most important contributions to the discipline were not theoretical works 
but practical introductions, handbooks and collections of treaties running 
through one augmented edition after another. And when lecturing on the posi-
tive law of nations, Krohg’s task was not to present theoretical knowledge to his 
students, but to guide them through reference works and other recommended 
literature. His own textbook might well be understood as an attempt to enable 
the students to find their way through more substantial works on the subject.32
In the first four chapters of his textbook Krohg deals with 1) some common 
rules according to which the nations’ special legal relations should be deter-
mined, 2) the nations’ property rights and territorial rights in general, 3) trea-
tises in general and 4) envoys. Although these are classical issues in the law of 
nations and the two last subjects are treated in a rather traditional manner, 
the first two deserve closer attention. To clarify the legal relations between the 
nations was a task for the natural law of nations, for the simple reason that it 
had nothing to do with current treaties; on the contrary, it was a prerequisite 
to any binding agreement between nations. And here one had to cope with the 
same problems that had once occupied Vattel: What is the difference between 
 31 Ibid., § 8.
 32 Among the works recommended by Krohg were two important collections of trea-
ties:  Gabriel Bonnot de Mably, Le droit public de l’Europe fondé sur les traités conclus 
jusqu’en l’année 1740 (The Hague:  Jean Van- Duren, 1746), and Georg Friedrich von 
Martens, Recueil des principaux traités d’alliance, de paix, de trêve, de neutralité, de com-
merce, de limites, d’échange etc. conclus par les puissances de l’Europe (Göttingen: Dieterich, 
1791– 1801).
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a sovereign state’s obligations towards itself and its obligations towards other 
states? And to what extent can interstate obligations be regarded as something 
more solid than the temporary results of diplomatic casuistry or the political 
prudence expressed in numerous treaties and other formal agreements? While 
authorities on the positive law of nations tried to move beyond Vattel regard-
ing the second problem, they simply bypassed the first by taking the difference 
between the two forms of obligations for granted. To regard interstate obliga-
tions as equally binding as a state’s obligations to itself presupposed a political 
arrangement different from the existing system of sovereign states. This was a 
philosophical concern, like the Kantian idea of a perpetual peace or a cosmo-
politan law, not a matter for jurists – and certainly not for the positive law of 
nations.33
Although Krohg’s references to Vattel are sparse and his textbook does not 
include the almost mandatory sketch of the history of the law of nations, he 
would no doubt have accepted the statement that the Swiss had brought the 
law of nations back on the right track after it had lost itself in philosophical 
speculations, and that he thus provided the discipline with a foundation upon 
which to build.34 That said, Krohg has no misgivings about quoting from or 
referring to works of a more philosophical or utopian kind, such as a proposi-
tion presented to the French National Convention in April 1795 by Henri Jean- 
Baptiste Grégoire (1750– 1831). This proposition was at odds with the idea of a 
law of nations based on the European system of sovereign states and had been 
subject to severe criticism in sources also used by Krohg.35 Some of Grégoire’s 
principles were abstract moral maxims that could only be implemented under 
conditions which, if they were present, would make the implementation un-
necessary. Other principles were more dangerous, like the prohibition of alli-
ances that violated the interests of a single nation or the suggestion that only 
constitutions based on the principles of freedom and equality conformed to 
 33 Georg Friedrich von Martens, Précis du droit des gens moderne de l’Europe (Göttingen: 
Dieterich, 1801), 14.
 34 See Georg Friedrich von Martens, Einleitung in das positive Europäische Völkerrecht 
(Göttingen:  Johann Christian Dieterich, 1796), §  8, and Karl Gottlob Günther, 
Europäisches Völkerrecht in Friedenszeiten (Altenburg: Richter, 1787), §§ 26, 27.
 35 ‘Discours de Grégoire, député à la Convention nationale par le département de Loir et 
Cher, prononcé dans la séance de 4. Floreal an. 3. de la Rép. Francaise (23. Avril. 1795.) 
sur une déclaration de droit des gens à faire par la Convention nationale,’ Recueil des 
Traités de paix, d’amitié, d’alliance, de neutralité et autres conclus entre la République fran-
caise et les différentes Puissances de l’Europe depuis 1792 jusqu’à la paix générale. Premiere 
Partie. Septembre 1791 – Aout 1795 (Hamburg: Fréderic Perthes; Paris: Treuttel et Würtz, 
1796), 9– 25. For the criticism of Grégoire, see Martens, Einleitung, v– xvi.
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the rights of peoples. The constitution of a state was a matter for nobody but 
the sovereign state itself. Whatever the status of the principles of the natural 
law of nations, they were not something a state could invoke in order to take 
action against another state. This is the unequivocal message in Krohg’s out-
line of how the rules regulating legal relations between nations maintain the 
balance between equality and sovereignty.
The internal organization of every state regarding the legal relations be-
tween the ruler and the subject or between subjects is an issue that only 
concerns the state itself and is dependent upon its will. The laws and 
the form of government are therefore, according to the advice of policy 
and wisdom, different in different states. But this difference has no direct 
influence on the law of nations. The law of nations can therefore not em-
bark on these matters that first and foremost belong to public law and 
political prudence without transgressing its boundaries.36
Being free and independent, the nations do not acknowledge a common su-
perior except God and the law of justice and right. The interpreter of the law 
is the single nation itself, and in its contentions with other nations it is also 
entitled to pass its own verdict – and to implement it. But this must be done 
according to the principles of reason, which, on the one hand, highlight securi-
ty, peace and perfection as the ultimate purposes of nations, and, on the other 
hand, maintain that no nation is entitled to pursue these purposes in a way 
that interferes with the rights of others. Between nations there is legal equal-
ity; and according to the natural law of nations, a single nation cannot have 
other or more extensive rights than another nation would be entitled to under 
similar circumstances. Supremacy in power, higher culture, enlightenment or 
refinement does not give a nation any rightful advantages over others. On the 
contrary, because every nation has a natural inclination to pursue justice and 
virtue, it can claim respect from others just as well as any citizen can demand 
to be respected as a human being. Mutual respect is a prerequisite for any kind 
of cooperation and interstate sociality – and with a reference to Vattel, Krohg 
declares that the only natural limit to the nations’ right to interact with each 
other is their own security.37
Before closing his chapter on legal relations between nations Krohg intro-
duces the following problem:  does the fact that the positive law of nations 
 36 Krohg, Forsøg, § 20.
 37 Ibid., § 27; see also Vattel, The Law of Nations, Preliminaries, §§ 11– 12.
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presupposes an advanced stage of cultural development also have conse-
quences for relations between more developed and less developed nations? 
According to Krohg there is no doubt that historical circumstances have cre-
ated social ties between the European states that are much closer than any 
ties they might have with other nations. Bypassing the fact that many of the 
authors he elsewhere refers to insist that whereas Turkey is a European nation 
it is not on the same cultural level as the rest of Europe, Krohg emphasizes that 
the cultural ties between European nations do not make them into a society 
that is so distinct from all other nations that it has had or has its own positive 
law of nations.38 Philosophers and travel authors use culture, enlightenment 
and justice as a benchmark in order to distinguish between ethical, barbarian 
and savage nations. Whereas the European nations ascribe the title of moral 
to themselves,
[t] hose nations, on the other hand, that normally do not pay heed to the 
commands of the general law of nations, except through specific prom-
ises to do so, or that are unwilling to acknowledge the binding power of 
European customs, are in Europe given the name of barbarians; but this 
denomination cannot deny them the protection of the general law of 
 nations.39
Although Krohg later refers to barbarians and savages, he seems to use the 
terms interchangeably and does not elaborate the distinction between them 
in the way that was then prevalent.40 According to this distinction the bar-
barian states might not meet the European moral and cultural standards, but 
it was still possible to make agreements with them, as a number of current 
treaties illustrated. Savages, on the other hand, appeared to lack law, liberty 
and civilization and hence to be devoid of all means for cooperation. It makes 
perfect sense, therefore, that when Krohg later returns to barbarians and sav-
ages, it is in his account of the concept of terra nullius:  neither the natural 
nor the positive law of nations prohibits a nation from taking possession of 
a territory over which no other nation claims ownership or which has been 
abandoned by its previous owner. All nations do not enjoy the same level of 
culture, but a lack of culture is not a crime leading to the loss of property 
 38 See Jennifer Pitts, ‘Empire and Legal Universalisms in the Eighteenth Century,’ The 
American Historical Review 117 (2012): 101– 104.
 39 Krohg, Forsøg, § 28.
 40 For a meticulous examination of these concepts, see J.G.A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion 
IV: Barbarians, Savages and Empires (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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rights. According to the dictates of reason, the use of a possession is entrusted 
to the owner’s discretion insofar as it does not intend to harm others, and no 
nation is entitled to expropriate an uncultivated territory within the borders 
of another nation.
The possessions of the so- called savage nations can thus not be sub-
ject to the states’ right to expropriation. And even less can differences 
in religion, forms of government etc. give other nations such rights. The 
injustices that the European nations have made themselves guilty of in 
this regard are common knowledge, and the guardian angel of humanity 
seems, in our time, to have prevented such violent deeds from achieving 
the name of justice. The present treaties and arrangements of the Euro-
pean nations explicitly presuppose that the territory of the barbarian or 
savage belongs to him in the same sense that it can become European 
through legal negotiations.41
Whereas Krohg here seems to run barbarian and savage nations together, 
 recognizing both as legal persons, they do not fully meet the standards of 
moral nations. In his chapter on treaties he explains to his students that the 
united voices of politics and justice tell the moral nations to keep their trea-
ties with barbarian states ‘with twice the normal meticulousness’.42 Although 
he does not explain why this is so, any explanation would confirm the indel-
ible difference between moral and barbarian nations. The rights and duties 
prescribed by the natural law of nations might apply to all nations alike, but 
the reliability or trustworthiness of barbarians and savages remain an open 
question. Despite all arguments for the universal validity of the law of na-
tions, the fact that he introduces the difference between types of nations 
shows the extent to which Krohg adhered to the view that the legal relations 
between nations is modelled on a European cultural self- understanding. And 
it is no coincidence that this is the only place in his lectures where he refers 
to works that are not strictly juridical, but general surveys of the uniqueness 
of European culture.43
 41 Krohg, Forsøg, § 35. See also Vattel, The Law of Nations, book ii, chap. 7, §§ 86– 88. Most 
of what Krohg has to say about this subject seems to be lifted from Vattel.
 42 Krohg, Forsøg, § 62.
 43 The works are Daniel Jenisch, Cultur- Character des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts, nach 
bürgerlicher Verfassung, Sittlichkeit, Kunstgeschmack und Wissenschaft (Berlin:  Verlag 
de Königl. Preuss. Akad., 1800), and Friedrich Gentz, Von dem politischen Zustand von 
Europa vor und nach der Französischen Revolution (Berlin: Heinrich Frölich, 1801).
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5 Krohg’s Lectures 2: Trade, War and Neutrality
Little of what Krohg had said so far suggested that his audience was not stu-
dents of law at the University, but cadets at the Naval Academy. However, 
this changes in the last three chapters of his textbook, dealing with trade and 
shipping (chap. 5), the legal relations between belligerent nations (chap. 6) 
and the duties and rights of neutral nations (chap. 7). These issues were of 
great relevance to his audience and they are presented in a manner differ-
ent from the rest of the book. Although Krohg had insisted that the natural 
and the positive law of nations should be treated together, his last chapters 
are first and foremost about the latter. The very order of these chapters also 
illustrates a general trend in the literature on the law of nations in the late 
eighteenth century: the concept of neutrality is treated not only in the light 
of warfare but also in the light of trade and shipping, and it is regarded as a 
topic of its own.
After telling his students that need and industry once gave birth to trade 
between the nations, Krohg underlines that laws were introduced in order to 
prevent this enterprise from evolving into fighting or injustice. For a naval of-
ficer it is just as important to learn the rules of justice in shipping and trade 
as it is to know the trajectory of a bullet and the power of stormy waves.44 The 
rules to be obeyed are the law of nations, royal commands, current treaties 
and custom. Krohg here cites numerous excerpts from treaties and trade agree-
ments, not only between European powers but also between Denmark- Norway 
and other European states as well as the Barbary states, i.e. the North African 
nations of Morocco, Algiers, Tunisia and Tripoli. The signing of treaties with 
these nations in the 1740s and 1750s was of great significance for the sea trade, 
because it allowed Danish- Norwegian ships to sail through the Strait of Gibral-
tar and carry goods across the Mediterranean Sea.
In addition to the rules specified in treaties or agreements there were two 
sets of regulations that a Danish- Norwegian naval officer had to know about. 
The first was the unwritten set of rules for ceremonial conduct at sea, including 
the proper way to salute, the striking of sails, the hoisting and lowering of flags 
etc. According to Krohg this set of rules was ‘in its original form sensible, but 
had through its many amendments become something of a bone of conten-
tion’. The more complex the rules, the more difficult it was to avoid mistakes 
that could provoke an opponent.45 Some of these rules were also specified in 
 44 Krohg, Forsøg, § 83.
 45 Krohg, Forsøg, § 95.
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the Danish- Norwegian naval articles of 1752, which was the second set of regu-
lations here in question.
Moving from the regulations of peacetime to the rules of wartime, Krohg 
defines war as ‘the state in which the nations find themselves after declaring 
the general state of mutual security to be repealed, and the nations have made 
manifest their will to inflict damage upon each other by applying coercive 
power’.46 Because peace and the enforcement of right are the purpose of war, 
warfare is a means permitted by reason itself in order to achieve this purpose. 
It is, however, important to notice that, in the same way as reason, by prescrib-
ing a purpose to man, does not endorse whatever means could be considered 
as convenient in order to achieve this purpose, there are also rules according to 
which war between nations ought to be waged. But even if the nations, and es-
pecially those that wish to deserve the title of moral, acknowledge these rules, 
they are not to be found in any general treaty of warfare but are the rules of 
custom and the sacred commands of reason.
According to Krohg, war is the circumstance, or situation, that occurs as a 
result of a state’s will to use extraordinary means to pursue right and peace. 
Although he does not mention Grotius here, he nevertheless seems to follow 
a Grotian argument according to which war has little to do with the law of na-
ture, but all the more with the law of nations, regarded as voluntary: ‘Custom 
has so prevailed, that not the Act of Hostility, but the State and Situation of the 
contending Parties, now goes by that Name; so that War is the State or situation 
of those [...] who dispute by Force of Arms’.47 This means that war does not 
refer to specific acts: it refers, rather, to the circumstance in which these acts 
take place. But as Krohg further explained to his students, even if war repeals 
the mutual security that accompanies peace and overrules a number of the 
duties imposed upon peaceful nations, this does not mean that it puts an end 
to all binding relations between nations. There are limits to what you can do 
in war, and it is ‘the sacred commands of custom, reason and humanity’ that 
must guide the warrior.48
Therefore, an enemy, as a human being, can still demand a certain 
amount of respect – despite the unjust cause of his nation. [...] To despise 
 46 Krohg, Forsøg, § 100.
 47 Grotius, The Rights of war and peace, book i, chap. 1, § ii, 134; see also Vattel’s defini-
tion: ‘War is that state in which we prosecute our right by force’. The Law of Nations, book 
iii, chap. i, § 1, 291. For a thorough treatment of this issue, see Neff, War and the Law of 
Nations, 138– 140.
 48 Krohg, Forsøg, § 101.
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individual members of a nation just because the nation is our enemy is a 
behaviour that cannot be justified in any reasonable manner. The warrior 
defends his fatherland, but the enemy warrior that attacks him, is not his 
personal foe.49
The secondary rights to exercise violence in wartime are, however, limited in 
scope – and they should also, ideally, be limited in degree. In the first place, 
one must notice that the purpose of war is not individual gain; war is waged 
by the state and is a matter between states. It is the regent who declares war 
and decides who among his underlings are entitled to perform hostile actions 
and under what conditions. In the second place, it is not for the natural law 
to decide which coercive measures a belligerent party should make use of. 
This question must be handed over to the parties themselves and be answered 
in light of what the occasion demands. But because the right to use coercive 
measures is prompted by necessity, reason recommends that neither party re-
sort to harsher measures where more lenient ones are sufficient. And some 
measures, such as the use of traitors or assassins and the poisoning of wells, are 
not to be used under any circumstances. Reason cannot endorse, nor can na-
tions regard as legal, actions that will exterminate righteousness and virtue.50
Krohg then turns to an issue concerning naval warfare. Having made clear 
that the natural law of nations does not permit private citizens to exercise hos-
tilities and prohibits assaults, attacks or maltreatment of citizens of a hostile 
state as long as they remain peaceful, he adds that this rule in general also 
protects private property. ‘The positive law of nations has, however, introduced 
certain exceptions to this rule by allowing that merchant vessels from hostile 
states that are encountered at sea by warships or privateers from the counter- 
party, can be arrested, seized and brought before a prize court’.51 When tell-
ing his students that only regular armed forces were entitled to attack or open 
hostilities, Krohg made an exception for those who had received special per-
mission through a letter of marque, i.e. privateers. This kind of engagement in 
maritime warfare by commission had developed during the Middle Ages, and 
in the eighteenth century a large part of the total military force at sea were 
privateers. In a Danish- Norwegian context this system was well known from 
the Great Northern War (1709– 1720), and it would in a few years’ time be used 
again on a greater scale than ever. What made privateering legal in contrast 
to piracy was the fact that the permission was anchored in a set of generally 
 49 Ibid., § 102.
 50 Ibid., § 103.
 51 Ibid., § 109.
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accepted rules. A privateer should not only seize his booty according to the 
terms stated in his letter of marque but also bring it before a prize court, i.e. a 
court authorized to decide if the booty had been lawfully captured.
What Krohg had to say about war and belligerent nations is clearly an-
chored in a Grotian framework. His treatment of neutrality, on the other hand, 
illustrates how this concept had been transformed during the eighteenth cen-
tury. According to Grotius, ‘it is the Duty of those that are not engaged in the 
War, to sit still and do nothing, that may strengthen him that prosecutes an 
ill Cause, or to hinder the Motions of him that hath Justice on his Side’.52 And 
even if he did not draw the conclusion of the old doctrine of just war – that 
because one of the belligerents will have a just cause for war, it is morally 
reprehensible not to support him – Grotius still understood ‘neutrality’ from 
the vantage point of war.53 Krohg, on his side, approached neutrality from two 
different angles: one of them was, of course, the concept of war; the other, and 
more important, was maritime trade in peacetime. Here he followed what had 
become the prevalent understanding of neutrality. Whereas the contractual 
understanding of war acknowledged the right of third parties to remain neu-
tral, it was far from clear whether they also had the right to carry on business 
as usual. Among the most important contributors to this new understanding 
of neutrality was the person whom Schlegel had described as ‘the great cham-
pion of neutral privileges’, the Danish- German jurist Martin Hübner (1723– 
1795).54 Although Krohg only has one single reference to Hübner’s De la saisie 
des bâtimens neutres (1759), his treatment of the issue suggests that Hübner’s 
importance is far greater than the lack of further quotations or references 
might suggest. After all, Hübner was not only the author of an influential book 
on neutrality but had also been an advisor to the Danish- Norwegian min-
ister for foreign affairs and the architect of the nation’s policy of neutrality, 
J.H.E. von Bernstorff (1712– 1772).55
 52 Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, book iii, chap. 17, § iii.1, p. 1525; see also Koen 
Stapelbroek, ‘The Rights of Neutral Trade and its Forgotten History,’ in Trade and War: The 
Neutrality of Commerce in the Interstate- System, ed. Koen Stapelbroek (Helsinki: Helsinki 
Collegium for Advanced Studies, 2011), 3– 13.
 53 Grotius never uses the term ‘neutrality’ but talks about ‘eorum qui a bello abstinet’. And 
although the chapter is entitled ‘Of Neuters in war’, this is a translation of ‘De his qui in 
bello medii sunt’.
 54 Schlegel, An Examination, 132.
 55 The literature on Hübner is sparse, but a fine introduction to his major work is Nora 
N.  Leerberg, The Legal Politics of Neutrality in the Age of Privateering. Martin Hübner’s 
Law of Neutrality and Prize (Oslo: Dreyer, 2015). See also Stapelbroek, ‘Universal Society, 
Commerce and the Rights of Neutral Trade’.
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Krohg opens his chapter on neutrality with half a dozen pages of references 
to relevant works on the subject, before telling his students that a neutral na-
tion resides in a state of neutrality and therefore has not only duties towards 
others but also rights of its own.56 Here it is crucial to distinguish between a 
nation’s right to stay neutral and its rights as neutral. It is for a nation itself 
to decide if a just cause of war is present and if it should help another nation 
against its enemies, but it is not compelled to do so unless an explicit promise 
has been given. Peace is the natural state of nations and every nation must 
be regarded as peaceful and neutral and also be treated as such, unless it has 
proved otherwise. Against this background it should be rather easy to point out 
the rights and duties of the neutral nation.
Because the neutral nation lives in peace with the belligerents, it should 
enjoy all the rights and all security that characterizes a peaceful rela-
tionship in general, as it should also fulfill all the duties that the law of 
nations imposes on a nation that lives in peace with others. The same 
liberty of trade and commerce, the same security on its own and on for-
eign territory in regard to persons and goods that behooved it under a 
common peace, should still be ascribed to it after the outbreak of war 
 between  other nations, towards which the neutral should enjoy the safe-
ty of a peace that it in no way can be presumed to have broken.57
This is the status of a neutral nation according to the natural law of nations. But 
because treaties and custom have long since put restrictions upon the rights of 
neutral nations, it is important to determine whether the positive law of nations 
has overruled these rights or whether these restrictions should be modified ac-
cording to the general freedom of nations. And even if there is no general agree-
ment concerning neutral nations’ legal relations with belligerents and hence no 
unequivocal specification of the rights and duties in question, neutral nations 
have no doubt, by consent, renounced the general freedom of trade and thus 
acknowledged principles apparently alien to the natural law of nations.
Neutral nations agree not to supply belligerent nations with certain 
goods that were given the name of contraband of war. In treaties it was 
decided whether the principle: free ship, free goods was valid or not. The 
investigation or visitation that neutral vessels, under certain conditions, 
 56 Krohg, Forsøg, § 126.
 57 Ibid., § 127.
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should submit to, was given a more determined form, and rules according 
to which the neutrality of the vessel and the legality of the cargo should 
be proven, were fixed.58
Using this historical fact as a vantage point, Krohg turns to the positive law 
of nations, leaving the natural law of nations aside because it has no room 
for concepts like contraband of war or blockade. In general, ‘contraband’ was 
goods ‘that immediately and in their present form are destined for waging war’; 
but to qualify as contraband these goods had to be destined for a port belong-
ing to a belligerent power, and no goods ‘which are not explicitly regarded as 
contraband of war in treaties, can be regarded as such’.59 Concerning block-
ades, the natural law of nations acknowledged the right of belligerent nations 
to deny neutral ships access to a certain port even if they did not carry contra-
band. But in order for a port to be recognized as blocked, two further criteria 
had to be met: 1) the blockade had to apply to a specific port and 2) there had to 
be warships present in order to render attempts to access the port a dangerous 
adventure.60 Whereas the concept of contraband put limits on the principle of 
free ship, free goods, a blocked port limited the freedom of navigation. On the 
other hand, both restrictions were beneficial to neutral nations in a twofold 
manner:  1) they introduced specifications that made it easier to understand 
the rules of play, and 2) they were countermeasures against ‘the interventions 
that belligerent nations had allowed themselves in regard to neutral nations’ 
natural and treaty- bound rights’. Here Krohg refers to the Russian Declaration 
of 28 February 1780 where Tsarina Catharina ii presented ‘a draft of a sea- law 
that included the most important principles concerning neutral nations’ rights 
and duties towards belligerents’.61 In the absence of a universal agreement, 
these principles became the foundation upon which a viable politics of neu-
trality was conducted.
Almost all the sea- powers that these principles were announced to, gave 
them their consent; and when some nations united in order to render 
them valid through armed force, the system of armed neutrality so re-
nowned to the recent naval law of nations was founded – and its main 
principles have since then been repeated and renewed in numerous 
treaties. […] Even those powers between whom no mutual agreements 
 58 Ibid., § 135.
 59 Ibid., § 136, § 138.
 60 Ibid., § 138, § 140.
 61 Ibid., § 138.
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concerning the right of the neutral flag have been concluded are com-
mitted to acknowledge the maxim: free ship, free goods; provided those 
powers, in one way or another, have also acknowledged the validity of the 
armed neutrality and its compliance with the natural law of nations.62
The political context of the Russian Declaration was beyond the scope of 
 Krohg’s lectures. Regarded as a contribution to the positive law of nations, 
it was sufficient to present the principles upon which the League of Armed 
Neutrality was founded as a reaffirmation of the rights of neutral nations, and 
support this view with references to recent treaties and agreements. The stu-
dents were not told that this was an alliance of naval powers (Russia, Denmark- 
Norway and Sweden), founded in order to protect neutral shipping against the 
British Royal Navy’s wartime policy during the American War of Independence 
(1775– 1783) and the Anglo- French War (1778– 1783)  – a policy that included 
coastal blockades and unlimited search for contraband. In his aforementioned 
response to the High Court of Admiralty, Schlegel had complained that the 
British in their maritime wars relied on their superior naval power, and sought 
‘to extend the contraband articles of war as far as possible, in order thereby 
to distress their enemies to the utmost of their power’.63 It was against a con-
ception of contraband that included not only goods that directly and in their 
actual form served the purpose of war, but also goods that indirectly or occa-
sionally could do so, that treaty- bound specifications were aimed. The restrict-
ed concept of a blockade was, likewise, targeted against the British attempt to 
cut off neutral maritime vessels from entire coastlines.
Although the League was dissolved in 1783, its principles retained their valid-
ity and when the same naval powers founded a second League of Armed Neu-
trality during the War of the Second Coalition (1798– 1802) they reconfirmed 
the political programme of 1780. But this time the British government regarded 
the League as an alliance with France and attacked Denmark- Norway, destroy-
ing parts of its naval fleet in the first Battle of Copenhagen in April 1801 and 
forcing it to withdraw from the League.64 By then the League itself was about 
to collapse, and after negotiations between Britain and Russia a convention 
was signed in June 1801 and later joined by Denmark- Norway. Here two new 
principles forwarded by the League were confirmed: 1) that seizure of neutral 
 62 Ibid., § 138, § 139.
 63 Schlegel, An account, 94– 5.
 64 See Ole Feldbæk, Denmark and the Armed Neutrality 1800– 1801 (Copenhagen: Akademisk 
Forlag, 1980), and The Battle of Copenhagen 1801. Nelson and the Danes (Barnsley: Leo 
Cooper, 2002).
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ships required a just cause, and 2) that merchant ships under neutral convoy 
should not be visited by belligerent warships. Krohg’s translation of a large 
part of the convention forms the bulk of his section on visitation of neutral 
ships.65 Although he thereafter adds three short paragraphs on verdicts passed 
on seized neutral ships, hostilities on neutral territory, and the rights of war-
ships and privateers to enter neutral ports, he clearly regarded this convention 
as the last contribution to the positive law of nations and hence a natural place 
for his lectures to end.
6 Conclusion
Following the path that Professor Schlegel had cleared when he introduced the 
positive law of nations in a Danish- Norwegian context and showed that this 
discipline amounted to more than natural right applied to interstate relation-
ships, Krohg in his textbook guided the cadets at the Naval Academy all the way 
from the principles of the natural law of nations to the most recent statements 
of the positive law of nations. Both teachers relied, more or less explicitly, on the 
theories once put forth by Grotius and Vattel and used these as a vantage point 
from which to approach the works of Martens and other proponents of the 
law of nations as a historical science. Whereas Schlegel still treated the law of 
nations as a part of the comprehensive system of natural right, Krohg focused 
on making the discipline more accessible to an audience with more practical 
needs. More than half of his textbook’s 280 pages were in fact references, quo-
tations or excerpts from treaties, conventions and agreements. Unlike Schlegel, 
Krohg was not inclined to theoretical or systematic thinking. Soon after his 
textbook was published he left the academic world, despite his appointment 
as extraordinary professor of law in 1803. Eager to seek employment in Norway, 
Krohg was appointed assessor in the regional high court in Trondheim in 1804 
and turned his attention to practical legal matters for a while, before he once 
again got caught up in issues pertaining to the law of nations.
Krohg’s textbook addressed future naval officers in a neutral state; after the 
outbreak of the Napoleonic Wars (1803– 1815), however, it became more diffi-
cult for the state to maintain its neutrality. When Britain noticed that Denmark- 
Norway had come under severe pressure from France and Russia to pledge its 
naval forces to Napoleon, the Royal Navy bombarded Copenhagen in Septem-
ber 1807 and then seized the fleet. After the attack, Denmark- Norway entered 
 65 Krohg, Forsøg, § 141.
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an alliance with France through the Treaty of Fontainebleau, in October 1807. 
But as early as September 14, when the ruins of Copenhagen still smoldered, 
the government issued regulations for privateering – and more than thirty ves-
sels were fitted out for this task in less than a month. According to the positive 
law of nations, prize courts were established in several towns along the Danish 
and Norwegian coastlines in order to supervise the privateering. One of the 
members of the prize court in Trondheim was assessor Krohg; and from 1810 
and until it was dissolved in 1814 he served as the court’s chief justice. What 
he had once told his students at the Naval Academy about neutrality probably 
occurred to him as irrelevant at this time. What he had said about the rules of 
privateering was more relevant than ever before.
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 chapter 4
The Law of Nations in German historia literaria 
and Encyclopaedias in the Eighteenth Century
Frank Grunert
1 Introduction: Textbooks for Academic Teaching
If one is interested in the law of nations as an academic subject, one clearly 
has to focus on lectures and textbooks dedicated to the subject. But from a 
historical point of view, it is worthwhile also to analyse the more general know-
ledge of the law of nations – that provided to non- specialists and especially 
to young academics before they started their specialist training. What did a 
beginning academic get to know about the law of nations? The propaedeutic 
lessons available provide interesting information regarding what the general 
academic public knew about the subject.
In the German context during the eighteenth century, historia literaria 
(‘Geschichte der Gelehrsamkeit’, ‘history of learning’) was the most prominent 
genre of general instruction in any subject of academic relevance. Its promi-
nence is shown by the large number of textbooks which appeared throughout 
the whole of the century and the significant number of courses which were 
offered at all universities, academies and even at high schools. For more than 
a century, historia literaria was considered extremely successful, keeping the 
same general aim and changing only in the form of its practical realization. 
An authoritative definition of the purpose of historia literaria is given in Chris-
toph August Heumann’s Conspectus reipublicae literariae sive via ad historiam 
literariam, which appeared for the first time in 1718 and for the last time in a 
posthumous eighth edition in the 1790s. Heumann provides that definition in 
the first paragraph: ‘The history of learning is the history of letters [i.e. books] 
and authors, or the narration of the origin and progress of learning from the 
beginning up to our times’.1
 1 Christoph August Heumann, Conspectus reipublicae literariae sive via ad historiam litera-
riam iuventuti studiosae aperta, editio tertia (Hannover: apud Io. Jacobum Foersterum, 1733), 
1:  ‘Historia literaria est Historia literarum et literatorum, sive Narratio de ortu et progres-
su studiorum literariorum ad nostram usque aetatem’. See:  Sicco Lehmann- Brauns, ‘Neu-
konturierung und methodologische Reflexion der Wissenschaftsgeschichte. Heumanns 
 
 
 
 
 
Simone Zurbuchen - 978-90-04-38420-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 09/19/2019 09:19:14AM
via University of Lausanne
90 Grunert
The original idea of historia literaria goes back to Francis Bacon. In Of the 
Proficience and Advancement of Learning (1605) Bacon suggested the establish-
ment of a new historical discipline distinct from civil history and ecclesiastical 
history which had to represent all knowledge of the past – ideally without any 
limits. Bacon’s objective was a sort of enormous repository of all knowledge 
from every period and every geographical area, with the purpose of giving con-
structive impulses to both scientific research and political governance.2 Since 
his concept had utopian dimensions, it is not surprising that its realization is 
also described in his New Atlantis.3 Although the German historians of learn-
ing and scholarship were fascinated by the idea of collecting every piece of 
former knowledge, they realized that a complete collection of knowledge was 
simply impossible. So while they adopted the idea, they reduced its scope and 
adapted it to propaedeutic purposes. That is, they decided to provide a focused 
and comprehensive survey of important scholarly information about all dis-
ciplines at any given time for the benefit of students in all disciplines. That 
comprised for example bibliographical and biographical information, outlines 
Conspectus reipublicae literariae als Lehrbuch der aufgeklärten Historia literaria,’ in Historia 
literaria. Neuordnung des Wissens im 17. Und 18. Jahrhundert, ed. Frank Grunert and Friedrich 
Vollhardt (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2007), 129– 160; Helmut Zedelmaier, ‘Heumanns Conspec-
tus Reipublicae Literariae. Besonderheit, Kontext, Grenzen,’ in Christoph August Heumann 
(1684– 1764). Gelehrte Praxis zwischen christlichem Humanismus und Aufklärung, ed. Martin 
Mulsow, Kasper Risbjerg Eskildsen and Helmut Zedelmaier (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2017), 
71– 92. For more information on historia literaria in general, see Martin Gierl, ‘Bestandsauf-
nahme im gelehrten Bereich. Zur Entwicklung der “Historia Literaria” im 18. Jahrhundert,’ 
in Denkhorizonte und Handlungsspielräume. Festschrift für Rudolf Vierhaus zum 70. Geburts-
tag (Göttingen: Wallstein, 1992), 53– 80; Helmut Zedelmaier, ‘ “Historia Literaria”. Über den 
epistemologischen Ort des gelehrten Wissens in der ersten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts,’ Das 
achtzehnte Jahrhundert, 22, 1 (1998): 11– 21. Frank Grunert, Anette Syndikus, ‘Historia litera-
ria. Erschließung, Speicherung und Vermittlung von Wissen,’ in Wissensspeicher der Frühen 
Neuzeit. Formen und Funktionen, ed. Frank Grunert and Anette Syndikus (Berlin: de Gruyter, 
2015), 243– 293; Hanspeter Marti, ‘§62. Litterärgeschichte (historia literaria),’ in Grundriss 
der Geschichte der Philosophie, begr. von Friedrich Ueberweg. Die Philosophie des 18. Jahrhun-
derts, ed. Helmut Holzhey and Vilem Mudroch (Basel: Schwabe, 2014), vol. 5, 1425– 1429. And 
last but not least the contributions in Frank Grunert and Friedrich Vollhardt (eds.), Historia 
litera ria. Neuordnung des Wissens im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2007).
 2 Francis Bacon, Of the Proficience and Advancement of Learning, Divine and Humane (1605), in 
The Works of Francis Bacon, ed. James Spedding et al., vol. 3 (London: Longman, 1859).
 3 Francis Bacon, The New Atlantis (1627), ibid., vol. 3. See Frank Grunert, ‘ “Viel Tausend und 
Millionen Bücher”. Zur Bewältigung und zur Hervorbringung von Wissenspluralität in der 
frühneuzeitlichen “Historia literaria”,’ in Pluralisierungen. Konzepte zur Erfassung der Frühen 
Neuzeit, ed. Jan- Dirk Müller, Wulff Österreicher and Friedrich Vollhardt (Berlin: de Gruyter, 
2010), 192– 194; Grunert and Syndikus, ‘Historia literaria. Erschließung, Speicherung und Ver-
mittlung von Wissen,’ 253– 255.
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of the nature and development of disciplines, and at least some advice for 
learning and conducting scientific work. So, generally, German historia litera-
ria became an important part of propaedeutic lessons to introduce students to 
the world of academic erudition.4
Despite its prominence historia literaria was – especially in the second half 
of the century – complemented by another historical genre, which pursued a 
similar aim. This was the encyclopaedic text, which likewise offered a first ori-
entation in the scientific world, especially for beginning students and the gen-
eral public. Encyclopaedias focused on each discipline by defining its nature 
and its function. They also recommended important authors and their books, 
but, unlike historia literaria, they did not try to present a more or less full his-
tory of the disciplines – they did not give a ‘narratio de ortu et progressu dis-
ciplinarum’ (Heumann). Instead they concentrated on a short sketch (‘kurzer 
 Begriff ’) and avoided long and sometimes complicated histories. These texts 
were organized as a course in all the academic disciplines, and accordingly 
they were generally called ‘encyclopaedias’, after the Greek term popularized 
during the Renaissance ‘enkyklios paedeia’, meaning the circle of learning 
about a certain subject with propaedeutic aims. The encyclopaedia as a reposi-
tory of knowledge has its own rather long history, but the idea became more 
and more attractive in the second half of the eighteenth century, which may 
indicate a crisis for historia literaria.5 The assimilation of the detailed historical 
and bibliographical information of the latter seemed no longer feasible, at least 
not in the eyes of a part of the public. The purpose and the structure of the gen-
eral historia literaria were nevertheless continued in specialized histories of 
individual disciplines. So the general knowledge of the law of nations that was 
provided to non- specialists at the beginning of their academic training during 
the eighteenth century is to be found in three particular historical genres: the 
general historia literaria, the specialized history of scholarship  focused on one 
discipline, and the broader encyclopaedia.
In relation to the perception and the presentation of the law of nations, it 
is necessary to keep the following questions in mind:  1. To which discipline 
 4 Paul Nelles, ‘Historia litteraria at Helmstedt: Books, professors and students in the early En-
lightenment university,’ in Die Praktiken der Gelehrsamkeit in der Frühen Neuzeit, ed. Helmut 
Zedelmaier and Martin Mulsow (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2001), 147– 176; Anette Syndikus, ‘His-
toria literaria als Propädeutikum an der Königsberger Universität des 18. Jahrhunderts,’ in Die 
Universität Königsberg in der Frühen Neuzeit, ed. Hanspeter Marti and Manfred Komorowski 
(Köln, Wien, Weimar: Böhlau, 2008), 379– 422.
 5 See Grunert, Syndikus, ‘Historia literaria. Erschließung, Speicherung und Vermittlung von 
Wissen,’ 289– 293.
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was the law of nations said to belong? 2. How was the law of nations defined? 
3. How were natural law and the law of nations said to relate to each other? 
4. Which authors and which books were principally presented in discussions 
of the law of nations? It is important to note that the following sketch does not 
deal with the history of the law of nations itself: the aim is only to set out the 
ideas of a couple of representative authors who were significant in the history 
of learning for a certain period. The purpose is to find out what contempo-
raries learned about the law of nations when they studied the widely used text-
books on the history of learning and encyclopaedias.
2 A Brief Sketch: the Law of Nations, Seventeenth to  
Eighteenth Century
Before our questions can be answered, it is necessary to outline the discussion 
of the law of nations in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. If one sur-
veys the whole debate, beginning inevitably with the highly influential cate-
gorical distinctions in Grotius’s De jure belli ac pacis and ending most plausibly 
with the Primae lineae juris gentium Europaeum (1785), a general treatise on 
international law by the Göttingen law professor Georg Friedrich von Martens, 
one can get the impression that the core of the whole discussion was the re-
lationship between natural law and the law of nations (jus gentium). Grotius 
made a distinction between the voluntary law of nations and natural law – as 
 Francisco Suárez had done before – but the idea of a voluntary law of nations 
was rejected by Samuel Pufendorf, who asserted that only natural law can cre-
ate obligations between states. As a consequence, the discussion went on be-
tween two more or less extreme positions: on the one hand, that of ‘naturalists’, 
such as Pufendorf and Samuel Cocceji, who relied on natural law and denied 
that a manmade law of nations can invoke more or less universal obligations; 
and on the other hand, that of thinkers such as Johann Jakob Moser and Georg 
Friedrich von Martens, who emphasized the manmade aspect of the law of 
nations along with an early positivist philosophy of international law, to use 
anachronistic terms.6
 6 See Stephen C.  Neff, Justice among Nations. A  History of International Law (Cambridge, 
MA:  Harvard University Press, 2014), esp.  155– 201; Wilhelm Grewe, The Epochs of Interna-
tional Law, transl. and revised by Michael Byers (Berlin:  de Gruyter, 2000), esp.  348– 360; 
Oliver Diggelmann, ‘The Periodization of the History of International Law,’ in The Oxford 
Handbook of the History of International Law, ed. Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 997– 1011; Karl- Heinz Ziegler, Völkerrechtsgeschichte, 2nd 
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Since Pufendorf had set the tone7 it is hardly surprising that his highly in-
fluential follower Christian Thomasius had no concern at all with the law of 
nations. Thomasius of course knew everything that Hugo Grotius had written 
on this topic, but clearly he had no interest in it. In his eyes, the law of nations 
is just a part of natural law, which deals with only two issues, namely duties 
towards legatees  – ‘De officiis erga legatos’  – and duties towards deceased 
persons – ‘De officio erga mortuos’: ‘There remains the society of nations, in 
which as we already said above no new purpose or new precepts are to be 
expected, only the application of the general precepts set out in the second 
book to two of the more important parts of the law of nations, those concern-
ing legations and the right of burial’.8 But while Thomasius stuck to this as 
far as the duties to diplomats are concerned and explicitly denied that they 
formed part of a voluntary law of nations, he went on to argue that the duties 
towards deceased persons are not a subject of natural law but that they do 
not contradict it. One may wonder why he discussed them in the context of 
the law of nations at all, but it confirms the impression of his entire lack of 
interest in the law of nations in his first book on natural law, an impression 
that is reinforced in his second major work in the field, the Fundamenta juris 
naturae et gentium (1705).9
However, during the lifetime of Thomasius, Adam Friedrich Glafey returned 
to Grotius’s distinction between natural law and jus gentium voluntarium. He 
seemed to follow Thomasius and other natural lawyers when he stated that 
the law of nations is nothing but an ‘applicatio regularum Juris naturae ad 
statum gentium’.10 Nevertheless, he emphasized the already existing concept 
of jus gentium voluntarium (‘willkührliches Völker- Recht’), which he defined 
 ed. (München:  Beck, 2007); Tilmann Altwicker, Francis Cheneval, Oliver Diggelmann 
(eds.), Völkerrechtsphilosophie der Frühaufklärung (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015).
 7 See for a more detailed discussion of Pufendorf ’s concept of the law of nations: Michael 
Seidler, ‘Der Begriff des Völkerrechts bei Samuel Pufendorf,’ in Völkerrechtsphilosophie, ed. 
Altwicker, Cheneval and Diggelmann, 61– 78.
 8 Christian Thomasius, Institutes of Divine Jurisprudence with Selections from Foundations 
of the Law of Nature and Nations, ed., transl. and with an introduction by Thomas Ahnert 
(Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2011), 544. English translation of Institutiones jurispruden-
tiae divinae (Frankfurt and Leipzig: M.G. Weidmann, 1688).
 9 Christian Thomasius, Fundamenta juris naturae et gentium (Halle: Salfeld, 1705). For the 
English translation see note 8.
 10 Adam Friedrich Glafey, Vernunfft- und Völcker- Recht (Frankfurt and Leipzig:  Christoph 
Riegel, 1723), 231. For Glafey’s ideas of the law of nations, see Frank- Steffen Schmidt, 
Praktisches Naturrecht zwischen Thomasius und Wolff: Der Völkerrechtler Adam Friedrich 
Glafey (1692– 1753) (Baden- Baden: Nomos, 2007), esp. 199ff.
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as ‘customs […], which were transformed into rights through common prac-
tice among different nations and admitted to be obligatory law among them’.11 
Glafey explicitly contrasted this idea with the position of Christian Thomasius 
and thus demonstrated a certain interest in the theoretical independence of 
the law of nations.
A similar interest was shown by Christian Wolff through the publication 
of his Jus gentium methodo scientifica pertractatum (1749) separately from his 
eight- volume Jus naturae (1740– 1749). Based on the Grotian dualistic concep-
tion, Wolff announced a careful distinction of the ‘Natural Law of Nations 
[…] from that which is voluntary, stipulative and customary’.12 He opened 
his Jus gentium with the following definition: ‘By the Law of Nations we un-
derstand the science of that law which nations or peoples use in their re-
lations with each other and the obligations corresponding thereto’.13 Wolff 
admitted that the Jus gentium necessarium consists in natural law as applied 
to nations in general,14 but he introduced a more comprehensive definition 
of the law of nations, which encompasses all juridical relations between 
nations without regard to their sources. The complete emancipation of the 
law of nations from any kind of natural law was accomplished in the works 
of Johann Jakob Moser and Georg Friedrich von Martens. They were inter-
ested in practical agreements as guidelines for politics and even explicitly 
denied ‘the existence of a general international law’.15 It is therefore not sur-
prising that especially von Martens ‘was regarded, with at least some rea-
son, as an important progenitor of the positivist philosophy of international 
law’.16
 11 Glafey, Vernunfft- und Völcker- Recht, 195:  ‘[D] iejenigen Gebräuche […], welche bey ver-
schiedenen Völkern durch langen Brauch zu Rechte gediehen, und sie unter sich als ein 
verbindliches Recht gelten lassen’.
 12 Christian Wolff, The Law of Nations treated according the Scientific Method, transl. by 
Joseph H. Drake, ed. and with an introduction by Thomas Ahnert (Carmel, IN: Liberty 
Fund, 2017), 1.
 13 Wolff, The Law of Nations, 12. Christian Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica 
Pertractatum (Halle:  Renger, 1749), in Gesammelte Werke, Abt. 2, vol. 25 (Hildesheim, 
Zürich, New  York:  Olms, 1972), 1:  ‘Per Jus Gentium intelligimus scientiam juris, quo 
Gentes, sive populi inter se utuntur & obligationum eidem respondentium’. On Wolff see 
Knud Haakonssen, ‘Christian Wolff (1679– 1754),’ in The Oxford Handbook of the History 
of International Law, ed. Fassbender, Peters, 1106– 1109.
 14 Wolff, The Law of Nations, 14: ‘We call that the necessary law of nations which consists in 
the law of nature applied to nations’.
 15 Neff, Justice among Nations, 194, see also 199.
 16 Ibid., 200.
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3 Neglect: the Law of Nations in the Early General 
Compendia of historia literaria
Turning to the textbooks in historia literaria, we clearly find all steps in the 
development sketched above. Especially in the first half of the century, one 
can get the impression that there is nearly no interest in dealing with the law 
of nations as a special topic. It is surprising that the historians of learning in 
the early eighteenth century, despite their programmatic aims and explicit 
intentions, sometimes completely ignore the law of nations. We find detailed 
remarks on natural law in volume 3 of the famous Kurtze Anleitung zur His-
torie der Gelahrheit (1718)17 by Gottlieb Stolle, a student of Christian Thoma-
sius, but not a single word on the law of nations. Neither does the later and 
otherwise detailed Anleitung zur Historie der juristischen Gelahrheit (1745)18 
by the same author deal with the law of nations. Apparently, Stolle still did 
not consider it a topic in jurisprudence. The same lack of interest can be ob-
served in Heumann’s Conspectus. He there presents a very brief ‘historia juris-
prudentiae naturalis’, but the term ‘jus gentium’ appears, without any further 
explanation, only in the context of some remarks about Samuel Pufendorf ’s 
natural law.19
Nicolaus Hieronymus Gundling – also a former student of Christian Thoma-
sius – treats the history of natural law in his programme announcing a Col-
legium uber die Historiam litterariam (1713). No more than a list of items to 
be highlighted in his lecture, number 106 in the programme explicitly asks 
whether jus gentium should be treated separately from natural law – ‘ob das 
Ius Gentium besonders zu tractiren’ – and he adds that in this context he will 
make some remarks on Johann Wolfgang Textor’s Synopsis Juris Gentium.20 
One may expect that he would present some definition of the law of nations, 
but the programmatic text does not allow us to tell. In his treatise on natural 
law Gundling rejects the necessity of treating the law of nations, because he 
explicitly denies it a separate identity; it is nothing but the application of natu-
ral law to nations.21 We find the same position in the Versuch zu einer Historie 
 17 Gottlieb Stolle, Kurtze Anleitung zur Historie der Gelahrheit (Halle: Neue Buchhandlung, 
1718).
 18 Gottlieb Stolle, Anleitung zur Historie der juristischen Gelahrheit (Jena:  Johann Meyers 
seel. Erben, 1745).
 19 Heumann, Conspectus, 245.
 20 Nicolaus Hieronymus Gundling, Collegium uber die Historiam litterariam (Halle, [1713]), 
35. Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis juris gentium (Basel: Rüdinger, 1680).
 21 Nicolaus Hieronymus Gundling, Jus naturae ac gentium, 3rd ed. (Halle:  Renger 1736), 
20– 21.
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der Gelehrheit (1728) by Martin Schmeitzel, a historian and a former student of 
Gundling. He, too, explains that he treats jus naturae and jus gentium together 
because the latter is only jus naturae applied to the nature and the negotia-
tions of nations.22 His further treatment of the law of nations is as meagre as 
that in the large Abriß einer allgemeinen Historie der Gelehrsamkeit (1752– 1754), 
in whose three volumes Johann Andreas Fabricius found room for only one 
sentence on the subject: ‘when natural law is applied to the state of nations it 
is called the law of nations which deals with the rights and duties of nations 
and countries towards each other’.23 Fabricius, who was a famous historian of 
learning, classified natural law and hence the law of nations as part of philo-
sophy. In other words, the works of Glafey and Wolff on the law of nations did 
not lead Fabricius to include any further details on that law.
4 Philosophy vs. Law: the Law of Nations in Later Compendia 
of historia literaria and in Encyclopaedias
However, as times changed so did theories. In textbooks on the history of 
learning from the second half of the eighteenth century, the law of nations 
was dealt with in a far more elaborate way. The change is still more obvious 
if one includes the already mentioned encyclopaedias and the specialized 
compendia of historia literaria, texts such as Johann Georg Sulzer’s Kurzer 
Begriff aller Wissenschaften24 (1759), Christian Heinrich Schmid’s Abriß der 
Gelehrsamkeit25 (1783), Johann Joachim Eschenburg’s Lehrbuch der Wissen-
schaftskunde26 (1792), Johann Stephan Pütter’s Neuer Versuch einer Juristischen 
Encyclopädie und Methodologie27 (1767) or Dietrich Heinrich Ludwig von 
 22 Martin Schmeitzel, Versuch zu einer Historie der Gelehrheit (Jena: Fickelscherr, 1728), 552.
 23 Johann Andreas Fabricius, Abriß einer allgemeinen Historie der Gelehrsamkeit, vol. 1 
(Leipzig:  Weidmann, 1752), 402:  ‘[W] enn dieses Recht der Natur auf den Stand der 
Völker angewendet wird, so heißt es das Völkerrecht und ist sodann die Wissenschaft der 
Rechte und Pflichten der Völker und Staaten gegeneinander’.
 24 Johann Georg Sulzer, Kurzer Begriff aller Wissenschaften und andern Theile der 
Gelehrsamkeit, worin jeder nach seinem Innhalt, Nuzen und Vollkommenheit kürzlich 
be schrieben wird, 4th ed. (Frankfurt and Leipzig: [s.n.],1774).
 25 Christian Heinrich Schmid, Abriß der Gelehrsamkeit für encyklopädische Vorlesungen 
(Berlin: Himburg, 1783).
 26 Johann Joachim Eschenburg, Lehrbuch der Wissenschaftskunde ein Grundriß encyklopä-
discher Vorlesungen (Berlin, Stettin: Nicolai, 1792).
 27 Johann Stephan Pütter, Neuer Versuch einer Juristischen Encyclopädie und Methodologie 
nebst etlichen Zugaben (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1767).
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Ompteda’s extensive Litteratur des gesammten sowohl natürlichen als positiven 
Völkerrechts (1785).28
There can be no doubt that the Wolffian concept of the law of nations 
caused this change. Although all these authors acknowledge the close connec-
tion between the law of nations and natural law, they treat the law of nations 
as in some sense a sui generis discipline and deal with it in special chapters or 
paragraphs, separate from natural law. Beginning with Sulzer, we see that for 
him the law of nations was still a part of natural law and therefore belonged 
to philosophy, but he nevertheless treated the law of nations in a special para-
graph directly after his remarks on natural law. Sulzer defined jus gentium in 
the traditional way:  ‘If one considers different independent civil societies as 
individual persons and if one applies natural law to these persons, then one 
gets the law of nations. This law deals with the duties of free states towards 
each other and analyses their rights concerning peace and war, alliances, pacts 
and negotiations’.29 In his chapter on jurisprudence he mentions natural law 
again and considers it to be the theoretical basis for law as a whole, but in this 
explicitly juridical context he does not refer to the law of nations. Since Sulzer 
was a philosopher and not a lawyer, one should perhaps not expect him to 
focus on juridical questions, but nevertheless one gets the impression that the 
law of nations is still not important enough to be treated in a more detailed 
way, despite the development of the subject into a more and more self- reliant 
discipline.
This development marks the difference between Sulzer and the later au-
thors. Thus towards the end of our period, Johann Georg Meusel’s Leitfaden 
zur Geschichte der Gelehrsamkeit (1800) emphasizes that ‘praktisches Völker-
recht’ is a new part of jurisprudence and refers to Vattel, Mably, Martens, 
Günther and von Römer as eminent authors in this field.30 Eschenburg’s 
 28 Dietrich Heinrich Ludwig von Ompteda, Litteratur des gesammten sowohl natürlichen als 
positiven Völkerrechts. Erster Theil. Nebst vorangestellter Abhandlung von dem Umfange 
des gesammten sowohl natürlichen als auch positiven Völkerrechts, und Ankündigung eines 
zu bearbeitenden vollständigen Systems desselben, part 2 (Regenburg: Montag, 1785).
 29 Sulzer, Kurzer Begriff aller Wissenschaften, 173– 174:  ‘Wenn man verschiedene unab-
hängliche bürgerliche Gesellschaften als einzelne Personen betrachtet, und das Recht der 
Natur auf diese Personen anwendet, so entstehet daher das Völkerrecht. Dieses betrach-
tet demnach die Pflichten, welche ein freyer Staat gegen andere zu beobachten hat, und 
untersucht das Recht der freyen Staaten in Ansehung des Krieges und Friedens, der 
Bündnisse, Verträge und Handlungen’.
 30 Johann Georg Meusel, Leitfaden zur Geschichte der Gelehrsamkeit (Leipzig:  Fleischer, 
1800), 1310:  ‘Ein neuer Zweig ist das praktische Völkerrecht, in welchem vor dem 18. 
Jahrhundert noch wenig gearbeitet war’.
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Lehrbuch der Wissenschaftskunde (1792), which was supposed to be a Grund-
riß encyclopädischer Vorlesungen, is an interesting case insofar as he  discusses 
the law of nations twice:  in philosophy and in jurisprudence. As a rather 
traditional philosopher he suggests that the law of nations is closely con-
nected to natural law and treats the nation as a moral person, but he also 
distinguishes between the law of nations in general and the positive law of 
nations: the former ‘is based on the general relationships between peoples; 
[the latter] contains the mutual obligations established between several peo-
ples through custom and contracts’.31 Wolff ’s Jus gentium and Emer de Vattel’s 
Le droit des gens are recommended for further reading. When Eschenburg 
treats the law of nations in his chapter on jurisprudence, he simply repeats 
his remarks from the earlier chapter on philosophy without adding details 
from the perspective of jurisprudence. The way in which he treats the law of 
nations twice is indicative of the tendency for the law of nations to make it 
independent from philosophy.
However, an interesting detail may correct this impression. In the chap-
ter on jurisprudence Eschenburg emphasizes that the natural law of nations 
(‘natürliches Völkerrecht’) is the basis of the positive law of nations, ‘which 
fairly deduces its judgements and principles from this source, and which has to 
be led back to it, in spite of all modifications caused by the requirements of the 
people’.32 He also states in the chapter on philosophy that the obligation of the 
general law of nations is much stronger than the vis obligandi of the positive 
law, ‘because those are founded on the rights and claims of reason itself, while 
these in contrast are based on particular temporary agreements and agreed 
conditions’.33 These remarks strengthen the role of philosophy and run coun-
ter to the impression mentioned above. Eschenburg seems to try to defend the 
philosophical status of the law of nations against the already established claim 
by lawyers that the positive law of nations belongs to juridical practice. In 
other words, a philosopher is defending his turf against the professional claims 
by jurists.
 31 Eschenburg, Lehrbuch der Wissenschaftskunde, 109:  ‘Jenes beruht auf den allgemeinen 
Verhältnissen eines Volks gegen andre; dieses enthält die zwischen mehrern Völkern 
durch Herkommen und Verträge festgesetzten gegenseitigen Verbindlichkeiten des 
Verhaltens’.
 32 Ibid., 262: ‘[W] elches seine Entscheidungen und Grundsätze billig aus dieser Quelle her-
leiten, und, bei aller ihrer nach den Bedürfnissen jedes Volks abgeänderten Anwendung, 
doch zuletzt auf dieselbe zurückführen muß’.
 33 Ibid., 109: ‘[W] eil jenes die Rechte und Ansprüche der Vernunft, dieses hingegen gewisse 
vorläufige Einwilligungen und gemachte Bedingungen zum Grunde hat’.
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5 Effects of Specialization: the Law of Nations in Juridical 
Encyclopaedias and the Example of a Specialized historia literaria
The emphasis on the juridical function of the positive law of nations is charac-
teristic of the Göttingen school of law. Johann Stephan Pütter – one of the most 
famous exponents of this school – wrote his Neuer Versuch einer juristischen 
Encyclopädie und Methodologie for law students, not for a general academic 
readership. The law of nations plays a significant role in Pütters’s Encyclopädie, 
insofar as he mentions it at all levels of the work. In his chapter on legal theory 
he deals with the law of nations together with natural law; in the chapter on 
positive law, he treats the practical law of nations, especially with respect to 
the German Empire; and he also speaks about the law of nations in his meth-
odological remarks at the end of the book. In a now familiar way, Pütter distin-
guishes between the general law of nations (‘allgemeines Völkerrecht’), which 
only applies the principles of natural law to nations,34 and the positive law 
of nations, which is based on contracts on the one hand and customs or tacit 
consent on the other:
So entire nations do not have other sources of obligation than contracts. 
Thus there is in fact no other law of nations than the universal one which 
is a part of the law of nature (§ 19). But since obliging customs can be 
created by tacit consent and since several nations, which are related to 
each other by sharing the same historical level of civilization, the same 
soil, the same religion and things like that, agree upon certain principles 
by contracts and customs, another voluntary (positive) law of nations 
can be conceived, which undoubtedly exists among the European states 
today and which already existed in former times.35
 34 Pütter, Neuer Versuch einer juristischen Encyclopädie und Methodologie, 10– 11.
 35 Ibid., 13– 14: ‘Ganze Völker haben daher unter einander keine andere Quelle von dieser Art 
Verbindlichkeiten, als die sie sich selbst mit Verträgen aufladen. Folglich gibt es eigentlich 
kein ander Völkerrecht, als das allgemeine, so einen Theil des Rechts der Natur ausmacht 
(§19). Jedoch sofern auch aus stillschweigender Einwilligung verbindliche Gebräuche 
entstehen können, und sofern mehrere Völker, die einerlei Welt- Alter, einerley Theil des 
Erdbodens, einerley Religion und was dergleichen mehr ist, in nähere Verbindung setzt, 
sich durch Gebräuche und Verträge auf gewisse Grundsätze vereinbaren, und insonder-
heit manche sonst dem allgemeinen Völkerrechte nach unbestimmte Dinge näher zu 
bestimmen; so läßt sich noch ein weiteres willkührliches (positives) Völkerrecht denken, 
dergleichen heutiges Tages unter den Europäischen Staaten unleugbar ist, und in vorigen 
Zeiten eben so wenig ohne Beyspiel gewesen’.
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This positive law of nations plays multiple roles, especially in Germany. It is 
applied to the relations between the German Empire as a whole with foreign 
countries, but it is also applied to the relations of the individual territorial states 
of the Empire with foreign countries, to the relations of the individual German 
territorial states with each other, and finally to relations between the individual 
territorial states and the Empire as a whole. So Pütter is right when he states 
that a German lawyer has a lot of opportunities to work in the field of the law of 
nations. For this reason, he recommends his students to study history, especially 
the modern conflicts between European nations since the Peace of Westphalia, 
and all parts of the practical law of nations and ‘statistics’ (‘Staatenkunde’, theo-
ry of the state).36 So there is no doubt about the juridical importance of the 
positive law of nations and, hence, of the necessity to present it extensively in 
the juridical encyclopaedia. As we have seen, Pütter acknowledges the logical 
priority of natural law as the basis of all general concepts of law, and he cer-
tainly stresses that a lawyer is especially useful (‘desto brauchbarer’) when he 
combines a wide range of knowledge of positive law (including the positive 
law of nations) and case law with the ability to base this knowledge on gen-
eral terms and concepts. So the study of natural law and the study of positive 
law (including the positive law of nations) should be linked. To this end, Pütter 
recommends that natural law should be studied not only at the beginning but 
also at the end of legal education, ‘since especially general constitutional law 
and the law of nations deserve to be reconsidered in a way that is not possible 
on the first entry into the study of law’.37 In spite of its logical priority, it is clear 
that aspects of natural law – the general constitutional law and the general law 
of nations – should be re- interpreted, maybe extended or even modified in the 
light of positive law in general and of the positive law of nations in particular. So 
the emancipation of the law of nations has reached a much higher level.
The final step was taken by a student and friend of Pütter, Dietrich Heinrich 
Ludwig von Ompteda, significantly a lawyer, diplomat, and politician, not an 
academic.38 In his Litteratur des gesammten sowohl natürlichen als positiven 
Völkerrechts (1785) we find everything we missed in all the other compendia. 
Ompteda delivered a careful ‘historia litteraria seu litteratura juris gentium’39 
 36 Ibid., 102.
 37 Ibid., 67:  ‘[D] a insonderheit auch das allgemeine Staats- und Völker- Recht wohl ver-
diente, alsdenn noch mit andern Augen angesehen werden, als es beym ersten Eintritt in 
die Rechtswissenschaft geschehen kann’.
 38 The title page of his book mentions Ompteda’s functions:  ‘Königl. Grosbrit. Churfürstl. 
Braunschw. Lüneb. Comitial- Gesandter bey der Reichsversammlung zu Regensburg und 
bevollmächtigter Minister am Churpfälz. Hofe zu München’.
 39 Ompteda, Litteratur des gesammten sowohl natürlichen als positiven Völkerrechts, 91.
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of no less than 672 pages, in which topics were extensively differentiated – the 
detailed table of contents alone takes up 21 pages. The book met a desidera-
tum of his time. When Ompteda began his study of international law, he was 
amazed by the quantity of bibliographical material and the complete lack of 
guidance through the wide- ranging scholarship on the law of nations. Other 
scholars had lamented that there was no compendium to this literature, al-
though the law of nations was already an independent discipline separate from 
natural law.40 Ompteda considered his book to be a counterpart to Pütter’s 
Litteratur des teutschen Staatsrechts. Like Pütter’s, it is divided into two parts, 
‘history of the discipline and bibliographical guidance’41 – and it does in fact 
provide a highly systematic and annotated bibliography of the whole of the 
relevant literature on the law of nations. Ompteda’s work is not a compendium 
of historia literaria intending to offer an orientation to the world of academic 
knowledge to new students. It is, rather, a general reference work, written for 
experts by an expert who was a lawyer and a politician at the same time.
6 Conclusion
German histories of learning seem to reflect fairly precisely the development of 
the general discussion of the law of nations in Germany. Initially, historians of 
scholarship were not interested in presenting the theoretical aspects of or bib-
liographical material on the law of nations, thus reflecting the distance of early 
natural lawyers to the subject – although the historia literaria juris gentium of 
Ompteda does provide evidence that the earlier discussion of the law of nations 
was in fact more lively than one might have expected. In all the compendia con-
sulted for the present survey, discussions of natural law dominate. It played a 
significant role in normative political thought and – perhaps even more – in 
moral theory, so it is not surprising that those historians of learning and those 
authors of encyclopaedias who had moral concerns42 focused on natural law, 
especially since this focus was supported by the political circumstances in Ger-
many, with its composite constitutional structure. The situation changed when 
the works of Glafey, Wolff and Vattel appeared – the discussion of international 
law became more elaborate and it was given a theoretical and practical basis. 
 40 Ibid., ‘Vorrede,’ n.p.
 41 Ibid., 93: ‘Geschichte der Wissenschaft und Bücherkunde’.
 42 See Frank Grunert, ‘Von “guten” Büchern. Zum moralischen Anspruch der Gelehrsamkeits-
geschichte,’ in Historia literaria, ed. Grunert and Vollhardt, 65– 88.
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The differentiation and specialization of the law of nations was reflected in his-
toria literaria, which was a medium for scholarly developments, and when the 
law of nations became more important as a subject in legal studies, specialized 
propaedeutic compendia began to include more information on this field. The 
historia literaria juris gentium by Ompteda gives a wide- ranging overview of all 
aspects of the law of nations, from the earliest times to his own. Even though 
it was not by any means fully specialized, it did facilitate even more differenti-
ation. This development may be contrasted with the state of the generalist his-
tories of learning, in which the treatment of the law of nations remained quite 
poor. These historians of scholarship – both before and after Friedrich Schiller’s 
Briefe zur ästhetischen Erziehung des Menschen – pursued a more holistic ideal 
of explicit philosophical ‘Bildung’, and that entailed an aversion to specializa-
tion and a neglect of, for example, the emergence of the law of nations as a 
separate discipline, even when they were well aware of this.
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 chapter 5
Pufendorf on the Law of Sociality 
and the Law of Nations
Kari Saastamoinen
1 Introduction
In his grand exposition of natural law, De jure naturae et gentium (hereafter 
jng),1 Samuel Pufendorf denied the existence of a separate law of nations as 
a set of positive legislation agreed by all nations. Following Thomas Hobbes, 
he maintained that the norms which prevailed between sovereign states were 
nothing but the application of the law of nature to interstate relations.2 The 
fundamental principle of natural law, in turn, was the duty to cultivate and 
maintain sociality towards other human beings.3 This much about Pufendorf ’s 
views can be said without much disagreement among modern commentators. 
But once we ask what he meant by the endorsement of sociality, among indi-
viduals or between states, things become complicated and scholarly opinion 
diverges. One reason for rival interpretations is that Pufendorf ’s remarks on 
the law of nature oscillated between two seemingly incompatible positions. 
On the one hand, he not only observed that human beings are by nature pre-
occupied with their personal safety and welfare, but also emphasized that 
observing natural law serves their long- term interests. With such remarks, he 
appeared to follow Hobbes in deducing natural law from the requirements of 
 1 Samuel Pufendorf, De jure naturæ et gentium libri octo (Lund: 1672). The modern scholarly 
edition is De jure naturae et gentium, 2 vols., ed. Frank Böhling, Samuel Pufendorf: Gesam-
melte Werke, ed. Wilhelm Schmidt- Biggemann, vols. 4.1– 2 (Berlin:  Akademie Verlag, 1998). 
This edition identifies the additions Pufendorf made to the expanded edition published in 
1684 (jng 1684). Most of the English translations are from De jure naturae et gentium libri 
octo, 2 vols., vol. 2: Of the Law of Nature and Nations, transl. C.H. Oldfather and W.A. Oldfather, 
The Classics of International Law, ed. J.B. Scott, no. 17 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), here-
after lnn. Occasionally, I also use The Political Writings of Samuel Pufendorf, transl. Michael 
J. Seidler, ed. Craig L. Carr (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). On Pufendorf, his histor-
ical significance and modern Pufendorf scholarship see Michael Seidler, ‘Pufendorf ’s Moral 
and Political Philosophy,’ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2015 Edition), ed. 
Edward N. Zalta, https:// plato.stanford.edu/ archives/ win2015/ entries/ pufendorf- moral/ .
 2 jng 1672, book ii, chap. 3, § 22 (1684, book ii, chap. 3, § 23). lnn, 226.
 3 jng 1672, book ii, chap. 3, § 15. lnn, 208.
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individual self- preservation. On the other hand, Pufendorf explicitly distanced 
his method of deducing natural law from that of Hobbes, maintaining that 
natural law imposes on human beings a reciprocal duty of general friendship, 
which is not dependent on any consequences for their own security or welfare 
but relies solely on their shared humanity.
It has been suggested that the discrepancy between these two ways of 
 characterizing natural law is resolved once we realize that only the first men-
tioned expressed Pufendorf ’s sincere opinion on the issue. Despite ostensible 
attempts to distance himself from Hobbes, Pufendorf followed the English phi-
losopher in identifying natural law with principles needed for individual se-
curity and welfare. His efforts to dissociate himself from Hobbes on this issue 
were motivated by a need to avoid the reputation of being a follower of  Hobbes, 
who was widely associated with atheism and amorality in seventeenth- century 
Europe. This aspiration was especially strong in the expanded edition of jng 
published in 1684, as the accusation of being a Hobbist had been one of the 
charges levelled at Pufendorf after the publication of the first edition in 1672.4 
Recently, the idea of the Hobbesian character of Pufendorf ’s theory has also 
been associated with what is called his international theory.5 Pufendorf is 
 4 The idea of the Hobbesian character of Pufendorf ’s natural law is defended in great detail 
in Fiammetta Palladini, Samuel Pufendorf dicepolo di Hobbes: Per una reinterpretazione del 
giusnaturalismo moderno (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1990). See also Palladini, ‘Pufendorf Disciple 
of Hobbes: The Nature of Man and the State of Nature: The Doctrine of socialitas,’ History of 
European Ideas, 34 (2008): 26– 60. On the debate following the publication of jng 1672, see 
Palladini, Discussioni seicentesche su Samuel Pufendorf. Scritti Latini:  1663– 1700 (Bologna:  Il 
Mulino, 1978). The idea that Pufendorf deduced the content of natural law from the require-
ments of individual self- preservation is also to be found in Istvan Hont, ‘The Language of 
Sociability and Commerce: Samuel Pufendorf and the Theoretical Foundations of the “Four- 
Stages” Theory,’ in The Language of Political Theory in Early- Modern Europe, ed. Anthony 
Pagden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 253, 267; and in Richard Tuck, ‘The 
“Modern” Theory of Natural Law,’ in The Languages of Political Theory in Early- Modern Eu-
rope, ed. Anthony Pagden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 105. Tuck has later 
modified his position, seeing now a marked difference between Hobbes and Pufendorf on 
this issue. Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace. Political Thought and the Internation-
al Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 151– 152. See also Ian 
Hunter, ‘Natural Law as Political Philosophy,’ in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy in Early 
Modern Europe, ed. Desmond Clarke and Catherine Wilson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 490.
 5 Theodore Christov, Before Anarchy. Hobbes and His Critics in Modern International Thought 
(New  York:  Cambridge University Press, 2015). Other recent writings exploring Pufendorf 
from the perspective of international relations are Peter Schröder, Trust in Early Modern In-
ternational Political Thought, 1598– 1713 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), Ben 
Holland, The Moral Person of the State. Pufendorf. Sovereignty, and Composite Polities (Cam-
bridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2017), and Vanda Fiorillo, ‘States, as Ethico- Political 
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presented as a closet Hobbesian who used the vocabulary of sociality to cam-
ouflage the similarities between his and Hobbes’s conclusions. Behind his ‘self- 
professed anti- Hobbesian sentiments’, Pufendorf implicitly acknowledged the 
‘authentically Hobbesian foundations in the construction of the international 
political order’.6
The idea of the close affinity between Hobbes’s and Pufendorf ’s accounts of 
natural law has obvious merits. Above all, it has made obsolete the previously 
widely shared view of Pufendorf as Hobbes’s adversary, who rejected the lat-
ter’s gloomy picture of human nature and established natural law on the idea 
of a natural human inclination to sociability, inspired by Hugo Grotius. While 
Pufendorf heralded Grotius as his most important predecessor in the study of 
natural law, it has been shown convincingly that the single most significant 
intellectual inspiration behind his theory was Hobbes. Pufendorf found no 
natural inclination to peaceful sociality in human nature, as he saw human 
behaviour governed mainly by self- love and self- preservation, and often also 
by an inclination to hurt others. The cultivation of sociality was a norm im-
posed on such creatures with the purpose of advancing peaceful social life. The 
Hobbesian inspiration was even more obvious in Pufendorf ’s theories of the 
state of nature and civil society. It also seems plausible that Pufendorf wanted 
to avoid the reputation of being a Hobbesian, and some of the things he wrote 
to that end may well have been the original source for his fame as an adversary 
of Hobbes.7
Nevertheless, nothing in the above forces us to conclude that Pufendorf fol-
lowed Hobbes in deducing natural law from the requirements of individual self- 
preservation. And in this chapter, I will argue that there are good reasons for 
holding that he did not. While Pufendorf shared Hobbes’s view of the pivotal 
role self- preservation and self- love play in human behaviour, his idea of natural 
law differed significantly from that of the English philosopher. This disagree-
ment between Hobbes and Pufendorf was most visible in their rival views on 
the character and status natural law has outside civil society, and it indicated 
noteworthy differences in the ways they articulated the moral relations between 
sovereign states. In the first part of this chapter, I will explore how Pufendorf 
Subjects of International Law: The Relationship between Theory and Practice in the Inter-
national Politics of Samuel Pufendorf,’ in System, Order, and International Law: The Early His-
tory of International Legal Thought from Machiavelli to Hegel, ed. Stefan Kadelbach, Thomas 
Kleinlein, and David Roth- Isigkeit (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2017), 199– 215. These 
works came out too late to be commented on here.
 6 Christov, Before Anarchy, 143– 157, 176.
 7 Palladini, ‘Pufendorf Disciple of Hobbes,’ 59– 60.
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deduced the cultivation of sociality as the fundamental principle of natural 
law.8 In the second part, I will analyse his remarks on Hobbes’s theory and show 
how their different methods of deducing natural law were connected to their 
dissimilar understanding of interstate relations. In doing this, I will distinguish 
between what Pufentorf wrote in the first edition of jng (jng 1672) and what 
he added to the edition of 1684 (jng 1684). While the numerous new refer ences 
to classic Stoic texts and Richard Cumberland’s anti- Hobbesian De legibus nat-
urae (1672) may well have served the purpose of defending the author from the 
charges of being a Hobbesian, many of the remarks Pufendorf added to jng 
1684 were fully in line with the theory he had put forward in jng 1672.
2 Sociality as the Fundamental Principle of Natural Law
The first thing to explore here is the demonstrative science of natural law. For 
Pufendorf, reflecting on natural law and sociality was not a matter of adopting 
some true philosophical doctrine. There were many argumentative strategies 
to convince people of their need to ponder morality and social institutions 
from the perspective of sociality.9 One could try to convince them that it serves 
their personal interests to do so, or one could use suitable citations from phi-
losophers of different schools to show how wise men have reached similar con-
clusions despite their dissimilar intellectual starting points. In jng Pufendorf 
used both approaches, but he also found it important to argue that there was 
a demonstrative science of natural law. By ‘demonstrative science’ he did not 
refer to a process of inquiry but to a certain type of organized knowledge. The 
model for such knowledge was not Euclidian geometry, which had inspired his 
early Elementorum jurisprudentiae universalis (1660), but the Aristotelian de-
monstrative syllogism. Demonstrative science consists of evident propositions 
and propositions which can be reduced back to such obvious statements, and 
it offers knowledge about necessary connections between things. In this way, it 
is ‘certain and clear’ as well as valid ‘everywhere and at all times’.10
 8 In this part I will reformulate and further develop ideas presented in Kari Saastamoinen, 
The Morality of the Fallen Man. Samuel Pufendorf on Natural Law (Helsinki: Finnish His-
torical Society, 1995).
 9 This much, at least, I agree with Knud Haakonssen, ‘Rejoinder to My Commentators,’ in 
‘Pufendorf on Power and Liberty,’ in the series Liberty Matters: A Forum for the Discussion of 
Matters pertaining to Liberty (January 2017). http:// oll.libertyfund.org/ pages/ lm- pufendorf.
 10 jng 1672, book i, chap.  2, §  3. lnn, 23–2 4. On Pufendorf ’s moral science, see 
Saastamoinen, The Morality of the Fallen Man, 54– 62.
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In Pufendorf’s view, it was an error to think, as most scholars had done, that de-
monstrative certainty is impossible in moral sciences.11 This did not mean, how-
ever, that the quest for certainty was a central concern of his enterprise. Human 
beings adopt their moral views unreflectively from education and prevailing so-
cial practices, and most of them lack the capacity to understand how natural law 
follows from first principles.12 Their knowledge of natural law is always probable 
in character, and Pufendorf saw no need for things to be otherwise. His criticism 
of the view that moral sciences lack demonstrative certainty was not that this 
had left humankind in a state of moral scepticism. What he complained about 
was that it ‘has worked an immense injury’ to moral science, as it has ‘caused 
scholars to investigate but diffidently into that which they believed rested on so 
slippery a foundation’. To those scholars who have altogether neglected the moral 
sciences, it has offered ‘the plausible excuse, that they were founded on no cer-
tain demonstrations, and could be treated merely in a rough and ready fashion’.13
Achieving full certainty was less important than exploring natural law in a 
thorough manner and having a clear understanding of its character and pur-
pose. Such an intellectual exercise was the job of intelligent and well- educated 
experts and persons in important governmental positions, and it was these 
people Pufendorf addressed in jng. It is important to note that his demonstra-
tive account of natural law did not aim to describe or transform the moral self- 
understanding of the uneducated common people, who observed natural law 
by following the general example of society, without comprehending how its 
precepts could be demonstrated.14 In the case of the common people, it was the 
duty of the sovereign to take care that they follow laws not so much due to their 
fear of punishment than out of habit.15 To be sure, even those with mediocre 
intelligence could understand the demonstration of natural law, if this was pre-
sented to them by others.16 Yet, Pufendorf made it clear that his compendium 
of natural law for university students, De officio hominis et civis (hereafter ohc), 
offered only the rudiments of the demonstrative understanding of natural law.17 
In the preface to this work he explained how it is ‘in the public interest to steep 
 11 jng 1672, book i, chap. 2, § 1. lnn, 22.
 12 jng 1672, book i, chap. 3, § 5; book ii, chap. 3, § 13. lnn, 42, 202– 203.
 13 jng 1672, book i, chap. 2, § 1. lnn, 22.
 14 jng 1672, book ii, chap. 3, § 13. lnn, 202– 203.
 15 jng 1672, book vii, chap. 9, § 4. lnn, 1119. On Pufendorf ’s views on habitual behav-
iour, see Heikki Haara, Sociability in Samuel Pufendorf ’s Natural Law Theory (PhD diss., 
University of Helsinki, 2017), 27– 36.
 16 jng 1672, book ii, chap. 3, § 13. lnn, 202.
 17 Samuel Pufendorf, De officio hominis et civis juxta legem naturalem libri duo 
(Lund:  1673). The modern scholarly edition is De Officio, ed. Gerald Hartung, Samuel 
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in the minds of young men a moral doctrine whose usefulness in civil life is ac-
cepted as obvious’. But to achieve this aim one should take care that students are 
not ‘put off at the beginning by a massive accumulation of difficult questions’, 
which would happen if they were ‘to set out on the wide expanses of this subject 
without a knowledge of what one might call the elements’.18 Thus, the idea of 
demonstrative moral science was unmentioned in ohc, and the argumentation 
in this work was often considerably looser than in jng. This should not, how-
ever, be understood to mean that Pufendorf regarded the idea of demonstrative 
moral science as insignificant. After all, what was equally missing in ohc was 
one of his main claims to fame: the theory of moral entities.19
The important point in this context is that when Pufendorf defended the 
possibility of demonstrative moral knowledge, he made a distinction between 
two fields of moral sciences. One of them, associated by Pufendorf with pru-
dence, is concerned with ‘the successful management of one’s own actions 
and those of others, with an eye to the security and welfare primarily of the 
public’.20 This kind of reasoning cannot achieve demonstrative certainty, as it 
is founded on ‘axioms drawn by a dexterous observation and collection of the 
customs of men and the events of human history’, and because ‘the smallest 
things can change radically the outcome in human affairs’.21 The other field 
of moral science deals with norms which determine the rectitude of human 
actions, and this is by and large identical with the science of natural law. Pufen-
dorf explained that why this kind of moral knowledge can be demonstrative 
would become fully apparent later in the work, when he explores the origins 
of natural law.22 This indicated that the demonstrative character of such know-
ledge has to do with premises which are founded on the contemplation of 
‘man’s nature, condition and inclinations’.23 Pufendorf added that while our 
actions are free, and therefore not necessary, once some principles have been 
imposed on them, this gives rise to ‘affections’, which can be demonstrated.24 
In jng 1684 he clarified this remark by explaining that ‘the acts which fall un-
der the conduct of the law of nature have an intrinsic force toward sociality’ 
Pufendorf: Gesammelte Werke, ed. Wilhelm Schmidt- Biggemann, vol. 2 (Berlin: Akademie 
Verlag, 1997).
 18 ohc, Prefatio. The English translation is from On the Duty of Man Citizen, ed. James Tully, 
transl. Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 6.
 19 On moral entities, see jng 1672, book i, chap. 1.
 20 jng 1672, book i, chap. 2, § 4. lnn, 24.
 21 jng 1672, book i, chap. 2, § 4. lnn, 25.
 22 jng 1672, book i, chap. 2, § 5. lnn, 26.
 23 jng 1672, book ii, chap. 3, § 14. lnn, 205.
 24 jng 1672, book i, chap. 2, § 5. lnn, 26.
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(socialitas).25 While these acts are contingent in the sense that they follow 
from our free decisions, the relationship between these acts and their effects 
on sociality ‘is necessary and natural, and therefore capable of demonstra-
tion’.26 Below we will see how Pufendorf referred, already in jng 1672, to this 
idea in his definition of the fundamental principle.
Natural law has to do with acts which have a necessary effect on sociality 
among human beings. To be sure, Pufendorf made it clear that there is also 
a strong positive correlation between the observance of natural law and the 
promotion of one’s personal salus, a term which referred to both physical secu-
rity and welfare. This is a theme Pufendorf emphasized especially in jng 1684. 
All in all, actions which are in accordance with the rules of sociality not only 
‘maintain and increase a man’s standing, reputation, and position’, but also 
‘procure some advantage and reward for a man, and contribute to his happi-
ness’. Actions repugnant to these rules, in turn, ‘may at times return some util-
ity, and more often some pleasure, which however never endures for long, and 
is followed by a throng of much greater ills’.27 However, in the paragraph on 
the sanctions of natural law added to jng 1684 Pufendorf gave a more nuanced 
picture of the issue. There, he admitted that those are not totally mistaken who 
claim that ‘many are returned for their benefactions only hatred, envy, and 
other ills, while, on the other hand, others enjoy without punishment the fruits 
of their evil deeds’. Accordingly, Pufendorf qualified his position by pointing 
out that, while ‘it cannot be assumed, without chance of error, that for our 
good deeds we shall be returned in kind by other men’, still ‘it is sure that, from 
good actions, we can reasonably hope for advantages with a degree of certain-
ty that would not be justified if one were to expect to get them from opposed 
 vices’. While the consequences of our morally good deeds are never certain, 
there ‘is still an evident probability that not a few benefits will follow, or at all 
events more than what can be expected from evil actions’.28
In other words, while actions ordered or forbidden by natural law have a 
necessary effect on sociality, their effects on our personal safety and welfare 
are never more than highly probable. For example, a person who steals a large 
sum of money evidently violates natural law. And while the likeliest scenario 
is that this person will be severely punished, it is not impossible that he or she 
 25 jng 1684, book i, chap. 2, § 5: ‘Sane enim constat, actus, de quibus naturali lege disponi-
tur, intrinsecam habere vim ad socialitatem’. Translation K.S.
 26 Ibid. ‘[N] exus inter actus nostros & effectus omnes independentes necessarius est, & 
plane naturalis, eoque demostrationis capax’. lnn, 26.
 27 jng 1684, book ii, chap. 3, § 10. lnn, 196.
 28 jng 1684, book ii, chap. 3, § 21. lnn, 223.
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will not get caught, but end up being a rich and respected member of society. 
Such uncertainty concerning the effects of our actions does not characterize 
the consequences stealing money has for sociality. Human beings cannot but 
be grossly aggravated when someone takes their property without their per-
mission, wherefore theft has always a negative effect on sociality.29 This would 
suggest that, in Pufendorf ’s theory, the duty to cultivate sociality is not merely 
a means to promote one’s own security and welfare. While human beings have 
strong innate inclination to preserve their own lives and to promote their per-
sonal welfare, their most fundamental moral duty is to behave in a manner 
which promotes sociality among human beings.
There are several features in jng which support this interpretation. The 
first thing to note is the role Pufendorf gave to God in defining the content of 
the fundamental principle. It is well known that he saw the morally obligating 
character of natural law as being dependent on the idea that it is imposed by 
God.30 However, the idea of God was explicitly present also throughout his 
discussion of the content of the fundamental principle. While Pufendorf saw 
human reason as unable to understand the true character of God, this did 
not prevent him from holding that reason can make it possible to draw some 
conclusions about God’s intentions in creating the human species. Already in 
the chapter on the moral entities he declared that the first moral entities were 
imposed on human beings by God, who did not want human beings to live 
‘without being accountable to any law, rule, or necessity’ but wanted ‘men’s life 
and actions to be tempered by certain principles’.31 More importantly, Pufen-
dorf started the discussion of natural law in jng Book ii by asking how, since 
God has given human beings a free will, do we know for sure that God had not 
granted them a full liberty to follow their own will but wants them to observe 
a law.32 His answer was that we know this from the fact that full liberty would 
be disadvantageous and prejudicial to human nature, and that the salus of hu-
man nature requires it to be restricted by law.33 While God has given other ani-
mal species a sort of liberty to follow their own desires, the fact that they had 
not been endowed with a soul capable of recognizing a law makes it apparent 
that God was pleased to manifest his power simply by creating and destroying 
them.34 In the case of human beings, the fact that God has endowed them with 
 29 jng 1672, book iii, chap. 1, § 1. lnn, 314.
 30 jng 1672, book i, chap. 2, § 6; book ii, chap. 19– 20. lnn, 27–2 8, 215– 218.
 31 jng 1672, book i, chap. 1, § 3. lnn, 5.
 32 jng 1672, book ii, chap. 1, § 1. lnn, 145.
 33 jng 1672, book ii, chap. 1, § 2. lnn, 145.
 34 jng 1672, book ii, chap. 1, § 4. lnn, 148.
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intellectual and moral capabilities indicate that God wanted them to establish 
an organized way of living, and by doing so increase God’s glory and their own 
happiness.35 Moreover, the inability of human individuals to survive without 
the company and assistance of other members of their species means that a 
social way of living is necessary for the salus of human beings. Yet, the strong 
human proclivity to hurt one another and the great variety of their inclina-
tions indicate that social life is impossible without law. Thus, Pufendorf closed 
the discussion by concluding that the idea of the natural liberty of human be-
ings should always be understood as ‘something restrained by sane reason and 
 natural law’.36
The above indicates clearly and explicitly that God is concerned with the 
salus of human beings, and that this is the aim for which he has imposed natu-
ral law on them. This was the most elementary assumption in Pufendorf ’s 
deduction of the fundamental principle. It was also an idea which, he thought, 
most of his readers were ready to accept, irrespective of their religious con-
fession and without further evidence or argument. Equally obvious was that 
God has imposed natural law on the human species collectively. This idea may 
sometimes be blurred by the fact that Pufendorf used, in the conventional 
manner, the singular form, homo, as a generic term to indicate both the whole 
human species and human individuals as representatives of the species. Thus, 
he spoke interchangeably about the salus of a human being, the salus of hu-
man nature and the salus of the human species.37 He also explained how after 
God had made a human being (homo) an animal who could not be salvum 
unless he observed natural law, one could not believe that God would annul or 
change natural law without changing human nature.38 In this statement homo 
did not refer to the members of the human species individually, as Pufendorf 
knew well that there are people who prosper even though they have violated 
natural law. It signified the whole human species, which cannot survive unless 
a significant majority of its members observe natural law at least most of the 
time. Of course, Pufendorf did not hold that the preservation and welfare of 
the human species could be separated from the salus of its individual mem-
bers. But this was something he presented, already in 1672, as a corollary of 
the duty to cultivate sociality. The sociality for which God has created human 
beings ‘cannot be exercised and preserved to good advantage unless every man 
improves and preserves himself to the best of his ability’. Thus, ‘when a man 
 35 jng 1672, book ii, chap. 1, § 5. lnn, 149.
 36 jng 1672, book ii, chap. 1, § 6– 8. lnn, 149– 153.
 37 jng 1672, book ii, chap. 1, § 2; book ii, chap. 3, § 11, § 15. lnn, 145, 199, 208.
 38 jng 1672, book ii, chap. 3, § 5. lnn, 185.
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neglects his own care, he works an injury, not, indeed, on himself, but on God, 
his Creator, and on the human race’.39 In jng 1684 Pufendorf encapsulated this 
idea in the remark that ‘the safety [salus] of the whole of human society is 
an unintelligible phrase, if it makes no difference whether individuals are safe 
[salvum] or not’.40
How, then, do we know that God has imposed the duty to cultivate sociality 
on the human species? The mere fact that God wants humankind to survive 
and prosper does not tell us what norms human beings should obey to achieve 
this end. At the beginning of the chapter ‘On the law of nature in general’, 
Pufendorf explained that, after showing how the condition God has imposed 
on human beings does not permit them to live without law, he would now 
explore the most general norm human beings are obligated to follow.41 After 
commenting on some previously presented ideas about natural law, he did this 
in much- cited paragraphs ii.3.14– 15.
It should be clear by now that, when Pufendorf at the beginning of para-
graph ii.3.14 declared that ‘there is no more direct and appropriate way to in-
vestigate natural law than to contemplate carefully man’s nature, condition, 
and inclinations’, this did not indicate a fresh start out of nothing. Pufendorf 
took it for granted that the general end of natural law, the salus of the human 
species, was clear for every attentive reader. And since these readers under-
stood that human salus consists of both preservation and welfare, he could 
say, before making a single observation concerning the human condition, that 
whether this law is imposed by God ‘to advance man’s happiness or to restrain 
his evil dispositions, which may be to his own destruction, there is no easier 
way to learn it than by observing when man needs assistance and when he 
needs restraint’.42 Thus, when Pufendorf started his contemplation on the hu-
man condition by referring to the tendency of human beings to love them-
selves more than others, and to protect their own lives by all possible means, 
he was not declaring that in these inclinations we have found the true end 
of natural law:  individual preservation and welfare.43 Pufendorf ’s point was 
that in determining the most general norm needed for the salus of the human 
 39 jng 1672, book ii, chap. 4, § 1 (1684, book ii, chap. 4, § 16). lnn, 256.
 40 jng 1684, book ii, chap. 4, § 16. lnn, 256.
 41 jng 1672, book ii, chap. 3, § 1. lnn, 179.
 42 jng 1672, book ii, chap. 3, § 14. lnn, 205.
 43 Later in jng Pufendorf made it clear that the mere fact that the human nature is endowed 
with an affect or an inclination does not indicate that this is how natural law wants 
human beings to behave, as most of such natural tendencies are evidently opposed to 
natural law. jng 1672, book vi, chap. 1, § 28. lnn, 891.
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species one could not rely on any human tendency to altruism or self- sacrifice. 
Instead, one had to take seriously the fact that human beings are usually ready 
to give assistance to others only if they think that it is in their own interest to 
do so, and that they are bound to behave aggressively towards anyone they see 
as a threat to their own security. The other relevant features for identifying 
the fundamental norm were the inability of human beings to survive without 
other people’s assistance, their extensive ability to help each other, and their 
strong tendency to inflict harm on one another.44
After these observations, Pufendorf was ready to deduce the most general 
norm for the salus of the human species. His argument had an empirical and a 
normative component. The empirical component goes as follows.
Man [homo], it is clearly apparent, is an animal most eager to preserve 
himself, essentially in need, ill- equipped to maintain himself without 
the aid of those who are like him, and very well suited for the mutual 
promotion of advantages. All the same, he is often malicious, insolent, 
easily annoyed, and both ready and able to inflict harm. For this kind of 
animal to be safe [ut salvum sit], it is necessary that he be sociable. That 
is, he must will to be so united with those who are similar to himself and 
conduct himself towards them in such a way that they are provided with 
no cause to hurt him but instead have a reason to maintain or promote 
his advantage.45
Here, homo is a generic term referring to the human species, and the state-
ment expresses the most general requirement for the preservation and welfare 
of this species and its individual members: their reciprocal willingness to join 
together in the purpose of exchanging services, and their need to behave in a 
manner which mutually motivates such activity. From this observation Pufen-
dorf made the following normative conclusion.
And so the fundamental law of nature will be this: Every man must, inas-
much as he can, cultivate and maintain towards others peaceful sociality. 
A corollary of this is that, since whoever obligates a man to an end obli-
gates him as well to the means without which the end cannot be obtained. 
All things which necessarily work to that sociality [ad istam socialitatem 
 44 jng 1672, book ii, chap. 3, § 14. lnn, 207.
 45 jng 1672, book ii, chap. 3, § 15. lnn, 207– 208. The English translation is from The Political 
Writings of Samuel Pufendorf, 151– 152, excluding a remark Pufendorf added to jng 1684.
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necessario faciunt] are understood to be commanded by natu ral law, and 
all that disturb or destroy it to be forbidden.46
There are two things to note here. First, following the views he had presented 
in the chapter on the certainty of moral science, Pufendorf maintained that 
the laws of nature command or forbid acts which have a necessary effect on 
sociality among human beings. Accordingly, his demonstrations of the most 
general individual precepts of natural law relied very much on their status as 
necessary means for preventing violence and discord among human beings.47 
Second, since the end of natural law is the salus of the whole humankind, it 
obligates human beings to cultivate sociality also in their relations with indi-
viduals who are not able to help or hurt them, including a human foetus, who 
completely lacks such capabilities.48 It should be noted that the above citation 
is from jng 1672. In jng 1684 the argument was interrupted by a long remark 
on the character of sociality. As a result, the reference to the necessary effects 
that acts observing or violating natural law have on sociality is often left un-
mentioned by modern commentators.
It has been argued that Pufendorf ’s fundamental principle of natural law 
was actually a reformulation of the first principle of natural law Hobbes had 
defined in De cive as the duty ‘to seek peace when it can be had; when it can-
not, to look for aid of war’.49 However, Hobbes’s first principle relied entirely 
on his idea of natural law as ‘the Dictate of right reason about what should be 
done or not done for the longest possible preservation of life and limb’.50 Noth-
ing like this was ever suggested or even tacitly assumed by Pufendorf. For him, 
the principle behind the fundamental principle was the idea of natural law as 
a norm God had imposed to foster the salus of the human species. Accordingly, 
 46 Ibid. English translation by K.S., following The Political Writings of Samuel Pufendorf, 152, 
and lnn, 208, and excluding the additions made to jng  1684.
 47 For an example of such argumentation, see Kari Saastamoinen, ‘Pufendorf on Natural 
Equality, Human Dignity, and Self- Esteem,’ Journal of the History of Ideas 1 (2010): 39– 62.
 48 Pufendorf held that all human beings share a right of not being hurt by others, and this 
also applies to an embryo in the womb of her mother. jng 1672, book i, chap. 1, § 7. 
lnn, 8.  On the natural law and rights in Pufendorf ’s theory, see Kari Saastamoinen, 
‘Liberty and Natural Rights in Pufendorf ’s Natural Law Theory,’ in Transformations in 
Medieval and Early- Modern Rights Discourse, ed. Virpi Mäkinen and Petter Korkman 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 225–2 55.
 49 Thomas Hobbes, De cive (Amsterdam, 1647, 2nd ed.), chap. ii, § 2. The translation is from 
On the Citizen, ed. Richard Tuck, transl. Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press. 1998), 34. Palladini, ‘Pufendorf disciple of Hobbes,’ 50. See also Hunter, 
‘Natural Law as Political Philosophy,’ 490.
 50 Hobbes, De cive, chap. ii, § 1. On the Citizen, 33.
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he established the obligation to preserve one’s own life and the right to protect 
it by violent means by arguing that the non- existence of such norms would 
have negative effects on sociality. The argument for the first mentioned duty 
was, as we saw above, that sociality cannot be exercised and properly preserved 
‘unless every man improves and preserves himself to the best of his ability’.51 In 
the case of violent self- defence, Pufendorf found it meaningful to remark that 
when we kill or injure someone to protect our own lives, we do this to a human 
being ‘with whom we are required to cultivate social life, while by his death 
apparently as great a loss is entailed upon the human race as would come from 
our own death’. The reason why this observation should not prevent us from 
defending ourselves against an unjustified attack is that if natural law denied 
good people the right to protect themselves against the bad ones, this would 
not advance the salus of the human species. On the contrary, it would indi-
cate ‘the end of mankind’.52 It is important to bear in mind that with such ar-
guments Pufendorf was not describing the mental process by which human 
beings adopt their moral beliefs. Human beings internalize their moral con-
victions through education and daily social practice, though the above norms 
happen to find extra motivational strength in self- love and the inclination to 
self- preservation. What Pufendorf was explaining was how natural law norms 
follow from the first principles, and he did this for a small minority, whose task 
it was to understand properly the character and purpose of natural law.
3 The Application of the Principle of Sociality to Interstate Relations
The above method of deducing natural law makes it understandable why 
Pufendorf felt there was a need to explain how his theory compared with that 
of Hobbes. As he maintained that self- love and self- preservation have a pre-
dominant role in human behaviour, it was inevitable that he was going to be 
associated with Hobbes by his contemporaries. And his Hobbes- inspired ideas 
of the state of nature and the origins of civil society were only going to make 
this connection stronger. Thus, right after deducing the fundamental principle, 
Pufendorf used three paragraphs to compare his position with the one Hobbes 
had put forward in De cive. There is no reason to conclude that he did this to 
camouflage the true Hobbesian character of his natural law. Once we take seri-
ously the idea that the fundamental duty of natural law is to cultivate sociality, 
 51 jng 1672, book ii, chap. 4, § 1 (1684, ii.4.16). lnn, 256.
 52 jng 1672, book ii, chap. 5, § 1. lnn, 264–26 5.
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not to preserve one’s own life, it becomes apparent that Pufendorf had good 
reasons to distinguish his own theory from Hobbes’s ‘cleaver’ method of de-
ducing natural law ‘solely from the care of one’s own safety’.53
Pufendorf admitted that Hobbes’s method had the virtue of establishing 
clearly how important it is for the welfare of human beings that they follow 
such dictates of reason. After all, Hobbes had not claimed that each person 
should ‘seek his own advantage to the detriment of others’, but had, rather, ob-
served how ‘care of our own welfare itself orders us to observe the laws of soci-
ality, since our welfare cannot remain secure without this’.54 This was no small 
merit, as Pufendorf valued all arguments which could be used to convince peo-
ple that observing natural law serves their personal interests. Nonetheless, as 
a demonstration of natural law Hobbes’s method was unsatisfactory. The mere 
fact that some rules are beneficial for one’s personal salus fails to indicate ‘that 
a man has right to apply them as means toward his own preservation’ and that 
he is ‘bound to observe them as by some law’. To ‘receive the force of law’, these 
dictates of reason must be deduced from a different principle.55 This could, 
of course, be understood to mean that in order to be proper laws, these pre-
cepts should be seen as God’s commands. However, Pufendorf knew well that 
 Hobbes had said the same thing in De cive, so there was no need to criticize 
Hobbes over this issue.56 And when Pufendorf himself made the point about 
God’s role, he wrote that for the rules of sociality to be proper laws, ‘a higher 
principle is needed’ (sublimior principio opus est).57 In the case of Hobbes’s 
method of deducing natural law, however, a higher principle was not enough. 
The law of nature had to be deduced from an altogether different principle 
(omnino ex alio principio deducendum est).58
This entirely different principle was the duty to promote sociality, and it 
relied on the idea of natural law as a norm God has imposed to promote the 
salus of the human species. This was clearly assumed when Pufendorf com-
mented on Hobbes’s infamous remark that if ‘man naturally loved his fellow 
man’, it would be difficult to understand ‘why everyone would not love every-
one equally as equally men, or why every man would rather seek the company 
of men whose society is more prestigious and useful to him than to others’.59 
 53 jng 1672, book ii, chap. 3, § 16. The Political Writings of Samuel Pufendorf, 153.
 54 jng 1672, book ii, chap. 3, § 16. lnn, 211.
 55 Ibid.
 56 jng 1672, book ii, chap. 3, § 20. lnn, 219.
 57 Ibid. lnn, 217.
 58 jng 1672, book ii, chap. 3, § 16. lnn, 211.
 59 De cive, chap. i, § 2. On the Citizen, 22.
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In his comment, Pufendorf identified the general love of other human beings 
with the duty to cultivate sociality, arguing that Hobbes had confused the most 
general duties of sociality toward all human beings with the motives human 
beings have when they establish particular societies. For ‘reasons cited above’, 
i.e. in the deduction of the fundamental principle, natural law has ordained a 
duty of general friendship (amicitia) among all human beings, excepting only 
those whose monstrous deeds had excluded them from the human moral com-
munity. This duty of friendship is not dependent on the ability of the other 
person to help or hurt us, but solely on the fact that he or she is a human be-
ing.60 It consists of abstaining from violating other people’s life and property, 
holding them as one’s moral equals by nature, and observing what Pufendorf 
called the duties of humanity. Such a friendship is not contradicted by the fact 
that people seek closer company and make special agreements with those 
from whom they expect honour or benefits. The end of natural law is the salus 
of the human species, and it obligates every one of us to take care of ourselves. 
Therefore, sociality should be cultivated so ‘that by mutual exchange among 
many of assistance and property, we may be enabled to take care of our own 
concerns to greater advantage’.61
Hobbes’s and Pufendorf ’s different methods of deducing natural law were 
connected to a dissimilar understanding of the character this law has outside 
civil society. In his political theory, Hobbes had maintained that the most ele-
mentary requirement for preserving one’s own life was peace, and he had iden-
tified several laws of nature which human beings needed to observe in order 
to maintain peace. These laws were, Hobbes declared, ‘immutable and eternal’ 
rules of human morality.62 However, it was rational to believe that observing 
these precepts would preserve one’s safety only when there were good reasons 
to assume that others would do the same. Such situations were not impossible 
outside civil society, but they were limited in scope and usually did not last 
long. When such circumstances did not prevail, the laws of nature obligated 
human beings only in ‘the internal court’ (in Foro interno), meaning that they 
had a duty to seek a situation in which observing them would become ratio-
nal. As long as such a situation did not exist, the duty to preserve one’s own 
life ordered them to use all possible means, including war, to protect their own 
lives.63 Since there were no relations of authority among people in the state of 
nature, it was up to each individual to decide ‘whether the means he is to use 
 60 jng 1672, book ii, chap. 3, § 16. lnn, 212.
 61 jng 1672, book ii, chap. 3, § 18. lnn, 214.
 62 De cive, chap. iii, § 29. On the Citizen, 54.
 63 De cive, chap. iii, § 27. On the Citizen, 53– 54.
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and the action he intends to take are necessary to the preservation of his life 
and limbs or not’.64 And Hobbes claimed that in relation to other human be-
ings this meant that ‘every man was permitted to do anything to anybody, and 
to possess, use and enjoy whatever he wanted and could get’. In other words, 
everyone had ‘a right to all things’.65
Pufendorf was acutely aware of the above elements in Hobbes’s theory, so 
much so that he seems to have thought they were bound to give a scholar using 
Hobbes’s idea a bad reputation. Thus, when he commented on them in the 
chapter on the state of nature, he was less interested in criticizing Hobbes than 
in suggesting that Hobbes had not meant what he had written. While Hobbes’s 
remarks appeared ‘paradoxical at the first sight’, actually he had not denied 
that there are objective rules of self- preservation already in the state of nature. 
After all, the idea that a human being would have a ‘licence to do whatever 
he pleases to anyone he pleases’ could not be ‘considered by any sane man a 
sufficient means for his continued preservation’. Thus, it ‘must be concluded 
that nature never has granted it’. The real meaning of Hobbes’s remarks must 
be, first, that natural law has initially given human beings a right to use those 
material things they need for their preservation, though later these had been 
divided by agreements, and second, that he who has no superior can use his 
own will, when guided by right reason, to do ‘whatever will work for his contin-
ued preservation’.66 Pufendorf returned to Hobbes’s views when he discussed 
the reasons for establishing civil society, offering again a similarly favourable 
interpretation. Hobbes’s idea of ‘the right against all men and to all things’ 
should not be extended further ‘than sane reason admits’. It indicates mere-
ly that a person ‘has a right to use all the means, which right reason judges 
 necessary for his preservation, against all by whom the same right reason sug-
gests that he is threatened’. The answer to the question of when a person is 
so much menaced by someone else that this allows a violent reaction is not a 
matter of purely subjective reasoning, but something for which there are inter-
subjective criteria of right reason.67
It has been suggested that with the above remarks Pufendorf was correct-
ing Hobbes’s theory by using a remark Hobbes himself had made about right 
reason and natural law in a note he added to the second edition of De cive.68 
There, Hobbes explained that by ‘true reasoning’ he meant ‘reasoning which 
 64 De cive, chap. i, § 9. On the Citizen, 27–2 8.
 65 De cive, chap. i, § 10. On the Citizen, 28.
 66 jng 1672, book ii, chap. 2, § 3. lnn, 158–15 9.
 67 jng 1672, book vii, chap. 1, § 7. lnn, 959– 962.
 68 Palladini, ‘Pufendorf Disciple of Hobbes,’ 58.
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draws conclusions from true principles correctly stated’, and that ‘every viola-
tion of natural law consists of false reasoning or in stupidity, when men fail to 
see what duties toward other men are necessary to their own preservation’.69 
If read in isolation, this remark could be seen as affirming that there is an 
intersubjective criterion for personal survival already in the state of nature. 
However, in the note Hobbes continued by pointing out that the ‘principles of 
right reasoning about such duties are those laid out in Chapter i, articles 2– 7’.70 
And the conclusion he presented in these articles was that in the state of na-
ture human beings are able and willing to hurt each other, wherefore ‘the first 
foundation of natural Right is that each man protects his life and limbs as much 
as he can’.71 In the above note, Hobbes offered a mere reformulation of the 
subjective character of contemplating the requirements of self- preservation 
in the state of nature. What right reason teaches human beings in that state is 
that they have no criterion for what is necessary for their preservation other 
than their own reasoning.72 There was nothing in Hobbes’s remarks Pufendorf 
could have used to transform them into something he would have found more 
acceptable. And in jng 1684 he was ready to admit that Hobbes’s formulations 
may not allow the favourable interpretation he had suggested, and that if this 
was so, it was up to Hobbes himself to see ‘how he can avoid a just criticism’.73
As Noel Malcolm has pointed out, the peculiar feature of Hobbes’s natural 
law was that, in the state of nature, natural law was a purely self- regarding 
norm of human behaviour.74 Human beings have an obligation to do whatever 
they believe is the best way to preserve their own lives, and even in the state of 
nature this may sometimes mean acting in a sociable and peaceable manner 
towards others. However, in this case they do so only for instrumental reasons, 
as the best way to preserve their own lives. Their relationship with other hu-
man beings is not governed by any idea of shared humanity, which would have 
 69 De cive, chap. ii, § 1, n. 1. On the Citizen, 33– 34.
 70 Ibid.
 71 De cive, chap. i, § 7. On the Citizen, 27.
 72 De cive, chap. ii, § 1, note. On the Citizen, 33: ‘By right reason in men’s natural state, I mean 
not, as many do, an infallible Faculty, but the act of reasoning, that is, a man’s own true 
Reasoning about actions of his which may conduce to his advantage or other men’s loss. 
I say his own reasoning, because […] outside of a Commonwealth, where no one can dis-
tinguish right reason from false except by making comparison with his own, each man’s 
own reason must be regarded not only as the measure of his own actions, which are taken 
at his own risk, but also as the measure by which to judge the reasoning of others in his 
affairs’.
 73 jng 1684, book ii, chap. 2, § 3. lnn, 159.
 74 Noel Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 32–3 4, 444– 446.
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moral implications. Human beings and sovereigns sin against natural law, for 
example, by cruelty, which Hobbes defined as ‘vengeance without regard to 
future good’.75 However, even the duty to abstain from cruelty follows from the 
system of self- regarding duties and rights related to self- preservation, not from 
any duty to respect the humanity of the victim. And what counts as cruelty 
depends solely on one’s own evaluation of what is and what is not necessary 
for one’s preservation. Thus, Hobbes remarked that what is done ‘of necessity, 
or in pursuit of peace, or for self- preservation is done rightly’. All other harm 
inflicted ‘on men is a violation against natural Law and wrong against God’.76 
What he did not say was that such behaviour would be wrong against other 
people. While the law of nature is a universal moral norm of human behaviour, 
in the state of nature it is universal only in the sense that it is ‘duplicated in 
every individual’. It does not require ‘a person to respect the good of any other 
human being, still less of humanity in general as a primary good’.77
The above applied also to interstate relations, in which sovereigns were ob-
ligated by natural law to advance the preservation and welfare of their sub-
jects. To be sure, Hobbes made it clear that the state of nature which prevailed 
between sovereign states differed from the one among independent individu-
als. Above all, as people living in civil societies were quite well protected, the 
sovereign had most often no reason for unprovoked aggression towards other 
states. In fact, Hobbes was mostly critical of wars of aggression and expansion, 
holding that these have, with great likelihood, negative consequences for the 
long- term security and prosperity of one’s country.78 For most of the time, na-
tural law ordered sovereigns to advance peaceful relations and commerce with 
neighbouring countries. Yet, this was a purely self- regarding code of conduct 
which did not establish any coherent system of rights and duties among sov-
ereign states. This Hobbes expressed clearly in Dialogue between a Philosopher 
and a Student of the Common laws of England, written in the 1660s but pub-
lished posthumously in 1681. There, the philosopher, who represented Hobbes, 
remarked that the king is entitled to defend militarily a neighbouring country 
which is under attack if he believes that the invader has plans to assault his 
own country too. When the lawyer replied that surely the king is entitled to do 
so only if the attack against the neighbour is unjustified, the philosopher dis-
regarded such questions as irrelevant. The only thing which justifies avoiding 
interference is that the invader ‘will, and can put me in security, that neither 
 75 De cive, chap. iii, § 27, note. On the Citizen, 54.
 76 Ibid.
 77 Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes, 444.
 78 Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes, 441.
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he, nor his Successors shall make any Advantage of the Conquest of my Neigh-
bour, to do the same to me in time to come’.79 In Dialogue the philosopher 
also identified ‘the necessity of subsisting’ as a just reason for occupying new 
territories. If the subjects of the sovereign are facing starvation, he is entitled 
to invade a neighbouring country with more fertile land, irrespective of the 
consequences this may have for its inhabitants.80 In Leviathan Hobbes stated 
that if the number of poor people exceeds what the country can sustain, some 
of them should be ‘transplanted into Countries not sufficiently inhabited’. And 
even though the people moving to colonies should not ‘exterminate those they 
find there’, but only ‘constrain them to inhabit closer together’, there was no 
reason to consider what the original inhabitants might think about the mat-
ter.81
Pufendorf addressed the self- regarding element in Hobbes’s natural law 
when he criticized the latter’s infamous claim that the natural state of human 
beings is war. On this issue, Pufendorf was not so much concerned about the 
universal condition of war Hobbes had attributed to the fictive condition of 
independent individuals.82 What he found truly objectionable was Hobbes’s 
claim that the condition between commonwealths is a ‘state of hostility’, 
so that even ‘when the fighting between them stops, it should not be called 
Peace, but an intermission during which each watches the motion and aspect 
of its enemy and gauges its security not on the basis of agreements but by the 
strength and designs of the adversary’.83 Pufendorf ’s reason for rejecting such 
a statement was not an assumption that in reality relations between human 
beings or states would be overwhelmingly peaceful in character. He held it 
evident that the condition which once prevailed between independent male 
householders had been saturated by fear of aggression, and that this had been 
the main reason for the establishment of civil societies.84 War was constantly 
present also in interstate relations, and there was no reason to assume that 
things would be different one day.
For Pufendorf, the main question regarding the state of nature was not 
the amount of warfare that takes place among sovereign states. The crucial 
 79 Thomas Hobbes, Writings on the Common Law and Hereditary Right, ed. Alan Cromartie 
and Quentin Skinner (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2005), 23. Malcolm, Aspects of 
Hobbes, 455–45 6.
 80 Hobbes, Writings on the Common Law, 135.
 81 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), 239.
 82 jng 1672, book ii, chap. 2, § 7. lnn, 168–16 9.
 83 De cive, chap. xiii, § 7. On the Citizen, 144– 145. jng 1672, book ii, chap. 2, § 5. lnn, 165.
 84 jng 1672, book vii, chap. 1, § 7. lnn, 961.
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question was, rather, the moral relation which prevails between them. Hobbes 
had written that when human beings ‘are not subject one to the other or to any 
common ruler’, they are ‘enemies [hostes] to each other’.85 Pufendorf saw this 
as a statement concerning the moral relations between states. In the chapter 
on the laws of war, he explained that when someone is my enemy, this means 
that I am morally allowed ‘to use force against him to any degree, or so far as 
I may think desirable’ (in infinitum, aut quantum mihi videatur).86 In the case of 
an enemy, one is always entitled to execute a pre- emptive strike. Of course, the 
logic of Pufendorf ’s argument allowed the sovereign sometimes to decide that 
it would be wiser to abstain from such attacks, and to uphold the condition of 
ceasefire with the enemy. However, he should do so only for instrumental rea-
sons, which have to do with the preservation and welfare of his own people. If 
he chooses to do otherwise, he does nothing wrong to his enemy.
In other words, if we assume that the natural condition of human beings 
is war, we are forced to conclude that relations between states are governed 
by self- regarding principles of self- interest and security. Therefore, Pufendorf 
held that it is a matter of the utmost importance to know whether those who 
‘have no common master, and neither obey nor command one another, should 
be considered as mutual enemies, or as peaceable people and friends’.87 And 
he strongly argued that even though war is, due to human nature, an inescap-
able element of the human condition, it should always be seen as an aberra-
tion from the natural human condition, which is that of peace. In saying this, 
Pufendorf was not using the term ‘peace’ in the same way he did in the chapter 
on moral entities, where he defined peace as a ‘state in which men dwell to-
gether in quiet and without violent injuries, and render their mutual dues, as 
of obligation and desire’.88 The peace which prevails in the state of nature does 
not refer to a total absence of aggression and warfare, but to the moral duty to 
uphold peace as much as one can. Peace is the state ‘the creation and preser-
vation of which constitutes one of the chief reasons for the law of nature being 
placed in the hearts of men’.89 The reciprocal duty to cultivate peaceful sociali-
ty prevails not only within civil society but also in the state of nature, imposing 
duties to abstain from harming those who do not harm me, to allow everyone 
to enjoy their own possessions, and to fulfil the agreements they have made 
 85 De cive, chap. xiv, § 19. On the Citizen, 164.
 86 jng 1672, book viii, chap. 6, § 7. lnn, 1298.
 87 jng 1672, book ii, chap. 2, § 5. lnn, 165.
 88 jng 1672, book i chap. 1, § 8. lnn, 9.
 89 jng 1672, book viii, chap. 6, § 2. lnn, 1292.
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with one another.90 Of course, there is no reason to assume that people or sov-
ereigns always obey these obligations. Nevertheless, the ‘maintenance of peace 
toward all men as such is a natural state of man’ in the sense that it rests ‘upon 
that obligation of natural law, by which all men are bound, in so far as they are 
endowed with reason, and which does not owe its original introduction to any 
convention of men’.91 All this was not contradicted when Pufendorf remarked 
that the peace which prevails in the state of nature is ‘but a weak and untrust-
worthy thing’.92 This merely indicated that it is the duty of the sovereign not 
only to cultivate peace and friendship with neighbouring countries, but also to 
take ‘care that everything required to repel invasion stands in readiness, such 
as forts, arms, and troops’.93
Pufendorf referred to the self- regarding element in Hobbes’s theory also 
when in jng 1684 he defended the general duty of friendship against Hobbes. 
While God has so adapted natural law with human nature that its observance 
is always ‘connected with profit and advantage of men’, in justifying the duty of 
friendship as a command of natural law one should not refer to these advan-
tages but to the common nature of human beings. If, for example, one gives a 
reason for not injuring another person, one does not point out that such be-
haviour is advantageous for oneself, though it evidently is. What one says is 
that the other person is ‘an animal related by nature, whom it is a crime to 
injure’.94 Behind such reasoning one can detect the idea that if the justification 
for natural law is that obeying it is useful for myself, then if I fail to observe it, 
the only person to whom I do something wrong is myself. For Pufendorf, the 
idea of natural law as a norm God has imposed to advance the salus of the 
whole humankind enabled one to escape such a counterintuitive conclusion.
Pufendorf ’s non- Hobbesian understanding of the state of nature was re-
flected in his account of interstate relations. As mentioned above, in Hobbes’s 
view, a sovereign contemplating the need to assist a neighbouring country 
against an invading third party had no reason to assess the moral character 
of the war. Pufendorf agreed that wars may sometimes be fought on behalf 
 90 jng 1672, book ii, chap.  2, §  9. lnn, 118. In jng 1684 Pufendorf added the duty to 
advance the interests of others, in so far as one is not bound by more pressing obligations.
 91 jng 1672, book ii, chap. 2, § 11. lnn, 175.
 92 jng 1672, book ii, chap. 2, § 12. lnn, 176.
 93 jng 1672, book vii, chap. 9, § 13. lnn, 1126. The general duty to cultivate peace does 
not forbid civil sovereigns to establish various ‘systems of states’ with those with whom 
they have common interests. See Michael Seidler, ‘ “Monstrous” Pufendorf:  Sovereignty 
and System in the Dissertations,’ in Monarchism and Absolutism in Early Modern Europe, 
ed. Cesare Cuttica and Glen Burgess (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2011), 170–17 4.
 94 jng 1684, book ii, chap. 3, § 18. lnn, 213– 214.
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of a neighbouring country. Yet, while the issue was complicated, and there 
were several things the sovereign had to consider carefully, what was clear 
was that the war must be morally justified.95 Pufendorf also departed from 
the Hobbesian view that to prevent his citizens from starving, the sovereign 
was entitled to disregard the loss of lives conquering new territories would 
cause to their original population. Of course, he admitted that there is a right 
of necessity which entitles people facing starvation through no fault of their 
own to disregard conventional property rights, if no other way of being nour-
ished is available to them. And in the state of natural liberty, food can be 
taken from its owners even by means of war. However, such a right applies 
only when the owners have more than they need for themselves. It never 
justifies taking food when the result is that the owners become unable to 
survive.96 Pufendorf did not present necessity as a legitimate reason for con-
quering territories belonging to other nations. Nor did he find acceptable the 
idea of transplanting the surplus population to colonies without asking the 
opinion of those who already lived there. His argument against Vitoria’s and 
Grotius’s justifications for colonialism relied on the idea that Europeans and 
the inhabitants of colonialized countries share reciprocal duties and rights. 
When he added that the native people were entitled to possess unoccupied 
land in the form of collective ownership, it followed that the duties of hos-
pitality did not dismantle their right to decide on the use of their own terri-
tories any more than it did in the case of Europeans. When Europeans failed 
to acknowledge these rights, they violated what Pufendorf described as the 
most universal and necessary of all the duties of natural law: the duty not to 
hurt other  human beings.97
To cite Noel Malcom one more time, with his account of natural law  Hobbes 
departed radically from the Stoic and scholastic versions of natural law by 
taking ‘no cognizance of the good of mankind as such’. While individuals and 
sovereigns had rights and duties in the state of nature, due to the self- regarding 
character of natural law these were not ‘fixed by nature in any pattern of mutual 
 95 jng 1672, book viii, chap. 6, § 14. lnn, 1305.
 96 jng 1672, book ii, chap. 6, § 5. lnn, 301–30 2.
 97 jng 1672, book iii, chap. 1, § 1; book iii, chap. 3, §§ 7– 10; book iv, chap. 6, § 4. lnn, 
313– 314, 359– 368, 571. On Pufendorf ’s critique of colonialism, see Barbara Arneil, John 
Locke and America. The Defence of English Colonialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 
54– 60; See also Christov, Before Anarchy, 200–29 7. This analysis does not, in my view, 
confirm the author’s claim about the Hobbesian character of Pufendorf ’s international 
theory. For the claim that, in Pufendorf ’s view, Spanish colonialism took place ‘in the 
a- licit state of nature’, see Ian Hunter, ‘The Figure of Man and the Territorialisation of 
Justice,’ Intellectual History Review 23 (2013): 296– 297.
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harmony or reciprocity’. Outside civil society, natural rights and natural duties 
were often in direct conflict. It was only inside the commonwealth that they 
could ‘be presumed to be in harmony’.98 Pufendorf followed Hobbes in reject-
ing the metaphysical assumptions and teleological conceptions of the Stoic 
and scholastic doctrines, and by adopting an Epicurean- style anthropology.99 
One thing Pufendorf was not ready to share with Hobbes, however, was the 
idea of natural law as a self- regarding rule concerning the preservation of one’s 
own life. Instead, he established natural law on a highly constricted notion of 
God’s intentions, which, he thought, should be acceptable to all human be-
ings, irrespective of their religious confession. This enabled Pufendorf to hold 
that humankind was one moral community, whose members had duties to one 
another simply due to their shared humanity. The duties and rights which pre-
vailed in the state of nature were perhaps not always as neatly organized as 
those in civil society, but Pufendorf held it evident that while the main duty of 
civil sovereigns was to advance the safety and welfare of their country, natural 
law imposed on them genuine moral duties to other states and their inhabi-
tants. When sovereigns violated these precepts, they did not merely jeopardize 
the long- term security and welfare of their country. They also did something 
morally wrong to their fellow human beings.100
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 chapter 6
The International Political Thought of Johann Jacob 
Schmauss and Johann Gottlieb Heineccius: Natural 
Law, Interest, History and the Balance of Power
Peter Schröder
1 Introduction
Hugo Grotius had been fairly optimistic that his natural law doctrine would be 
able to regulate the antagonistic relations between sovereign states. By looking 
at the arguments of Johann Jacob Schmauss (1690– 1757) and Johann Gottlieb 
Heineccius (1681– 1741), this chapter scrutinizes the limits of natural law regard-
ing interstate relations. They used classical political or juridical concepts of 
international political thought  – such as interest, balance of power, natural 
law and history – in their political and philosophical writings. Schmauss and 
Heineccius were both taught by Christian Thomasius1 and were part of the 
circle of Thomasius’s disciples at the newly founded University of Halle who 
shaped and continued the early Enlightenment and natural law project. But 
they pursued their writings and teaching in different directions.
Schmauss belonged to the great eighteenth- century jurists. And yet he is 
almost entirely forgotten, despite the fact that some specialists have empha-
sized his importance.2 Schmauss provides one of the crucial links between the 
University of Halle and the natural law tradition which is so closely associated 
with Thomasius, and the up and coming University of Göttingen, where he 
 1 In contrast to Schmauss and Heineccius, Thomasius has been well researched. See in particu-
lar the English contributions by Ian Hunter, The Secularisation of the Confessional State: The 
Political Thought of Christian Thomasius (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2007); 
Thomas Ahnert, Religion and the Origins of the German Enlightenment: Faith and the Reform 
of Learning in the Thought of Christian Thomasius (Rochester, NY:  University of Rochester 
Press, 2006); and Timothy Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
 2 For instance, Schmauss has been described by Notker Hammerstein as ‘the last in the great 
tradition of Halle […] and the first great publicist in Göttingen’. Notker Hammerstein, Jus und 
Historie. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des historischen Denkens an deutschen Universitäten im 
späten 17. und frühen 18. Jahrhundert (Göttingen: Vandenhoek und Ruprecht, 1972), 343: ‘Man 
kann ihn [i.e. Schmauss] getrost als letzten der grossen Hallischen Tradition […] bezeichnen 
und zugleich als den ersten grossen Publicisten Göttingens’.
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accepted the chair of natural law and ius gentium in 1721.3 Heineccius is equally 
forgotten today, but during the eighteenth century he found fame and recog-
nition, albeit foremost outside Germany.4 This was mostly due to his writings 
on Roman law.5 In contrast to Heineccius, Schmauss enjoyed a greater reputa-
tion in the Holy Roman Empire during his lifetime. He was also influenced by 
Nicolaus Hieronymus Gundling (1671– 1729),6 the favourite disciple and friend 
of Thomasius, who became himself a leading philosopher at the University 
of Halle. Whereas Heineccius was competing with Gundling for the chair of 
history and eloquence at Halle, Schmauss was full of praise for the latter.7 This 
is all the more remarkable because Gundling defended even the indefensible 
state of nature of Hobbes and went as far as to write an essay claiming that 
 3 For biographical details, see Wolfgang Sellert, ‘Johann Jacob Schmauss – Ein Göttinger Jurist,’ 
in JuS Juristische Schulung 11 (1985): 843– 847.
 4 For biographical details, see Christoph Bergfeld, ‘Johann Gottlieb Heineccius und die Grund-
lagen seines Natur- und Völkerrechts,’ in J.G. Heineccius, Grundlagen des Natur- und Völker-
rechts, transl. Peter Mortzfeld, ed. Christoph Bergfeld (Frankfurt/ Main: Insel, 1994), 507– 534; 
Patricia Wardemann, Johann Gottlieb Heineccius (1681– 1741). Leben und Werk (Frankfurt/ 
Main: Lang, 2007), 1– 20; Martin Kühnel, ‘Halle – Franeker – Frankfurt/ Oder – Halle: Heinec-
cius’ Laufbahn als Hochschullehrer’, in Love as the Principle of Natural Law. The Natural Law 
Theory of Johann Gottlieb Heineccius and its Contexts, ed. Frank Grunert and Knud Haakons-
sen (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming).
 5 See Fernando Perez Godoy, ‘La Teoria del Derecho natural y de gentes de Johannes Heinec-
cius en la Cultura juridical iberoamericana,’ Revista de Estudios Histórico- Juridicos XXXVII 
(2015):  453– 474, and the forthcoming articles by Laura Beck Varela, ‘Heineccius and his 
Catholic Readers’; Elisabetta Fiocchi Malaspina, ‘Heineccius’ Role in Italian Legal Education 
in the 18th and 19th Centuries’ and Alexei Krouglov, ‘Die Rezeption Heineccius in Russland’. 
On Heineccius’s influence in the Netherlands during his lifetime, see Klaus Luig, ‘Heinec-
cius – ein deutscher Jurist in Franeker,’ Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 79 (2011): 219– 227.
 6 Gundling, in comparison to Thomasius, is much less studied. See notably Martin Mulsow, 
‘Gundling vs. Buddeus. Competing Models of the History of Philosophy,’ in History and the 
Disciplines. The Reclassification of Knowledge in Early Modern Europe, ed. Donald R. Kelley 
(Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 1997), 103– 125; Hammerstein, Jus und Histo-
rie, 205– 265; Heinrich Rüping, Die Naturrechtslehre des Christian Thomasius und ihre Fort-
bildung in der Thomasius- Schule (Bonn: Ludwig Röhrscheid, 1968), 104– 108 and passim; Peter 
Schröder, Naturrecht und absolutistisches Staatsrecht. Eine vergleichende Studie zu Thomas 
Hobbes und Christian Thomasius (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001), 57– 61, and less pertinent 
for our subject, Hermann Klenner, ‘Eine fast vergessene Quelle deutscher Menschenrechts- 
und Rechtsideen: Nicolaus Hieronymus Gundling,’ Dialektik (1994): 123– 130.
 7 In 1707, Heineccius unsuccessfully applied for a professorship at Halle. Instead, Gundling was 
appointed to the chair of history and eloquence (Professor für Geschichte und Beredsamkeit). 
It is not known how Heineccius took this decision and whether it influenced his relationship 
with Gundling. Therefore, not too much should be read into this competition and Heinec-
cius’s failure to be appointed as professor in Halle when he was still in his late twenties. In 
1708, the faculty of philosophy appointed him as adjunct, a junior academic position, and 
Heineccius began teaching at Halle.
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Hobbes was not an atheist.8 This shows that Gundling was daring enough to 
explore intellectual and theological issues bordering what was acceptable at a 
relatively free place such as Halle, but he soon had to face harsh criticism from 
the orthodox Lutheran establishment. Gundling fell within the grey area that 
formed between the clandestine radical and the moderate Enlightenment.9
Interestingly, Heineccius, too, seemed to follow Hobbes’s argument when he 
described the state of nature: 
For here the doctors justly distinguish between those living in a state of 
nature, and subject to no magistrate, by whom they may be defended and 
protected, and those who live in a civil state, and under magistracy. For 
since, in a state of natural liberty, there is no one to protect us against in-
juries, our right of self- defence cannot but begin the moment our danger 
commences, and cannot but continue while it lasts, or till we are absolute-
ly secure. But our danger begins the moment one shews a hostile disposi-
tion against us, and while that continues, our right of self- defence lasts.10 
However, although Heineccius followed Hobbes’s argument concerning the pre-
carious and threatening state of nature, which had been explicitly defended by 
Gundling, he was keen to distance himself from Hobbes in quite polemical terms. 
What shall we then say of the whole philosophy of Hobbes in his books 
de Cive, or his Leviathan? When he asserts the right of every man in a 
state of nature to all things, he affirms a proposition which is neither true, 
nor evident, nor adequate, since the duties of men to God and themselves 
cannot be deduced from that principle; yea, while he goes about it in that 
manner, pretending to establish the law of nature, he really subverts it. 
[…] Hence it is plain what we are to think of this other principle, viz. “that 
external peace is to be sought and studied if it can be obtained, and if not, 
 8 Nicolaus Hieronymus Gundling, Status Naturalis Hobbesii in corpore iur civ. (Halle: 
Zeitlerus, 1706); N.H. Gundling, ‘Hobbes ab Atheismo liberatus,’ in Observationes selectae 
(Halle: Renger, 1737), vol. 1, 37– 77, and N.H. Gundling, ‘Von Th. Hobbesii Atheisterey,’ in Gun-
dlingiana darinnen allerhand zur Jurisprudentz, Philosophie, Historie, Critic, Litteratur und 
übrigen Gelehrsamkeit gehörige Sachen abgehandelt werden (Halle: Renger, 1717), 303– 339.
 9 See Martin Mulsow, Enlightenment Underground Radical Germany 1680– 1720, transl. H.C. 
Erik Midelfort (Charlottesville, VA & London: University of Virginia Press, 2015), 206: ‘the 
radical and the moderate Enlightenments were not two incommensurable movements 
because they were mutually dependent on each other, woven together in many ways’.
 10 Johann Gottlieb Heineccius, A Methodical System of Universal Law:  or the Laws of 
Nature and Nations, transl. G. Turnbull [1741], ed. Thomas Ahnert and Peter Schröder 
(Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2008), 136.
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force and war must be called to our aid.” [cf. Hobbes, Leviathan, 92] For 
here likewise Hobbes lurks behind the curtain.11
Instead, Heineccius argued ‘that love is the principle of natural law’.12 Although 
Heineccius perceived the state of nature and interstate relations, like Hobbes 
and Pufendorf, as conflictual, he believed that his principle of love provided 
an adequate answer to the question of how the state of nature could be reg-
ulated by natural law. Heineccius held with Hobbes and Pufendorf that all 
states have, like all individuals in the state of nature, a fundamental right to 
self- preservation. The decision as to what constitutes the appropriate employ-
ment of any means deemed necessary for self- preservation is at the discretion 
of each state. Hobbes pointed to an inherent structural and juridical problem in 
the right to everything which becomes manifest where everyone remains judge 
of their own case. Despite the fact that Heineccius shared common ground with 
Hobbes and his belief that the very nature of sovereignty fixes states within an 
unstable and hostile framework, he strongly attacked the notorious Englishman.
2 Heineccius, the Natural Law Tradition and Systems of States
Both Schmauss and Heineccius reworked the natural law doctrine as it had 
been developed by Grotius, Pufendorf and Thomasius. Thomasius claimed 
that Grotius was part of a modern natural law tradition which, for him, marked 
a divergence from scholasticism. In particular, Thomasius proposed a history 
of natural law which was rife with invectives against the scholastics, a history 
culminating in the alternative of an alleged coherent development from ‘the 
incomparable Hugo Grotius who can never be praised too much’ to ‘the bless-
ed Baron Pufendorf and his opponents, when he attacked the irrational opin-
ions of the scholastics’.13 Most natural law thinkers during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries followed in one way or another Pufendorf ’s natural law 
doctrine and implicitly his interpretation of Grotius.
 11 Ibid., 59.
 12 Ibid., 63. Note the important parallel to Hutcheson’s argument regarding natural law and 
benevolence.
 13 Christian Thomasius, ‘On the History of Natural Law until Grotius,’ in Ch. Thomasius, Essays 
on Church, State and Politics, ed. Ian Hunter et al. (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2007), 
44 and 46f. This essay was the foreword by Thomasius to the first German translation of 
Grotius’s De jure belli ac pacis. Adam Friedrich Glafey made a very similar point when 
he claimed:  ‘Eben also fieng mit Grotio ein neuer Periodus an, in welchem die Gelehrten 
im Studio Juris Nat. weiter nichts thaten, als dass sie über dessen Jus B & P [i.e. the Latin 
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Heineccius was perhaps more distanced from Thomasius and his circle than 
Schmauss. In his A Methodical System of Universal Law: or the Laws of Nature 
and Nations, first published in Latin as Elementa juris naturae et gentium in 
1738 and a result of his teaching at the University of Halle,14 he reworked the 
established natural law tradition.15 Heineccius often closely engaged with the 
arguments he found in Grotius, Pufendorf and Thomasius.16 Although the ti-
tle suggests otherwise, there is not that much one can take from Heineccius 
regarding the law of nations or the question of interstate relations more gener-
ally. Nevertheless, it is illustrative to see to what extent former pupils of Tho-
masius followed different directions and pursued what they believed to be not 
just the advancement of the juridical discipline, but a way forward to organize 
and stabilize the conflict- rife European state system.
In fact, Heineccius followed Pufendorf ’s use of the state system and helped 
to give it further prominence within the discussion of early modern interstate 
relations.17 Pufendorf analysed how states related to new ideas which he had 
abbreviation of Grotius’s On the Law of War and Peace] disputirten, commentirten selbige in 
Compendia und Tabellen brachten, und endlich gar in andere Sprachen übersetzten. Dieses 
dauerte so lange, bis Pufendorff auftrat’. Adam Friedrich Glafey, Vollständige Geschichte 
des Rechts der Vernunfft, worinnen in dieser Wissenschaft ans Licht getretenen Schriften nach 
ihrem Inhalt und wahren Werth beurtheilet (Leipzig: Christoph Rigel, 1739), 111. See also the 
discussion by Frank Grunert, ‘The Reception of Hugo Grotius’s De jure belli ac pacis in the 
Early German Enlightenment,’ in Early Modern Natural Law Theories: Contexts and Strategies 
in the Early Enlightenment, ed. T.J. Hochstrasser and Peter Schröder (Dordrecht:  Kluwer, 
2003), 89– 105 and J.B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy. A History of Modern Moral 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 66– 70.
 14 Heineccius emphasized in the preface to his Elementa the crucial connection 
between teaching and a textbook written by the teacher himself, rather than having 
to rely on other works. Johann Gottlieb Heineccius, Elementa iuris naturae et gentium 
(Halle:  Orphanotrophei, 1738), xi:  ‘Et sane qui in academiis erudiendae iuventuti 
operam nauant, ii reipsa quotidie experiuntur, quanto cum taedio coniuncta sit servitus, 
cui obnoxii sunt omnes qui aliorum libellos enarrare coguntur’.
 15 Since 1727, Heineccius had been professor of law at the University of Frankfurt an der 
Oder, but against his will he had to leave Frankfurt, because the Prussian king, Frederick 
William i, appointed him to a chair at the University of Halle in 1733. The appointment of 
such a prestigious scholar was intended to boost the reputation of Halle, but Heineccius 
had to accept conditions that did not reflect his international reputation.
 16 A little too superficial and certainly too dismissive is the judgement of Wieacker, who 
described Heineccius’s natural law doctrine as hardly original, mainly revealing his 
indebtedness to Thomasius. Franz Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit unter 
besonderer Berücksichtigung der deutschen Entwicklung (Göttingen:  Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1967), 223.
 17 See also the general remarks on Pufendorf ’s influence on Heineccius in Christoph Bergfeld, 
‘Pufendorf und Heineccius,’ in Samuel von Pufendorf und die europäische Frühaufklärung, 
ed. Fiammetta Palladini and Gerald Hartung (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1996), 225– 235.
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developed under the influence of Hobbes.18 For Pufendorf, natural law can be 
most meaningful for regulating interstate relations in the specific context of 
a system of states.19 When writing about the constitution of the Holy Roman 
Empire, Pufendorf developed the Hobbesian categories into his theory on the 
irregularity of the Empire. He had shown that Bodin’s definition of sovereignty 
was not a sufficient category to characterize the constitution of the Empire. 
However, as far as Pufendorf was concerned, the concept of sovereignty was 
not to be abandoned. On the contrary, while building on Bodin and Hobbes, 
Pufendorf recognized that the strict notion of absolute sovereignty was appli-
cable neither to the Holy Roman Empire nor to interstate relations. On the for-
mer, he famously concluded that ‘the best account we can possibly give of the 
Present State of Germany, is to say, That it comes very near a System of States, 
in which one Prince or General of the League excells the rest of the Confedera-
tion’.20 What he effectively argued for was a system- based concept of sover-
eignty which would allow states to enter into agreements without giving up 
their sovereignty entirely. A ‘system results when several neighbouring states 
are so connected by perpetual alliance that they renounce the intention of ex-
ercising some portions of their sovereign power, above all those which concern 
 18 Hobbes had already elaborated on the concept of a system – which was to become one 
of the key terms for theorizing interstate relations in outlining a theory of regular and 
irregular political bodies:  ‘Having spoken of the Generation, Forme, and Power of a 
Commonwealth, I am in order to speak next of the parts thereof. And first of Systems […], 
by [which] I understand any numbers of men joyned in one Interest, or one Businesse. 
Of which some are Regular, and some are Irregular. Regular are those, where one Man, 
or Assembly of men, is constituted Representative of the whole number. All other are 
Irregular.’ Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992), 155. See the instructive discussion by David Boucher, ‘Resurrecting 
Pufendorf and capturing the Westphalian moment,’ Review of International Studies 27 
(2001): 570f., and Martin Wight, Systems of States (London: Leicester University Press, 
1977), 21– 45.
 19 Because natural law thereby acquires a new place within interstate relations, it would be 
wrong to privilege the concept of ‘interest’ as foundational for Pufendorf ’s international 
political thought. This is the argument made by Meinecke and Dufour. See Friedrich 
Meinecke, Die Idee der Staatsräson (Munich:  R. Oldenbourg, 1960), 264– 286, and 
Alfred Dufour, ‘Pufendorfs föderalistisches Denken und die Staatsräsonlehre,’ in Samuel 
von Pufendorf und die europäische Frühaufklärung, ed. Fiammetta Palladini and Gerald 
Hartung (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1996), 122. More nuanced is the argument by David 
Boucher, Political Theories of International Relations (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 
1998), 246: ‘It is certainly the case that in trying to accommodate self- interest with the 
universal standards of conduct expressed in the Natural Law, the ethical constraint often 
appears to be extremely weak, and even subordinate to the Reason of State’.
 20 Samuel Pufendorf, The Present State of Germany, ed. Michael J.  Seidler (Indianapolis, 
IN: Liberty Fund, 2007), 178, see also 161 and 217.
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external defence, except with the consent of all, but apart from this the liberty 
and independence of the individual states remain intact’.21
Heineccius seemed to have taken Pufendorf’s concept of a state system on 
board when he wrote that ‘many republics may, each preserving its form of gov-
ernment and its independency intire [sic], make a confederacy for acting with 
common consent for their common preservation and safety. Such confederated 
republics […] are called systems of republics’.22 However, in an annotation to 
this page he criticized Pufendorf’s use of ‘system’ and maintained that neither 
subjection nor a situation where different states retain their independent polit-
ical constitution should be considered a state system. As far as Heineccius was 
concerned, only on the basis of mutual consent was it appropriate to talk of a 
state system: only in the case ‘in which two kingdoms, or two bodies of people 
uniting their will and strength for common defence, constitute one larger soci-
ety, and therefore are a system of republics, according to our definition’.23
3 Schmauss, the Natural Law Tradition and Interstate Relations
Schmauss was more critical of Pufendorf than Heineccius in his writings on 
 natural law theory. Perhaps a little surprisingly, given the close intellectual rela-
tionship between Pufendorf and Thomasius, Schmauss appears closer to Thoma-
sius than to Pufendorf.24 He is best known for his history of the jus publicum 
 21 Samuel Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen, ed. James Tully (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), part ii, chap. 8, § 15, 145. On the innovative and modern char-
acter of Pufendorf ’s position, even in relation to discussions about the European Union, 
see Boucher, ‘Resurrecting Pufendorf and capturing the Westphalian moment,’ 572– 577, 
and more generally Werner Maihofer, ‘Schlusswort:  Was uns Pufendorf noch heute zu 
sagen hat,’ in Samuel Pufendorf und seine Wirkungen bis auf die heutige Zeit, ed. Bodo 
Geyer and Helmut Goerlich (Baden- Baden:  Nomos, 1996), 223– 282. See also Andreas 
Osiander, ‘Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,’ International 
Organization 55 (2001), 279:  ‘If the European system as a whole can be called a loose, 
informal regime with few institutions […], the empire was essentially a more developed 
regime with more elaborate institutions, providing a system of governance for matters of 
common interest while leaving internal government to each of the participating actors 
individually’.
 22 Heineccius, A Methodical System of Universal Law, 419.
 23 Ibid.
 24 The relationship between Thomasius and Pufendorf, and how the former developed 
the thought of the latter, deserves further research. See, however, Simone Zurbuchen, 
‘Gewissensfreiheit und Toleranz:  Zur Pufendorf- Rezeption bei Christian Thomasius,’ in 
Samuel von Pufendorf und die europäische Frühaufklärung, ed. Fiammetta Palladini and 
Gerald Hartung (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1996), 169– 180, and Schröder, Naturrecht, 137f.
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of the Holy Roman Empire,25 but he also presented his own fairly original ac-
count of natural law.26 One of the key texts for understanding Schmauss’s con-
tribution to a theory of interstate relations is his influential Einleitung zu der 
Staats- Wissenschafft, which was first published in 1741. This work is influenced 
by Gundling, whose earlier account had used a strikingly original approach to 
advance arguments similar to those later taken up by Schmauss. The latter was 
open in acknowledging his debt to Gundling, as in the preface to his Corpus 
Juris Gentium Academicum, published 1730 in Leipzig, in which he recognized 
Gundling’s ground- breaking work on international political thought: 
This Juris publici Europaei course of study is seldom taught at academies 
now; and yet after […] the famous Friedrich University in Halle was for-
tunate enough that, with all of his learning and chiefly his political stud-
ies, the greatly meritorious Royal Prussian Privy Councillor and Professor 
Nicol. Hieron. GUNDLING first initiated this course of study and gave it 
the correct form, and led the young people to such matters that would 
otherwise only have been obtainable through royal prerogative and se-
crets of major state ministries, others are now beginning, hither and 
thither, to follow his example, and as the gains can even be distinctly felt 
and every day more and more subsidies through the publication of very 
large volumes of state negotiations are contributed to this, there is the 
hope that these sciences will henceforth be properly treated, in forma ar-
tis, especially at Protestant universities and in particular by Professoribus 
historiarum, as has already happened in some places.27
 25 Johann Jacob Schmauss, Historisches Ius Publicum des Teutschen Reichs, oder Auszug der 
vornehmsten Materien des Reichs- Historie (Göttingen:  Abraham Vandenhoecks Witwe, 
1754). On Schmauss’s importance for developing a political science (Staatslehre) on the 
basis of a new understanding and interpretation of imperial history, see Sellert, ‘Johann 
Jacob Schmauss,’ 846, and Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories, 147f.
 26 Johann Jacob Schmauss, Neues Systema des Rechts der Natur (Göttingen:  Abraham 
Vandenhoecks Witwe, 1754). Frank Grunert, ‘Das Recht der Natur als Recht des Gefühls. 
Zur Naturrechtslehre von Johann Jacob Schmauss,’ Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik/ Annual 
Review of Law and Ethics 12 (2004), 153: ‘Schmauss presented a theory of natural law that 
lay beyond the mainstream of the German natural law discussion of the eighteenth cen-
tury […] with an emphasized anti- Wolffian accent and a critique of Samuel Pufendorf ’s 
theory of natural law’.
 27 Johann Jacob Schmauss, Corpus Juris Gentium Academicum, enthaltend die vornehmsten 
Grund- Gestetze, Friedens- und Commercien- Tractate, Bündnüsse und andere Pacta der 
Königreiche, Republiquen und Staaten von Europa (Leipzig:  Joh. Friedrich Gleditschens 
Sohn, 1730), 1f. The cumbersome German baroque reads: ‘Nun wird zwar dieses Studium 
Juris publici Europaei auf Academien noch gar selten getrieben; Nachdem jedoch […] 
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Before discussing how Schmauss conceptualized interstate relations, it will, 
therefore, be useful to have a closer look at the nature of Gundling’s influence. 
What exactly is the ‘correct form’ Gundling  – according to Schmauss  – had 
provided for the jus publicum Europaeum and the political thought on inter-
state relations more generally? Gundling’s main works on this subject, and 
those which Schmauss presumably had in mind, are Jus Naturae et Gentium, 
Ausführlicher Discours über den ietzigen Zustand der europäischen Staaten and 
Ausführlicher Discours über das Natur- und Völcker- Recht, as well as his writ-
ings on the Peace of Westphalia and on the Spanish Succession.28 It is beyond 
the scope of this chapter to discuss systematically Gundling’s impressive body 
of writings. It is enough for the purpose of my argument to show briefly that 
Schmauss took up Gundling’s argument that a proper knowledge and under-
standing of the history of the European state system was the indispensable 
basis for conceptualizing international political thought.29 This seems to be 
a banal statement, but as we know from the ground- breaking studies by, for 
instance, Notker Hammerstein or Tim Hochstrasser, the introduction of a new 
understanding and use of history was a crucial part of the development of the 
early modern natural law theory and political thought alike.30
die berühmte Friedrichs- Universität zu Halle das Glück gehabt, dass der um die ganze 
Gelehrsamkeit, und vornehmlich um die politische Studia so hoch verdiente Königl. 
Preusische Geheimde Rath und Professor Hr. Nicol. Hieron. GUNDLING dasselbe zuerst 
in den Gang und in eine rechte Form gebracht, und die Jugend auf solche Sachen geführet 
hat, die man sonst nur von Reservata und Geheimnüsse grosser Staats- Ministres gehalten; 
so fangen nun auch hier und dar andere an, seinem Exempel nachzufolgen, und da man 
den Nutzen davon gar mercklich spühret, und täglich mehr und mehr Subsidia durch 
an Taggebung gantzer grossen Voluminum von Staats- Negociationen hierzu beygetra-
gen werden, so ist Hoffnung, dass absonderlich auf Protestantischen Universitäten diese 
Wissenschafften hinfüro ordentlich in forma artis, zumahlen von Professoribus histo-
riarum, wie bereits einiger Orten geschieht, werden abgehandelt werden.’
 28 There are also some less prominent writings by Gundling of which Schmauss presumably 
was also aware, such as Nicolaus Hieronymus Gundling, ‘Ob wegen der anwachsenden 
Macht der Nachbarn man den Degen entblössen könne,’ in Gundlingiana, Darinnen aller-
hand zur Jurisprudenz, Philosophie, Historie, Critic, Litteratur und übrigen Gelehrsamkeit 
gehörige Sachen abgehandelt werden (Halle: Renger, 1716), 379– 416.
 29 See Sellert, ‘Johann Jacob Schmauss,’ 846. On the more general argument, see Richard 
Devetak, ‘Historiographical Foundations of Modern International Thought: Histories of 
the European States- System from Florence to Göttingen,’ History of European Ideas 41 
(2015): 62– 77.
 30 See Hammerstein, Jus und Historie, 17– 42, and Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories, 1– 23. 
Also very important is Reinhart Koselleck, Vergangene Zukunft – Zur Semantik geschicht-
licher Zeiten (Frankfurt/ Main: Suhrkamp, 1989).
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Gundling was among the first in the Holy Roman Empire to apply this ap-
proach to the international sphere. In his preface to Ausführlicher Discours über 
den ietzigen Zustand der europäischen Staaten, he addressed the reader by won-
dering why it is that knowledge of the various states or political science (Staat-
slehre)31 was hardly taught at the universities. This political science, Gundling 
asserted, is ‘perceived like a strange Indian animal’.32 He claimed that only a pro-
found knowledge of history would enable a proper understanding of political 
science, which is, in turn, necessary for an adequate handling of state affairs.33
This move was taken up and amplified by Schmauss.34 In his Corpus Juris 
Gentium he explains that just as he had treated the history of the Holy Roman 
Empire, he now wants to extend this historical approach to other European 
states. His aim was not only to provide an academic compendium for students; 
he also hoped that his work would be useful for statesmen. Such a claim to 
practical usefulness is much more than simply promotional rhetoric, given 
that Gundling and Schmauss both believed that relations between states were 
organized by the positive treaties concluded between them. They were ‘the 
reason that Europe was at peace’.35 However, at the same time, the very reason 
why conflict and even war might ensue among the European states lay in the 
possibility of conflicting interpretations of these treaties.
4 Heineccius and Schmauss on Trust and 
Mistrust in Interstate Relations
For Heineccius, the natural law principle of love informed the dealings be-
tween states and prevented misuse of pacts. Trust between states was based 
on this underlying principle, because
 31 ‘Political science’ does not fully translate the meaning of the German term Staatslehre, 
which was used by Gundling and his contemporaries. For want of a better term, I have 
used the usual translation.
 32 Nicolaus Hieronymus Gundling, Ausführlicher Discours über den ietzigen Zustand der 
europäischen Staaten (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1733), i:  ‘die Staaten- Lehren, als ein 
Indianisches unbekandtes Thier ansehen wollen’.
 33 Gundling, Ausführlicher Discours über den ietzigen Zustand der europäischen Staaten, 
ix: ‘weil doch derjenige Weg, welchen man sich aus denen vormahligen Geschichten zu 
der Staats- Lehre bahnet, als die sicherste Vorbereitung anzusehen, dadurch man zu einer 
künfftigen Bedienung by Staats- Affairen könne geschickt werden’.
 34 Rüping, Die Naturrechtslehre, 100, also very briefly discusses Schmauss. But he hardly 
does justice to Schmauss’s natural law theory and his overall political theory when he 
claims that Schmauss maintains ‘an extreme voluntarism and a right of nature which is 
based only on passions and dispenses of human reason and the concept of norms’.
 35 Schmauss, Corpus Juris Gentium Academicum, iii.
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the love of justice is the source of all the duties we owe to one another, 
and this love commands us not to do to others what we would not have 
done by them to ourselves. But surely none would desire to be deluded by 
the promises and pacts of another. It is therefore our duty not to deceive 
anyone by our pacts and promises; not to defraud one, by making him 
trust to our fidelity, but faithfully and conscientiously to perform what 
we engage to do.36
Heineccius’s appeal to natural law based on the principle of love and his ref-
erence to and application of the ‘golden rule’ fell short of providing any mech-
anism of deciding conflicting interpretations.37 He simply demanded that 
states act faithfully and that, therefore, trust between states ought to be possi-
ble. However, the problem of trust in interstate relations had long since been 
forcefully expressed by Machiavelli. By asking ‘how trust may be preserved 
among princes’, the title of chapter xviii of the Principe called into question 
the idea that trust should be maintained under all circumstances.38 Although 
Machiavelli was by no means the first to point to this issue, ever since he had 
posed his poisonous and notorious question, it continued to trouble political 
thinkers. And it was more often than not felt that an appeal to moral norms as 
reiterated by Heineccius would not be sufficient.39
Schmauss was prepared to engage with this thorny issue. For him, any polit-
ical theory which claimed to be relevant to the organization of the European 
state system not only would have to take the problem of the misuse and pre-
tence of legal titles into account, but, more importantly, would have to offer a 
reliable means of eradicating such abuse. Providing a consistent and uncon-
tested interpretation of these international agreements which would encom-
pass their historical development was thus of the highest relevance for the 
 36 Heineccius, A Methodical System of Universal Law, 298.
 37 It is noteworthy that in his natural law doctrine, the Neues Systema des Rechts der Natur, 
Schmauss also relied upon the golden rule. But in contrast to Heineccius, the ‘binding 
effect of the Golden Rule […] is not based on moral understanding, but rather on the 
individual’s own feeling of fear of the injured person’s unavoidable revenge’. Grunert, 
‘Das Recht der Natur als Recht des Gefühls’, 153. See Turnbull’s summary discussion of 
the golden rule in his annotations to Heineccius’s Methodical System. George Turnbull, 
‘Remarks,’ in Heineccius, A Methodical System of Universal Law, 170. See Joachim 
Hruschka, ‘Die Goldene Regel in der Aufklärung – die Geschichte einer Idee,’ Jahrbuch für 
Recht und Ethik/ Annual Review of Law and Ethics 12 (2004): 157– 172.
 38 Machiavelli, The Prince, ed. Quentin Skinner and Russell Price (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 61 [translation altered].
 39 See, for example, Heineccius, A Methodical System of Universal Law, 329 and 508.
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conduct of international politics. Demonstrating that one had right on one’s 
side was a crucial element in the practice of international politics.40 Louis xiv 
was the most notorious example in recent European history of a ruler who had 
justified his various wars with highly contested claims. Among the many writ-
ers and philosophers who reacted against the aggressive policies of Louis xiv 
were Pufendorf and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646– 1716). Despite their ob-
vious animosity, Pufendorf and Leibniz shared concerns about the defence of 
the Holy Roman Empire and Protestantism from the French quest for religious 
and political hegemony in Europe. When Strasbourg was taken by the French, 
against the stipulations of the Peace of Münster, Leibniz was alarmed. In his 
polemic Mars Christianissimus, he argued against this blatant violation of the 
peace. This is one of the few polemics Leibniz published during his lifetime, 
and was presumably known by Schmauss and Heineccius.41 Leibniz saw that 
the main political and juridical problem – as already formulated by Machiavel-
li – posed by such an ambitious ruler was the destruction of trust in an existing 
legal and diplomatic framework: ‘But France […] forces the others to desperate 
resolutions and acts in such a way that it will be henceforth an impardonable 
folly to trust her word and to hope for a good peace’.42 Leibniz probed whether 
the existing political system could reasonably allow the actors to have good 
faith in their counterparts: 
Certainly, if there is a way to trust in assurances in human negotiations, if 
the public pledge of kings has some effect, if religion and conscience are 
not simply names invented to fool the simple- minded, this peace ought to 
have been solid and sure; but since it has been broken and trampled un-
derfoot on the first favourable occasion, one must grant (they say) that he 
who would henceforth trust the word of France is in fact simple- minded, 
and worthy of being deceived; this is why the Dutch, the Spanish, the Em-
peror, and the rest of the allies who treated peace at Nimwegen are being 
at present, or will soon be, punished for their credulity.43
 40 Schmauss, Corpus Juris Gentium Academicum, iii: ‘mit einem Schein des Rechtens’.
 41 On Leibniz’s international political thought, see Peter Schröder, ‘ “Un Politique peut dire 
ce qu’un Prince devroit faire” – les concepts de paix et d’équilibre dans la pensée poli-
tique de Leibniz,’ in La Paix des Pyrénées (1659) ou le triomphe de la raison politique, ed. 
Lucien Bély, Bertrand Haan and Stéphane Jettot (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2015), 109– 
132, and Peter Schröder, Trust in Early Modern International Political Thought, 1598– 1713 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 141– 154.
 42 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, ‘Mars Christianissimus,’ in G. W. Leibniz’ Political Writings, ed. 
Patrick Riley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 143.
 43 Leibniz, ‘Mars Christianissimus,’ 138.
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The taking of Strasbourg during peacetime without any legal title and in obvi-
ous breach of the existing law as stipulated in the Peace of Münster provoked 
strong reactions against the French king, and other princes were increasingly 
unwilling to trust his word.
Writing after the death of Louis xiv, Schmauss can be seen in this tradition 
of thinkers who were very suspicious of French foreign policy. He, too, insin-
uated that he had the aggressive attitude of Louis xiv in mind when writing 
his treaties.44 However, he hoped that his work would contribute to a better 
understanding of the sources of conflict and thus the ways in which these con-
flicts could be solved or even avoided. In this context, he also discussed the 
extent to which the various pacts, alliances, peace treaties and existing inter-
national laws had ‘legal or obliging force’.45
To what extent was Heineccius concerned with this question? In his preface 
to the Elementa, the issue of the validity and binding force of international 
law was flagged up quite prominently. He argued against using holy scripture 
or Roman law to resolve interstate conflicts, because such a source would not 
be accepted by non- European peoples such as the Turks, Japanese or Chinese. 
Heineccius ironically stressed that Europeans would hardly be prepared to 
accept references to Mohamed by the Turks or Confucius by the Chinese to 
resolve a dispute with European powers. If one did not want to give up entirely 
on resolving interstate disputes, a different source was necessary. According 
to Heineccius, the law of nature and nations (jus naturae et gentium) provided 
these rules. God, silently accepted by Heineccius as an ‘acceptable source’ for 
all peoples, had given it to the whole of humanity, regardless how different in 
language and geographically remote the various peoples might be. This law 
had to be used to regulate relations and affairs among independent states.46 
The preface was, therefore, quite promising in suggesting a concrete appli-
cation of natural law regarding interstate relations. His natural law doctrine 
is treated in book ii of the Elementa, entitled Of the Law of Nations, and so 
it might be expected that he would offer his thoughts on interstate relations 
there. But despite the auspicious claims in the preface, the treatment of the 
jus gentium is rather disappointing. Heineccius mostly seems keen instead 
to deal with questions regarding the internal organization of civil societies. 
 44 He criticized, for instance, those states that were ruled by the arbitrary power of a single 
ruler and not by positive constitutional law. Schmauss, Corpus Juris Gentium Academicum, 
iv: ‘Staaten, welche nicht nach der blossen Willkühr eines einigen Haupts, sondern nach 
Positiven Grund Gesetzten regiert werden’.
 45 Schmauss, Corpus Juris Gentium Academicum, iv: ‘vim legis oder obligandi’.
 46 Heineccius, Elementa, IXf.
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Heineccius discusses only selected aspects of interstate relations. He employs 
the well- trodden argument that ‘the law of nations is the law of nature’47 at the 
very beginning of book ii, and only towards the end of it does he turn to some 
concrete aspects of interstate relations and international law. Heineccius en-
gaged with Grotius and Pufendorf and his arguments tend to be closer to those 
of Pufendorf than to those of Grotius.48 For instance, Heineccius sided with 
Pufendorf against Grotius when he maintained that ‘the punishment of crimes 
is not to be admitted as a just cause of war; rather, that it is certain an equal 
cannot be punished by an equal; and therefore one nation cannot be punished 
by another’.49
Regarding the right to punish in interstate relations, Pufendorf had followed 
Hobbes’s understanding that punishment can be inflicted only if there is a su-
perior authority endowed with this right.50 Although Pufendorf subscribed to 
 47 Heineccius, A Methodical System of Universal Law, 323. See, for instance, the same argu-
ment by Hobbes, Pufendorf and later also Vattel. In Leviathan, 244, Hobbes famously 
made the point that ‘concerning the Offices of one Souveraign to another, which are 
comprehended in that Law, which is commonly called the Law of Nations, I need not say 
any thing in this place; because the Law of Nations, and the Law of Nature, is the same 
thing’. Pufendorf followed Hobbes’s argument and claimed almost verbatim that ‘the Law 
of Nations, […] is nothing other than the law of nature’. Samuel Pufendorf, Two Books 
of the Elements of Universal Jurisprudence, ed. Thomas Behme (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty 
Fund, 2009), 225. Vattel drew attention to this development and summarized it at the 
beginning of his influential Le droit des gens, ou Principes de la loi naturelle appliqués à la 
conduite & aux affaires des Nations & des Souverains: ‘Hobbes was […] the first who gave 
a distinct though imperfect idea of the law of nations. He divides the law of nature into 
that of man, and that of states: and the latter is, according to him, what we usually call 
the law of nations. […] This author has well observed, that the law of nations is the law 
of nature applied to states or nations. But we shall see in the course of this work, that 
he was mistaken in the idea that the law of nature does not suffer any necessary change 
in that application […]. Pufendorf declares he unreservedly subscribes to this opinion 
espoused by Hobbes. He has not therefore separately treated of the law of nations but 
has everywhere blended it with the law of nature properly so called.’ Emer de Vattel, The 
Law of Nations, ed. Béla Kapossy and Richard Whatmore (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 
2008), 8f.
 48 Even in the preface to the Elementa, viii, Grotius was substantially criticized. See as well 
Heineccius’s repeated criticism of Grotius when, for instance, he argued that ‘Grotius’s 
distinction between private and public war hath no foundation’. Heineccius, A Methodical 
System of Universal Law, 501f. Or with further criticism ibid., 313 or 459. See also Ernst 
Reibstein, ‘Johann Gottlieb Heineccius als Kritiker des grotianischen Systems,’ Zeitschrift 
für öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 24 (1964): 236– 264.
 49 Heineccius, A Methodical System of Universal Law, 502f.
 50 See Gerald Hartung, ‘Von Grotius zu Pufendorf. Die Herkunft des säkularisierten Strafrechts 
aus dem Kriegsrecht der Frühen Neuzeit,’ in Samuel Pufendorf und die europäische 
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Grotius’s definition of punishment as an evil inflicted for an evil which had 
been done,51 he insisted against the Dutchman that neither in the state of na-
ture nor in a war between states would it make sense to speak of punishment. 
Pufendorf argued against the position Grotius had advanced in his De jure belli 
ac pacis52 and maintained ‘that it is an improper Expression to say, a Man is 
obliged to be punished, or that such a one owes a Punishment; because Pun-
ishment signifies Harm inflicted against a Man’s Consent, and implies Aversion 
of the Will to it’.53 Pufendorf profoundly contradicted Grotius’s notion of pun-
ishment regarding the state of nature and interstate relations. As far as natural 
law is concerned, he was adamant that in the state of nature ‘violations of natu-
ral law […] have no penal sanctions attached’.54 But on what basis could the 
binding force of the natural law be founded? This question had already been 
of concern to Grotius and Pufendorf, and they had offered different solutions. 
However, it remained a contested issue, one which Heineccius did not want 
to take up again. Nor did Schmauss want to rely solely on natural law; he was 
Frühaufklärung, ed. Fiammetta Palladini and Gerald Hartung (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 
1996), 123– 136.
 51 Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen, part ii, chap. 13, §4, 158: ‘A punishment is an 
evil one suffers, inflicted in turn for an evil one has done; in other words, some painful evil 
imposed by authority as a means of coercion in view of a past offence’.
 52 Grotius offered a book- length discussion of punishment in the international sphere in 
book ii, chap. xx of his De iure belli ac pacis. Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, 
ed. Richard Tuck (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2005), vol. 2, 949– 1052. He argued that 
the right to punish originally belonged to everyone and that it was derived from the law 
of nature (972). See also Hugo Grotius, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty, ed. 
M.J. v. Ittersum (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2006), 136. However, he also maintained 
that sovereigns ‘have a Right to exact Punishment, not only for Injuries committed against 
themselves, or their Subjects, but likewise, for those which do not peculiarly concern 
them, but which are, in any Person whatsoever, grievous Violations of the Law of Nature 
or Nations. For the Liberty of consulting the Benefit of human Society, by Punishments, 
which at first […] was in every particular Person, does now, since Civil Societies, and 
Courts of Justice, have been instituted, reside in those who are possessed of the supreme 
Power, and that properly, not as they have an Authority over others, but as they are in 
Subjection to none’ (Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, vol. 2, 1021). In his transla-
tion of the works of Grotius and Pufendorf, Jean Barbeyrac pointed out that ‘almost this 
Whole Chapter [chapter xx of Grotius’s De Iure Belli ac Pacis] should be compared with the 
third [chapter] of the eighth Book of Pufendorf, where the same Matter is treated of, and 
our Author’s Thoughts frequently explained or corrected; tho’ sometimes defended in the 
Notes’. Annotation by Barbeyrac in Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, book ii, 949.
 53 Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, book viii, chap. iii, § 4, 766.
 54 Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen, book ii, chap. 12, § 4, 155f. On punishment 
between states in Grotius, Hobbes and Pufendorf, see my discussion in Schröder, Trust, 
89– 136.
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trying to pursue an alternative route. The problem that states could too easily 
pervert existing moral and legal norms in their self- interest within the Europe-
an state system was still depressingly present and unsolved for Schmauss. In 
many ways he followed a twofold strategy to address this fundamental issue. 
On the one hand, his historical account and natural law doctrine attempted 
to provide a set of norms and rules which – although not new – aimed to help 
create a universally accepted system which could claim to possess legitimate 
and enforceable authority. At the same time, he realized, following Pufendorf, 
that this claim to internationally binding obligations remained deficient. This 
is why he endeavoured on the other hand to incorporate the idea of a balance 
of power in his international political thought.55
5 Interest and the Balance of Power
Pufendorf ’s contribution is crucial for understanding the options available to 
Heineccius and Schmauss. Writing after the Peace of Westphalia, Pufendorf 
reflected on the theoretical tools of international political thought. For him, in-
terstate relations were not determined by natural law alone.56 In his Introduc-
tion to the History of the Principal Kingdoms and States of Europe, he discussed 
interstate relations within an empirical historical account of the European 
political scene. Pufendorf wanted to ensure that his theory as presented in his 
natural law doctrine was related to these concrete political issues. Following 
the reason of state doctrine, he recognized ‘interest’ as the guiding principle 
 55 Schmauss was not alone in developing the idea of a balance of power. For further dis-
cussion see Bruno Arcidiacono, Cinq types de paix. Une histoire des plans de pacification 
perpétuelle (Paris:  puf, 2011). Of particular interest in this context is Ludwig Martin 
Kahle, who was vice provost of the University of Göttingen from 1749 to 1750 and sup-
ported George ii’s pro- Hanoverian policies in his La balance de l’Europe. Kahle was also 
influenced by Gundling, but he went even further than Gundling and Schmauss when he 
claimed that justice between states rested on the balance of power. Louis Martin Kahle, 
La balance de l’Europe considerée comme la regle de la paix et de la guerre, transl. from 
Latin (Berlin and Göttingen: Les frères Schmid, 1744), 118f.
 56 Dufour even claims that interest and not natural law is the foundation of Pufendorf ’s 
international law. Dufour, ‘Pufendorfs föderalistisches Denken und die Staatsräsonlehre,’ 
122:  ‘die Staatsräson, wie sie in seiner Staatsinteressenlehre formuliert ist, [bildet] den 
fundamentalen Grundsatz des Völkerrechts’. An excellent overview of the place of histo-
riography within Pufendorf ’s political thought is given by Michael Seidler, ‘Natural Law 
and History, Pufendorf ’s Philosophical Historiography,’ in History and the Disciplines. The 
Reclassification of Knowledge in Early Modern Europe, ed. Donald R.  Kelley (Rochester, 
NY: University of Rochester Press, 1997), 203– 222.
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for state actions: ‘the Interest of each State […] is to be esteemed the Principle, 
from whence must be concluded, whether State- Affairs are either well or ill 
managed’.57 Interest can be misunderstood and thus state affairs misguided. 
The study of contemporary history can help to identify the real interest of a 
state and to avoid policies whereby ‘great Errors are committed […] against the 
Interest of the State’.58 Thus, the interest of one state can be opposed to the in-
terest of another, and it can change with time. Pufendorf ’s theory of interstate 
relations thus takes two distinct aspects into account. One has to consider his-
torical experience and analyse the conflicting interests of the various states.59 
One aggravating factor in an already volatile situation is that rulers often pur-
sue ‘an Imaginary Interest’, for instance ‘when a Prince judges the welfare of his 
State to consist in such things as cannot be perform’d without disquieting and 
being injurious to a great many other States, and which these are oblig’d to op-
pose with all their Power’.60 Above all else, the pursuit of universal monarchy 
is ‘the Fuel with which the whole World may be put into a Flame’.61 Because 
rulers do not only pursue the ‘real interest’62 of their state, it is much more dif-
ficult to calculate the behaviour of the various actors. In the end, there may be 
no alternative to ‘everyone decides for himself whether the measures are apt to 
conduce to self- preservation or not’.63
Heineccius engaged less emphatically with the troublesome question of the 
extent to which international treaties would be binding and could, therefore, 
reliably regulate interstate relations even if interest seemed to point towards 
breaking them. Without mentioning ‘interest’ expressis verbis, he reached a 
pragmatic conclusion by emphasizing that interest would overrule any agree-
ment a state had previously entered into: ‘nothing ought to be held more sa-
cred than treaties, nor nothing more detestable than the perfidiousness of 
treaty- breakers. Yet because no society is obliged to prefer another’s interest 
 57 Samuel Pufendorf, An Introduction to the History of the Principal Kingdoms and States of 
Europe, ed. Michael J. Seidler (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2013), 7.
 58 Pufendorf, An Introduction to the History of the Principal Kingdoms and States of Europe, 8.
 59 There is a strong indication that Pufendorf ’s understanding of ‘interest’ led him to argue 
in his natural law doctrine, too, that ‘the relation of states to each other is a somewhat 
precarious peace. It is therefore a duty of sovereigns to take measures to develop military 
virtue and skill with weapons in the citizens […]. But one should not take the initiative in 
aggression even with a just cause for war, unless a perfectly safe opportunity occurs and 
the country’s condition can easily bear it.’ Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen, book 
ii, chap. 11, § 13, 154.
 60 Pufendorf, An Introduction to the History of the Principal Kingdoms and States of Europe, 7.
 61 Ibid., 8.
 62 Ibid.
 63 Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen, book ii, chap. 1, § 8, 117.
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to its own, a republic cannot be obliged by an alliance or treaty to assist anoth-
er, if its own condition doth not permit’.64 Contrary to Pufendorf, Heineccius 
did not endeavour to determine how interest should be assessed. Given that 
Pufendorf had already shown that interest could be defined differently, de-
pending on different viewpoints, Heineccius’s discussion fell behind the level 
Pufendorf had already reached in his analysis. As with Heineccius’s treatment 
of Hobbes’s arguments, Heineccius drew upon some of Pufendorf ’s key argu-
ments without adding anything substantially new. Instead, he reiterated the 
familiar argument that sovereignty entailed ‘the right of making alliances and 
treaties, sending ambassadors, and making war and peace; since without these 
rights the state could not be preserved safe and secure’.65 But Heineccius did 
not endeavour to show how natural law could be conceived to regulate this 
volatile situation.
The idea of a balance of power was at the time of his writings a well- 
established concept in political thinking and provided the crucial alternative 
to the natural law doctrine. Pufendorf had attempted to reconcile these two 
concepts by discussing natural law in view of state interest. However, despite 
its widely recognized significance for the organization of the European state 
system, the concept of balance of power was also contested in many ways.66 
The criticism by the Abbé Saint Pierre is perhaps the most pertinent critique of 
the shortcomings of this system at the beginning of the eighteenth century.67 
Furthermore, the concept of the balance of power was also employed in the po-
lemics of the period. In the English context, Charles D’Avenant is presumably 
 64 Heineccius, A Methodical System of Universal Law, 517.
 65 Ibid., 452.
 66 The best study on the history of political thought on the balance of power is still Ernst 
Kaeber, Die Idee des europäischen Gleichgewichts in der publizistischen Literatur vom 16. 
bis zur Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts (Berlin: A. Duncker, 1907), but see also Arno Strohmeyer, 
Theorie der Interaktion. Das europäische Gleichgewicht der Kräfte in der frühen Neuzeit 
(Wien: Böhlau, 1994); Heinz Duchhardt, Balance of Power und Pentarchie: Internationale 
Beziehungen 1700– 1785 (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1996); Hans Fenske, ‘Gleichgewicht, 
Balance,’ in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch- sozialen 
Sprache in Deutschland, vol. 2, ed. Otto Brunner et  al. (Stuttgart:  Klett- Cotta, 1975), 
959– 996; Evan Luard, The Balance of Power. The System of International Relations 
1648– 1815 (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 1992); Richard Little, The Balance of Power in 
International Relations: Metaphors, Myths and Models (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007); and Michael J. Sheehan, The Balance of Power. History & Theory (London, 
New York: Routledge, 1996).
 67 Unparalleled on the Abbé Saint Pierre is Olaf Asbach, Die Zähmung der Leviathane. Die 
Idee einer Rechtsordnung zwischen Staaten bei Abbé de Saint- Pierre und Jean- Jacques 
Rousseau (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2002).
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the best- known example. He used the concept of the balance of power quite 
forcefully against Louis xiv in his Essay upon the Balance of Power.
Despite this multi- faceted use of the balance of power, Schmauss was among 
those who were confident that it would actually achieve its purpose of stabiliz-
ing the European state system. Interestingly, in contrast to Schmauss, Heinec-
cius seemed not at all interested in discussing the balance of power. What is per-
haps most remarkable about Schmauss’s contribution to this debate is the fact 
that he combined it with, and embedded it in, his historical approach and his 
resultant account. This approach aimed to unearth the validity of the balance of 
power as a political general maxim which operated beyond specific individual 
state interest. The first part of his Einleitung zu der Staats- Wissenschaft deals, as 
its title indicates, with the ‘history of the balance of power in Europe’. The struc-
ture of this account is quite telling, with the first part concerned with the period 
before the Peace of Westphalia and the Peace of the Pyrenees. The latter effec-
tively added the missing piece to the construction of 1648.68 The second part is 
concerned with the period from 1659 to the beginning of the War of the Spanish 
Succession, and the third part considers the current situation up to 1740.
This presentation of European history was aimed at influencing the current 
affairs of the European state system, which Schmauss perceived to be under sub-
stantial threat. As D’Avenant and many others had done, Schmauss insisted that 
Europe’s liberty was closely related to the balance of power: ‘For more than two 
hundred years the whole of Europe has turned to Great Britain as the only power 
capable of providing protection when its liberty was under threat’.69 Schmauss’s 
argument is familiar, not only in the way he employs the balance of power doc-
trine, but also in the way he juxtaposes this doctrine as providing the structural 
guarantee of Europe’s freedom against claims to universal monarchy and their 
inherent threat to the independence and liberty of the European states.70
 68 Michael Rohrschneider, Der gescheiterte Frieden von Münster. Spaniens Ringen mit 
Frankreich auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongress 1643– 1649 (Münster:  Aschendorff 
Verlag, 2006); Heinz Duchhardt (ed.), Der Pyrenäenfriede 1659: Vorgeschichte, Widerhall, 
Rezeptionsgeschichte (Göttingen:  Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010); and Lucien Bély, 
Bertrand Haan and Stéphane Jettot (eds.), La Paix des Pyrénées (1659) ou le triomphe de la 
raison politique (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2015).
 69 Johann Jacob Schmauss, Einleitung zu der Staats- Wissenschafft und Erläuterung des 
von ihm heruasgegebenen Corpus Juris Gentium Academici und aller andern seit mehr 
als zweyen Seculis her geschlossenen Bündnisse, Friedens- und Commercien- Tractaten 
(Leipzig: J.F. Gleditsch, 1741), If. Translations here and below are by the present author.
 70 See, for instance, Schmauss, Einleitung zu der Staats- Wissenschafft, 106. The modern 
authoritative account on universal monarchy is Franz Bosbach, Monarchia Universalis. 
Ein politischer Leitbegriff der Frühen Neuzeit (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988).
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What is substantially different in his argument from the others I have cited, 
however, is that he did not attempt to contribute to contemporary polemical 
arguments, but rather tried to systematize the various stages of the European 
conflicts. In this respect the struggle for universal monarchy was seen by him 
as yet another variant of the contest between ‘the powerful houses of Austria 
and France’,71 a contest which he believed was at the heart of most European 
wars of the period. The stalemate between these crowns was always precarious 
and almost all other European states were drawn into the conflict. According 
to his own assertion, Schmauss intended to provide a better understanding of 
‘the principles, maxims and rules after which the European states and their 
governments conduct their affairs’,72 the current situation being, to his mind, 
unsustainable.
Although Schmauss had followed Gundling and had taken up the natural 
law tradition in his conception of international thought, he maintained that 
he did not believe that these principles and rules could be found in ‘natu-
ral or international law or a jus publicum universale, but only in view of the 
 interest’.73 This seems a surprising assertion, but throughout his historical 
analysis Schmauss tried hard to demonstrate how interstate relations through 
history develop into a system in the form of the expanding repertoire of cur-
rent treatises, which are at the same time a manifestation of the state. What he 
attempted to achieve seems thus to reformulate the notion of interest in view 
of the European state system, which in his view found its clearest expression 
in the balance of power. He thus tried to demonstrate that the real interest of 
each European state was enshrined in and protected by the balance of power. 
By undertaking this huge task in his historical approach, Schmauss contrib-
uted substantially to the international political thought of the first half of the 
eighteenth century.
 71 Schmauss, Einleitung zu der Staats- Wissenschafft, viii.
 72 Ibid., xi.
 73 Ibid. Incidentally, Merio Scattola showed that the process of disintegration of natural 
law actually began with Schmauss, and in particular with his theory of the passions. 
See Merio Scattola, ‘Das Naturrecht der Triebe, oder das Ende des Naturrechts:  Johann 
Jacob Schmauss und Johann Christoph Claproth,’ in Das Naturrecht der Geselligkeit. 
Anthropologie, Recht und Politik im 18. Jahrhundert, ed. Vanda Fiorillo and Frank Grunert 
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2009), 250. With a similar judgement, see Sellert, ‘Johann 
Jacob Schmauss’, 846.
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6 Conclusion
One year after the death of Schmauss, in 1758, Emer de Vattel (1714– 1767) sum-
marized the European situation that Schmauss, Heineccius and their genera-
tion had tried to come to grips with: 
Europe forms a political system, […] closely connected by the interests of 
the nations inhabiting this part of the world. […] The continual attention 
of sovereigns to every occurrence, the constant residence of ministers, and 
the perpetual negotiations, make of modern Europe a kind of republic, of 
which the members – each independent, but all linked together by the ties 
of common interest – unite for the maintenance of order and liberty. Hence 
arose that famous scheme of the political balance, or the equilibrium of 
power; by which is understood such a disposition of things, as that no one 
potentate be able absolutely to predominate, and prescribe laws to others.74
Perhaps it is fair to say that Heineccius was much more pessimistic about the 
regulation and pacification of the European state system. Towards the end of 
his text on natural law doctrine he summarized his views on interstate relations. 
For him, the sovereignty of the state meant that states would remain in a volatile 
situation, rife with conflict, as each state had to decide for itself how best to pro-
tect its security. Indeed, it seems that Heineccius had, for very similar reasons to 
Hobbes, as little hope as Hobbes of overcoming the antagonistic state system:
Because all empire is supreme and absolute, it follows, that different em-
pires or civil states are independent, and subject to no common authority 
on earth. But such states are in the state of nature, and therefore in a 
state of natural equality and liberty. And because in such a state the in-
jured have no defence or protection but in themselves, and therefore in 
it everyone has a right to repel violence and injury, and to extort by force 
what is due to him by perfect right, it is abundantly evident, that every 
civil state or republic has the right of making war.75
 74 Vattel, The Law of Nations, 496. On Vattel’s use of the balance of power, see the discussions 
in Richard Devetak, ‘Law of Nations as reason of State: Diplomacy and the Balance of 
Power in Vattel’s Law of Nations,’ Parergon 28 (2011): 105– 128; and Isaak Nakhimovsky, 
‘Vattel’s Theory of the International Order: Commerce and the Balance of Power in the 
Law of Nations,’ History of European Ideas 33 (2007): 157– 173.
 75 Heineccius, A Methodical System of Universal Law, 498. I  have argued elsewhere that 
Hobbes actually was seriously concerned with overcoming the state of nature between 
sovereign states. See Schröder, Trust, 104– 119.
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Without mentioning it here, Heineccius underpins his theory of sovereignty 
with the self- interest of each individual state. This can lead only to the aggres-
sive conduct of interstate relations, and Heineccius provided no indication of 
whether he thought that natural law was able to mediate and better this antag-
onistic constellation.
In contrast to Heineccius, Schmauss – like Vattel – belongs to those  natural 
law theorists whose historical philosophizing about European order and li-
berty was not merely taught as an academic subject, but pursued in the hope 
of influencing the ways politics were conducted. Schmauss’s and Heineccius’s 
emphasis on the importance and applicability of natural law to interstate re-
lations differs considerably. Whereas Schmauss employed the concepts of in-
terest and balance of power in a constructive and innovative way which was 
informed by his historical analysis and increasingly led him away from seeing 
natural law as crucial for regulating the state system, Heineccius reworked the 
existing natural law traditions without showing serious concern for offering 
new solutions to antagonistic interstate relations. This is mainly due to the un-
derlying principle of his natural law doctrine, which baulked at the use and ap-
plication of natural law in the interstate sphere. With the natural law doctrines 
as developed by Schmauss and Heineccius, we reach the limits of natural law 
as far as effective regulation of interstate relations are concerned.76
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 chapter 7
Men, Monsters and the History of Mankind  
in Vattel’s Law of Nations
Pärtel Piirimäe
1 Introduction
Emer de Vattel has been widely considered a seminal figure in the European 
tradition of the law of nations. While attaching himself to the earlier tradition 
of natural jurisprudence, he offered a normative system of the law of nations 
that was more firmly and explicitly anchored to the political practice of his 
contemporary Europe than were the doctrines of his predecessors. Vattel pro-
moted the practical applicability of his Droit des gens (1758), stressing that it 
was not so much written for interested ‘private individuals’, i.e. other scholars 
or the general public, but it was a ‘law of sovereigns’ that was primarily in-
tended for ‘them and their ministers’. It would not help much, he explained, 
if his maxims were studied only by those who had no influence over public 
affairs; the ‘conductors of states’, on the other hand, if they chose to learn this 
science and adopt its maxims as the ‘compass’ for their policies, could produce 
many ‘happy results’.1 Vattel emphasized the easy comprehension and applica-
bility of his book, contrasting his approach with that of Christian Wolff, whose 
treatise on the law of nations could be understood only if one ‘previously stud-
ied sixteen or seventeen quarto volumes which precede it’.2 As Vattel famous-
ly declared, his original intention was to introduce Wolff ’s system to a wider 
readership, by rendering his rigid and formal work more ‘agreeable and better 
calculated to ensure it a reception in the polite world’.3
While it is clear that Vattel’s work amounted to much more than a system-
atic account of Wolff ’s principles,4 it is in the manner of presentation that the 
differences between the two scholars are the most striking. Already the choice 
of French over Latin, the language of diplomats over that of the republic of 
 1 Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, ed. Béla Kapossy and Richard Whatmore (Indianapolis, 
IN: Liberty Fund 2008), Preface, 18.
 2 Ibid., 12.
 3 Ibid., 10– 12.
 4 Vattel himself outlines some differences in ibid., 13– 16.
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letters, is a sign of an appeal to political and diplomatic rather than scholarly 
circles. But an even more important difference appears from Vattel’s choice of 
examples. The Swiss scholar illustrated his maxims with numerous historical 
cases, with a clear purpose in mind. He explains that if the aim of a book is 
not just to inform readers of the right principles of action but also to motivate 
those who are in charge to follow these principles, it is not sufficient to lay out 
a systematic account of the law: one also needs to cite examples, ‘to render the 
doctrine more impressive’.5 For this reason, ‘whenever I  found a convenient 
opportunity, I have, above all things, endeavoured to inspire a love of virtue, by 
shewing, from some striking passage of history, how amiable it is, how worthy 
of our homage in some truly great men, and even productive of solid advan-
tage’.6 Teaching through exempla is, of course, an essential feature of humanist 
rhetorical strategy that most seventeenth- century natural jurists had also fol-
lowed, with a few notable exceptions such as Thomas Hobbes and the early 
Samuel Pufendorf, who set out to construct a more rigid geometrical system.7 
But it is important to note here that Vattel contrasts his choice of examples 
with that of his predecessors:  ‘I have quoted the chief part of my examples 
from modern history, as well because these are more interesting as to avoid a 
repetition of those which have been already accumulated by Grotius, Puffen-
dorf, and their commentators’.8
The broader aim of this chapter is to discuss the relationship between Vat-
tel’s normative system and his usages of history. I will argue that Vattel’s re-
sort to examples from modern history had a greater significance for his overall 
theory than he modestly indicates in the passage quoted above, and also a far 
greater importance than earlier historiography has attached to it. In previous 
research, Vattel’s uses of history have not been addressed in any systematic 
manner, creating an impression that Vattel was not interested in history as 
such, and that his examples, therefore, serve indeed only as illustrations. Some 
scholars have suggested more explicitly that Vattel’s approach is ahistorical, in 
the sense that he provides a normative account that is not anchored in any sys-
tematic understanding of European or civilizational history. Walter Rech, for 
 5 Ibid., 18.
 6 Ibid., 19.
 7 Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen (1642), ed. Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne (Cam-
bridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1998); Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651), ed. Richard 
Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Samuel Pufendorf, Two Books of the El-
ements of Universal Jurisprudence (1660), ed. Thomas Behme (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 
2009); see Fiammetta Palladini, Samuel Pufendorf discepolo di Hobbes:  Per una reinterpre-
tazione del giusnaturalismo moderno (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1990).
 8 Vattel, The Law of Nations, Preface, 20.
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example, has stated that Vattel ‘moved away from history’, replacing the ‘his-
toricism’ or ‘cultural relativism’ of his predecessors (Bodin, Grotius and Byn-
kershoek) with a ‘faith in universal Reason’. Vattel’s ahistorical approach was, 
in Rech’s view, purely rationalist, and the ‘inherent rationality and conformity 
with the principles of the natural law of nations’ of his ‘Europe’s international 
law’ enabled him to justify ‘the hegemony of the civilized’.9
Another example is Ian Hunter’s interpretation of Vattel, which in its cen-
tral contentions is almost an exact opposite to those of Rech. In a number of 
essays Hunter presents a convincing refutation of the post- colonialist critique 
of Vattel, arguing that Vattel’s concerns were primarily intra- European. Rather 
than constructing a universalist theory aimed at justifying European coloniza-
tion or dispossessing the barbarian, Vattel’s central objective was ‘to consoli-
date the civilizing effect of the intra- European regulation of warfare’.10 For this 
purpose Vattel worked with a ‘double register’ of norms. In their conscience, 
sovereigns were bound by the natural law principles of universal justice based 
on a Wolffian natural law metaphysics of self- perfecting corporate persons.11 
In the actual practice of international relations, where there was no universal 
authority to form judgements on the conduct of free, independent and equal 
nations, these universal principles were suspended and replaced with a body 
of rules that Vattel calls ‘voluntary law’.12 These were prudential rules drawn 
from European state practice, the essence of which was to treat both parties 
in war as legally equal, no matter how their behaviour seemed from the point 
of view of universal justice. Voluntary law was derived from natural law, as it 
was natural law itself that commanded sovereigns to suspend its rigorous prin-
ciples in favour of these prudential rules in order to reduce the violence of 
inter- state warfare.13 Hunter portrays Vattel’s theory as ‘diplomatic casuistry’ 
that operates in the space between these distinct normative registers, pro-
viding the diplomats who were serving the interests of a European territorial 
state with the tools of adjusting universal justice to the conditions of national 
self- interest. The suspension of natural law in the interests of one’s own na-
tion simultaneously served the interests of the society of nations as a whole, 
 9 Walter Rech, Enemies of Mankind:  Vattel’s Theory of Collective Security (Leiden, Bos-
ton: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), 118.
 10 Ian Hunter, ‘Global Justice and Regional Metaphysics: On the Critical History of the Law 
of Nature and Nations’, in Law and Politics in British Colonial Thought: Transpositions of 
Empire, ed. Shaunnagh Dorsett and Ian Hunter (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 
11– 29, at 19.
 11 Hunter, ‘Global Justice and Regional Metaphysics’, 17.
 12 Vattel, The Law of Nations, Preliminaries, § 21.
 13 Vattel, The Law of Nations, Preface, 17.
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supporting the principles of non- discriminatory war and peace settlement 
through compromise.14
Among the variety of intellectual sources that inform Vattel’s vision of in-
ternational order, Hunter attributes a distinct role to European public law, 
 collections of treaties, and diplomatic history, from which the prudential vol-
untary law rules were inferred.15 But with regard to his usage of the conjectural 
histories of the Enlightenment, Hunter appears in line with Rech, although on 
opposite grounds. For Rech, Vattel’s supposed lack of interest in the histories 
of mankind and the denial of any collective advancement of humanity16 is a 
sign of his disregard of cultural- historical diversity for the sake of justifying 
the forced export of Europe’s international law. Hunter also denies that Vattel 
‘based his construction of the law of nature and nations on a universal philo-
sophy of justice or a universalising philosophical history’ but this was not be-
cause of a Eurocentric prejudice but because his thought was wholly internal 
to ‘a specifically European political history’.17
One can only agree with Hunter that a universalizing philosophical histo-
ry was not the main pillar on which Vattel constructed his normative theory. 
Indeed, Vattel writes hardly anything explicit about the history of mankind or 
the logic of collective advancement of humanity. Nevertheless, the lack of a sys-
tematic account of philosophical history does not mean that we should reduce 
his theory to a mere European peace project. This chapter is an attempt to show 
that his concern with European nations and European international  relations 
had a universalist framework, as he projected his pragmatic diplomatic- 
historical account onto a specific version of Enlightenment philosophical his-
tory. It was not a stadial conjectural history of humanity that was sketched by 
 14 Ian Hunter, ‘Vattel’s Law of Nations:  Diplomatic Casuistry for the Protestant Nation’, 
Grotiana 31 (2010), passim. For a similar interpretation, see Martti Koskenniemi, From 
Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 108– 122.
 15 Ian Hunter, ‘The Figure of Man and the Territorialisation of Justice in “Enlightenment” 
Natural Law: Pufendorf and Vattel’, Intellectual History Review 23:3 (2013): 289– 307, at 
291. This does not mean that Vattel replaced universalist rules with a mere conventional 
law of treaties or European customary laws. He explicitly distinguished between the 
universalist realms of natural law and voluntary law on the one hand, and conventional 
or particular law on the other hand, arguing that the latter realm does not belong to a 
treatise on the law of nations, but to ‘the province of history’. Vattel, The Law of Nations, 
Preliminaries, § 24.
 16 Rech, Enemies of Mankind, 119. Rech also denies that Vattel does not use the concept of 
‘progress’, which is not correct. See the mentions of national ‘progrès’ in Vattel, The Law of 
Nations, book i, § 22, § 25; book ii, § 18.
 17 Hunter, ‘The Figure of Man’, 291, has both Pufendorf and Vattel in mind.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simone Zurbuchen - 978-90-04-38420-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 09/19/2019 09:19:14AM
via University of Lausanne
Men, Monsters and the History of Mankind in Law of Nations 163
Pufendorf and developed more fully by Scottish authors only after Vattel’s work 
was published,18 nor a Rousseauian sceptical vision of the corrupting force of 
civilization. Instead, he drew on Voltaire’s optimistic account of general human 
progress that was driven by enlightened monarchs who exercised a specific kind 
of political virtue. Vattel’s debt to Voltaire’s thèse royale is particularly visible in 
his account of the Russian tsar Peter the Great that drew directly on Voltaire’s 
historical works. I will argue that through his portrayal of Peter the Great, Vattel 
intended to demonstrate the potential of global human progress, which did not 
rely on the implementation of natural law by force, nor on virtuous self- denial, 
but on the proper, enlightened understanding of self- interest.
2 Men and Monsters in Vattel’s Law of Nations
In order to understand Peter the Great’s role in Vattel’s theory we first need to 
take a look at Vattel’s portrayal of human cultural and moral diversity. Despite 
the fact that Vattel’s Law of Nations does not offer a systematic classification of 
humanity, the large number of examples scattered throughout the book allow 
us to reconstruct a moral hierarchy of nations that characterizes the world in 
which his normative theory obtains. What emerges from the treatise is a picture 
of the globe that has been and still is inhabited by a variety of peoples whose 
customs, manners and civilizational achievements exhibit different stages of 
cultural and moral development. Accordingly, nations are labelled pejoratively 
as ‘savage’ or ‘barbarous’, or positively as ‘civilized’ or ‘polished’. Vattel employs 
these widely used labels to indicate that nations have realized their duty of 
self- perfection to different degrees. But he introduces an additional category, 
namely that of ‘monsters’, which cuts through all these distinctions. The con-
cept of monsters does not refer to fabulous creatures known from early mod-
ern travel writings19 nor to a specific level of cultural development existing in 
some part of the globe, but it is a theoretical concept to signify individuals or 
nations who lack the minimum of morality that is necessary for social life, and 
who are, therefore, morally speaking, more similar to brutes than to men. As 
this concept is an important tool for Vattel to determine the applicability and 
 18 See Istvan Hont, ‘The language of sociability and commerce: Samuel Pufendorf and the 
theoretical foundations of the “Four- Stages Theory” ’, in The Languages of Political Theory 
in Early- Modern Europe, ed. Anthony Pagden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987), 253– 276.
 19 See Jonathan P.A. Sell, Rhetoric and Wonder in English Travel Writing, 1560– 1613 (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2006).
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scope of the voluntary law of nations, the distinction between monsters and 
men deserves a closer scrutiny.
The first instance where we encounter ‘monsters’ occurs in the first book 
where Vattel discusses various obligations that nations owe to themselves by 
the laws of nature. It is important to note that these obligations are not de-
rived from the Hobbesian– Pufendorfian minimal concept of natural law that 
restricts its purview to mere self- preservation and societal peace. Instead, 
the duties to oneself originate from the Wolffian– Leibnizian metaphysics of 
 perfectibility, with a view to achieving perfection and happiness, both as an in-
dividual and as a nation.20 A sovereign is thus not a mere peacekeeper but is ul-
timately responsible for creating the conditions where all citizens are capable 
and motivated to strive towards perfection, which is the road to happiness.21 
The sovereign should, first of all, enable and promote economic activities that 
produce ‘a happy plenty of all the necessaries of life, with its conveniences, and 
innocent and laudable enjoyments’.22 Yet not all economic activities that might 
be able to provide for human necessities are morally equal for Vattel. There are 
some ways of life that are natural to men and thus conducive to achieving per-
fection; there are others that tend to corrupt the character and thus impede 
happiness; and finally, there are some that are thoroughly corrupt. Thus there 
is a gradation of employments, according to their effects on the human soul,23 
but also according to the effects that they have on other nations.
This gradation is articulated in the chapter ‘Of the Cultivation of the Soil’, 
where Vattel lifts agriculture above all other economic activities. Agriculture is 
not only the most stable foundation of national wealth and an infinite source 
of growth,24 but it is also the ‘natural employment of man’, which a sover-
eign should promote by any available means. Vattel does not place European 
 20 Emmanuelle Jouannet calls this perfectionist- eudamonist aspect of Vattel’s theory ‘le droit- 
providence’, or ‘welfarist’ purpose of the law, which complements the ‘liberal’ purpose, 
which is concerned with liberty and preservation of states: Emmanuelle Jouannet, The 
Liberal- Welfarist Law of Nations: A History of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 64, 105– 106.
 21 ‘The society is established with the view of procuring, to those who are its members, the 
necessaries, conveniences, and even pleasures of life, and, in general, every thing [sic] 
necessary to their happiness’, Vattel, The Law of Nations, book i, § 72.
 22 Ibid.
 23 See Vattel’s critique of luxury in the essay ‘Dialogue Between the Prince of **** and His 
Confidant, on Certain Essential Elements of Public Administration’, in Vattel, The Law of 
Nations, 783– 796; on Vattel in the context of the eighteenth- century debates on luxury, 
see Isaac Nakhimovsky, ‘Vattel’s theory of the international order: Commerce and the bal-
ance of power in the Law of Nations’, History of European Ideas 33:2 (2007): 157– 173.
 24 Vattel, The Law of Nations, book i, § 77.
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nations above the rest of the world in this respect. Quite the opposite is the 
case, because in many European countries, especially in Spain, where the 
Church owns too much land, the Roman heritage has been forgotten and the 
‘beloved employment of the first consuls and dictators of Rome’ is disdained 
by ‘a little insignificant haberdasher, a tailor’ and ‘even the most servile me-
chanics’. A positive modern example is provided by the Chinese, who hold ag-
riculture in honour, with the result that China is the ‘best cultivated country 
in the world’.25
Now Vattel moves on to those who fully neglect the obligation to cultivate 
the soil. Here he makes an important theoretical addition: this duty is not only 
derived from the obligation to pursue individual or national self- perfection 
but it is an ‘obligation imposed by nature on mankind’ as a whole, because 
the earth is given to all its inhabitants to nourish themselves, not to each na-
tion separately. This perspective enables him to censure those who, ‘to avoid 
labour, chuse to live only by hunting, and their flocks’.26 It is clear that Vattel 
morally condemns such ‘idle’ and wasteful modes of life but it also has im-
portant legal implications, because other, ‘more industrious’ nations that are 
‘too closely confined’ are entitled to take possession of the vast tracts that are 
‘rather ranged through than inhabited’.27 In another chapter, Vattel outlines a 
more systematic account of the acquisition of property. He argues that uncul-
tivated lands should be considered ‘vacant’, that is, without ownership in the 
legal sense, and therefore the colonization and appropriation by the ‘people of 
Europe’ of the lands of which the ‘savages’ did not make ‘actual and constant 
use’ was wholly legitimate.28 Vattel contrasts the legitimate colonization of 
North America with the conquest of the ‘civilized empires of Peru and Mexico’, 
which in his view was a ‘notorious usurpation’.29 In another famous passage 
Vattel rejects Grotius’s doctrine of universal punishment, which enabled the 
European nations to argue that they were entitled to subject these nations on 
the grounds of the civilizing and Christianizing mission.30 According to Vattel, 
sovereigns can rightfully punish only those transgressions that affect their own 
 25 Ibd., § 80.
 26 Ibid., § 81.
 27 Ibid.
 28 Ibid., § 209.
 29 Ibid., § 81.
 30 These passages have been in the focus of researchers who are interested in Vattel’s ‘colo-
nial’ legacy, such as:  Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace:  Political Thought and 
the International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1999), 
194– 196; Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 269– 270.
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rights and safety.31 With regard to the question of cultivation, it is clear that 
an injury occurs only when the ‘savages’ do not allow the legitimate appro-
priation of their lands by colonists. But Vattel also mentions another class of 
non- agricultural savages who can be rightfully punished by everyone:  ‘those 
nations (such as the ancient Germans, and some modern Tartars) who inhabit 
fertile countries, but disdain to cultivate their lands, and chuse rather to live 
by plunder, are wanting to themselves, are injurious to all their neighbours, 
and deserve to be extirpated as savage and pernicious beasts’.32 A much stron-
ger language is warranted here because these nations violate not just the duty 
of self- perfection but infringe the natural rights of others. Those savages who 
do not harm others, however, should be treated humanely and moderately, as 
was done by the English settlers who even purchased the land from the North 
American Indians, although this was clearly not needed for the acquisition of 
a legal title.33
The second cluster of beastly or monstrous nations appears in various chap-
ters of the second book, where Vattel examines the obligations that a nation 
owes to other nations. First, there is a general stipulation that when a sovereign 
condones the atrocities committed by the state’s citizens, the entire nation can 
be punished as a common enemy:  ‘when by its manners and by the maxims 
of its government it accustoms and authorizes its citizens indiscriminately to 
plunder and maltreat foreigners, to make inroads into the neighbouring coun-
tries, &c. […] all nations have a right to enter into a league against such a peo-
ple, to repress them and to treat them as the common enemies of the human 
race’. Vattel presents two examples, the Usbecks and the Barbary states, ‘with 
whom the love of plunder, or the fear of just punishment, is the only rule of 
peace and war’.34 He provides more cases of the maltreatment of foreigners in 
his discussion of the duty of hospitability, condemning those ‘savage nations 
who treated strangers ill, that Scythian tribe who sacrificed them to Diana’, and 
agrees with Grotius that ‘their extreme ferocity excluded them from the great 
society of mankind’.35 It also appears that it is not necessarily an entire nation 
that can act monstrously but a sovereign can alone become an enemy of man-
kind and can therefore be subjected to a collective punishment:  ‘As to those 
monsters who, under the title of sovereigns, render themselves the scourges 
 31 Vattel, The Law of Nations, book ii, § 7; book i, § 169; see Simone Zurbuchen, ‘Vattel’s law 
of nations and just war theory’, History of European Ideas 35 (2009): 408– 417, at 412.
 32 Vattel, The Law of Nations, book i, § 81.
 33 Ibid.
 34 Ibid., book ii, § 78.
 35 Ibid., § 104.
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and horror of the human race, they are savage beasts, who every brave man 
may justly exterminate from the face of the earth’.36 Vattel does not present any 
contemporary examples here, but mentions only three mythical tyrants:  ‘all 
antiquity has praised Hercules for delivering the world from an Antaeus, a Bu-
siris, a Diomede’.37 Yet the context for this statement is the question of the 
rights of sovereigns to interfere in the quarrel of another sovereign with his 
subjects where those subjects have risen in self- defence against an ‘insupport-
able’ tyranny. A single example of such a justified intervention is taken from 
modern history, namely the deposition of James ii by William of Orange.38 
This suggests that monstrous tyrants can also rise among the civilized peoples 
of Europe.
The third book, which is devoted to moral and legal issues related to war, 
offers yet another significant passage on ‘monsters’ that is crucial for an under-
standing of the function of these quasi- humans in Vattel’s system. It also helps 
to clarify some common misconceptions relating to the position of the tradi-
tional just war doctrine in his theory. In a paragraph about nations who ‘make 
war without reason or apparent motives’ Vattel writes as follows:
Nations that are always ready to take up arms on any prospect of advan-
tage, are lawless robbers: but those who seem to delight in the ravages 
of war, who spread it on all sides, without reasons or pretexts, and even 
without any other motive than their own ferocity, are monsters, unworthy 
the name of men. They should be considered as enemies to the human 
race […]. All nations have a right to join in a confederacy for the purpose 
of punishing and even exterminating those savage nations.39
Vattel makes here a distinction between two kinds of immoral nations: those 
who wage war without a just cause, only for the motive of advantage, and those 
 36 Ibid., § 56. Vattel’s own terminology is: ‘Pour ce qui est de ces Monstres, qui sous le titre 
de Souverain, se rendent les fléaux & l’horreur de l’humanité; ce sont des bêtes féroces’. 
Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle, appliqués à la Conduite & aux 
Affaires des Nations & des Souverains (Londres, 1758), book ii, § 56.
 37 Vattel, The Law of Nations, book ii, § 56. The quote is taken from Grotius: ‘And upon this 
Account it is, that Hercules is so highly extolled by the Antients, for having freed the Earth 
of Antaeus, Busiris, Diomedes, and such like Tyrants’. Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and 
Peace, ed. Richard Tuck (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2005), book ii, chap. xx, § 40.2.
 38 Vattel, The Law of Nations, book ii, § 56; see book i, § 121: ‘The monster who does not love 
his people is no better than an odious usurper, and deserves, no doubt, to be hurled from 
the throne’.
 39 Vattel, The Law of Nations, book iii, § 34.
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who do not have any reasons, pretexts or apparent motives but enjoy warfare 
as such. This distinction is not a novelty proposed by Vattel. His direct source 
of inspiration was Christian Wolff, who, in turn, drew on a long discussion of 
monstrously bellicose nations that was introduced by Hugo Grotius. But Vattel 
added an important further construction onto these foundations: a focus on 
pretexts as the criterion for distinguishing between monsters and men. Let us 
have a brief look at the foundations so as to gain an understanding of the role 
of monsters and the function of pretexts in Vattel’s theory.
Vattel starts his account of the causes of war with a distinction between 
‘justificatory reasons’, which refer to legal grounds of war, and ‘motives’, 
which refer to expediency.40 This distinction, too, is an inheritance from 
Grotius, who discussed a number of cases from antiquity when rulers had 
publicly presented a justifying reason (causa justifica) but the actual motive 
(causa suasoria) was ‘a strong desire of glory, empire and riches’.41 Wolff uti-
lized exactly the same terminology for a distinction between justifying (jus-
tifica) and persuasive (suasoria) reasons.42 All authors in the early modern 
tradition of natural jurisprudence argued that if a war was waged without 
legitimate justifying reasons (i.e. an injury done or threatened), it was un-
just, as it violated the (perfect) rights of the other nation. But even worse 
were those who lacked even the expedient motives: these nations were de-
scribed as ferocious, savage, beast- like enemies of mankind. Grotius writes 
that to covet dangers for danger’s sake is a ‘vice that so far passes the bounds 
of humanity, that by Aristotle it is styled brutishness’.43 As Grotius further 
elaborates in the chapter about punishments, such men are not com pletely 
human because, normally, people commit crimes for some wicked, self- 
oriented motives. Sinful desires are part and parcel of humanity whereas 
pure wickedness without any benefit to oneself is not:  ‘There is hardly any 
man wicked for nothing, and if there be any one who loves wickedness for 
its own sake, he is a sort of monster’.44 This is something so unnatural that 
Jean Barbeyrac in his commentaries on Pufendorf, referring to Grotius’s 
 40 Ibid., § 25.
 41 Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, book ii, chap. 22, § 1.2. For a systematic distinction 
between ‘justifying reasons’ and ‘motives of advantage’, see also book ii, chap. 1, § 1.1.
 42 Christian Wolff, The Law of Nations Treated According to the Scientific Method (1749), 
transl. Joseph H.  Drake, rev. and ed. Thomas Ahnert (Indianapolis, IN:  Liberty Fund, 
2017), § 621.
 43 Other words used by Grotius include feritas, saevitia, mera insania: Grotius, The Rights of 
War and Peace, book ii, chap. 22, § 2.
 44 Ibid., chap. 20, § 29.1.
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discussion of different kinds of unjust wars, doubts that such nations actu-
ally exist.45
Wolff also presents a Grotian typology of unjust wars that is based on the 
existence and relative force of ‘justifying’ and ‘persuasive’ reasons: first, wars 
undertaken solely for utility; second, wars waged for utility but with the exis-
tence of a just cause; and third, wars waged for utility but under the appear-
ance of quasi- justifying reasons (i.e. pretexts). The strongest moral condem-
nation belongs, again, to the fourth type:  ‘The war of those who, influenced 
neither by justifying nor by persuasive reasons, are carried into wars, is not 
only unjust but also transgresses the law of humanity’.46 Like Grotius and Bar-
beyrac, Wolff is puzzled why anyone would go to war without any apparent 
benefit to oneself. Therefore, those who, ‘influenced neither by justifying nor 
by persuasive reasons, are carried into war, must represent to themselves as a 
benefit the war considered as such, consequently, filled with a mistaken notion 
of good, they must gain pleasure from it, and consequently the slaughter and 
mangling of men and the destruction of property belonging to innocent men 
delights them’.47
Wolff ’s recipe for dealing with such monsters is also influenced by Grotius, 
who famously argued that every sovereign had the right to exact punishments 
not only for injuries done to the nation itself but for ‘any grievous violations 
of the law of nature or nations’.48 Thus war can be waged against those who 
‘offend against nature’. The list of such offenders includes those who practise 
tyranny, those who are inhuman to their parents, those who eat human flesh and 
those who practise piracy. The last group are described as semi- human monsters 
whose ‘depravity of mind’ has cut them off from human society. Against ‘such 
barbarians, and rather beasts than men’, a war is just and even ‘natural’.49 Wolff, 
however, takes the side with those critics of Grotius who argued that such an 
indeterminate account of universal punishment is an anathema to international 
 45 ‘Thus a war may be vicious, or unjust, with regard to the causes, for several ways: First, 
when we undertake it either without any justifying cause, or any motive of profit, tho’ 
never so little, but only out of a fierce and brutal fury, that makes us delight in blood and 
slaughter purely for the sake of killing. But there is reason to doubt, whether we can find 
any example of so barbarous a war’. Samuel Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, 
transl. Basil Kennett, 4th ed. (London: J. Walthoe et al., 1729), book viii, chap. vi, § 4, 
835, note 2. Pufendorf does not mention such nations, so Barbeyrac complements his 
analysis with additions from Grotius.
 46 Wolff, Law of Nations, § 626.
 47 Ibid.
 48 Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, book ii, chap. 20, § 40.1.
 49 Ibid., § 40.2– 4.
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order. Nevertheless, he did not go so far as to agree with Pufendorf’s wholesale re-
jection of the possibility of applying the concept of punishment to international 
relations.50 Wolff restricted the right of punitive war only to injuries done to one-
self: ‘For no one has a right of a war except one to whom a wrong has been done’.51 
But in Wolff’s view this restriction is not applicable to those who delight in war 
as such. Since these people ‘do not hesitate to injure any nations simply for self- 
gratification […] a right of war belongs to all nations in general’ against them.52
As we can see from the above, Vattel’s account of the ‘enemies of the hu-
man race’ who can be punished and even exterminated by all nations drew 
directly on that of Wolff. But Vattel added a very important twist to Wolff ’s ar-
gument that enabled him to determine with greater precision whether we are 
dealing with men or with monsters. This, in turn, was vital for him in order to 
determine whether or not natural law stipulations were to be suspended and a 
voluntary law regime applied in a particular case. In Vattel’s view, this cannot 
be decided on the basis of an analysis of the content of justifiable reasons pre-
sented by a party in war, because, as discussed above, nobody can claim to be 
able to judge the rightfulness of a sovereign’s cause. It may indeed often be the 
case that someone goes to war merely from motives of advantage; his conduct 
in that case is ‘reprehensible, and sullied by the badness of his motives’. War 
is so dreadful that only ‘manifest justice, joined to a kind of necessity’ renders 
it exempt from reproach.53 Nevertheless, as Vattel emphasizes, he cannot ‘be 
charged with injustice’, because ‘in every case susceptible of doubt, the arms of 
the two parties at war are to be accounted equally lawful, at least as to external 
effects’.54
Thus, in Vattel’s (and Wolff ’s) theory of just war there emerges an extensive 
space between the two extremes of manifest justice and manifest injustice. 
It is a sphere of epistemic moral uncertainty where we cannot be sure of the 
 50 On Grotius’s idea of natural right of punishment and Pufendorf ’s critique, see Gerald 
Hartung, ‘Von Grotius zu Pufendorf. Die Herkunft des säkularisierten Strafrechts aus dem 
Kriegsrecht der Frühen Neuzeit’, in Samuel Pufendorf und die europäische Frühaufklärung, 
ed. Fiammetta Palladini and Gerald Hartung (Berlin:  Akademie- Verlag, 1996), 123– 
136, and more recent discussion by Peter Schröder, Trust in Early Modern International 
Political Thought, 1598– 1713 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 101– 103, 
133– 134.
 51 Wolff, Law of Nations, § 636.
 52 Ibid., § 627. It should be noted that Pufendorf also allows war against those who ‘kill and 
eat’ innocent travellers, but this can be waged only by the sovereign whose subjects have 
been attacked. Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, book viii, chap. 6, § 5.
 53 Vattel, The Law of Nations, book iii, § 33.
 54 Ibid., § 33, § 40.
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substantive justice of the parties at war, and therefore we should give them the 
benefit of doubt, allowing the suspension of the rigorous regime of natural law 
and the application of voluntary law with regard to the external effects of war.55 
Since the first boundary between manifestly just and doubtful war affects only 
the moral appraisal of a belligerent, Vattel is more concerned with establishing 
with greater certainty the boundary between morally doubtful and manifestly 
unjust wars. Wolff did not offer a definitive solution to this problem but Vattel 
was able to construct his own solution on Wolff ’s explanation as to when the 
voluntary law applies. Presenting the already familiar doctrine of the liberty 
and independence of states, Wolff writes:
Therefore, since no nation can assume for itself the functions of a judge, 
and consequently cannot pronounce upon the justice of the war, al-
though by natural law a war cannot be just on both sides, since neverthe-
less each of the belligerents claims that it has just cause of war, each must 
be allowed to follow its own opinion; consequently by the voluntary law 
of nations the war must be considered as just on either side, not indeed 
in itself […] but as regards the results of war.56
Vattel focuses on Wolff ’s implied criterion, that a belligerent power must in-
deed claim that he has a just cause in order to qualify as a legitimate belliger-
ent.57 Therefore, the public presentation of justifying reasons is not only a 
necessary but, as Vattel further elaborates, also a sufficient condition for a le-
gitimate war under the regime of voluntary law. It does not matter whether 
the reasons announced are ‘real justificatory reasons’ or mere pretexts, which 
might be ‘even absolutely destitute of all foundation’.58 This is because:
Pretexts are at least a homage which unjust men pay to justice. He who 
screens himself with them shews that he still retains some sense of 
shame. He does not openly trample on what is most sacred in human 
 55 Wolff, Law of Nations, § 887– 888.
 56 Ibid., § 888.
 57 In fact, Grotius had already suggested that the modern laws of nations that restrict vio-
lence in a formal war between legitimate enemies may not be followed in case ‘we should 
have to do with a state so barbarous, as to think it lawful without any manner or reason, 
or denunciation of war, to treat in a hostile manner the persons and goods of all strangers’. 
Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, book iii, chap. 9, § 19.2, 85.
 58 Vattel, The Law of Nations, book iii, § 32.
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society: he tacitly acknowledges that a flagrant injustice merits the indig-
nation of all mankind.59
It should be noted that the shift of focus from substantive justice to pretexts 
does not mean a decriminalization of all enemies in warfare, nor an abandon-
ment of the just war theory as such, as claimed by Carl Schmitt and his follow-
ers. The Schmittian interpretation has posited that Vattel, following the lead 
of Grotius, abandoned the ‘medieval doctrine of just war’ and stipulated the 
legal equality of both sides in war, as long as the war was waged by a sovereign 
authority.60
Thus, according to this interpretation, the formal concept of justice replaced 
the substantive one, and the ‘non- discriminatory’ treatment of belligerents 
was established as a legal principle, with no reference to the existence or non- 
existence of a just material cause for war. Schmitt argued that Vattel reached 
‘the classical transparency of the enlightened 18th century’ and displaced the 
whole problem of a substantive, normative justice ‘openly and clearly in the 
mere “form”, i.e. in the purely state structure of war’.61
It is, however, impossible to reconcile this argument with Vattel’s account 
of monsters and the declaration of war. As we saw, a declaration was required 
not for the sake of proving that a war was waged by sovereign authority but 
for the sake of publicly announcing the reasons for war. Vattel never argued 
that the exercise of sovereign authority was sufficient to qualify as a legitimate 
belligerent who should enjoy non- discriminatory treatment under the regime 
of voluntary law. On the contrary, his distinction between men and monsters 
retained the traditional separation between just and unjust enemies in a par-
ticularly strong form, and this distinction was not tied to the concept of sov-
ereignty. This position is clearly evident in Vattel’s treatment of the Barbary 
corsairs, who admittedly exercised sovereignty over their own territories but 
who nevertheless were to be punished as the enemies of humankind by oth-
er nations. This is also recognized by Walter Rech, who struggles to reconcile 
his firm support for Schmitt’s thesis with Vattel’s account of the Barbary states. 
 59 Ibid., § 32. In his discussion of the faith of treaties, Vattel specifies that a pretext should 
not be ‘evidently frivolous’. Ibid., book ii, § 222, 388.
 60 Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum 
Europaeum, transl. G.L. Ulmen (New  York:  Telos, 2006), 165– 166; Rech, Enemies of 
Mankind, 3, 111. For an excellent discussion of the Schmittian argument, see Gabriella 
Silvestrini, ‘Justice, War and Inequality. The Unjust Aggressor and the Enemy of the 
Human Race in Vattel’s Theory of the Law of Nations’, Grotiana 31:1 (2010): 41– 68.
 61 Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, 165.
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Rather than using the latter as evidence to question Schmitt’s interpretation of 
Vattel’s normative system, Rech concludes that Vattel is inconsistent and be-
trays his own principles. He first attributes to Vattel the aim of ‘moving away 
from the traditional just war doctrine by focusing on the modality as opposed 
to the morality of warfare’. But Vattel failed to reach this supposed goal, because 
in order to ‘make a case against Barbary warfare [he] had to depart from the 
idea that sovereignty as such elicited the right to wage war’. Therefore, in Rech’s 
view, Vattel ‘problematically resorted to the just cause argument, which he put 
aside when describing the “war in due form” between European sovereigns’.62
I do not see the need to accuse Vattel of inconsistency or hypocrisy in this 
respect, because the figure of monsters and the argument of pretexts were in-
troduced by him precisely to maintain the principles of natural justice as the 
overarching framework within which voluntary law could operate. It was not 
the case that ‘strict natural law re- enters into force’ in the face of ‘grave and 
systematic violations of the “voluntary law of nations” ’, as Rech has argued.63 
On the contrary, strict natural law was always binding in conscience, and the 
voluntary law regime would not be applicable to nations or sovereigns who 
clearly and evidently violated the principles of natural justice, which is why 
they would be punished with its full force. Therefore, the requirement of a dec-
laration of reasons was not mere ‘form’ but it enabled men to be distinguished 
from monsters, buttressing the validity of natural justice. Vattel thus retained 
the distinction between justus hostis and an unjust enemy who should be 
 treated as a common criminal, even though he lowered the bar for the quali-
fication as justus hostis so as to render the potential criminalization less arbi-
trary and subjective.
Moreover, the presentation of a pretext was not a purely formal criterion 
because it functioned as an indication that a nation or a sovereign possessed 
a minimum of natural morality. This minimum was established not with re-
gard to how a nation treated others but with regard to how it behaved towards 
itself, that is, whether or not it had a basic understanding of its own proper 
good and the desire to advance it. A sovereign who presented a pretext was at 
least willing to appear that he was playing by the rules. This purely expedient or 
self- interested action indicated the presence of two basic components of moral 
behaviour upon which one could hope to build more advanced levels of mo-
rality: first, that sovereign (or nation) was not led purely by desires but demon-
strated the presence of a certain level of instrumental rationality; and secondly, 
 62 Rech, Enemies of Mankind, 108. Rech (58) also accuses Gentili of similar inconsistency.
 63 Ibid., 3.
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that it had a ‘sense of shame’, that is, an awareness of the existence of the moral 
rules of human society. The thrust of Vattel’s theory is that peaceful interna-
tional relations could not be realistically built on altruistic considerations of 
other nations’ good but upon enlightened self- interest.64 In the course of his-
tory, nations would gradually realize that the best way to advance their own 
interests was to pursue ‘mutual affection’ by honouring other nations’ rights 
and performing the offices of humanity: ‘Wise and prudent nations often pur-
sue this line of conduct from views of direct and present interest: a more noble, 
more general, and less direct interest, is too rarely the motive of politicians’.65 
Therefore, one could achieve peaceful and cooperative relationships that en-
abled mutual self- perfection even with selfish nations but not with monsters, 
who were guided by brutish desires rather than by motives of advantage.
3 Peter the Great and the Moral Development of Nations
As suggested in the introduction to this chapter, Vattel’s portrayal of men and 
monsters was not an abstract normative system but it was projected onto Eu-
ropean history in a manner that reveals an underlying but not fully articulated 
civilizational history of mankind. Unlike the works of his predecessors Gro-
tius, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, Wolff and others, Vattel’s treatise reveals a belief 
in recent momentous historical change and the corresponding understanding 
that his own age was qualitatively different from preceding ones. Law of Na-
tions is peppered with references to ‘the present age’66 and the ‘enlightened 
century’,67 which has higher moral standards than the earlier times.68 Vattel’s 
 64 See Kapossy and Whatmore, ‘Introduction’ to Vattel, The Law of Nations, xvii.
 65 Vattel, The Law of Nations, book ii, § 12.
 66 Vattel writes of the distinctiveness of the ‘present age’ in relation to, for example, the arts 
and sciences (The Law of Nations, book i, § 113), treaties with non- believers (book ii, § 
162), the treatment of hostages (book ii, § 246), and assassination and poisoning (book 
iii, § 155). Vattel also refers to ‘those unhappy times’ when the Popes intervened in the 
actions of sovereigns (book i, § 146, § 154).
 67 ‘[…] dans un siécle éclairé’: Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, book i, § 61, book ii, § 275. Elsewhere 
he says ‘Why does there still remain any vestige of so barbarous a law in Europe, which is 
now so enlightened and so full of humanity’, The Law of Nations, book ii, § 112. The term 
‘enlightened’ is also frequently used in book i, chap. 11– 13, which discuss the duties of 
sovereigns to perfect the nation.
 68 A typical example: ‘How could it be conceived in an enlightened age, that it is lawful to 
punish with death a governor who has defended his town to the last extremity, or who, in 
a weak place, has had the courage to hold out against a royal army? In the last century, this 
notion still prevailed’. Vattel, The Law of Nations, book iii, § 143.
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account implies that the last 100 years had been a particularly productive peri-
od in the long- term moral history of mankind. The ‘sacred precepts of nature’ 
that obliged nations to cultivate friendship with others for their own long- term 
interest were not an inborn knowledge of moral psychology but were ‘for a 
long time unknown to nations’.69 The ancients had no notion of the duty they 
owed to other nations by virtue of common humanity but ‘at length the voice 
of nature came to be heard among civilized nations; they perceived that all 
men are brethren’.70 But as we saw above, not all nations had heard this voice 
of nature or acted upon it, which explains the moral diversity of mankind, with 
a fundamental fault- line between monsters and men.
Emer de Vattel’s fascination with Peter the Great can be explained in the 
context of his account of the moral development of nations. Peter the Great’s 
Russia served for him as an example that pointed to the possibility of acceler-
ating the historical process which in general seemed to be slow and gradual. 
Rather than reflecting a genuine and critical interest in what had actually hap-
pened in Russia during and after Peter the Great’s reign, the figure of the tsar 
was used by Vattel as a vehicle to emphasize the transformative capacity of a 
single monarch who had a proper understanding of enlightened self- interest. 
Therefore, Peter had a different and more ambiguous role than was typical of 
progressive sovereigns of Europe, such as Louis xiv, who could draw on the 
long- term development of polite customs and manners of their cultured na-
tions. The ambiguity of Peter’s role expressed Vattel’s dual concerns. On the 
one hand, his figure pointed to the need to adhere to the minimum stan dards 
of morality necessary for peaceful international coexistence. On the other 
hand, Peter’s rational and self- interested striving towards perfecting his nation 
was simultaneously a call to European sovereigns to act as agents of improve-
ment rather than falling back to former, false concepts of military honour and 
vainglory that could put national welfare and international order in danger.
In Vattel’s Law of Nations, Peter the Great is mentioned on ten occasions. We 
encounter the tsar who not only strives towards perfecting his nation but also 
appears to have achieved his goal of transforming Russia into a civilized coun-
try: ‘things have been greatly changed in Russia; a single reign – that of Peter 
the Great – has placed that vast empire in the rank of civilized nations’.71 What 
Vattel means by ‘civilized nations’ is not, however, immediately clear, as he 
does not offer any definitions in his treatise. By contrast, Wolff had discussed 
at some length the differences between nations at various levels of moral 
 69 Ibid., book ii, § 20.
 70 Ibid.
 71 ‘[…] a mis ce vaste Empire au rang des Etats civilisés’. Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, book ii, § 108.
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and civilizational development. Wolff distinguishes barbarous nations from 
‘ cultured and civilized’ ones: cultured nations (gentes doctae) are those who 
cultivate intellectual virtues, whereas civilized nations (gentes cultae) have 
‘civilized manners which conform to the standard of reason and politeness’ 
(quae cultis utitur moribus, seu ad normam rationis et suavitatem compositis).72 
The distinction was purely theoretical, though, because in actual practice the 
care for intellectual virtues tended to lead to the adoption of civilized customs 
and manners and, vice versa, a neglect of the development of the mind led to 
the domination of natural inclinations that was typical of barbarians: ‘If a cul-
tured nation is assumed to cultivate the intellectual virtues without restriction, 
it will scarcely happen that it will not at the same time become civilized, since 
civilized customs develop from intellectual virtues, just as the uncivilized from 
the natural inclinations, unrestricted by reason’.73
Although Vattel is not interested in these specific definitions, a Wolffian eu-
daimonist doctrine of happiness provides the background against which he 
develops his portrayal of Peter the Great. As Wolff had argued, the cultivation 
of intellectual virtues is not morally indifferent but nations ‘ought’ to become 
civilized and therefore ‘develop the mind by that training which destroys bar-
barism’.74 In practice it was the ruler of the state who was responsible for ‘per-
fecting and preserving his nation’.75 In contrast to the Hobbesian– Pufendorfian 
model of a relatively limited state where the sovereign functions primarily as 
a peacekeeper, Vattel follows Wolff in attributing a key role to the sovereign in 
‘procuring the true Happiness of the Nation’.76 This meant that the sovereign 
was responsible not only for providing material conditions for a happy life but 
also for directing the life projects of citizens beyond ‘earthly enjoyments’ to-
wards achieving ‘their own perfection’. An important means for doing so was 
the advancement of arts and sciences, which ‘enlighten the mind and soften 
the manners’.77 Vattel uses the opportunity to attack Rousseau’s sceptical 
theo ry of civilization, without mentioning the name of his opponent: ‘Let the 
friends of barbarism declaim against the sciences and polite arts; – let us, with-
out deigning to answer their vain reasonings, content ourselves with appealing 
 72 Wolff, Law of Nations, § 53.
 73 ‘Quoniam vero Gentes barbarae moribus incultis utuntur, ideo Genti barbarae opponitur 
Gens docta & culta’. Ibid.
 74 Ibid., § 55.
 75 Ibid., § 38.
 76 The chapter title of Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, book i, chap. xi:  ‘Second objet d’un bon 
Gouvernement, procurer la vraie félicité de la Nation’.
 77 Vattel, The Law of Nations, book i, § 110– 113.
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to experience’.78 The empirical proof is found when we compare ‘England, 
France, Holland, and several towns of Switzerland and Germany, to the many 
regions that lie buried in ignorance, and see where we can find the greater 
number of honest men and good citizens’.79 Peter the Great functions here as 
a prime example of the present, more enlightened age, when the utility and 
necessity of ‘literature and the polite arts’ are generally acknowledged:  ‘The 
immortal Peter I thought that without their assistance he could not entirely 
civilize Russia, and render it flourishing’.80
This grand design of perfecting through civilizing is also the leitmotiv in 
other instances where Peter is mentioned in the first book. For example, Vattel 
disapproves of the general idea that a sovereign can freely appoint his suc-
cessor, which for him is associated with a ‘shocking, improper and dangerous’ 
notion of a patrimonial state.81 But Peter’s example shows that there are ex-
ceptions to this rule because he nominated his wife to succeed him, not for his 
own private advantage but for the welfare of his empire: ‘He knew that heroine 
to be the most capable person to follow his views, and perfect the great things 
he had begun’. From this example Vattel derives a more general, albeit a  rather 
vaguely formulated rule in the spirit of enlightened despotism:  ‘If we often 
found on the throne such elevated minds as Peter’s, a nation could not adopt 
a wiser plan in order to ensure to itself a good government, than to intrust the 
prince, by a fundamental law, with the power of appointing his successor’.82
We see from these examples that Peter the Great was a rare, extraordinary 
figure whose grand design was to ‘entirely civilize Russia’ but it is not apparent 
yet, in the first book, whether and to what extent, in Vattel’s opinion, he had 
actually reached his goal. In the second and third book, which deal with na-
tions’ duties towards others and with the issue of war, it appears that his con-
cept of ‘civilized’ did not imply an advanced level of ‘politeness’ which would 
make Russia comparable with England, France or Switzerland, but rather the 
minimum level of morality to enable it to interact on an equal footing with 
 78 On Vattel’s criticism of Rousseau, see Béla Kapossy and Richard Whatmore, ‘Emer de 
Vattel’s Mélanges de littérature, de morale et de politique (1760)’, History of European 
Ideas 34:1 (2008), 77– 103; Béla Kapossy and Richard Whatmore, ‘Introduction’, in Vattel, 
The Law of Nations, ix- xx; Theodore Christov, Before Anarchy: Hobbes and His Critics in 
Modern International Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 238– 244.
 79 Vattel, The Law of Nations, book i, § 113.
 80 Ibid.
 81 Ibid., Preface, 13; book i, § 61, 68.
 82 Ibid., book i, § 70. Vattel adds here the example of the Roman emperors, whose right to 
appoint a successor by adoption produced ‘a series of sovereigns unequalled in history – 
Nerva, Trajan, Adrian, Antonius, Marcus Aurelius’.
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those states. Vattel frequently refers to ‘polite’ or ‘polished’ nations whose be-
haviour towards others expresses the ‘superior gentleness’ of his age.83 This 
is particularly visible in war, where the ‘polished nations of Europe’84 have 
adopted much higher moral standards than required by the stipulations of 
the necessary or voluntary law of nations. In the third book of the treatise, 
Vattel keeps heaping praise on European sovereigns for their customs of war-
fare, presenting thus a standard of humanity that all nations should aspire 
to: ‘At present the European nations generally carry on their wars with great 
moderation and generosity. These dispositions have given rise to several cus-
toms which are highly commendable, and frequently carried to the extreme 
of politeness’.85
The standard of civilization that Russia had achieved was on a completely 
different level. In fact, the congratulatory remark that praised Russia for reach-
ing the rank of civilized nations occurs in the context of the discussion of the 
duties towards foreigners. Vattel mentions here a particularly grievous viola-
tion of the rights of individuals, namely the imprisonment of shipwrecked for-
eigners. This had also been practised in Muscovy but, as we saw above, things 
had ‘greatly changed’ in Russia during Peter’s reign, which had placed the state 
‘in the rank of civilized nations’.86
All the other instances where Peter is discussed in the second and third 
books convey the same message:  Russia should not be considered a ‘mon-
strous’ nation because, thanks to Peter’s efforts, it fulfils the minimum stand-
ard of morality that allows other countries to apply the regime of voluntary law 
in their mutual relations. The fact that Peter just barely cleared the bar is most 
evident in Vattel’s discussion of the reasons for his war against Sweden and the 
manner in which he waged it. Peter had justified his war against Sweden with 
an offence against his dignity:
The czar Peter the First, in his manifesto against Sweden, complained 
that the cannon had not been fired on his passing at Riga. He might think 
it strange that they did not pay him this mark of respect, and he might 
complain of it; but to have made this the subject of a war, must have indi-
cated a preposterous prodigality of human blood.87
 83 See for ibid., book ii, § 139, § 169, book iii, § 65, § 148.
 84 Ibid., book iii, § 148; see also § 147, § 158.
 85 Ibid., § 158.
 86 Ibid., book ii, § 108.
 87 Ibid., § 48.
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The same manifesto illustrates for Vattel the distinction between real justifica-
tory reasons and mere pretexts:
The name of pretexts may likewise be applied to reasons which are, in 
themselves, true and well- founded, but, not being of sufficient impor-
tance for undertaking a war, are made use of only to cover ambitious 
views, or some other vicious motive. Such was the complaint of the czar 
Peter I  that sufficient honours had not been paid him on his passage 
through Riga.88
But, as indicated above, the mere fact that Peter presented such a manifesto is 
a sufficient sign that he is not a monstrous enemy of mankind.89
Peter the Great is contrasted simultaneously with polite nations and with 
monsters also in Vattel’s analysis of ‘the rights of nations in war’, which later 
became known as the ‘ius in bello’ doctrine. Charles xii, the king of Sweden, 
listened to the ‘voice of humanity’ when he released all Russian prisoners af-
ter the Battle of Narva of 1700. Peter, on the contrary, ‘still impressed with the 
apprehensions which his warlike and formidable opponents had excited in his 
mind, sent into Siberia all the prisoners he took at Pultowa’.90 Later the course 
of the war showed, however, that Peter’s action was more commendable: ‘the 
Swedish hero confided too much in his own generosity: the sagacious monarch 
of Russia united perhaps too great a degree of severity with his prudence: but 
necessity furnishes an apology for severity, or rather throws a veil over it alto-
gether’.91 Similarly, in the discussion of ravaging and burning in warfare, Vattel 
condemns ‘savage and monstrous excesses, when committed without necessi-
ty’, but Peter the Great is excused for similar behaviour because he was moti-
vated by legitimate concerns of self- preservation: ‘The czar Peter the Great, in 
his flight before the formidable Charles the Twelfth, ravaged an extent of above 
fourscore leagues of his own empire, in order to check the impetuosity of a tor-
rent which he was unable to withstand’.92 Vattel emphasizes that one should 
not too eagerly follow the example of the tsar, because these kinds of actions 
are only excusable in case of extreme necessity. A counter- example is provided 
 88 Ibid., book iii, § 32.
 89 For the historical context of the Russian manifesto, see Pärtel Piirimäe, ‘Russia, the Turks 
and Europe: Legitimations of War and the Formation of European Identity in the Early 
Modern Period’, Journal of Early Modern History 11:1/ 2 (2007), 63– 86.
 90 Vattel, The Law of Nations, book iii, § 32.
 91 Ibid.
 92 Ibid., § 167.
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by the French, who, ‘in the last century […] ravaged and burnt the Palatinate’ 
without necessity, which is why ‘all Europe resounded with invectives against 
such mode of waging war’.93 Like the case with tyrants who, as we saw, can 
appear anywhere in Europe, the apparently civilized states are not immune 
from monstrous war- mongers raising their heads either. Vattel stresses this 
possibility also in his discussion of monsters, who wage wars without reason or 
pretext. Historical ‘barbarians’ such as Tamerlane, Attila and Genghis- Khan,94 
‘who make war only for the pleasure of making it’, serve here as warning exam-
ples to the bellicose rulers of Europe:  ‘Such are, in polished ages and among 
the most civilized nations, those supposed heroes, whose supreme delight is a 
battle, and who make war from inclination purely, and not from love to their 
country’.95
Peter the Great is thus a liminal figure whose barbarous origins are un-
mistakable (a person tolerant of a ‘prodigality of human blood’) but who has 
passed the threshold of humanity, showing in the process what the essence 
of civility is all about. True civility consists in actions that are based on the 
proper understanding of national interest and motivated by a love of country, 
not by a false concept of glory attainable by military conquests, which is the 
main threat to European peace. These views of Vattel reflect a vision of histo-
ry that draws heavily on the philosophical histories of Voltaire. In his histo-
ries of Charles xii (Histoire de Charles XII, 1731) and Louis xiv (Siècle de Louis 
xiv, 1751), and especially in Essai sur les moeurs (1756) – a summary of world 
history and the narrative of the rise of Europe  – Voltaire envisions a march 
of humankind towards a better and more ‘polished’ world, under the leader-
ship of great legislating monarchs.96 Although Vattel never directly refers to 
Voltaire, his portrayal of Peter the Great is unmistakably Voltairean. Voltaire’s 
Histoire de l’Empire de Russie (1760– 1762), which recounts in great detail the 
progress achieved by Peter the Great, was published only after Vattel’s trea-
tise, but Voltaire’s fascination with the tsar is evident already in the history 
of Charles xii, where Peter emerges as the other main protagonist. As J.G.A. 
Pocock has shown, Voltaire wrote his histories as an exponent of a thèse royale, 
 93 Ibid.
 94 ‘Such were several German tribes mentioned by Tacitus […]. Such have been the Turks 
and other Tartars,  – Genghis- khan, Timur- Bec or Tamerlane, who, like Attila, were 
scourges employed by the wrath of heaven’. Ibid., § 34.
 95 Ibid.
 96 See Siofra Pierse, ‘Voltaire:  Polemical Possibilities of History’, in A Companion to 
Enlightenment Historiography, ed. Sophie Bourgault and Robert Sparling (Leiden:  Brill, 
2013), 153– 188; Karen O’Brien, Narratives of Enlightenment: Cosmopolitan History from 
Voltaire to Gibbon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 21– 55.
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as an admirer of enlightened absolutism who rejected the equation of absolute 
monarchy with despotism.97 Voltaire contrasted Louis xiv and Peter the Great, 
who were both legislators, with Charles xii, who was not: ‘The Swedish king is 
presented as a hero and nothing else, a conqueror whose conquests have no 
meaning, a figure contrasted with that of his adversary Tsar Peter, who is both 
a conqueror and a legislator’.98
The contrast can also be expressed in terms of different understandings of 
glory:  the Swedish king seeks it in personal heroism, while for Peter glory is 
intimately connected with the good of the nation. Vattel’s account of true glory 
draws on Wolff ’s understanding of the ‘true and enduring fame of a nation’,99 
which depends on its perfection: ‘True glory consists in the favourable opinion 
of men of wisdom and discernment: it is acquired by the virtues or good quali-
ties of the head and the heart, and by great actions which are the fruits of those 
virtues’.100 But Vattel’s attribution of these qualities and actions uncritically to 
Peter is almost certainly influenced by his reading of Voltaire, who was chiefly 
responsible for the construction of a mythological image of the tsar, who ‘re-
solved to be a man, to command men, and to create a new nation’.101
The fact that Voltaire’s juxtaposition of Peter, ‘who consulted only his in-
terest’, with Charles, who ‘had never given way to anything but his idea of re-
venge and glory’,102 stimulated Vattel’s ideas is further attested by a dialogue 
that Vattel published in 1760. Its title indicates both the main protagonists and 
the topic to be discussed: ‘Dialogue between Peter the Great and Charles xii of 
Sweden on the Glory of Conquerors’.103 Charles acts here as the spokesperson 
for military glory, which is acquired by great commanders in war. There is no 
doubt, however, that Vattel’s own views are represented by Peter, who contrasts 
 97 J.G.A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, Vol. 2: Narratives of Civil Government (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 75.
 98 Ibid., 76.
 99 Wolff, Law of Nations, § 49.
 100 Vattel, The Law of Nations, book i, § 187.
 101 Voltaire, The History of Charles the XIIth, King of Sweden, transl. W.S. Kenrick, to which 
is added, The Life of Peter the Great, transl. J.  Johnson (London, 1780), 18. Voltaire also 
describes Peter’s civilizing projects  – for example, ‘Sciences, which in other coun-
tries have been the slow product of so many ages, were, by his care and industry, 
imported into Russia, in full perfection’ (24). For Voltaire’s image of Peter, and the sub-
sequent Enlightenment debates, see also Reto Peter Speck, The History and Politics of 
Civilisation:  The Debate about Russia in French and German Historical Scholarship from 
Voltaire to Herder (PhD dissertation, Queen Mary University of London, 2010).
 102 Voltaire, The History of Charles the XIIth, King of Sweden, 147.
 103 Published originally in Mélanges de littérature, de morale et de politique, transl. and pub-
lished in English by B. Kapossy and R. Whatmore in Vattel, The Law of Nations, 80– 85.
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military feats with other human achievements: ‘There are other things which 
demand perhaps still greater ability, more sublime talents. Such are the en-
quiries of true philosophers, the deep designs of a legislator, the art of ruling’. 
Peter does not despise military glory, conceding that ‘the warrior whose brav-
ery and abilities have preserved the State, should be foremost in the esteem 
of men, but always behind wise and enlightened Princes who are in essence 
the Fathers of their Peoples and the benefactors of the human race’. This is 
how Vattel’s Peter sees his own historical role:  ‘I civilized a vast empire that 
I received from my Forefathers in a semi- barbarous state. […] While famous 
Warriors have often been the cause of the destruction of their native lands, 
I have been the creator of mine’.104
4 Conclusions
The philosophical histories of the Enlightenment investigated the driving 
 forces and obstacles on the road towards human progress, with a view to pro-
viding instruction and guiding political reform in the present.105 Voltaire of-
fered a specific view of the progress of mankind that was driven by enlightened 
monarchs with a proper understanding of national interest and true glory. The 
aim of this chapter was to show that Vattel’s normative account of the duties 
of nations to themselves and to other nations cannot be fully understood if 
we disregard the philosophical history- writing of the era. Vattel expressed 
the Voltairean thése royale most forcefully in his portrayal of Peter the Great. 
Peter appears as a demiurge who ‘created’ his native country by civilizing it, 
but also as a liminal figure who passed the boundary between monsters and 
men, delineating more precisely where this boundary was situated. The figure 
of Peter the Great underlines Vattel’s minimalist definition of the notion ‘civi-
lized’, and at the same time demonstrates that a minimum level of morality is 
the proper foundation for further development towards enlightened forms of 
self- interest, which gives hope for the moral advancement of humankind and 
for a reduction in violence in inter- state relations. By tracing the changes in 
European customs of warfare in the present ‘enlightened age’, Vattel posited 
a dynamic account of international law, the development of which did not 
ne cessarily depend on constant positive international legislation by treaty- 
making but which could, at least partly, rely on voluntary adherence to the 
 104 Ibid., 83– 85.
 105 Speck, The History and Politics of Civilisation, 12.
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laws of humanity that many European sovereigns were already undertaking. 
This progress was threatened not so much by non- European barbarians or sav-
ages as by the monsters from within Europe who were led astray by a false con-
cept of glory. Vattel’s unrealistically optimistic portrayal of Peter as a singularly 
virtuous ruler who leapfrogged the otherwise slow and cumbersome process 
of civilization, served as a moralistic reminder to other European sovereigns to 
seek glory not from military achievements but from leading the nation towards 
perfection and happiness.106
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 chapter 8
Guarantee and Intervention: the Assessment  
of the Peace of Westphalia in International  
Law and Politics by Authors of Natural Law  
and of Public Law, c. 1650– 1806
Patrick Milton
1 Introduction
The Peace of Westphalia is simultaneously one of the most thoroughly re-
searched, and one of the most misunderstood peace settlements of early mod-
ern history, albeit not by the same people. The fact that this paradox has per-
sisted in the last two decades, when detailed historical research into the treaties 
of Münster (Instrumentum Pacis Monasteriensis, ipm) and Osnabrück (Instru-
mentum Pacis Osnabrugensis, ipo)1 and their implications has been booming, 
is indicative of the tenacity of the myth surrounding Westphalia.2 Broadly, the 
misperception of Westphalia has two dimensions, the  international –  according 
to which the Peace inaugurated a new international ‘Westphalian system’ 
of equal, sovereign states which do not intervene in each other’s domes-
tic  affairs3  – and the internal- constitutional, which alleges that the treaties 
granted the princely territories (Imperial Estates) of the Holy Roman Empire 
 1 Both treaties together constituted the peace settlement that ended the Thirty Years’ War and 
were both signed at Münster on 24 October 1648. See ‘Internet- Portal “Westfälische Geschichte” ’, 
last modified 1 November 2004, http:// www.lwl.org/ westfaelische- geschichte/ portal/ Inter-
net/ finde/ langDatensatz.php?urlID=740&url_ tabelle=tab_ quelle (IPO), and http:// www.lwl 
.org/ westfaelische- geschichte/ portal/ Internet/ finde/ langDatensatz.php?urlID=741&url_ ta-
belle=tab_ quelle (IPM).
 2 For the latest research on Westphalia, see the literature cited in Niels F. May, Zwischen fürst-
licher Repräsentation und adliger Statuspolitik: Das Kongresszeremoniell bei den westfälischen 
Friedensverhandlungen (Ostfildern: Jan Thorbecke, 2016).
 3 E.g.: Arnaud Blin, 1648, la paix de Westphalie ou la naissance de l’Europe politique moderne 
(Bruxelles: Editions Complexe, 2006); Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas 
Shaped Modern International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 4, 
30, 85.
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sovereignty.4 To a greater or lesser degree, some or all of these ascriptions have 
been repeated by political scientists, historians, scholars of international law, 
and legal historians.5 A rich body of research into the treaties and the West-
phalian order, including several pieces which explicitly provide correctives to 
the misperceptions, have only partially dented the Westphalian myth.6
Many scholars have viewed natural law as an ideological tool used by 
early modern rulers in the pursuit of princely absolutism, which helped 
the territorial state to overcome corporate rights and customary practice,7 
in order to realize the potential of sovereignty and absolute authority sup-
posedly inherent in the Westphalian settlement. In the eighteenth- century 
Holy Roman Empire, natural law was used by the princes to legitimate the 
streamlining and centralizing of administration and law in the territories, 
which often included attempts to sweep away the customary privileges of 
the territorial estates, and to inhibit the possibilities of appeals to the higher 
 4 E.g.: Derek Beales, Joseph II, vol 2: Against the World, 1780– 1790 (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1987), 410– 411; Michael Hughes, Law and Politics in Eighteenth Century Germa-
ny: The Imperial Aulic Council in the Reign of Charles VI (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1988), 
16– 17; James Sheehan, German History, 1770– 1866 (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1989), 16; Al-
brecht Randelzhofer, Völkerrechtliche Aspekte des Heiligen Römischen Reiches nach 1648 (Ber-
lin: Duncker & Humblot, 1967), passim.
 5 E.g.: Gene Martin Lyons and Michael Mastanduno, Beyond Westphalia? State sovereignty and 
international intervention (Baltimore, MD:  Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Sasson 
Sofer, ‘The Prominence of Historical Demarcations: Westphalia and the New World Order,’ 
Diplomacy and Statecraft 20, no. 1 (2009): 1– 19.
 6 Derek Croxton, The Last Christian Peace:  The Congress of Westphalia as A  Baroque Event 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 351– 362; Heinz Duchhardt, ‘Das “Westfälische Sys-
tem”: Realität und Mythos,’ in Akteure der Außenbeziehungen. Netzwerke und Interkulturalität 
im Historischen Wandel, ed. Hillard von Thiessen and Christian Windler (Cologne: Böhlau, 
2010), 393– 402; Georg Schmidt, ‘Der Westfälische Frieden – eine neue Ordnung für das alte 
Reich?,’ in Wendemarken in der Deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte: Tagung der Vereinigung für 
Verfassungsgeschichte, ed. Reinhard Mußgnug (Berlin:  Duncker & Humblot, 1993), 45– 84; 
 Johannes Burkhardt, ‘Der Westfälische Friede und die Legende von der landesherrlichen 
Souveränität,’ in Landes- und Reichsgeschichte: Festschrift für Hansgeorg Molitor zum 65. Ge-
burtstag, ed. Jörg Engelbrecht and Stephan Laux (Bielefeld: Verlag für Regionalgeschichte, 
2004), 199– 220; Peter H.  Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy:  A New History of the Thirty Years War 
 (London: Penguin Books, 2010), 776– 778; Derek Croxton, ‘The peace of Westphalia of 1648 
and the origins of sovereignty,’ International History Review 21, no. 3 (1999): 569– 591; Andre-
as Osiander, ‘Sovereignty, international relations, and the Westphalian myth,’ International 
Organization 55, no. 2 (2001): 251– 287; Stephane Beaulac, ‘The Westphalian legal orthodoxy – 
myth or reality?,’ Journal of the History of International Law 2 (2000): 148– 177.
 7 E.g.: Michael Stolleis, Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts in Deutschland, vol. 1 (Munich: C.H. 
Beck, 1988), 276– 277; Notker Hammerstein, ‘Christian Thomasius,’ in Politische Theorien des 
17. und 18. Jahrhunderts: Staat und Politik in Deutschland, ed. Bernd Heidenreich and Gerhard 
Göhler (Darmstadt: Philipp von Zabern, 2011), 123– 124, 131.
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(extra- territorial) judicial tribunals of the Empire.8 While such arguments 
are illuminating with regard to strategies of princely rule and consolidation, 
they also sometimes perpetuate the misperceptions about the treaties of 
Westphalia.9 This is not surprising, however, in light of the interpretations 
of Westphalia by several early modern theorists of natural law themselves, 
such as Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Emer de Vattel and Gottfried Achenwall, 
who varyingly viewed Westphalia as a charter for absolutism within the 
framework of the Empire, or the final stage in the evolution of the Empire 
into an overarching system of sovereign states.10 Thus, the mythologizing of 
 8 Knud Haakonssen, ‘German natural law,’ in The Cambridge History of Eighteenth- Century 
Political Thought ed. Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), 257. It is worth pointing out that discourses grounded in natural law were also 
cited by these very same Imperial authorities (chiefly the Reichshofrat  – Imperial Aulic 
Council) when justifying punitive actions and interventions against princes for the pro-
tection of the traditional customary rights of their suppressed territorial estates and other 
subjects, as well as confessional and other rights confirmed at Westphalia, a fact which is in-
sufficiently appreciated in the existing literature. In suspending the Duke of Mecklenburg- 
Schwerin from power, for example, the Reichshofrat argued that the duke’s disregarding 
of the obligations detailed in treaties concluded by his predecessors with their subjects 
was contrary to natural law. See report by the Reichshofrat, 3 Nov. 1722: Haus- Hof- und 
Staatsarchiv, Vienna, rhr, Vota 34. See also Patrick Milton, ‘Intervening against tyrannical 
rule in the Holy Roman Empire during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,’ German 
History 33, no. 1 (2015): 1– 29, and Robert von Friedeburg, ‘Natural Jurisprudence, Argument 
from History and Constitutional Struggle in the Early Enlightenment: The Case of  Gottlieb 
Samuel Treuer’s Polemic Against Absolutism in 1719,’ in Early Modern Natural Law The-
ories:  Contexts and Strategies in the Early Enlightenment, ed. T.J. Hochstrasser and Peter 
Schröder (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 2003), 141– 168. Early modern practition-
ers and lawyers used an eclectic range of sometimes contradictory, sometimes reinforcing 
legal traditions in their argumentation: Haakonssen, ‘German natural law’, 259.
 9 E.g.: Detlef Döring, ‘Der Westfälische Frieden in der Sicht Samuel Pufendorfs,’ Zeitschrift 
Für Historische Forschung 26, no. 3 (1999): 353, 358.
 10 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe (Berlin:  Akademie der 
Wissenschaften der ddr, 1983), series iv, vol. 2, 21; Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, 
Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and 
Sovereigns, with Three Early Essays on the Origin and Nature of Natural Law and on Luxury, 
ed. Béa Kapossy and Richard Whatmore (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2008), 683– 684; 
Gottfried Achenwall, Geschichte der allgemeineren Europäischen Staatshändel des vorigen 
und ietzigen Jahrhunderts im Grundriss der europäischen Geschichte (Göttingen:  Verlag 
der Witwe Vandenhoeck, 1761), 84. Another aspect of the Westphalian myth that was 
already argued by some natural law writers is the notion that the treaties of 1648 granted 
Switzerland and the Dutch republic full independence from the Holy Roman Empire: e.g. 
Vattel, The Law of Nations, 212, 696. For a refutation thereof, see Siegrid Westphal, Der 
Westfälische Frieden (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2015), 105, and Croxton, Last Christian Peace, 
354– 356.
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Westphalia began much earlier than is often assumed, beginning soon after 
the conclusion of the Peace itself.11
This leads to the broader question of how Westphalia in all its aspects and 
implications was perceived and assessed by writers in the tradition of the law 
of nature and nations, and how this differed from the reception of Westphalia 
in other traditions of seventeenth- and eighteenth- century legal and political 
thought. The literature on the Peace of Westphalia, both before and after the 
end of the Empire and therefore the Westphalian treaties’ legal validity in 1806, 
is immense, and several modern scholars have addressed the question of the 
reception of the Peace among early modern jurists and philosophers.12 This 
literature mainly dealt with the confessional and constitutional stipulations of 
the ipo as applied within the Holy Roman Empire, and their implications in 
the subsequent 150 years.13 Therefore, and in light of the theme of this volume, 
this chapter will address the assessment of those parts of the treaties which re-
lated to the law of nations, along with their subsequent impact and relevance. 
The most salient among these, because of its innovative nature, is the institu-
tion of the mutual guarantee (ipo art. 17, § 4– 5; ipm § 115– 116), and the impact 
this had on external interventionism. The focus will be on the assessment of 
Westphalia by natural law theorists while writing in different capacities, as 
authors of works of constitutional law, history and political tracts, for exam-
ple. After all, these different roles were not as separate as modern scholarship 
might suggest, and such capacities often overlapped and intersected.14 Fur-
thermore, such texts were written through the lens of the authors’ respective 
 11 While Leibniz and Christian Thomasius had ascribed extensive authority approximating 
sovereignty to the Imperial Estates, most authors in the later eighteenth century, such 
as Johann Jacob Moser and Johann Stephan Pütter, no longer shared these interpreta-
tions: Bernd Mathias Kremer, ‘Die Interpretationen des Westfälischen Friedens durch die 
“Schulen” des Jus Publicum,’ in Der Westfälische Friede: Diplomatie, politische Zäsur, kul-
turelles Umfeld, Rezeptionsgeschichte, ed. Heinz Duchhardt (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 
1998), 766– 769.
 12 For works published between 1648 and 1996, see Heinz Duchhardt, Eva Ortlieb, and 
Matthias Schnettger, ed., Bibliographie zum Westfälischen Frieden (Münster: Aschendorff 
Verlag, 1996). For works published after 1996, see the literature cited in Westphal, Der 
Westfälische Frieden.
 13 Bernd Mathias Kremer, Der Westfälische Friede in der Deutung der Aufklärung. Zur 
Entwicklung des Verfassungsverständnisses im Hl. Röm. Reich Deutscher Nation vom 
Konfessionellen Zeitalter bis ins späte 18. Jahrhundert (Tübingen:  Mohr, 1989); Döring, 
‘Der Westfälische Frieden in der Sicht Samuel Pufendorfs’.
 14 Michael J. Seidler, ‘Introduction,’ in Samuel Pufendorf, An Introduction to the History of 
the Principal Kingdoms and States of Europe, ed. Michael J. Seidler, transl. Jodocus Crull 
(Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2013), ix.
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understandings of natural law. This will be accompanied by the assessment of 
Westphalia by those writing on matters of international law who hailed from 
different intellectual traditions, primarily jus publicum. After briefly outlining 
the influence of Westphalia on the development of positive treaty law in the 
European legal order, the chapter will proceed by analysing how Westphalia 
and its impact were assessed by scholars of natural law, the law of nations, 
and public law, in terms of a general appraisal of the Peace, and the mutual 
guarantee along with foreign interventionism, both in theory and in practice.
2 The Impact of the Treaties of Westphalia 
on the droit public de l’Europe
While the Peace of Westphalia in many ways simply reaffirmed and enshrined 
existing constitutional conditions domestically within the Holy Roman Em-
pire – albeit in an optimized and recalibrated set- up – internationally, it was 
one of the most innovative features in the law of nations. This is because the 
Westphalian treaties were simultaneously a fundamental constitutional law 
for the Empire, and an international peace treaty. As part of the measures de-
signed to secure the longevity of the peace in ipo art. 17, the various contract-
ing parties, including both sovereign European powers and the non- sovereign 
German Imperial Estates, mutually and reciprocally guaranteed the entire 
 settlement, which was also recognized as a basic law of the Empire. This tied 
German public law to the law of nations, by creating an international respon-
sibility to uphold the Imperial constitution, thereby arguably establishing a 
system of collective security for central Europe, which built on the ‘Eternal Ter-
ritorial Peace’ that had been declared for the Empire in 1495.15 The guarantee 
therefore anchored German constitutional law to a collective enforcement and 
compliance mechanism under international law. Westphalia thus added a fur-
ther level to the legal hierarchy of Imperial Estates subordinated to the Emper-
or and Empire, by bestowing the ‘external’ guarantors, France and Sweden,16  
 15 Siegrid Westphal, ‘Reichskammergericht, Reichshofrat und Landfrieden als Schutzinstitute 
der Reichsverfassung,’ in Schutz der Verfassung:  Normen, Institutionen, Höchst- und 
Verfassungsgerichte, ed. Thomas Simon and Johanne Kalwoda (Berlin:  Duncker & 
Humblot, 2014), 13– 37.
 16 They were not technically external guarantors, as this would imply that a non- signatory 
third party such as a mediator had taken responsibility for the guarantee, which was 
not the case at Westphalia, where France, Sweden, the Emperor and the princes were 
all signatories and guarantors. For simplicity’s sake, though, France and Sweden may be 
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with a duty and a right to uphold the Imperial constitution by intervening un-
der certain circumstances and after a specified sequence of steps. Other no-
table innovations which proved to be seminal in the law of nations include 
the instrument of the multilateral peace congress and the neutralization of 
religious canon law through the assertion of the primacy of secular law.17
Heinhard Steiger has demonstrated that the Peace of Westphalia cannot 
strictly be viewed as a fundamental basic law of Europe, contrary to the West-
phalian myth. However, it left a clear imprint on subsequent treaty law, as a 
basic instance that was continuously mentioned in subsequent treaty texts, as 
a ‘reference peace’, and as a basic order that subsequent treaties sought to re-
affirm and re- establish. It was specifically the guarantee which largely ensured 
that the treaties’ immediate legal effects had a broader European scope than 
the internal constitutional matters of the Empire with which the settlement 
primarily dealt. For it was precisely in their capacity as guarantors of the peace 
that the signatories referred back to Westphalia and its guarantee when they 
concluded subsequent peace treaties, especially those involving the Empire. 
This was the case, for example, in the treaties of Nijmegen in 1679, Ryswick in 
1697, Rastatt/ Baden in 1714, and Teschen in 1779. Through these references, the 
basic order of Westphalia was reaffirmed by its guarantors as the ‘foundation’, 
‘fundamental norm’ or ‘unchangeable basis’ of relations among them and with-
in the Empire, following a temporary suspension during the preceding wars.18
Taking a longer- term perspective, it can plausibly be argued that by placing 
the confessional rights of religious groups under international guarantee, the 
Peace of Westphalia and its guarantee clauses helped to establish the principle 
of internationally guaranteed minority rights as a part of the positive law of 
nations.19 This, together with the experience over many years of peaceful, le-
gally regulated confessional co- existence within the Empire, arguably contrib-
uted to the gradual emergence of the philosophical conviction of confessional 
toleration as a desirable principle within states,20 as well as minority rights 
referred to as external guarantors, as the confessional- constitutional clauses of the trea-
ties (which made up most of the treaty stipulations) applied only to the Holy Roman 
Empire.
 17 Heinhard Steiger, ‘Konkreter Friede und allgemeine Ordnung – zur rechtlichen Bedeu-
tung der Verträge vom 24. Oktober 1648,’ in 1648: Krieg und Frieden in Europa ed. Klaus 
Bußmann and Heinz Schilling (Munich: Bruckmann, 1998), 137– 146.
 18 Heinhard Steiger, ‘Der Westfälische Frieden – Grundgesetz für Europa?’ in Der Westfälische 
Friede, ed. Duchhardt, 33– 80. See also Croxton, Last Christian Peace, 363.
 19 Steiger, ‘Grundgesetz’, 78.
 20 This has recently been argued by Christoph Kampmann: ‘Der Festgeschnürte Frieden: Prof. 
Christoph Kampmann erklärt ein Meisterwerk der Diplomatie,’ P.M. History, May 2017.
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protection as a principle in the natural law- based jus gentium, beyond merely 
being partially stipulated by the Westphalian guarantee in the positive jus inter 
gentes.
3 ‘Palladium of the Empire’: Overall Assessments of Westphalia
The Peace of Westphalia seems to experience somewhat cyclical fortunes in 
its general appraisal by scholars and commentators over the years, which is 
remarkably reflective of the political context. While it was enthusiastically 
hailed as a milestone in early modern progressivism, and as a possible model 
for European unity around the turn of the millennium and specifically its 350th 
anniversary,21 more measured evaluations have been proposed in recent years, 
although the appraisal is still very positive. Going back a step in history, ver-
dicts in the nineteenth and the first two- thirds of the twentieth century were 
drastically different. Under the influence of the collapse of the Empire in 1806 
and the subsequent Prussian drive for a new kleindeutsch empire which would 
be capable of power accretion and power projection, Westphalia was seen to 
mark the death knell of the old Reich as a political entity, the only advantage 
of which was that its impotence allowed Brandenburg- Prussia to rise and fulfil 
the mission of true national unification.22 This negative view of Westphalia 
persisted remarkably long; as late as the 1950s and 1960s the standard mono-
graph on the Peace described it as a ‘national misfortune’ for the Germans.23
Going back further yet, jurists and writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century again viewed the treaties in a completely different, largely positive, 
light, although assessments naturally differed and changed over the course of 
those 150 years or so. The almost uniformly negative perceptions which began 
to set in very soon after 1806 are in striking contrast to the favourable assess-
ments of the Peace during the preceding period when the Empire still existed. 
However, it should be noted that, contrary to many accounts, the Peace was 
not unanimously eulogized over this period, even among Protestants. Bernd 
 21 E.g. Johannes Burkhardt, ‘Das größte Friedenswerk der Neuzeit,’ Geschichte in Wissenschaft 
und Unterricht 49 (1998): 592– 612.
 22 Johann Gustav Droysen, Geschichte der preußischen Politik, Dritter Teil, Der Staat des 
großen Kurfürsten, Erste Abteilung (Leipzig:  Verlag von Veit und Comp., 1861), 61, 75; 
Heinrich von Treitschke, Deutsche Geschichte im 19. Jahrhundert (Leipzig:  Verlag von 
S. Hirzel, 1879), vol. 1: 11– 12; Leopold von Ranke, Französische Geschichte, vornehmlich 
des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts, vol. 2 (Stuttgart: Koehler, 1954), 359– 360.
 23 Fritz Dickmann, Der Westfälische Frieden (Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 1959), 494– 495.
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Mathias Kremer has shown how shifting intellectual and normative currents 
affected scholars’ evaluations of Westphalia, often leading to negative evalua-
tions.24 A dissonance between the principles underpinning the treaty terms on 
the one hand, and subsequent prevailing mindsets and conceptions of consti-
tutional and religious issues on the other hand, inevitably resulted in academic 
and intellectual debate on the merits or demerits of the continued validity of 
the terms of the Peace.
As a peace treaty and a constitutional law, the Peace of Westphalia ostensi-
bly seems more relevant to public law than to natural law. Indeed, it immedi-
ately assumed a high priority in the curricula of teaching and training in public 
constitutional law,25 and according to the jurist Carl Friedrich Gerstlacher it 
virtually spawned a whole new jus publicum.26 Most of the writing on public 
law after 1648 dealt with questions which were all affected by a particular in-
terpretation of ipo.27 But the intellectual and philosophical shifts mentioned 
above were especially discernible among writers of natural law, as they were 
less concerned with compiling applicable positive law than with deriving un-
derlying principles from it, and vice versa.28 Earlier theorists felt the need to 
defend the legitimacy of a legal- political inter- confessional peace, which failed 
to achieve a theological union, and Hermann Conring went to lengths to refute 
the legitimacy of the Papal protest against the Peace, something which would 
have seemed superfluous to later eighteenth- century natural law theorists.29 
Westphalia’s granting of limited, graded toleration, while ostensibly retaining 
 24 Kremer, Westfälischer Friede.
 25 Konrad Repgen, ‘Der Westfälische Friede: Ereignis und Erinnerung,’ Historische Zeitschrift 
267 (1998): 615– 647.
 26 Carl Friedrich Gerstlacher, Corpus Juris germanici publici et privati: das ist der möglichst 
ächte Text der teutschen Reichsgeseze, Reichsordnungen und andrer Reichsnormalien; in 
sistematischer Ordnung mit Anmerkungen (Karlsruhe:  Schmieder, 1784), 310. Indeed, 
questions pertaining to the treaties gave rise to hundreds of mainly legal dissertations 
from the mid- seventeenth century: see Heinz Duchhardt, ‘Münster und der Westfälische 
Friede  – Kollektives Gedächtnis und Erinnerungskultur im Wandel der Zeit,’ in Der 
Westfälische Friede, ed. Duchhardt, 856– 857.
 27 Joachim Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), vol. 2, 170.
 28 The foremost jurist of German public law, Johann Jacob Moser, criticized the tendency, 
as he viewed it, of natural law scholars to interpret Westphalia as they would like to see 
it, and also rejected their generalizing statements on the Imperial constitution: Johann 
Jacob Moser, Neues deutsches Staatsrecht (Stuttgart: Mezler, 1766), vol. 1, 527.
 29 Kremer, Westfälischer Friede, 25– 27. However, in 1758 Vattel still described the Pope’s 
invalidation and statements of protest against Westphalia as ‘violations of the law of 
nations’, which ‘directly tended to destroy all the bands that could unite mankind, and to 
sap the foundations of their tranquillity’: Vattel, Law of Nations, 390.
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the Right of Reformation (jus reformandi), chimed with the conceptions of tol-
eration, and of church– state relations of natural law writers such as Samuel 
Pufendorf and Christian Thomasius, whose conceptions thereof were likely af-
fected by the experience of Westphalia and the modes of peaceful confessional 
co- existence introduced by the peace settlement.30
Most natural law theorists favoured the secularization of law and the de- 
sacralization of politics.31 However, the confessional terms of ipo were soon 
regarded, under the influence of the early Enlightenment, as resulting in an 
inadequate separation of church and state, and an excessively limited and 
circumscribed tolerance, by such writers as the Halle natural law professor 
Nicolaus Hieronymus Gundling, as well as by writers in the later Enlighten-
ment such as Renatus Karl von Senkenberg, in even more vociferous terms.32 
This applied in particular to the rigid freezing of confessional conditions and 
possessions according to the ‘normative year’, with the concomitant ability of 
princes to expel subjects whose religion had not been practised in the rele-
vant territory on 1 January 1624,33 and the continued ban on sects and reli-
gions other than Catholicism, Lutheranism and Calvinism. Senkenberg asked 
himself ‘whether these stipulations are still valid’ and answered: ‘let all these 
provisions of the Peace of Westphalia which run contrary to natural law be 
considered invalid! They have not yet been explicitly abrogated, but since the 
 30 Samuel Pufendorf, Of the Nature and Qualification of Religion in Reference to Civil Society, 
ed. Simone Zurbuchen, transl. Jodocus Crull (Indianapolis, IN:  Liberty Fund, 2002); 
Christian Thomasius, Essays on Church, State, and Politics, ed. Ian Hunter, Thomas 
Ahnert, and Frank Grunert (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2007). See also Döring, ‘Der 
Westfälische Frieden’, 361– 364.
 31 Stolleis, Geschichte des Öffentlichen Rechts, vol. 1, 273– 275; T.J. Hochstrasser, Natural Law 
Theories in the Early Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 108. 
This applies less to the ‘Christian natural lawyers’: see Hans- Peter Schneider, Justitia uni-
versalis. Quellenstudien zur Geschichte des ‘Christlichen Naturrechts’ bei Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz (Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1967).
 32 Renatus Karl von Senkenberg, Darstellung des Osnabrück- und Münsterischen oder soge-
nannten Westfälischen Friedens, nach der Ordnung der Artikel (Frankfurt am Main: Gebhard 
und Körber, 1804); Gérard Laudin, ‘Le Gründlicher Discours über den Westfälischen 
Frieden de Nicolaus Hieronymus Gundling,’ in De la guerre juste à la paix juste: Aspects 
confessionnels de la construction de la paix dans l’espace franco- allemand (XVIe– XXe siècle), 
ed. Jean- Paul Cahn, Françoise Knopper, and Anne- Marie Saint- Gille (Villeneuve d’Ascq: 
Presses Univ. du Septentrion, 2008), 136– 137. I am grateful to Prof. Anuschka Tischer for 
pointing out this article to me.
 33 By the early eighteenth century, examples of such expulsions, while legal according to 
ipo, nevertheless caused public outrage across the Empire and Europe. For the example 
of the expulsion of the Salzburg Protestants, see Andrew C. Thompson, Britain, Hanover 
and the Protestant Interest, 1688– 1756 (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2006), 152– 167.
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Peace of Westphalia the Empire has not had the audacity to attempt to prevent 
individual Imperial Estates from tolerating other religions and sects’.34
Apart from the implications of the external guarantee (see below), there 
was also some criticism among writers, of various legal and intellectual tradi-
tions, of the supposed opacity of many aspects of the treaties, although some 
believed that was deliberate, in order to facilitate adaptations to conditions in 
later periods, given that the Peace was proclaimed to be valid in perpetuity.35 
Indeed, some authors explicitly declared that it was necessary to continually 
re- interpret the Peace in line with shifting circumstances, and that the ambi-
guities of the treaties permitted this.36 An area of disagreement surrounding 
the Peace related to differing interpretations of its specific role in the mutu-
al protection of individual and corporate rights, which, along with common 
defence, was arguably the raison d’être of the Empire.37 According to many 
writers of natural law, Westphalia chiefly enshrined the corporate rights of the 
Imperial Estates, whereas writers of the jus publicum generally emphasized the 
importance of upholding the corporate rights of mediate subjects, i.e. terri-
torial estates and other subjects. They therefore placed greater emphasis on 
Westphalia’s role in safeguarding individual rights of subjects, as well as its role 
in regulating and strengthening the broader Imperial structure as a restraint 
against princely absolutism in defence of mediate subjects.38
 34 Senkenberg, Darstellung, 146.: ‘ob diese Verordnung noch gelte? Ich antworte: möchten 
doch alle, die viele dem Naturrecht so sehr zuwider lauffende Verordnungen des W. Fr. so 
wenig gelten wie diese! Sie zwar noch nirgends ausdrücklich abgeschafft, aber man hat 
doch seit dem W. Fr. von Seite des ganzen Reichs einzelnen Reichsständen, nichts in den 
Weg zu legen sich unterstanden, wann Sie in ihren Landen andere Religionen und Sekten 
[…] zu toleriren, für gut befunden’. This is not entirely correct though. For an example of 
an Imperial prince being fined by the judicial tribunals of the Empire for tolerating sects, 
see Heinhard Steiger, ‘Die Gewährung der Gewissensfreiheit durch Ernst Casimir von 
Ysenburg- Büdingen im Jahre 1712,’ in Festschrift für Walter Mallmann, ed. Otto Triffterer 
and Friedrich von Zezschwitz (Baden- Baden: Nomos, 1978), 293– 318. See also Kremer, 
Westfälischer Friede, 132– 152.
 35 Kremer, Westfälischer Friede, 3.
 36 Johann Friedrich Vetter, Rechtliches Bedenken über drey wichtige, die Religions- Freyheit in 
dem Heiligen Römisch- Teutschen Reiche betreffende, Fragen; Aus dem Instrumento Pacis 
Westphalicae, und zwar dessen V. und VII. Articul, erwiesen u. abgefasset (Wetzlar: Nikolaus 
Ludwig Winkler, 1752), prologue.
 37 Peter H. Wilson, War, State and Society in Württemberg, 1677– 1793 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 19; idem., The Holy Roman Empire. A Thousand Years of Europe’s 
History (London: Penguin Books, 2016), passim.
 38 Johann Jacob Moser, Neues Deutsches Staatsrecht, 14: 257– 258, 263– 264; Johann Stephan 
Pütter, Historische Entwicklung der heutigen Staatsverfassung des teutschen Reiches, vol. 
3 (Göttingen:  Vandenhoeck, 1788), 234– 239; Karl Friedrich Häberlin, Handbuch des 
Teutschen Staatsrechts, vol. 3 (Berlin: Vieweg, 1797), 423–4 25.
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For the natural law writers who advocated a maximum degree of state au-
thority on the level of the territories, a perspective also shared by writers in 
the tradition of jus publicum universale, such as Justus Henning Böhmer,39 
the Peace was advantageous and progressive for precisely the same  – albeit 
largely mythical – reasons that the kleindeutsch nationalist historians of the 
nineteenth century reprobated it: the supposed sovereignty (or, approximate 
sovereignty) of the German princes. Paradoxically, this was also at the heart of 
an unwelcome effect of the Peace, which was sometimes commented upon, 
namely the effects it had on the disunity of the Empire.40 It was the same argu-
ment of princely quasi- sovereignty supposedly derived from Westphalia which 
led Friedrich Karl von Moser, rather exceptionally among constitutional jurists 
of the later Empire, to provide a markedly negative interpretation of the effects 
of the Peace of Westphalia. As a champion of subjects’ rights against prince-
ly despotism, the younger Moser was well known for his crusades against the 
tyrannical tendencies of some of the German princes. In an example of 
the early mythologizing of Westphalia mentioned above, Moser argued that 
the effects of Westphalia were regrettable because they greatly empowered the 
princes and thereby weakened the subjects, by extending the former’s author-
ity and prerogatives.41 Commenting on ‘the increasingly arbitrary power of the 
princes and lords over their largely very pathetic subjects’, he wrote in 1761 that 
‘the Peace of Westphalia and the Imperial capitulations of election are […] 
the foundation of the greatness of the princes, but simultaneously also of the 
misfortune of their subjects’.42
 39 Justus Henning Böhmer, Introductio in jus publicum universale, ex genuinis juris naturae 
principiis deductum (Halae Magdeburgicae: Orphanotropheum, 1710).
 40 Hermann Conring, De pace perpetua inter Imperii Germanici Ordines religione dissidentes 
servanda Libelli Duo (Helmstedt:  Mullerus, 1657), prologue; Samuel Pufendorf, The 
Present State of Germany, ed. Michael J.  Seidler, transl. Edmund Bohun (Indianapolis, 
IN:  Liberty Fund, 2007), 205– 206; Johann Jacob Schmauss, Kurtzer Begriff der Reichs- 
Historie, in diner accuraten chronologischen Ordnung (Leipzig:  Verlag Johann Ludwig 
Gleditsch, 1720), 689– 721.
 41 Such arguments made their way into twentieth- century historians’ assessments of the 
state- focussed and authoritarian nature of conceptions of ‘German Liberties’:  Leonard 
Krieger, The German Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition (Chicago, IL: University 
of Chicago Press, 1957), 5– 7. More recently, Georg Schmidt has provided a corrective to 
this portrayal: Georg Schmidt, ‘Die Idee “deutsche Freiheit”: Eine Leitvorstellung der poli-
tischen Kultur des Alten Reiches,’ in Kollektive Freiheitsvorstellungen im frühneuzeitlichen 
Europa (1400– 1850), ed. Georg Schmidt, Martin v. Gelderen, and Christopher Smigula 
(Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2006), 159– 189.
 42 Friedrich Karl von Moser, Beherzigungen (Frankfurt am Main:  Verlag der Knoch- und 
Esslingerschen Buchhandlung, 1762), 586:  ‘[…] der zunehmenden willkührlichen 
Gewalt der Fürsten und Herren über ihre größten Theils sehr bedauerns- würdige 
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But such debates and criticisms should not detract from the fact that there 
was general agreement in this period that the treaties were a boon overall, in 
that they had successfully settled, in a more or less satisfactory manner, all of the 
main areas of conflict contributing to the Thirty Years’ War.43 Apart from some 
Catholic commentators,44 there was no principled rejection of the overall legit-
imacy of Westphalia, a view that predominated in the nineteenth century. Par-
ticularly among Protestants, it was viewed as a laudable milestone which secured 
the rights of their confession and safeguarded peaceful co- existence, while also 
confirming princely prerogatives and therefore ‘German liberties’. It was seen by 
jurists of public law, such as Johann Jacob Moser and Johann Stephan Pütter, as 
the most important constitutional law of a praiseworthy legal- political structure 
of the Empire.45 Johann Jacob Schmauss, a professor of history and the law of 
nature and nations at Göttingen, wrote in 1766 that ‘the Peace of Westphalia is 
the bond which upholds the calm of the German Empire and the friendship be-
tween Catholics and Protestants’.46 The historian and jurist Johann Ehrenfried 
Zschackwitz described the Peace as ‘the fundamental pillar of the well- being of 
the German state’, although he recognized that it did not succeed in overcoming 
confessional tensions, which were again increasing at the time he was writing.47 
He later referred to Westphalia not only as the most important fundamental law 
of the Empire, but also as the ‘guiding star’ of its governance.48 Several commen-
tators, such as Gundling, routinely described Westphalia as the ‘palladium’ of 
the Empire.49 He was not alone in believing that Westphalia formed the basis 
Unterthanen  […] Der Westphälische Frieden und die Kaiserliche Wahl- Capitulationen 
seynd der Grund […] zu der Größe der Fürsten, zugleich aber auch der Grund von dem 
Unglück ihrer Unterthanen’.
 43 The highly positive assessment of the Peace in Zedler’s encyclopaedia entry of 1748 
exemplifies this attitude at the time of Westphalia’s 100th anniversary: Johann Heinrich 
Zedler, Grosses vollständiges Universal- Lexicon aller Wissenschafften und Künste, vol. 55 
(Halle and Leipzig: J.H. Zedler, 1748), 932– 936.
 44 Kremer, Westfälischer Friede, 1.
 45 Pütter, Historische Entwicklung der heutigen Staatsverfassung des Teutschen Reiches, 
3: passim; Johann Moser, Neues teutsches Staatsrecht, 1: passim.
 46 Johann Jacob Schmauss, Academische Reden und Vorlesungen über das teutsche Staatsrecht 
(Lemgo:  Meyersche Buchhandlung, 1766), 24:  ‘Der Westphälische Friede ist das Band, 
wodurch die Ruhe des teutschen Reichs und die Freundschaft zwischen Catholischen 
und Protestanten aufrecht erhalten wird’.
 47 Johann Ehrenfried Zschackwitz, Einleitung zu dem Teutschen Jure Publico, oder Staats- 
Rechte (Leipzig: J.F. Braun, 1710), 96– 98.
 48 Johann Ehrenfried Zschackwitz, Geschichtsmäßige und in der Reichspraxi gegründete 
Erläuterung des westfälsichen Friedens (Halle, 1741), 2.
 49 Nicolaus Hieronymus Gundling, Gründlicher Discours über den Westphälischen Frieden 
(Frankfurt and Leipzig: W.L. Spring, 1736), 6.
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not only of a German Imperial order, but also of a European international or-
der. Similar views were held by Heinrich von Cocceji, a professor of the law of 
nature and nations at Heidelberg, as well as writers who expounded the positive 
European law of nations based on treaties, such as the Abbé de Mably, although 
not everyone agreed with this.50 Jean- Jacques Rousseau famously regarded the 
treaties of Westphalia as the basis of the European political system and argued 
that preservation of the order it had created for the Empire was crucial for the 
maintenance of the wider balance of power in Europe.51
Whether or not Westphalia was seen as the foundation of a broader Euro-
pean order, many writers did grasp the crucial significance of the treaties for 
the development of international law. The inclusion of the ipo and ipm in 
published collections of treaties and the popularity of compendia of original 
sources related to the congress of Westphalia in the early eighteenth century to 
some extent reflects this.52 Zschackwitz considered the securing of the peace 
through a mutual guarantee of contracting parties particularly noteworthy, 
while others commented that the multilateral congress at Westphalia was an 
influential model for subsequent peace- making.53 Gerstlacher argued that it 
was the combination of constitutional law and the law of nations that made 
Westphalia unique and so important.54
In light of this immense significance accorded to Westphalia by all writers, 
it is unsurprising that many natural law authors viewed it as a constitut ional 
order that needed to be defended, and several writers, such as Pufendorf 
and Leibniz, placed it at the heart of their reform plans for the Holy Roman 
 50 Heinrich von Cocceji, Juris Publici Prudentia Compendio exhibita (Frankfurt am Main: 
J. Schrey & Heredum H.J. Meyeri, 1695), 8– 60.
 51 Jean- Jacques Rousseau, The Political Writings, ed. Charles E.  Vaughan (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1915), vol. 2, 372: ‘Malgré les défauts de cette constitution 
de l’Empire, il est certain que, tant qu’elle subsistera, jamais l’équilibre de l’Europe ne 
sera rompu, qu’aucun potentate n’aura à craindre d’être détrôné par un autre, et que le 
traité de Westphalie sera peut- être à jamais parmi nous la base du système politique. 
Ainsi le droit public, que les Allemands étudient avec tant de soin, est encore plus impor-
tant qu’ils ne pensent, et n’est pas seulement le droit public germanique, mais, à certains 
égards, celui de toute l’Europe’.
 52 Benjamin Durst, Archive des Völkerrechts:  Gedruckte Sammlungen europäischer 
Mächteverträge in der frühen Neuzeit (Berlin:  De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2016); Antje 
Ochsmann, ‘Johann Gottfried von Meiern und die “Acta pacis Westphalicae publica”,’ in 
Der Westfälische Friede, ed. Duchhardt, 779– 803.
 53 Zschackwitz, Einleitung zu dem Teutschen Jure Publico, 99; Gottfried Ferdinand von 
Buckisch und Loewenfels, Observationes Historico- Politicae in Instrumentum Pacis 
Osnabrugo- Westphalicum (Frankfurt am Main, Leipzig: J.N. Andreae, 1722).
 54 Carl Friedrich Gerstlacher, Corpus Juris Germanici Publici et Privati (Karlsruhe: Schmieder, 
1784), 310.
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Empire.55 The Abbé de Saint- Pierre went further in the early eighteenth cen-
tury and saw in the post- Westphalian Holy Roman Empire a model for a per-
petual peace in Europe, arguing that European states ought to surrender their 
sovereignty to an international organization in a fashion somewhat analogous 
to the Imperial Estates’ lack of sovereignty and dependence on the Empire.56
4 Interventions and Guarantees in the Law of Nature
By including the ‘foreign crowns’ France and Sweden in the mutual guarantee 
of Westphalia, a right to intervene for the protection of constitutional and re-
ligious rights within another state was enshrined in positive treaty law, which 
was unprecedented in the law of nations.57 As Westphalia was a fundamental 
constitutional law, the guarantee theoretically applied to all manner of legal 
rights, arrangements and privileges within the rather protean Imperial con-
stitution. Because this extended to a variety of mainly confessional rights en-
joyed by subjects, the guarantee of the actual Peace of Westphalia, as opposed 
to the ‘Westphalia’ of myth, therefore legalized interventions for the protection 
of the legal rights of subjects in a foreign state.58
 55 Michael J. Seidler, ‘Introduction,’ in Pufendorf, Present State of Germany, xvi, xix. Leibniz 
supported the elevation of Hanover to the 9th electorate on the basis that it would 
strengthen the Westphalian order by adding a militarily powerful and Protestant prince to 
the select group of electors. He believed this would improve the political and confessional 
balance at the heart of Westphalia. He repeated this argument following the conversion 
of the Saxon elector in 1697:  Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, series iv, vol. 5, 
xxvii; vol. 5, no. 22; vol. 6, no. 11. For his reform plans see ibid., vol. 1, no.7.
 56 Peter Schröder, ‘The Holy Roman Empire as a model for Saint- Pierre’s Projet pour  rendre 
la paix perpétuelle en Europe,’ in The Holy Roman Empire, 1495– 1806:  A European 
Perspective, ed. Peter H. Wilson and R.J.W. Evans (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 35– 50.
 57 For the use of legal and other argumentation in governments’ justifications of interventions 
in other states’ domestic affairs, see Anuschka Tischer, ‘Grenzen der Souveränität: Beispiele 
zur Begründung gewaltsamer Einmischung in “innere Angelegenheiten” in der Frühen 
Neuzeit,’ Historisches Jahrbuch 131 (2011): 41– 64.
 58 See the following works on the guarantee:  Hans Wehberg, ‘Die Schieds- und 
Garantieklausel der Friedensverträge von Münster und Osnabrück,’ Die Friedens- Warte 
48, no. 6 (1948): 281– 289; Heinz Duchhardt, ‘Friedenssicherung im Jahrhundert nach 
dem Westfälischen Frieden,’ in Friedenssicherung. Bd. 3: Historische, politikwissenschaft-
liche und militärische Perspektiven, ed. Manfred Spieker, vol. 3 (Münster:  Regensberg, 
1989), 11– 18; Maria- Elisabeth Brunert, ‘Friedenssicherung als Beratungsthema 
der  protestantischen Reichsstände in der Anfangsphase des westfälischen 
Friedenskongresses,’ in Frieden und Friedenssicherung in der Frühen Neuzeit: Das Heilige 
Römische Reich und Europa ed. Guido Braun and Arno Strohmeyer (Münster: Aschendorff 
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The two relevant theoretical components of the Westphalian guarantee were 
intervention for the protection of another prince’s subjects, and safeguards of 
treaties of peace and alliance. Both topics received attention from natural law 
theorists. There was a contextual shift in the writings on intervention over the 
course of the early modern period. Sixteenth- century writers such as Francisco 
de Vitoria and the Spanish Scholastics discussed the legitimacy of intervention 
in the context of the European colonization of the New World.59 This colonial 
element was still present in the theories of some seventeenth- century writers, 
such as Hugo Grotius, and to a lesser extent Pufendorf, but the focus now 
 shifted towards a consideration of interventions within Europe, reflecting a 
greater concern with the European context by natural law theorists.60
While Thomas Hobbes argued that such interventions for the protection 
of another prince’s subjects were impermissible,61 Grotius was much more 
accommodating to the notion. Building on previous arguments by Jean Bo-
din and Alberico Gentili, he argued that sovereign rulers could intervene for 
the protection of foreign subjects in order to punish egregious violations of 
the law of nature. Subjects themselves had no right of resistance against their 
own rulers, and therefore foreign sovereigns were entitled to act defensively 
on their behalf. Subjects’ lack of a right of resistance, sovereignty, and protec-
tive intervention therefore reinforced one another.62 According to Pufendorf ’s 
Verlag, 2013), 229– 258; Guido Braun, ‘Die französische Diplomatie und das Problem 
der Friedenssicherung auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongress,’ in Assecuratio Pacis: 
Französische Konzeptionen von Friedenssicherung und Friedensgarantie 1648– 1815, ed. 
Guido Braun (Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 2011), 67– 130.
 59 William Bain, ‘Vitoria: the laws of war, saving the innocent, and the image of God’, in Just 
and Unjust Military Intervention. European Thinkers from Vitoria to Mill, ed. Stefano Recchia 
and Jennifer M. Welsh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 70– 95; Simone 
Zurbuchen, ‘Eigenes und Fremdes im Völkerrecht der Frühen Neuzeit:  Rechtfertigung 
und Kritik der Unterwerfung der Völker der Neuen Welt’, in Völkerrechtsphilosophie 
der Frühaufklärung, ed. Tilmann Altwickler, Francis Cheneval and Oliver Diggelmann 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015), 177– 197.
 60 Emmanuelle Jouannet, ‘Des origines coloniales du droit international: à propos du droit des 
gens moderne au 18ème siècle’, in The Roots of International Law – Les fondements du droit 
international, ed. Pierre- Marie Dupuy and Vincent Chetail (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 649– 671.
 61 See Jonathan Havercroft, ‘Was Westphalia “all that”? Hobbes, Bellarmine, and the norm 
of non- intervention,’ Global Constitutionalism 1, no.  1 (2012):  120– 140; Richard Tuck, 
‘Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf on humanitarian intervention’, in Just and Unjust Military 
Intervention, ed. Recchia and Welsh, 107– 110.
 62 Christoph Kampmann, ‘Das “Westfälische System”, die Glorreiche Revolution und die 
Interventionsproblematik’, Historisches Jahrbuch 131 (2011): 65– 92, at 69 n. 1 1; G.P. van 
Nifterik, ‘Religious and humanitarian intervention in sixteenth and early seventeenth 
century legal thought,’ in Sovereignty and the Law of Nations (16th– 18th Centuries), ed. 
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conception of natural law, the right to intervene was more restricted. It could 
take place only if specifically requested by the oppressed subjects, and only if 
they had a legal right of resistance according to the constitutional set- up of the 
target state.63 Christian Wolff ’s conception of natural law was similarly disin-
clined towards intervention: ‘to interfere in the government of another […] is 
opposed to the natural liberty of nations’.64 However, Wolff ’s theory did hy-
pothetically permit collective intervention if it was carried out by a so- called 
civitas maxima. He conceived of this fictitious body as a commonwealth, or 
republic, encompassing a series of smaller associations and political units. 
On contractarian grounds, collective intervention by this overarching body 
could be legitimate, since the member states were joined to this larger unit 
and committed themselves to its laws.65 It is possible that Wolff was influenced 
by the Holy Roman Empire in devising this theory, as internal interventions 
within the Empire, mandated by the supreme judicial tribunals on the Emper-
or’s authority against the component territories (Imperial Estates), was legally 
possible and occurred frequently. Far from curtailing such internal interven-
tions, Westphalia strengthened them by increasing the scope of the basis upon 
which interventions could take place (chiefly by adding a catalogue of en-
shrined confessional rights), and by enhancing the legitimacy of the interven-
ing supreme courts through the imposition of confessional parity onto their 
personnel composition.66 Vattel’s conception of intervention was even more 
restrictive.67 According to his theory, the international system should consist 
of legally equal and politically independent sovereign states, which adhere to 
Randall Lesaffer and Georges Macours (Brussels: Peeters Publishers, 2006), 35– 60; Tuck, 
‘Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf on humanitarian intervention’.
 63 Tuck, ‘Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf on humanitarian intervention’, 110– 112.
 64 Quoted in Jennifer Pitts, ‘Intervention and sovereign equality:  legacies of Vattel’, in Just 
and Unjust Military Intervention, ed. Recchia and Welsh, 143. See also Richard Tuck, The 
Rights of War and Peace: Political Theory and the International Order from Grotius to Kant 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 189– 190.
 65 Pitts, ‘Intervention and sovereign equality: legacies of Vattel’, 142, 144– 145.
 66 Brendan Simms, ‘A false principle in the Law of Nations’:  Burke, state sovereignty, 
[German] liberty, and intervention in the age of Westphalia,’ in Humanitarian 
Intervention:  A History, ed. Brendan Simms and D.J.B. Trim (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 92; Michael Geyer, ‘Humanitarianism and human rights: A trou-
bled rapport,’ in The Emergence of Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas and Practice from the 
Nineteenth Century to the Present, ed. Fabian Klose (Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press, 2016), 31– 55; Milton, ‘Intervening against tyrannical rule’.
 67 Simone Zurbuchen, ‘Vattel’s “Law of Nations” and the Principle of Non- Intervention’, 
Grotiania 31 (2010):  69– 84; idem., ‘Emer de Vattel on the Society of Nations and the 
Political System of Europe’, in System, Order, and International Law. The Early History 
of International Legal Thought from Machiavelli to Hegel, ed. Stefan Kadelbach, Thomas 
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the attendant rule of non- intervention in each other’s domestic affairs. Inter-
vention was allowed only under extraordinary conditions, such as to aid tyran-
nized subjects who appeal for help and who are actually already in a state of 
revolt, or in the context of a civil war when the state has collapsed into warring 
factions, in which case the factions have in effect become distinct polities and 
it is therefore not truly an intervention within a state.68
These exceptions on the part of Vattel and Wolff notwithstanding, the fact 
that theories of natural law and the law of nations appear to become increas-
ingly anti- interventionist after 1648 seems to lend credence to a key aspect of 
the ‘Westphalian system’. However, as Jennifer Pitts and Brendan Simms have 
pointed out, these theories were an ideal- type normative narrative, rather than 
an accurate depiction of post- Westphalian state practice. Nor did they accu-
rately reflect the positive European law of nations, at least with regard to the 
possibility of French and Swedish intervention in the Empire. Pitts has there-
fore astutely remarked that the ‘Westphalian’ model of equal, independent 
sovereign states should more accurately be termed a ‘Vatellian’ model.69
According to Richard Tuck, Pufendorf’s restrictive approach to intervention 
was influenced by his personal experiences of the Thirty Years’ War, with its dest-
abilizing foreign interventions, and he was loath to see the carefully constructed 
arrangements of Westphalia upset by a new round of interventionism. However, 
Louis xiv’s revocation of the edict of Nantes in 1685 led Pufendorf to reconsider 
his views and he began to argue for a more expansive possibility to intervene 
in defence of subjects’ rights.70 Here one can discern a likely influence of West-
phalia, and in particular its juridification of intervention and of toleration, on 
Pufendorf’s theory of the law of nations with regard to intervention. According 
to his theory, intervention was permissible only if the legal basis for it existed, 
which is exactly what Westphalia furnished for the first time. However, it pro-
vided for the possibility only of a one- sided intervention, by the external guar-
antors France and Sweden into Germany. Faced with the crisis of the expulsion 
of the French Protestants, Pufendorf expanded his conception of intervention, 
on the basis of the principles underpinning Westphalian guarantor interven-
tion, by arguing that the Huguenots legally possessed the liberty of religion ‘in 
their own Right’, on the basis of the edict of Nantes, just as the three recognized 
Kleinlein, and David Roth- Isigkeit (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2017), 263– 281, 
at 266–26 7.
 68 Pitts, ‘Intervention and sovereign equality: legacies of Vattel,’ 146– 148; Tuck, The Rights of 
War and Peace, 193– 194.
 69 Pitts, ‘Intervention and sovereign equality:  legacies of Vattel’, 134– 135; Simms, ‘A false 
principle in the Law of Nations,’ 91.
 70 Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace, 160– 163.
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confessions possessed it on the basis of ipo.71 If the adherents of the three rec-
ognized confessions in the Empire were denied this right, then the guarantee of 
Westphalia could be activated, leading eventually to an intervention. Pufendorf 
was now arguing that an intervention against France was also permissible, on 
the similar basis of legal rights of toleration being denied in a tyrannical fashion: 
A Prince, who troubles his faithful Subjects merely upon the score of Re-
ligion, commits a gross Error […] as for such Princes and States, as have 
shaken off the Yoke of Popish Slavery, if they seriously reflect, how their 
fellow- Protestants are persecuted, and in what barbarous manner they 
are treated, will, questionless […] take such measures, as may be most 
convenient for to secure themselves from so imminent a Danger.72
Discussions of guarantees of treaties also appeared in the sections of their works 
which natural law scholars devoted to the law of nations. Here the influence of 
Westphalia seems not to have been particularly great, as the innovative char-
acter of the guarantees of 1648 – the fact that they were mutually guaranteed 
by the contracting parties themselves and included lower- ranking guarantors, 
i.e. Imperial Estates – usually did not make its way into the theoretical works. 
Pufendorf and Wolff both described the older types of guarantees, whereby 
third parties, usually mediators, or higher- ranking persons such as the Pope, 
assume the responsibility of a guarantee. Pufendorf wrote ‘when a Peace is mu-
tually ratified by each Sovereign Governour […] it is usual […] for some others 
oftentimes, especially amongst the Assistants at the Treaty, to undertake the 
Guaranty of the same, with Promises of Aid to him who ever is injured by the 
other’.73 Wolff similarly described the guarantee as commonly being taken over 
by ‘a third party’.74 Vattel, however, did refer to the possibility of the contracting 
parties of a peace treaty guaranteeing their own peace reciprocally, in a manner 
that first occurred at Münster, without however mentioning Westphalia. Possi-
bly influenced by the policies of Louis xiv towards the Empire in the later sev-
enteenth century, Vattel warned that external guarantors cannot execute treaty 
 71 Simone Zurbuchen, ‘Introduction,’ in Samuel Pufendorf, The Divine Feudal Law:  Or, 
Covenants with Mankind, Represented, ed. Simone Zurbuchen, transl. Theophilus Dorrington 
(Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2002), xi.
 72 Pufendorf, Of the Nature and Qualification of Religion, 120– 121.
 73 Samuel Pufendorf, The Whole Duty of Man According to the Law of Nature, ed. Ian Hunter 
and David Saunders, transl. Andrew Tooke (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2003), 244.
 74 Christian Wolff, Grundsätze des Natur- und Völckerrechts, worinn alle Verbindlichkeiten 
und alle Rechte aus der Natur des Menschen in einem beständigen Zusammenhange herge-
leitet werden (Halle: Renger, 1754), 837– 838.
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terms on their own accord without being called upon by the signatories, ‘lest, 
under colour of being a guarantee, a powerful sovereign should render himself 
the arbiter of the affairs of his neighbours, and pretend to give them laws’.75
5 The Mutual Guarantee of Westphalia in the Law of Nations  
and International Politics: Perceptions by 
Natural Law and Public Law Writers
How did natural law and public law writers assess the guarantee as specifically 
adopted at the Peace of Westphalia, and as applied in the post- 1648 period? It 
is important to note that the geopolitical context of the time of writing was 
central, as were the personal circumstances of the author. It is also important 
to recall that the guarantee applied not only to the religious and constitutional 
stipulations for the Empire and its inhabitants, but also to the various terms 
that formed the international dimension of the peace treaty between great 
powers. Indeed, these terms were prominent in discussions of the guarantee 
during the first few decades after the conclusion of the Peace, a time when 
German commentators were highly concerned with preventing the Empire be-
ing drawn back into ongoing wars.
A key stipulation in this regard was ipm §3, the so- called Assistenzverbot, 
which prohibited the Austrian Habsburgs from providing any assistance to 
their Spanish Habsburg cousins in the ongoing Franco- Spanish war (lasting 
until 1659), and which also exempted the Burgundian circle of the Empire 
(consisting largely of the Spanish territory of the Southern Netherlands) from 
the Imperial defensive framework and from the guarantee. Under Cardinal 
Richelieu’s original plan, the French had approached the peace congress with 
a view towards achieving a ‘universal’ peace, in other words, a peace treaty that 
would simultaneously settle all constituent and related conflicts of the Thirty 
Years’ War. When it became clear that the Franco- Spanish war could not be 
settled at Westphalia, the congress reached a point of crisis and risked dissolv-
ing. At this crucial moment, the congress was arguably saved by the efforts of a 
cross- confessional ‘third party’ of smaller princes who were willing to compro-
mise, and who propelled the negotiations forward in its final phase, forcing the 
Emperor to agree to the guarantee and the non- assistance clause.76 This pro-
vided France with the assurance that it could continue fighting Spain without 
 75 Vattel, Law of Nations, 396.
 76 Christoph Kampmann, Europa und das Reich im Dreißigjährigen Krieg (Stuttgart:  W. 
Kohlhammer, 2013), 128– 170.
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having to face the Emperor as well, and also assured the Protestant princes that 
France would come to their aid if the Catholics and the Emperor reneged on 
their religious concessions and resumed confessional depredations.
It was therefore an important instrument both to propel the peace settle-
ment to its conclusion, and to instil a degree of trust in a mutual and recip-
rocal enforcement mechanism at a time when trust between the contracting 
parties was lacking. Pufendorf captured this mutual distrust which necessi-
tated a mutual guarantee when he wrote ‘The Roman Catholicks charge the 
Protestants, That they have deprived them of a great part of their Wealth and 
Riches, and they are night and day contriving how they shall recover what 
they have thus lost, and the other Party are as well resolved to keep what they 
have got’.77 Although it is unknown whether he had the Westphalian con-
gress in mind, Gundling grasped the importance of guarantees in his work 
on the law of nature and nations, by arguing that the existence of a guarantee 
could instil trust and increase the willingness of warring parties to conclude 
a peace treaty, noting that it is ‘highly necessary to conclude such guarantees, 
otherwise the stronger will devour the weaker’.78 He recognized that the trea-
ty and its guarantee created a pacified security zone for central Europe, and 
expressed the hope this zone could eventually be expanded to cover all of 
Christian Europe.79
In the post- war years, the above- mentioned ‘third party’ of smaller  princes 
continued to actively work towards the preservation of the peace on the ba-
sis of upholding the guarantee. In forming the cross- confessional ‘Rhenish 
alliance’ (1658– 1668) together with both France and Sweden but not the Em-
peror, the message was clear that they considered the latter the biggest threat 
to their liberties and to peace. Indeed, he resented being prohibited by treaty 
law from allying with his relatives in Spain, while his own immediate subjects, 
the Imperial Estates, allied with France and Sweden. The princes’ perspectives 
soon changed with Louis xiv’s assumption of personal rule and the advent of 
his policy of aggressive expansionism towards the Rhine from the late 1660s, 
after which they viewed Emperor Leopold i as a more effective protector.80 
This context is important in understanding the assessments of the guarantee 
in this period by commentators such as Pufendorf and Leibniz. Pufendorf ’s 
 77 Pufendorf, Present State of Germany, 204.
 78 Nicolaus Hieronymus Gundling, Ausführlicher Discours über das Natur- und Völcker- Recht 
(Frankfurt am Main and Leipzig: Spring, 1747), 333.
 79 Laudin, ‘Le Gründlicher Discours’, 133.
 80 Roman Schnur, Der Rheinbund von 1658 in der deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte (Bonn: 
Röhrscheid, 1955).
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Monzambano first appeared just as this shift was beginning and later editions 
were published at the height of the Empire’s enmity to France.
Leibniz extensively discussed these geopolitical challenges facing Germany 
in his oeuvre, although his frame of reference was not so much theoretical and 
philosophical as grounded in historical empirical analysis.81 It is therefore hard 
to determine how or whether his assessments of Westphalia influenced his 
conceptions of natural law. In the late 1660s, Leibniz discusses the question of 
the duration of the exemption of the Burgundian circle from the Westphalian 
guarantee as part of the non- assistance clause. This was highly disputed and 
the text was ambiguous, but it had clear geopolitical implications as it largely 
covered the Spanish Netherlands, against which Louis xiv had aggressive de-
signs. France argued that the exemption was perpetual, whereas Spain argued 
that it was exempt only during the Franco- Spanish war that was ongoing at 
the time of the conclusion of the treaties of Westphalia, and that had ended in 
1659. Spain therefore demanded collective Imperial assistance on the basis of 
the guarantee were it to be attacked in that circle, and indicated that it would 
not offer financial contributions to the Empire if it was denied this assurance. 
The issue became salient in 1667 with the French attack on the Spanish Nether-
lands. Leibniz argued strongly in favour of the duty and the right of the Empire 
to defend the Spanish Netherlands, and that the guarantee remained exempt 
only for the duration of the war that was ongoing between France and Spain at 
the time of the signing of the treaty of Münster. He argued that failing to pro-
vide the requested assistance would amount to an abdication of the responsi-
bilities of the guarantee of Westphalia.82
Leibniz followed this up with a political tract in 1670 in which he discussed 
the best means for the Empire to achieve security in light of France’s hege-
monic designs.83 Its primary addressee was the archbishop- elector of Mainz, 
who had been the chief architect of the Rhenish alliance of 1658. Leibniz 
considered means to strengthen the defence of the Empire in the face of the 
 81 Wilhelm Schmidt- Biggemann, ‘Leibniz,’ in Politische Theorien des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts: 
Staat und Politik in Deutschland ed. Bernd Heidenreich and Gerhard Göhler (Darmstadt: 
Philipp von Zabern, 2011), 149– 151.
 82 Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, series iv, vol. 1: 115– 130, 141.
 83 Bedencken welchergestalt Securitas publica interna et externa und Status praesens im 
Reich, jitzigen Umständen auf festen Fuss zu stellen (1670), in ibid, pp.  133– 214. See 
also Christoph Kampmann, Arbiter und Friedensstiftung. Die Auseinandersetzung um 
den politischen Schiedsrichter im Europa der Frühen Neuzeit (Paderborn:  Ferdinand 
Schoeningh, 2011), 220– 226, and Wolfgang Burgdorf, Reichskonstitution und Nation. 
Verfassungsreformprojekte für das Heilige Römische Reich Deutscher Nation im Politischen 
Schrifttum von 1648 Bis 1806 (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 1998), 88– 95.
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French threat. He believed that Louis xiv did not want to directly conquer 
the German lands but rather, as had already occurred via the Rhenish alliance, 
place himself in the position to be the arbiter of conflicts within the Empire 
and therefore indirectly dominate Germany. However, the solution was not for 
Mainz or the Emperor to join the triple alliance of England, Sweden and Neth-
erlands. Leibniz considered it ‘a particularly dangerous alliance, which France 
would interpret as a hostile declaration’. Instead, the princes should seek to 
form a broad- based alliance that was not necessarily reliant on the Emperor, 
modelled on the Rhenish alliance and designed to secure the Westphalian or-
der, in order to harness the defensive capacity of the Empire: ‘the purpose of 
this alliance should be nothing other than to provide each other the guarantee 
of the Peace of Westphalia, which all Imperial Estates are bound into anyway’. 
A broad- based alliance of princes would do little to draw the Empire into for-
eign wars that did not directly affect its interests, nor would it cause offence or 
provoke aggression among other powers, primarily France, ‘especially because 
such an alliance amounts to nothing less than the Rhenish alliance which is 
in accordance with the Peace of Westphalia and the guarantee incorporated 
therein’.
According to Leibniz, the Westphalian order was very much at the heart of 
what needed defending and strengthening: ‘everyone has an interest in ensur-
ing that the Peace of Westphalia remains active, and all should act together 
so as to ensure that it is better implemented’.84 Leibniz argued that France 
was very adept at using the guarantee as an occasion or pretext to strengthen 
its position in the Empire and achieve the position of an influential arbiter, 
or  arbitrium rerum, which allowed it to build a strong patronage network and 
essentially usurp the position of the Emperor as a mediator and adjudicator 
in  inter- territorial disputes. Depending on its own interest, France would take 
sides against the party that was unwilling to ally with it or to become its client.85
Thus, although Leibniz saw the mutual guarantee as a helpful institu-
tion that ought to be strengthened, he was acutely cognisant of the dangers 
 84 Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe vi, 1: 141.: ‘ein absonderlich gefährlich Bündnüß, 
so Franckreich pro declaratione hostilitatis aufnehmen wird’; ibid., 1:  158:  ‘Der Zweck 
solcher Allianz soll nichts anders seyn, als blatt und bloß Garantiam Instrumenti Pacis, 
darinnen ohne das alle stände begriffen, einander zu leisten’; ibid., 1:  140:  ‘Sind iede 
insonderheit verbunden daran zu seyn damit das Instrumentum pacis in vigore bleibe, so 
können sie sich ja dazu mit einander zu beßerer Execution noch mehr verbinden’.
 85 Ibid., 1: 193– 5. For an analysis of French protection and patronage policy towards the 
Rhenish ecclesiastical electors, see Tilman Haug, Ungleiche Außenbeziehungen und grenz-
überschreitende Patronage. Die französische Krone und die geistlichen Kurfürsten (1648– 
1679) (Cologne: Böhlau, 2015).
 
 
 
 
Simone Zurbuchen - 978-90-04-38420-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 09/19/2019 09:19:14AM
via University of Lausanne
208 Milton
emanating from France’s instrumentalization of it for Louis xiv’s own inter-
ests. In the 1680s he accused France of having violated the ipm as the rightful 
foundation of relations between France and the Empire, and abused its guar-
antor position with the Reunions policy.86 At the time of the Peace of Ryswick, 
the fourth article of which altered the confessional balance in the Palatinate, 
Leibniz described the clause in question as a violation and a great blow to the 
religious terms of Westphalia, ‘which are one of the best foundations of peace 
and calm’, but regretted its ‘lack of guarantees’.87 Westphalia was not seen as 
ideal by Leibniz, but it was nevertheless to be the basis for an improved system. 
The above quote shows that he saw the treaty structure as a good internal or-
ganizing system as well as the basis of a defensive barrier against France.
Pufendorf ’s Monzambano appeared in the context of one of the inter- 
territorial disputes mentioned by Leibniz, the Wildfangstreit between the 
elector- Palatine and a number of its neighbours, in which the former sought 
assistance from the external guarantors, Sweden and France.88 Pufendorf was 
employed at the elector- Palatine’s university of Heidelberg at the time, which 
might explain why the Swedish intervention in the Thirty Years’ War was por-
trayed in a fairly positive light as having ensured the protection of Protestants 
from Austrian persecution.89 The guarantee itself is not portrayed negatively, 
although Pufendorf did criticize the princes’ right to form alliances (jus foed-
erum), an old customary practice that was enshrined at Westphalia. In combi-
nation, the two weakened the unity of the Empire and exposed it to deleterious 
foreign machinations. Pufendorf considered it a ‘pernicious Disorder […] That 
the Princes of Germany enter into Leagues, not only one with another, but 
with Foreign Princes too, and the more securely, because they have reserved to 
themselves a Liberty to do so in the Treaty of Westphalia’. He believed the jus 
foederum was dangerous because it ‘not only divides the Princes of Germany 
into Factions’, but also because it provides the guarantors, France and Sweden, 
with an ability to ‘mould Germany to their own particular Interest and Wills, 
and ultimately, when given an appropriate opportunity, by the assistance of 
their German Allies, to insult on all the rest of the Princes, especially when the 
 86 Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, series vi, vol. 2: 471– 502.
 87 Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, series i, vol. 14: no. 56:  ‘welche eine der besten 
Fundamente des Friedens und der Ruhe sind […] Mangel an Garantien’; Leibniz, 
Sämtliche Schriften, series vi, vol. 6: no. 42, 6: 289– 297.
 88 Roman Schnur, Der Rheinbund von 1658 in der deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte 
(Bonn: Röhrscheid, 1955), 80– 83.
 89 Pufendorf, Present State of Germany, 191. The intervention is portrayed even more posi-
tively in his later publications when he was a royal court historian of Sweden: Pufendorf, 
An Introduction, 519.
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Design of those Leagues is not levell’d against other Foreign Princes […] but 
against the Members of the Empire itself ’. Pufendorf therefore suggested that, 
while retaining Westphalia as a foundation, the members of the Empire must 
make provision to prevent foreign interference in its affairs and to harness 
common defence efforts to prevent a loss of territory to foreign conquerors. 
Amending the jus foederum to prevent princes allying against each other was 
one such option.90 In later editions of the piece, the earlier anti- Habsburg tone 
was replaced by a strong anti- French sentiment, reflecting the shifting mood 
outlined above.91 Towards the end of his career, Pufendorf accused France of 
pretending ‘to play the Master over Princes’ through designs ‘which overturn 
the Westphalian Treaty, or are intended against the Protestants in Germany 
and Holland’.92
The basic premise of Pufendorf ’s view of the well- being of Europe was that 
universal monarchy must be prevented. Westphalia was valuable and laudable 
in that it represented the culmination of the successful struggle against such 
attempts by the Habsburgs and, moreover, the achieved balance was mutually 
guaranteed and therefore secured for the future. Preventing the Holy Roman 
Empire from being dominated by a single power was vital to undercutting the 
emergence of universal monarchy. This risk existed both from within the Em-
pire, chiefly through the Habsburgs, and from without, by being subjected to a 
foreign power’s control. Therefore, the mutual guarantee clauses were highly 
important and effective, as none of the guarantors would permit the other to 
establish such a domination over Germany. While retaining this basic premise, 
Pufendorf ’s assessment of various individual stipulations and the state of the 
Westphalian order shifted in response to the changing geopolitical context, as 
well as the interests of his employer. Nevertheless, his writings were always 
guided by a belief in the necessity of upholding the basic German and interna-
tional order as established at Westphalia; however, the treaties also contained 
provisions which themselves threatened to undermine that very order.93
In the early 1740s, during a renewed period of French activism and military 
operations in the Empire (following a period of relative withdrawal in 1714– 
1733), Schmauss sought to analyse individual states’ self- interests and he argued 
that France assigned great value to its guarantor status. He wrote that France 
 90 Pufendorf, Present State of Germany, 205– 206, 219– 220. See also Peter Schröder, ‘The 
constitution of the Holy Roman Empire after 1648: Samuel Pufendorf ’s assessment in his 
Monzambano,’ The Historical Journal 42, no. 4 (1999): 970.
 91 Pufendorf, Present State of Germany, 193.
 92 Pufendorf, An Introduction, 602. See also Döring, ‘Der Westfälische Frieden’, 359– 360.
 93 Döring, ‘Der Westfälische Frieden’, 353– 355.
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uses guarantees to enhance its influence without expensive wars of conquest 
and direct rule. The guarantees allow France to achieve an ‘ascendancy and a 
higher degree of a general direction of Europe […] The guarantee of the peace 
of Westphalia gives her a pretext to interfere in German affairs’. The French se-
curity apparatus combined this with numerous other guarantees, such as that 
of Polish liberties and its ‘leapfrog diplomacy’94 with the Swedes and the Turks. 
In general, France’s use of its guarantor status shows ‘that France knows well 
how to cunningly make use of the guarantee, in order to acquire direction over 
everything that occurs in Europe’.95 Guarantees of peace treaties and other in-
ternational arrangements were an effective instrument of French hegemony, 
because ‘a guarantee is nothing other than a right to involve oneself in other 
affairs, by citing one’s obligation as a guarantor, if this is deemed to further 
one’s interests’.96
Other assessments by German jurists and other scholars in the early to mid- 
eighteenth century were similarly critical of France’s use of its guarantee, with-
out necessarily denying the theoretical value of the institution as a method to 
secure the peace. Like Pufendorf, Johann David Köhler and Franz Dominicus 
Häberlin viewed the jus foederum as dangerous, especially in combination with 
the French guarantee. They believed that the liberties granted to the princes 
were excessive, weakened the Empire as a whole, and helped France gain as-
cendancy over Germany, primarily through the guarantee. France’s previous 
intervention in the Thirty Years’ War was argued to have been designed pure-
ly to serve its own geopolitical interests, with Teutsche Freiheit employed as a 
blind to cover its own naked ambitions.97 In determining the reception of the 
 94 Brendan Simms, ‘Europe’s shifting balance of power,’ in The Oxford Handbook of Early 
Modern European History, 1350– 1750, Vol 2:  Culture and Power, ed. Hamish Scott 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 649– 650.
 95 Johann Jacob Schmauss, Einleitung zu der Staats- Wissenschafft, und Erleuterung Des von 
ihm herausgegebenen Corporis Juris Gentium Academici und aller andern seit mehr als 
zweyen Seculis her geschlossenen Bündnisse, Friedens- und Commercien- Tractaten, vol. 1 
(Leipzig, 1741), 630.: ‘Ascendant, und höhern Grad einer allgemeinen Direction in Europa 
[…] Die Garantie des Westphaelischen Friedens giebt ihm Vorwand, sich in Teutsche 
Sachen zu Mengen … daß sich Frankckreich der Garantie gar listig zu bedienen weiß, um 
sich […] über alles und iedes was nur in Europa vorgehet eine Direction zu erwerben’.
 96 Ibid., 631:  ‘Eine Garantie ist nichts anders, als ein Recht, sich unter Anführung der 
Obliegenheit eines Garant in andere Händel zu mischen, wann man es seinem Interesse 
gemäß erachtet’.
 97 Johann David Köhler, Kurtzgefaste und gründliche teutsche Reichs- Historie (Frankfurt and 
Leipzig:  Riegel, 1736), 564– 566; Franz Dominicus Häberlin, Anmerkungen über die in 
Johann Carl Königs Selectorum juris publ. P. VIII. c. 16. befindliche Erörterung der Frage: Ob 
die Crone Frankreich vor einen Erbfeind des H. R. Reichs zu achten seye? (n.p., 1745), passim.
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guarantee among legal and political writers of the period, one ought to be clear 
about the purpose of the author. One must distinguish between assessments 
of the guarantee as it operated in geopolitical and diplomatic practice on the 
one hand, in other words its role in Franco- German and Swedish- German rela-
tions, and how it was evaluated as an instrument under the law of nations on 
the other hand. This distinction is more significant than locating the author 
in a particular tradition such as natural law or public law, although individual 
writers often addressed both aspects in the same publications. The commen-
taries in the works examined so far have mainly been of the former category, 
namely assessments of the role and effects of the guarantee in practice. When 
assessed in principle, the guarantee was viewed much more positively, espe-
cially in the later eighteenth century, during a period of French decline far 
removed from the hegemonic wars of Louis xiv. Johann Stephan Pütter, for 
example, lauded the guarantee as ‘highly praiseworthy’.98 The Halle professor 
Johann Christian Krause viewed the guarantee as beneficial in theory and in 
practice, as it promoted the unity of Europe by tying numerous powers into a 
reciprocal system of securing the peace.99 Mably argued that the mutual guar-
antee elevated Westphalia above other peace treaties because it encompassed 
carefully devised mechanisms to provide long- term safeguards of the peace.100
The prolific scholar of public law Johann Jacob Moser was one of the few 
jurists to write a monograph specifically on the guarantee of Westphalia.101 It 
was primarily a legal exposition of the guarantee in theory, although it also 
served a contemporary political purpose, namely to define a set of parameters 
in order to limit the ways in which the guarantee could be applied in practice, 
otherwise the external guarantors could plausibly assert a right to intervene in 
any matter affecting the Imperial constitution.102 Moser’s aim was undoubt-
edly influenced by more than a century of French instrumentalization of the 
guarantee for power- political ends.103 He did this by insisting that the guaran-
tee could be activated and implemented by armed force only if it was re quested 
by the injured party, and only if all other internal Imperial judicial channels 
 98 Johann Stephan Pütter, Der Geist des Westfälischen Friedens; nach dem Buchstaben und 
Sinn desselbigen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1795), 543.
 99 Johann Christoph Krause, Lehrbuch der Geschichte des Dreyßigjährigen teutschen Krieges 
und Westphälischen Friedens (Halle: Johann Christian Hedel, 1782), 130.
 100 Gabriel Bonnot de Mably, Le droit public de l’Europe, fondé sur les traités (Amsterdam: 
Arkstee & Merkus, 1761), 8– 10.
 101 Johann Jacob Moser, Von der Garantie des Westphaelischen Friedens; nach dem Buchstaben 
und Sinn desselbigen ([Stuttgart], 1767). See also Kremer, Westfälischer Friede, 44– 46.
 102 Moser, Von der Garantie, 44.
 103 Moser, Neues teutsches Staatsrecht, 1: 450.
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had been exhausted without procuring redress. In exercising the guarantee, 
the guarantors must comply with natural law and the law of nations. Although 
the Emperor was himself a guarantor as well, Moser argued that the exercise of 
his guarantee must not allow him to arrogate to himself rights as a guarantor 
derived from the law of nations which were denied him as head of the Empire 
on the basis of Imperial constitutional law. Therefore, jus publicum set limits to 
his freedom of action as derived from jus gentium. Moser also emphasized that 
the guarantee was designed to uphold not only princely rights, but also those 
of the ‘mediate members of the Empire, territorial estates and subjects’.104 This 
was the case because ‘In so far as much of the Peace of Westphalia is provided 
for their benefit, it applies to them as interested parties of the Peace; and just 
as the Peace itself, this is also the case with its guarantee, according to which 
one can and must take up their cause, if they are affronted in violation of the 
Peace’.105
Moser was thus one of the few scholars who discussed the guarantee in 
terms of its potential role as a legalized form of intervention for the protection 
of foreign subjects.106 When addressing the question of who could be targeted 
in an intervention according to the guarantee, Moser wrote that anyone violat-
ing the terms of the Peace was a legitimate target, including the Emperor, an 
external power and the territorial princes.107 Moser stressed that the guarantee 
did not render the Imperial judiciary obsolete in the securing and executing of 
the Peace. Instead, he viewed the guarantee as its substitute, to be resorted to 
only if the regular channels failed to enforce Westphalian rights:
This armed guarantee should be a surrogate for the judicial office, and the 
guarantors should be authorized to take those measures which the judge, 
under whose jurisdiction the complainant is, should have taken, but did 
not take, either because he was not appealed to, or because he hesitated 
 104 Moser, Von der Garantie, 46:  ‘mittelbare Glieder des Reichs, Land=Stände und 
Unterthanen’.
 105 Ibid.: ‘In so ferne aber viles in dem Westphälischen Friden zu ihrem Besten verordnet ist, 
seynd sie Fridens=Intereßenten, und wie des Fridens selbst, also auch dessen Garantie, 
in so fern fähig, daß man sich ihrer annehmen kan und muß, wann sie gegen den 
Fridens=Schluß beleidiget werden’.
 106 An actual example of the implementation of the guarantee for the protection of foreign 
subjects (albeit not strictly following the prescribed steps) was Sweden’s intervention 
for the benefit of the Protestants of Austrian Silesia in 1707. See Norbert Conrads, Die 
Durchführung der Altranstädter Konvention in Schlesien 1707– 1709 (Cologne: Böhlau, 
1971).
 107 Moser, Von der Garantie, 47.
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for too long. Hence the external guarantors, who otherwise have no juris-
diction in this state, may nevertheless intervene in such cases.108
While Moser generally sought to restrict the practical application of the guar-
antee by the foreign powers (instead pointing to the internal guarantors as be-
ing more promising), he did seek to make it more impactful in one important 
respect. He argued that the three- year waiting period stipulated by the trea-
ty before a guarantor intervention could take place was excessive and should 
therefore be ignored, because in urgent cases the injured party might incur 
unacceptable losses if rapid redress were not forthcoming.109 He was making 
the case for adhering to the spirit rather than the letter of the law, as the title 
of his monograph indicated.
Another author who devoted a work to the guarantee was the professor of 
public law Johann Christoph Steck, who penned his essay on instructions from 
Brandenburg- Prussia in 1757.110 The geopolitical context was the recent activa-
tion of the guarantee by all guarantors, France, Sweden, the Emperor and the 
Empire, against Prussia for having invaded and laid waste to Saxony at the out-
set of the Seven Years’ War (1756– 1763). It is notable that despite the wartime 
interests of his employer of having this example portrayed as an abuse of the 
guarantee, given that it was directed against Berlin, the author nevertheless 
highlights the benefits of the mutual guarantee in theory and when properly 
applied. In general, he held the Peace of Westphalia in very high regard, as it 
safeguarded and enshrined Protestant and princely rights, and he portrayed 
the mutual guarantee as a necessary, effective, and appropriate new instru-
ment in international law to secure the longevity of the peace terms: ‘no more 
effective means to eternalize this Peace and to secure its holiness could have 
been devised than the guarantee and warranty, which all contracting powers 
have reciprocally assumed over it’.111 Older means of securing the peace, such 
 108 Ibid., 64:  ‘Dise gewaffnete Garantie solle ein Surrogatum des richterlichen Amtes seyn, 
und die Garants sollen befugt seyn, das zu thun, was der Richter, unter dem der Beleidigte 
stehet, hätte thun sollen, aber nicht gethan hat, weil er entweder nicht angeruffen worden 
ist, oder zu lang gezaudert hat, dahero die auswärtige Garants, denen sonsten in solchem 
Staat keine Gerichtbarkeit zustehet, in solchem Fall dennoch zugreiffen dörffen’.
 109 Ibid., 49, 57.
 110 Johann Christoph Wilhelm Steck, ‘Abhandlung von den Rechten und Pflichten der hohen 
Garans des Westphälischen Friedens,’ in Abhandlungen aus dem deutschen Staats- und 
Lehnrecht zur Erläuterung einiger neuen Reichsangelegenheiten (Halle:  Johann Justinus 
Gebauer, 1757), 99– 132.
 111 Ibid., 103.:  ‘Kein wirksameres Mittel aber konte ausgesonnen werden, diesen Frieden 
zu verewigen, und seine Heiligkeit zu versichern, als die Garantie und Gewährleistung 
welche alle schließende Mächte wechselweise darüber übernommen haben’.
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as the exchange of oaths and hostages, ‘had long ago ceased to be adequate in 
instilling loyalty and faith in treaties between nations’.112 The guarantee was 
effective precisely because self- interest and suspicion about the other side’s 
future adherence to the agreement prevailed. Not all parties were believed to 
have had an equal desire to see Westphalian terms upheld, particularly the 
Emperor, who lost entire provinces and saw his plans for an ‘unlimited power 
over Germany’ scuppered, while also being highly suspicious of Sweden’s new 
role as an Imperial Estate with considerable territories in north Germany. It 
was therefore ‘highly necessary to employ great care and guidance, to make 
this peace perpetual and binding’. In pursuit of this goal, ‘all diligence would 
have been futile, if all contracting powers had not committed themselves to re-
ciprocally safeguard the holiness and compliance with this Peace, and to offer 
each other powerful assistance against any violator’.113
Steck argued that one needed to distinguish between the internal and the 
external guarantors, because ‘our Peace is a treaty between European powers, 
and simultaneously a fundamental constitutional law of the German Em-
pire’.114 The external guarantors did have certain rights and duties which Steck 
saw as grounded in natural law. Citing Wolff ’s and Cocceji’s work on jus gen-
tium et naturae,115 Steck argued that guarantors were obliged to ensure that 
treaty terms are upheld and to remonstrate, and if need be act against violators 
of the guaranteed treaty, if called upon to do so by the injured party. Steck 
then applied this to the Westphalian guarantors and stated that Sweden and 
France were empowered to ensure the maintenance and upkeep of the terms 
of Westphalia and the Imperial constitution in general. They were authorized 
to defend the constitutional and fundamental laws of the Empire, to intervene 
on behalf of and for the protection of those whose Westphalian rights had 
been violated, ‘to guard the freedom of the Imperial Estates’, to interfere in 
Imperial business as long as called upon by the injured party, and to defend 
 112 Ibid.:  ‘längstens nicht mehr hinreichend Treue und Glauben in den Bündnissen der 
Völcker zu befestigen’.
 113 Ibid., 104– 105:  ‘unumschränkten Gewalt über Teutschland […] höchstnöthig, alle 
Maasregeln der Vorsichtigkeit zu ergreifen, und diesen Frieden dauerhaft und seine 
Verbindlichkeit unauflöslich zu machen […] Alle Behutsamkeit aber würde vergeblich 
gewesen sein, wenn sich nicht alle schließenden Mächte wechselsweise verpflichtet hät-
ten, über der Heiligkeit und Beobachtung dieses Friedens zu wachen, und sich wider alle 
Übertreter desselben kräftigen Beistand zu leisten’.
 114 Ibid., 107: ‘unser Friede ein Bündnis Europäischer Mächten, und zugleich ein Grundgesetz 
des deutschen Reiches ist’.
 115 The works cited are Christian Wolff, Jus gentium methodo scientifica pertractatum 
(Halle: Renger, 1749), chap. iv, §§ 443– 445, 363– 364; Heinrich v. Cocceji, Disputatio juris 
gentium publici de guarantia pacis (np, 1702), vol. 1, diss. 4.
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the confessional rights of the three recognized confessions. This broad scope 
made the dangers of potential abuse and exploitation particularly large, al-
though Steck did not deny that the external guarantors had a right and duty to 
intervene in the internal affairs of the Empire only if Westphalian terms were 
actually violated, and only if they were called upon by the injured party be-
forehand.116 Given the political aims he pursued, Steck argued that France had 
indeed abused the guarantee for its own self- interest, as was the case in 1756/ 
1757. Steck submitted that Prussia was in fact defending Westphalian rights by 
acting defensively against a planned dismemberment through pre- emption in 
order to defend the principle of Imperial Estates being allowed to retain the 
territories whose possession had been confirmed at Westphalia. He suggested 
that more emphasis needed to be placed on the internal guarantors to defend 
the terms of Westphalia that dealt with arrangements within the Empire and 
the Imperial constitution in general.117
The exercise of the guarantee by the internal guarantors, which Steck and 
Moser both viewed as more beneficial to the Empire’s interests than the ex-
ternal guarantee, was not uncontroversial either. It had been at the heart of 
a constitutional crisis that emerged in the early eighteenth century at a time 
of renewed confessional strife occasioned by several restrictions imposed on 
Protestant subjects by the electors of the Palatinate and Mainz, and several 
smaller Catholic princes along the Rhine. The umbrella organization of Reichs-
tag envoys representing all Protestant Imperial Estates, the Corpus Evangeli-
corum, used this crisis and the publicity campaign surrounding it to assert a 
new interpretation of the guarantee of Westphalia. In the 1710s and 1720s the 
Corpus developed a constitutional vision which asserted that, as contracting 
parties of the treaties of Westphalia, the Protestant princes were entitled on 
the basis of the guarantee to execute the treaty terms by force if necessary, if 
Westphalian terms were violated and if the Emperor refused to immediately 
dispatch execution commissions. The Corpus was therefore asserting a right 
to intervene in the domestic territorial affairs of Catholic princes for the pro-
tection of the latter’s Protestant subjects. It claimed to derive this right not 
only from the positive law of the Westphalian guarantee, but also from the 
right, based in natural law, of corporate groups proffering assistance to fellow 
members.118
 116 Ibid., 114– 115: ‘Vor die Freyheit der Reichsstande zu wachen’.
 117 Ibid., 118– 119, 122– 124.
 118 See Patrick Milton, ‘The early eighteenth- century German confessional crisis: the juridifi-
cation of religious conflict in the re- confessionalised politics of the Holy Roman Empire,’ 
Central European History 49 (2016): 39– 68.
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The Protestant diplomats at Regensburg received ample intellectual support 
in this endeavour from several of their co- religionists in the field of public law 
and natural law. While the Emperor and the Catholics rejected this expanded 
scope of legally buttressed interventions for the protection of other princes’ 
subjects, Protestant jurists largely espoused the Corpus’s pluralistic interpreta-
tion of protective intervention, based on Westphalia and general invocations 
of natural law.119 Moser, the most vociferous advocate of this expanded author-
ity of intervention conceived as self- help, answered the question of ‘Whether 
[…] Imperial Estates of either religion are permitted to step in and support 
fellow estates of their own religion, as well as co- religionists who are subject 
to the territorial rule of other Imperial Estates’, with an emphatic yes.120 He 
was also of the opinion that individual princes or corporate unions such as 
the Corpus Evangelicorum had the right ‘to resort to more forceful and final-
ly violent measures, when amicable means have been fruitless, and when the 
confessional grievances have multiplied’.121 Furthermore, Moser commented 
‘that in the entire text of the Treaties of Westphalia there is not a single pas-
sage which states that Protestants should necessarily be obliged to refer only 
their confessional grievances to the Emperor, and to await only his verdict and 
assistance in such matters’. The only exception to this right had been made for 
the Austrian hereditary lands.122 He stressed that ‘there can be no doubt that 
customary protective justice […] and art. 17 Pac. Westph. § 5, 6 &c grants all 
contracting parties an undeniable right to uphold all and every stipulation of 
the said Peace, and to protect everyone for whose benefit the terms were stipu-
lated […] those terms of the 5th article which stipulate subjects’ religious and 
 119 Steck supported this interpretation of the guarantee:  Steck, ‘Abhandlung von den 
Rechten’, 132. See also Nicolaus Hieronymus Gundling, Ausführlicher Discours über 
das Natur- und Völcker- Recht, 332, and the references cited in the published appeal by 
the Corpus Evangelicorum to the Emperor’s representative (Prinzipalkommissar) at the 
Imperial Diet, Regensburg, 28 Dec. 1719, in Europäische Staats- Cantzley, ed. Anton Faber 
(Frankfurt a. M. and Leipzig, 1697– 1760), vol. 35 (1720), 381– 439.
 120 Moser, Neues teutsches Staatsrecht, vol. 7: 208: ‘Ob […] der einen oder anderen Religion 
zugethanen Reichs=Ständen erlaubt seye, sich ihrer Religionsverwandten Mitstände, 
wir auch ihrer unter anderer Reichsstände Landeshoheit stehenden Glaubensgenossen, 
anzunehmen?’.
 121 Ibid. 254:  ‘wann die gütliche Mittel nichts haben verfangen wollen, und die 
Religions=Beschwerden […] gehäuffet worden seynd, nachdrücklichere und endlich 
gewaltsame Wege zu ergreiffen’.
 122 Ibid. 426– 427:  ‘Es ist aber höchst=merckwürdig, daß in dem ganzen Instrumento 
Pacis kein Wort zu befinden ist, daß die Evangelischen schuldig seyn sollten, ihre 
Religionsbeschwerden nothwendig bey dem Kayser anzubringen, und alleine Dessen 
Auspruch und Hülffe darüber zu erwarten’.
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church rights are by no means excluded therefrom’.123 It was in this context of 
the internal exercise of the guarantee for the protection of Protestant subjects’ 
Westphalian confessional rights that Moser called for the disregarding of the 
three- year waiting period. Gundling also supported the Corpus’s interpretation 
of its right to intervene on the basis of his natural law conception of guarantees 
in the international sphere, although not on the basis of a right to intervene for 
the protection of a foreign ruler’s subjects whose rights are being violated.124
6 Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that assessments of Westphalia 
among jurists varied considerably depending on the particular aspect of the 
settlement that was being written about, as well as the context and period in 
which its later impact was being evaluated. Contrary to the claims of the West-
phalian myth, the Peace increased the legal scope of external involvement in 
the Empire and its individual territories, by providing for (and in the case of 
internal Imperial interventions, strengthening) a juridification of intervention. 
This new development in international and constitutional law furnished le-
gal thinkers with much food for thought. Among writers of the natural law 
tradition, there was a distinct ambivalence towards the guarantee and foreign 
intervention in the Empire in general, especially on the part of seventeenth- 
century and early- eighteenth- century scholars. The experience of the Thirty 
Years’ War had undoubtedly been traumatic and the foreign interventions had 
greatly exacerbated the suffering and prolonged the war. However, such writ-
ers portrayed the risk of Habsburg monarchical hegemony over the Empire as 
a threat, and the confessional and princely liberties which were threatened by 
it could be defended only through foreign assistance. The resulting guaran-
tee legalized this external protection of confessional and political rights, and 
thereby ‘codified’ foreign involvement in the Imperial constitution. Yet this 
state of affairs was largely seen as deleterious in practice, due to French abuse, 
 123 Ibid., 7:202– 203:  ‘Es lässet sich unter keinem Schein zweifeln, ob nicht […] von Alters 
hergebrachten Schuz= und Schirms=Gerechtigkeiten […] Art 17 Pac Westph § 5, 6 &c den 
sämtlichen Pacis Consortibus ein unwidersprechliches Recht beygelegt seye, alle und jede 
Verordnungen selbigen Fridens zu handhaben, und diejenige, denen zu gute sie gemacht 
sind, dabey zu schützen […] wovon diejenige hauptsächliche Verordnungen des 5ten Art 
welche von der Unterthanen Religions= und Kirchen=Gerechtsamen disponiren, keines-
wegs auszuschliessen sind’.
 124 Nicolaus Hieronymus Gundling, Ausführlicher Discours über das Natur- und Völcker- Recht, 
332.
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and some theorists also saw it as damaging in theory because it arguably weak-
ened the unity of the Empire.
The paradox can be illustrated by Pufendorf ’s writing on the topic. In his 
theory of the law of nature and nations, he argued that states are a necessary 
form of human organization, which allow people to escape from their natural 
state of insecurity, and therefore to achieve common peace. Yet in order to 
fulfil these tasks, such states must be of a ‘regular’ form, with clearly unified 
sovereignty.125 He famously viewed the Empire as lacking such regularity,126 
and he regarded the jus foederum and the external guarantee as among the 
chief reasons for the disunity of the Empire. Yet his modest reform plans for 
the Empire were firmly grounded in a continuation of the Westphalian order, 
and he often argued that the liberties of Europe and the Protestant interest 
required that Germany not be dominated by a single power. In any case, he 
argued that to re- impose a centralized Imperial monarchy in Germany would 
exact too high a price in terms of conflict and disorder.127 He also expressed 
contradictory attitudes towards the foreign interventions in the Empire. On 
the one hand he viewed the ability of foreign powers to interfere in the Empire 
as highly deleterious in his Monzambano, yet on the other hand he later por-
trayed the Swedish intervention of 1632 in particular as having been advanta-
geous and the foreign crowns as having secured German liberties when writing 
his Introduction to the History of the Principal Kingdoms, which was clearly a 
reflection of the influence of his personal circumstances.
The influence of the experience of the war and the peace settlement on 
the conceptions of natural law can be inferred at times, yet more detailed re-
search would be necessary on this topic to achieve a clearer picture. When 
comparing the writing on the law of nations in the context of the guarantee 
of Westphalia by authors from the public law tradition and by authors from 
the natural law tradition, some differences emerge. Several natural law writers 
argued that interventions for the protection of foreign subjects were permis-
sible in the law of nature and nations, a right which the public law scholars 
who focussed more on positive treaty law, such as Moser, denied. According to 
him, such interventions were possible only if explicitly provided for in positive 
treaty law, as opposed to being permissible in the underlying normative frame-
work of natural law, and it was precisely the guarantee of Westphalia which 
provided the only permissible form of foreign intervention. It is clear, though, 
 125 Vattel, Law of Nations, vii.2.13, 8.1– 4. Michael Seidler, ‘Introduction,’ in Pufendorf, 
Introduction, xxii– xxiii.
 126 Pufendorf, Present State of Germany, 159.
 127 Ibid., 216.
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that scholars from both a natural law and a public law perspective agreed on 
the significance of the seminal nature of the peace settlement for the develop-
ment of the law of nations.128
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 chapter 9
Born to Rule: Burlamaqui and Rousseau 
on the Education of Princes
Lisa Broussois
1 The Barbarous Philosopher: Rousseau’s 
Critique of the Education of Princes
The opening lines of Rousseau’s Principles of the Right of War, probably mainly 
written in 1755– 1756,1 gave a radical critique of the literary world of the time. 
Rousseau denounced the gap he noticed between what was generally taught 
in books on law and ethics and the reality people had to face in their everyday 
lives. He began:
I open the books on right and on ethics; I listen to the scholars and juris-
consults and, moved by their ingratiating discourses, I deplore the miser-
ies of nature, I admire the peace and justice established by the civil order, 
I bless the wisdom of public institutions, and console myself for being 
a man by seeing that I  am a citizen. Fully instructed about my duties 
and happiness, I close the book, leave the class- room, and look around 
me […].2
What did Rousseau see around him? The answer was clear: the huge gap be-
tween the scholars and jurisconsults’ books and the real world. Nothing he had 
read in books could prepare him for facing the reality of his time. Rousseau 
used harsh words to describe it: misery, chaos, the more powerful with the laws 
on their side and the weakest being the unfortunate victims of an unjust sys-
tem. The worst of all our destructive creations that he mentioned was war. War 
 1 See Blaise Bachofen and Céline Spector, ‘Introduction: Jean- Jacques Rousseau, la guerre et 
la paix,’ in Principes du droit de la guerre, Écrits sur la paix perpétuelle, ed. B. Bachofen and 
C. Spector (Paris: Vrin, 2008), 10.
 2 Jean- Jacques Rousseau, ‘The State of War,’ in Rousseau, The Social Contract and other later 
political writings, ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 162. 
French edition: Jean- Jacques Rousseau, ‘Principes du droit de la guerre,’ in Principes du droit 
de la guerre, Écrits sur la paix perpétuelle, ed. Bachofen and Spector, 69.
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everywhere – war, which was the product of public institutions, the product 
of existing policies. He expressed his indignation: ‘So this is the fruit of these 
peaceful institutions! Pity, indignation swell up in the depths of my heart. Ah 
barbarous philosopher! Read us your book on a battlefield!’3
Indignation and pity were the only possible emotional reactions for a man 
who had decided to face the truth that public institutions and civil order were 
far from guaranteeing peace and justice and there was no wisdom to be found 
in them at all. Rousseau believed that experience was a better means of edu-
cation than books because books brought with them all the prejudices and 
the lies of their authors. Experience, at least, gave an opportunity to judge for 
oneself. Rousseau’s idea of education was, firstly, to preserve and protect chil-
dren from a culture that was harmful in order to have future individuals who 
were capable of judging for themselves. In Emile, his book on education, he 
insisted on this point: ‘I do not tire of repeating it: put all the lessons of young 
people in actions rather than in speeches. Let them learn nothing in books 
which experience can teach them’.4 He believed that reading books led to a 
habit of taking for granted what other people believed or wanted their readers 
to believe. Instead of developing their own thinking, young people were, little 
by little, deprived of their natural sense of judgment and were not able to think 
autonomously anymore. He explained:
We are bent over books from our childhood and accustomed to read with-
out thinking; what we read is all the less striking to us since we already 
contain within ourselves the passions and the prejudices which fill his-
tory and the lives of men, and therefore all [that] men do appears natural 
to us because we are outside of nature and judge others by ourselves.5
Teachers misled their pupils insofar as they filled the heads of young people 
with prejudices and made them become exactly like their educators. Rousseau 
pointed out that the teachers were, in general, not the best people to be taken 
as examples. Indeed, Rousseau believed that, unfortunately, philosophers writ-
ing on law and ethics not only created a gap between reality and their books, 
which were filled with prejudices, but also were ignorant of the very matter 
they were supposed to teach: ‘It is not philosophers who know men best. They 
 3 Rousseau, ‘The State of War,’ 162. Rousseau, ‘Principes du droit de la guerre,’ 69.
 4 Jean- Jacques Rousseau, Emile, or On Education (Hanover and London:  University Press of 
New England, 2010), 408. French edition:  Jean- Jacques Rousseau, Émile ou De l’éducation 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1969), 382.
 5 Rousseau, Emile or on Education, 396. Rousseau, Émile ou De l’éducation, 368.
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see them only through the prejudices of philosophy, and I know of no station 
where one has so many’.6
His critique of those philosophers, writers of books on law and ethics, pro-
fessors and jurists, went further. It was not just the gap between those books 
and reality that worried Rousseau, nor was it the ignorance of philosophers 
about what human beings were; it was also the support those philosophers 
gave to the political system, to the figure of the prince in monarchies who 
 oppressed his subjects. Rousseau strongly condemned what he called the 
interested author, the one who wrote books only for her/ his career and the 
 advantage it could create for her/ him, without caring about truth or authentic 
good and real justice. He observed:
The People grants neither pensions, nor positions, nor [University] chairs, 
nor memberships in Academies; why should it be protected? Magnani-
mous princes, I speak in the name of the literary establishment; oppress 
the people with a clear conscience; we expect everything from you alone; 
the people is no good to us.7
In Emile, he noticed how self- interested preceptors were and how bad was the 
result for the education of young people: ‘A preceptor thinks of his own inter-
est more than of his disciple’s. He is devoted to proving that he is not wasting 
his time and that he is earning the money he is paid. He provides the child with 
some easily displayed attainments that can be showed off when wanted’.8
The figure of the ‘barbarous philosopher’, eminent member of the ‘literary 
establishment’, was the exact opposite of what Rousseau aspired to be – to such 
an extent that he defined his own philosophical project in reaction to what 
these self- interested authors were doing. Rousseau’s aim was to study human 
institutions and call them into question through study of their first principles 
and, above all, he wanted to correct the ‘false ideas’ that these self- interested 
authors supported.9 In the books of self- interested authors could be found, for 
example, the idea that the aim of the government was public felicity and that 
the administration was acting in the public interest. But in book iii,  chapter 6 
of the Social Contract, ‘Monarchy’, Rousseau wrote the following:  ‘everything 
proceeds toward the same goal, it is true, but that goal is not public felicity, 
and the very force of the administration constantly works to the prejudice of 
 6 Rousseau, Emile, or On Education, 399. Rousseau, Émile ou De l’éducation, 371.
 7 Rousseau, ‘The State of War,’ 162. Rousseau, ‘Principes du droit de la guerre,’ 69– 70.
 8 Rousseau, Emile, or On Education, 306– 307. Rousseau, Émile ou De l’éducation, 260.
 9 Rousseau, ‘The State of War,’ 163. Rousseau, ‘Principes du droit de la guerre,’ 70.
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the State’. Did it serve to try to make people believe in lies? The truth was that 
princes acted in their own personal interest and did the contrary of what they 
should do in the public interest.10 Rousseau continued:
A political sermonizer may well tell them that since the people’s force is 
their force, their greatest interest is to have the people flourishing, nu-
merous, formidable; they know perfectly well that this is not true. […] 
I admit that, assuming always perfectly submissive subjects, it would be 
in the Prince’s interest that the people be powerful, so that this power, 
being his, might render him formidable to his neighbors […].11
Without doubt, a flourishing, numerous, and formidable people would be a 
great advantage for a prince, so that the state might be respected and feared, 
and might discourage attacks on its frontiers, but this would be the case only 
if the prince had ‘perfectly submissive subjects’. Princes were well aware that it 
was never in their private interest to have powerful subjects. It was thus useless 
to continue telling a prince that he should act in the interest of his people. The 
prince’s interest and the people’s interest differed too much.
Let us take for example the book of reference in Europe at the time for 
the education of princes, François Fénelon’s The Adventures of Telemachus. 
Fénelon’s Mentor was among those who defended this pattern. He taught 
Telemachus that the wise king saw to it that his subjects should live in abun-
dance and acted in the interest of their happiness.12 It is clear that Rousseau 
also had Hobbes in mind, as the Leviathan was presented as a manuscript to 
the future King Charles ii when they were both in exile in Paris. Hobbes hoped 
that the Leviathan would instruct the prince in the best methods of ruling. He 
explained:  ‘Now in Monarchy, the private interest is the same with the pub-
lique. The riches, power, and honour of a Monarch arise onely from the riches, 
strength, and reputation of his Subjects. For no King can be rich, nor glorious, 
 10 The same severe statement can be found in Rousseau’s Jugement sur la paix perpétuelle, 
in Principes du droit de la guerre, Écrits sur la paix perpétuelle, ed. Bachofen and Spector, 
118. Rousseau explained that kings’ actions pursued two goals: to spread their dominion 
beyond their country and to make their dominion more absolute within. Public felicity 
was a mere pretext.
 11 Rousseau, Of the Social Contract, in The Social Contract and other later political writings, 
ed. Gourevitch, 95. French edition:  Jean- Jacques Rousseau, Du contrat social (Paris: 
Flammarion, 2001), 106– 107.
 12 Fénelon, Telemachus, son of Ulysses, ed. and transl. Patrick Riley (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 16. Fénelon, Les aventures de Télémaque (Paris: Garnier, 1987), 
137.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simone Zurbuchen - 978-90-04-38420-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 09/19/2019 09:19:14AM
via University of Lausanne
Burlamaqui and Rousseau on the Education of Princes 233
nor secure; whose Subjects are either poore, or contemptible, or too weak 
through want, or dissention, to maintain a war against their enemies’.13 But the 
truth for Rousseau was the opposite: private and public interests were never 
the same, at least in a monarchy. Princes knew it and so did their instructors.
If princes read books on law and ethics, as Rousseau did, they would also 
recognize quickly enough that these books described a different world from 
the one they lived in. These books told people what they were supposed to 
be and what they should do. However, the truth was, firstly, that princes con-
sidered themselves different from other people and, secondly, that they had 
never been used to listening and obeying. The reality of the army and the court 
invited them instead to behave quite differently from the way philosophers 
claimed they should. Instead of learning about their duties as princes and 
about their responsibilities, princes were encouraged to act as they wished, 
without any care for the consequences and, worst of all, self- interested authors 
defended them and pretended to be unaware of the reality that was right in 
front of their eyes.
Fénelon’s Telemachus complained about the duplicity of a king’s entourage 
and thought a monarch was lost if she/ he could not resist flattery.14 But what 
happened in the real world? Princes were not morally good and not political-
ly responsible. These latter remarks also showed why the figure of the prince 
was important and, at the same time, why the situation seemed so desperate 
to Rousseau, because the solution to human misery might lie in the prince’s 
hands, but he was never up to the task. Rousseau was very pessimistic about 
the education of princes; indeed, in his view it was a complete failure. The 
problem was that the monarchic system was entirely corrupt. Even if the 
prince and the instructor had good intentions and wanted to make things 
right, there would still be the flattery of the court and the corruption of the 
army to spoil everything: ‘Everything conspires to deprive of justice and reason 
a man brought up to command others. Great pains are taken, so they say, to 
teach young Princes the art of ruling; it does not appear that this education 
profits them. It would be better to begin by teaching them the art of obeying’.15 
Even if a prince was, in the future, destined to rule, a young prince was not yet a 
ruler. He was a child, not a monarch. Children were not just future adults; they 
were already people with their own needs and their own identities. Raising a 
child as a prince meant that there was confusion between what the child was 
 13 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 131.
 14 Fénelon, Telemachus, 20. Fénelon, Les aventures de Télémaque, 141.
 15 Rousseau, Of the Social Contract, 97. Rousseau, Du contrat social, 110.
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and what he was supposed to become one day. Young princes were raised as if 
they were different from ordinary mortals: inevitably, the result was that they 
believed it and acted accordingly.
How could a prince be a good ruler if he was not able to put himself in 
the place of the people he commanded? Rousseau concluded by asking: ‘and 
if a royal education necessarily corrupts those who receive it, what can be 
 expected of a succession of men brought up to rule?’16 For Rousseau, self- 
interested authors pretended to be unaware of how royal education corrupted 
young princes. They taught them only how to make speeches using virtuous 
and noble vocabulary, but this fooled no one: ‘Our Authors have noticed these 
difficulties, but they have not been disturbed by them’.17
Unlike the ‘literary establishment’, Rousseau wanted to denounce these dif-
ficulties. This is probably one of the main reasons why Rousseau refused to 
advise the Swiss Reverdil to help the preceptor Reventlow in educating the 
future king Christian vii of Denmark.18 Rousseau’s rejection of the education 
of princes may appear surprising at first sight, knowing that his major work, 
Emile, focused on education. However, in Emile, Rousseau expressed his views 
even more clearly, recounting, for example, the following anecdote:
Someone of whom I know only the rank had the proposal to raise his 
son conveyed to me. He doubtless did me a great deal of honor; but far 
from complaining about my refusal, he ought to congratulate himself 
on my discretion. If I had accepted his offer and my method were mis-
taken, the education would have been a failure. If I had succeeded, it 
would have been far worse. His son would have repudiated his title; he 
would no longer have wished to be a prince. I am too impressed by the 
greatness of a preceptor’s duties, I  feel my incapacity too much ever 
 16 Rousseau, Of the Social Contract, 98. Rousseau, Du contrat social, 110– 111.
 17 Rousseau, Of the Social Contract, 99. Rousseau, Du contrat social, 111.
 18 See Michel Termolle, ‘Rousseau, conseiller pédagogique par correspondance,’ in Lire la 
correspondance de Rousseau, ed. Jacques Berchtold and Yannick Séité (Genève:  Droz, 
2007), Annales de la Société Jean- Jacques Rousseau 47, 309– 326. See also John Christian 
Laursen, ‘Télémaque manqué:  Reverdil at Court in Copenhagen,’ in Reconceptualizing 
Nature, Science, and Aesthetics: Contribution à une nouvelle approche des Lumières helvé-
tiques, ed. Patrick Coleman, Anne Hofmann, and Simone Zurbuchen (Genève: Slatkine, 
1998), 147– 156. More generally about Denmark- Norway, see Henrik Horstboll, 
‘Defending Monarchism in Denmark- Norway in the Eighteenth Century,’ in Monarchisms 
in the Age of Enlightenment: Liberty, Patriotism, and the Common Good, ed. Hans Blom, 
John Christian Laursen, and Luisa Simonutti (Toronto, Buffalo, London:  University of 
Toronto Press, 2007), 175– 193.
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to accept such employment from whatever quarter it might be offered 
to me.19
If Rousseau felt incapable of becoming a preceptor, it was because this function 
required him to comply with the established education practice and system 
of his time. Yet, Rousseau showed, in Emile, that the most important thing to 
learn could not be found in books on law or ethics, nor in a lecture room with 
a preceptor. Concerning Emile’s education, he said, ‘Living is the job I want to 
teach him. On leaving my hands, he will, I admit, be neither magistrate nor 
soldier nor priest. He will, in the first place, be a man’.20
If there was one thing that the education of princes did not provide, clearly 
it was the way to become a ‘man’. Emile was raised in the countryside, not in 
a palace surrounded by the court and the army. If Rousseau felt incapable of 
accepting such employment, it was because he did not want to become a self- 
interested author and he knew all too well that princes grew in an environ-
ment that would never allow them to become what they were supposed to be. 
He described the prince as a ‘factitious being’, corrupted by the court and the 
army as well as by the preceptor:
[A] fter having stifled his nature by passions that one has caused to be 
born in him – this factitious being is put in the hands of a preceptor who 
completes the development of the artificial seeds that he finds already 
all formed and teaches him everything, except to know himself, except 
to take advantage of himself, except to know how to live and to make 
himself happy.21
The result of such an education of princes was not long in coming and was the 
opposite of the result that should have been arrived at: ‘The rich, the nobles, 
the kings are all children who, seeing that men are eager to relieve their misery, 
derive a puerile vanity from that very fact and are very proud of care that one 
would not give to them if they were grown men’.22 For Rousseau, learning to 
be a citizen was not the principal task of education; first, children needed to 
learn how to become ‘men’. On the one hand, they needed to be preserved and 
protected from a culture that corrupted them and, on the other, they need-
ed to learn how to become free individuals. Authority was nothing without 
 19 Rousseau, Emile, or On Education, 176. Rousseau, Émile ou De l’éducation, 100.
 20 Rousseau, Emile, or On Education, 166. Rousseau, Émile ou De l’éducation, 88.
 21 Rousseau, Emile, or On Education, 174. Rousseau, Émile ou De l’éducation, 97.
 22 Rousseau, Emile, or On Education, 216. Rousseau, Émile ou De l’éducation, 146– 147.
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freedom and freedom was not the fate of the princes of this world because 
they would always need other people for everything. Princes were incapable of 
doing any thing by themselves. The truth was that men brought up to rule were 
men brought up to be slaves; they always depended on others and because of 
this they were miserable. What could an education do to free a human being 
from such a deplorable condition? Even worse: what could an education do for 
the sake of a nation ruled by such a miserable being?
2 Teaching the Laws of Justice and 
Humanity: Burlamaqui’s Royal Education
In order to seek answers to these questions, we must leave Rousseau to one 
side and join the opposite camp. To Rousseau’s question ‘what can be expected 
of a succession of men brought up to rule?’, Burlamaqui’s response was that 
there was much that might be expected (or so at least he claimed to believe).
The portrait Rousseau painted of the philosophers and the ‘literary estab-
lishment’ he criticized could, in many respects, call to mind Burlamaqui’s ac-
tions and works. Jean- Jacques Burlamaqui, born in Geneva just like Rousseau, 
was indeed a celebrated philosopher and jurist, who was professor of natu-
ral law and civil law at the Academy of Geneva (1723– 1739), and achieved the 
greatest political honours as a member of the councils of his native republic.23 
Frederick ii, Landgrave of Hessen- Kassel (son of William viii, nephew of the 
king of Sweden), came to Geneva in November 1732 and became Burlamaqui’s 
pupil in his classes on the law of nature. In 1734, when the prince left the city, 
Burlamaqui accompanied him and followed him to his court in Kassel.24 The 
prince later came back to Geneva and stayed until 1737. During all this time, 
Burlamaqui was in charge of educating the young prince about the law of na-
ture and the law of nations. When the two were not together, they continued 
their lessons by letter, with Burlamaqui sending exercises to the prince.
 23 In a funeral oration given in the Sovereign Council of Geneva, the general prosecutor 
Leonard Buisson said, about Burlamaqui: ‘Combien de lumières, en effet, combien de ver-
tus n’avons- nous point vu briller dans Monsieur le Conseiller Burlamaqui! En lui se sont 
trouvés réunis l’homme de lettre, le philosophe, l’orateur, le jurisconsulte, l’homme d’État’. 
[What lights, indeed, what virtues have we not seen shine in Councillor Burlamaqui! In 
him were united the man of letters, the philosopher, the orator, the jurisconsult, the 
statesman]. Cited after Bernard Gagnebin, Burlamaqui et le droit naturel (Geneva:  édi-
tions de la Frégate, 1944), 78.
 24 For an account of the particular circumstances in which the prince and Burlamaqui left 
Geneva, see Gagnebin, Burlamaqui et le droit naturel, 51– 68.
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Without asserting that Burlamaqui was necessarily one of Rousseau’s tar-
gets in the texts referred to above – even if Rousseau did mention Burlamaqui 
in his Second Discourse and otherwise critically engaged with his writings25 – it 
is difficult to avoid the impression that Burlamaqui matches Rousseau’s de-
scription of the self- interested author in many respects. However, despite this 
resemblance, it is important to ask what exactly Burlamaqui’s royal education 
consisted of and whether Rousseau’s critique of the ‘barbarous philosopher’ 
could really apply to Burlamaqui’s attempt to educate a young prince.26 I will 
also add that Rousseau’s judgment was not entirely negative concerning all 
the professors in Geneva and Paris. He often pointed out that the main prob-
lem was the entire educational system rather than the educators. Maybe Bur-
lamaqui was among those Rousseau had in mind when he said, ‘There are in 
the academy of Geneva and the University of Paris Professors whom I  like, 
whom I esteem very much and believe to be very capable of instructing the 
Young well, if they were not forced to follow the established practice’.27
What was the established practice in the case of Burlamaqui? Before an-
swering this question, let us first explain how Burlamaqui defended the le-
gitimacy of his royal education. To understand this, we need to focus on the 
role of the law of nature. Far from agreeing with the idea that royal education 
corrupted princes, Burlamaqui argued that this kind of education was abso-
lutely necessary to the process of founding a good government, which would 
respect the law of nature and nations. In other words, Burlamaqui believed, or 
at least seemed to believe, that it was possible to raise an enlightened prince if 
the prince was educated according to the law of nature. This idea was directly 
linked to his definition of the law of nature and the law of nations as being fun-
damentally one and the same thing. Burlamaqui sided with Pufendorf and Bar-
beyrac by maintaining, in his Principles of Politic Law, that the law of nations 
 25 See for example Robert Derathé, Jean- Jacques Rousseau et la science politique de son temps 
(Paris: Vrin, 1971), and Gabriella Silvestrini, Diritto naturale e volontà generale. Il contrat-
tualismo repubblicano di Jean- Jacques Rousseau (Torino: Claudiana, 2010), chap. 3.
 26 Jean- Jacques Rousseau, ‘Preface to the Discourse on the Origin and the Foundations of 
Inequality among Men,’ in Rousseau, The Discourses and other early political writings, 
ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 125– 26. French 
edition: Rousseau, Discours sur l’origine et les fondements de l’inégalité parmi les hommes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1969), 54. Rousseau said: ‘It is this ignorance of the nature of man that 
casts such uncertainty and obscurity on the genuine definition of natural right: for the 
idea of right, says M. Burlamaqui, and still more that of natural right, are manifestly ideas 
relative to the nature of man. Hence, he goes on, it is from this very nature of man, from 
his constitution and his state, that the principles of this science have to be deduced’.
 27 Rousseau, Emile, or On Education, 165, note. Rousseau, Émile ou De l’éducation, 86, note.
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was ‘no more than the laws of nature, which men, considered as members of 
society, in general, ought to practise towards each other’.28 He said, in his Prin-
ciples of Natural Law, that the law of nations was necessary ‘to serve as a rule 
for mutual commerce’ and that ‘this law [could] be nothing else but the law of 
nature itself ’.29
More precisely, Burlamaqui theorized the law of nations by dividing it into 
two types: first, the law of nations itself as universal, which was not different 
from the law of nature; second, the law of nations derived from conventions 
(between two or more states), which was obligatory only for the contracting 
states. However, the obligation linked to the second type of law of nations was 
the obligation of the law of nature itself (through the duty to respect our com-
mitments). In other words, the law of nations could not be understood as a 
separate entity from the law of nature. One problem for Burlamaqui was that 
distinguishing the law of nations from the law of nature had very dangerous 
consequences, in particular in relation to princes:
It is owing perhaps to our distinguishing the law of nations from the law 
of nature, that we have insensibly accustomed ourselves to form quite 
a different judgment between the actions of sovereigns and those of 
private people. Nothing is more usual than to see men condemned in 
common, for things which we praise, or at least excuse in the persons of 
princes.30
The most fundamental point for Burlamaqui was to show that princes were 
not different from the common people in relation to the law of nature and 
that they were subject to the same obligations. If princes needed to learn one 
thing in their classroom, it was that ‘there is only one sole and the same rule 
of justice for all mankind’. He carried on in the same passage:  ‘Princes who 
infringe the law of nations, commit as great a crime as private people, who vio-
late the law of nature: and if there be any difference in the two cases, it must be 
charged to the prince’s account, whose unjust actions are always attended with 
more dreadful consequences than those of private people’.
 28 Jean- Jacques Burlamaqui, The Principles of Natural and Politic Law, ed. Petter Korkman 
(Indianapolis, IN:  Liberty Fund, 2006), 288. French edition:  Jean- Jacques Burlamaqui, 
Principes du droit politique (Amsterdam: Zacarie Chatelain, 1751), 2– 3.
 29 Burlamaqui, The Principles of Natural and Politic Law, 116. French edition: Burlamaqui, 
Principes du droit naturel (Genève: Barrillot & Fils, 1747), 221.
 30 Burlamaqui, The Principles of Natural and Politic Law, 118. Burlamaqui, Principes du droit 
naturel, 226– 227.
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This refusal to distinguish between the law of nature and the law of nations 
grounded his definition of politics:
These remarks may serve to give us a just idea of that art, so necessary to 
the directors of states, and distinguished commonly by the name of Polity 
[Politics]. Polity [Politics] considered with regard to foreign states, is that 
ability and address by which a sovereign provides for the preservation, 
safety, prosperity and glory of the nation he governs, by respecting the 
laws of justice and humanity.31
The rules of the law of nature consisted of what reason approved and pre-
scribed as the best means for attaining happiness.32 Nevertheless, reason 
had to be exercised and this is why education was so important. It was not a 
question of preserving and protecting children so they would learn to judge 
for themselves. It was a question of exercising and developing a faculty that 
would allow them to judge rightly or correctly. In brief, princes could only 
succeed in realizing good policies and could only understand what politics 
was if, and only if, they learned to respect ‘the laws of justice and humanity’. 
What were these laws? They were nothing more than the laws of nature. The 
laws of nature were key to ensuring that the private interest of the prince and 
the public interest of his people were convergent. The role of the professor 
was clear: make sure that princes learned to govern on the basis of the law of 
nature. For Burlamaqui, the need for safety and security was not sufficient to 
ground the right of sovereignty. The right of sovereignty was justified insofar as 
it pursued public happiness. The role of the sovereign was to know the law of 
nature so she/ he could promulgate positive laws on this basis. The sovereign 
was never ‘the’ law but only an interpreter of the law of nature and because 
she/ he was an interpreter, it was better to be sure that her/ his education gave 
her/ him the necessary tools to interpret rightly.33
 31 Burlamaqui, The Principles of Natural and Politic Law, 117. Burlamaqui, Principes du droit 
naturel, 222.
 32 Burlamaqui, The Principles of Natural and Politic Law, 69. Burlamaqui, Principes du droit 
naturel, 58.
 33 See, for example, Jérémy Simonin, ‘L’homme et le citoyen dans la science du droit 
naturel de J.- J. Burlamaqui,’ in Genève et la Suisse dans la pensée politique, Actes du collo-
que de Genève (sept. 2006), ed. Michel Ganzin (Aix- en- Provence: Presses Universitaires 
d’Aix- Marseille, 2007), 89– 101. For more on Burlamaqui’s concept of sovereignty, see, 
for example, Gagnebin, Burlamaqui et le droit naturel, 183– 189, 234– 235, and Helena 
Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva, From the First Discourse to the Social Contract, 1749– 
1762 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 100– 101.
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For Rousseau, the problem was always that the prince never became the 
virtuous person he was supposed to be and that royal education did not help 
him to improve. For Burlamaqui though, correct study of the law of nature had 
the capacity to turn the prince into a good and virtuous person and to achieve 
some results. In truth, man’s nature consisted in exercising reason until he was 
able to know what the law of nature was. While Rousseau argued that learning 
too much about the science of reigning made princes ignorant of it, the point 
for Burlamaqui was to show that princes needed to stay in the classroom as 
long as necessary for them to learn the law of nature, because all their actions 
depended on their knowledge of the law of nature, on the battlefield as well as 
everywhere else.
In Burlamaqui’s teaching on the law of nature, there was, for example, the 
idea that the strength of a state, with regard to war, was its people and that the 
prince had ‘to neglect nothing that [could] either support or augment the num-
ber of them’.34 It was one of the main teachings of the law of nature to show 
the prince the importance of his people. Another important lesson was related 
to the prince’s training in relation to obedience. The written correspondence 
between Prince Frederick of Hessen- Kassel and Burlamaqui provides a better 
understanding of Burlamaqui’s method for teaching the law of nature to the 
prince correctly.35 One of the letters explained, for example, how the prince 
should study the law of nature when the professor was not with him (29 May 
1734, Burlamaqui to Frederick):
Have Mr. Schmerfeld come to your study at 9 o’clock. Settle him in the 
armchair beside your desk, then take your second ledger and continue to 
peruse from the place where you left off the day before yesterday. After 
that, give your paper to Mr. Schmerfeld who will question you. Repeat 
this little exercise until 10 o’clock strikes and I will vouch for the success 
of my method.
Burlamaqui concluded in this letter: ‘Sir, I give you frankly the whole secret of 
my art and should you make sustained use of it, you will soon be in a position 
to oust me’. At first, the study of the law of nature, at least when Burlamaqui 
was not with the prince, did not seem to be too demanding and to take too 
 34 Burlamaqui, The Principles of Natural and Politic Law, 291. Burlamaqui, Principes du droit 
politique, 10.
 35 Correspondence between Burlamaqui and Frederick of Hessen- Kassel, archival material 
from Staatsarchiv Marburg, replica accessed in Geneva Library, Facs 37, f. 90– 142 (my 
translation).
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much of the prince’s time. However, as the prince grew up, it appears that he 
had to spend more and more time in the study room so he could understand 
all the implications of the law of nature for his future career.
A letter dated 19th December 1735, from Burlamaqui to Frederick, was an 
exercise to test the prince’s ability to respond to the question of the usefulness 
of his education. In this letter, Burlamaqui asked the prince if those who were 
destined to rule should receive the same education as those destined to obey. 
Burlamaqui began by explaining the interest of such exercises to the prince:
That is to say, Sir, that all one may have learnt in the study room and 
beneath the eyes and the direction of a master is nothing if one does not 
then try to make use of it one’s self […]; your mind will work, you will set 
in motion your energy and your talents, you will train yourself in consis-
tent and sustained attention, which is more necessary to people of your 
standing than any other.
Burlamaqui then asked the prince:
In a word, I  ask whether it is just and fitting to subject those who are 
born to rule to the same schooling as those who are destined to obey 
and whether a little common sense and some slight knowledge of the sci-
ences does not suffice a prince for his glory and his happiness, provided 
that he learns early to know the world and, above all, that he is trained in 
the great art of war.
As we can guess, the answer was ‘no’. A little common sense and some slight 
knowledge of the sciences were not sufficient for princes. Princes needed to 
study the law of nature if they wanted to reign justly and rightly. Experience 
was not enough. Knowledge, exercise and attention were the key to success.
It was part of the prince’s training to be able to explain clearly the reasons 
why the law of nature was so important. Thus, Frederick accomplished the ex-
ercise and answered Burlamaqui’s question by repeating Burlamaqui’s lessons. 
Frederick began by pointing out that public happiness was the aim of politics 
and that it was by studying the law of nature that princes had the opportunity 
of realizing this aim. The prince ended with a reminder of the importance of 
leaving future governors in the study room, cut off from the world, until they 
learned what they needed to know (‘Answer to the First Letter’ by Frederick):
A prince, for example, who must one day be called to govern peoples, 
is naturally obliged to have as his principal object the happiness of his 
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people and from this it follows that the means apt to lead him to this 
end must be his principal occupation:  enlightening his mind through 
knowledge and shaping his heart through sustained attention; these are 
certainly the only means that might lead him there.
The prince carried on:
It is certain that neither the world nor the court nor the army can be 
the primary educator of a young prince. The flattery of one side and the 
dissipation and frequent opportunities to succumb to his passions of the 
other are too dangerous for a young man to be exposed to them. Still less 
would he be able to draw from them the knowledge that is necessary and 
suitable for the position he must occupy. Therefore, a young prince should 
be left in the study room until he is instructed in all that he must know.
Rousseau and Burlamaqui might agree on the idea that the court and the army 
were dangerous for a prince. The only difference was that Burlamaqui thought 
books could preserve and protect his student from bad influence whereas 
Rousseau thought that books were themselves part of the bad influence the 
prince needed to be preserved from.
Following Burlamaqui’s teaching, Frederick explained why he could not 
learn what he needed to know in the court or in the army and why he should 
be ‘left in the study room’ to be instructed by books instead of being instructed 
by the real world outside the classroom. He pointed out something important 
that he had been taught, namely that the virtues of war were not different from 
the virtues of justice and humanity. This confirms the connection Burlamaqui 
made between the law of nature and the law of nations. Prince Frederick had 
learned to condemn the consequences of war and knew the importance of 
learning to obey before learning to command. He concluded:
The virtues of war cannot dispense with justice, moderation, and human-
ity, which differs only by its application. Nonetheless, one cannot deny 
that peace is more advantageous a situation than war, whose unfortunate 
consequences are only too well known. In answer to your final question, 
I end by saying that he who cannot obey will never be able to rule well.
Even if Rousseau was sceptical about the benefit of a prince being ‘left in the 
study room’, he seemed to agree with Burlamaqui on the idea that learning 
obedience was one of the keys to a good royal education and that the conse-
quences of war were a disaster that needed to be avoided as far as possible. In 
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truth, there is apparent agreement between them on many points concerning 
the definition of what made a good basis for a successful royal education, but 
the major difference was that Rousseau thought it was not possible to succeed 
in this task, while Burlamaqui thought it was.
It might be thought that Rousseau’s pessimism and Burlamaqui’s optimism 
concerning royal education also depended on their personal situations. Bur-
lamaqui clearly belonged to the ‘literary establishment’ of his time, with all the 
honours that came with that position. He was a politician and committed pro-
fessor who was concerned about what could be done here and now, in the non- 
ideal situation of Europe at that time; he certainly had a pragmatic sensibility, 
which made him act in favour of princes, monarchs, and governments in pow-
er because it seemed to him that this was likely to give better results.36 Yet it is 
also true that Burlamaqui, just like Barbeyrac, was not particularly in favour of 
absolute monarchy. He clearly preferred a ‘tempered government’ with a mix 
of democratic and aristocratic elements.37 Burlamaqui was more optimistic 
than Rousseau, because he had better opportunities, giving him more reason 
to believe that his actions could have an impact in politics. He was, after all, 
directly in charge of a prince’s education and this function offered the prospect 
of great influence. But was it truly the case? Did the Burlamaquian education 
eventually bear fruit?
3 The Results: Two Burlamaquian Cases
It seems that only history can have the final word and be the judge of who 
was right, Rousseau or Burlamaqui, about the education of princes. Of course, 
most historical examples show that it is difficult to prove Rousseau wrong in 
his radical critique of royal education. At the same time, it may well be argued 
that princes could have been far worse without professors like Burlamaqui 
who tried to teach them the law of nature. We can at least credit Burlamaqui 
with the merit of having tried and we can analyse the results of his teachings 
to see if we can find a specimen of what we could call a Burlamaquian enlight-
ened prince.
 36 For an account of Burlamaqui’s role in politics, especially in relation to the troubles 
of 1734 in Geneva, see Gagnebin, Burlamaqui et le droit naturel, 51– 69. It appears 
that Burlamaqui preferred giving more support to the aristocracy in power than to the 
bourgeoisie.
 37 Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva, From the First Discourse to the Social Contract, 
1749– 1762, 100.
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I will let the reader judge for her/ himself and I will give only two potential 
candidates for the title of Burlamaquian enlightened prince, two examples 
that may provide an illustration of a prince educated on the law of nature. 
I am aware that the question ‘what is enlightened absolutism?’ is far from be-
ing resolved today and it is not my aim to try to answer it.38 I agree with Charles 
W. Ingrao when he explains, ‘it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the task 
of reaching a consensus had been complicated by an underlying clash of na-
tional cultural and historical perspectives’.39 I only propose here to look at two 
figures that might help us to determine how to consider the efficiency of Bur-
lamaqui’s royal education on the law of nature when it comes to practice.
For the first example, I return to Prince Frederick of Hessen- Kassel, since we 
know that he directly benefited from Burlamaqui’s teaching. Even if Frederick 
seemed to learn Burlamaqui’s lessons on the law of nature correctly, it is not 
certain that he could avoid Rousseau’s criticisms concerning the efficiency of 
his royal education. It is certainly one thing to learn correctly, but quite an other 
to apply what was taught. My second example is Gustav iii of Sweden because, 
even if Burlamaqui was not directly his professor, Gustav was educated using 
Burlamaqui’s writings and he is certainly often acknowledged today for being 
one of the figures of the eighteenth- century monarchic enlightenment.
First, Frederick of Hessen- Kassel. Of course, it is important to mention that 
Burlamaqui was not the only one in charge of the prince’s education. There 
were others:  for example, Jean- Pierre de Crousaz, former professor of philo-
sophy at the Academy of Lausanne, also had this task for a while. In any case, 
Prince Frederick grew up with the teachings of Burlamaqui’s law of nature and 
he was indeed known for being an enlightened monarch with respect to arts 
and letters. He admired the philosophers, for example Voltaire, and enjoyed 
writing some philosophical thoughts himself. The prince was well known for 
having enhanced the city of Kassel and its residential properties and he con-
tributed to the development of Marburg University. However, his reputation 
in other areas was more debatable. He was also very famous for his merce-
naries and he raised money by renting his soldiers out many times to those 
engaged in conflicts, including the American War of Independence, where he 
 38 As Tore Frängsmyr noted concerning the term ‘Enlightenment’, ‘Originally, the designa-
tion was used mainly for the French Enlightenment but it has since come to be used 
for rationalist currents of ideas of all possible types or as a purely chronological label’. 
‘Defining the Enlightenment: The Swedish Case,’ in Centre(s) and Margins, Enlightenment 
from Belfast to Beijing, ed. Marie- Christine Skuncke (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2003), 196.
 39 Charles W.  Ingrao, The Hessian Mercenary State: Ideas, Institutions, and Reform under 
Frederick II, 1760– 1785 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 3.
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sent troops to support Great Britain. If Frederick was a Burlamaquian enlight-
ened prince, he was one of a warlike kind. Ingrao commented: ‘Notwithstand-
ing everything that he imbibed from the Enlightenment’s teaching of natural 
law, it was inevitable that Frederick would derive a more sanguine attitude 
toward the military and warfare. […] Like all Hessian princes he was trained to 
be a soldier’.40 Because of this mixture of Enlightenment with military temper, 
it is not certain that Frederick would have fulfilled Rousseau’s criteria or would 
have gained his approval.
Second, let us consider Gustav iii of Sweden as another example of an 
eighteenth- century prince educated with Burlamaqui’s books on law and 
ethics. Gustav was born in 1746 and ruled between 1771 and 1792. In 1756, Count 
Carl Fredrik Scheffer, well known in the philosophical circles of Paris, became 
the prince’s new governor and educated him in contemporary political theo-
ry, with an emphasis on the works of Locke, Wolff, and Burlamaqui.41 In his 
instructions to the prince’s preceptor in 1757, Scheffer explained that once 
the prince had gained clear and accurate notions of his duties as a ‘man’, he 
needed to learn in an orderly and systematic way what were his duties as a 
member of civil society. Scheffer thought that Burlamaqui’s work was appro-
priate as Gustav’s manual because it was a short but solid system of the law of 
nature and nations. He thought it was also the most convincing work in terms 
of proving that unlimited despotism was as dangerous for the prince as it was 
for the prince’s subjects and that the best government for all was grounded on 
political freedom and demarcated by fundamental laws.42 As Marie- Christine 
 40 Ingrao, The Hessian Mercenary State, 15.
 41 Pièces concernant l’éducation du prince royal, à présent roi de Suède par son excellence Mr 
le Comte Charles de Scheffer, sénateur du royaume et commandeur des ordres du roi, &c., 
traduites du suédois (Stockholm: H. Fougt, 1773), 5– 6:  ‘pour parvenir à donner à S.A.R 
des idées claires et évidentes des vertus et des vices, il est important qu’on lui fasse con-
naître quelque ouvrage qui traite la morale systématiquement. À cet effet je recommande 
à Mr le Conseiller de faire étudier à S.A.R l’extrait que j’ai tiré des ouvrages de Wolff, de 
Locke, de Burlamaqui et d’autres’. [In order to succeed in giving hrh clear and evident 
ideas on virtues and vices, it is important that he is given to study some work that treats 
of morality systematically. With this in mind, I recommend that the Councillor has hrh 
study the extract I have taken from the works of Wolff, Locke, Burlamaqui and others], my 
translation.
 42 Pièces concernant l’éducation du prince royal, 6– 7: ‘Un système court mais solide du droit 
de la nature et des gens, qui depuis quelques années a été publié à Genève, peut servir à 
Mr le conseiller pour ce genre d’instruction, et je recommande d’autant plus volontiers 
ce petit ouvrage, qu’il est de tous ceux que je connais sur ce sujet, celui qui prouve d’une 
manière plus convaincante, que le despotisme illimité est aussi dangereux pour le prince, 
que pour les sujets ; qu’au contraire la liberté politique, et une puissance royale bornée 
par des lois fondamentales, étant plus conformes à la loi naturelle, constituent aussi le 
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Skuncke explains, limited monarchy appeared to be the best form of govern-
ment in accordance with the law of nature.43 Just like Frederick, Gustav had 
to spend most of his days in the lecture room and Scheffer prescribed that the 
prince had first to study the law of nature and nations before he could study 
Swedish public law.44
Hildor Arnold Barton underlines the fact that catalogues in the Royal Li-
brary in Stockholm showed that Gustav’s personal library was voluminous and 
that he quickly acquired the latest works of the Enlightenment.45 Gustav was 
fond of theatre and wrote some pieces himself. He met various philosophers 
in Paris, including Helvetius, Marmontel, Grimm, Quesnay, d’Alembert, and 
the elder Mirabeau. He also visited Rousseau and, even if Gustav seemed to 
prefer Voltaire’s ideas to Rousseau’s critique of sciences and arts and to the 
Social Contract,46 Barton also evokes Gustav’s ‘undeniable fascination’ with 
Rousseau.47 Burlamaqui’s work also seemed to have a place of honour in the 
prince’s Order of the Arc.48
gouvernement le plus glorieux pour les rois, et le plus avantageux pour les hommes en 
général’. [A short but solid system on the law of nature and nations, published some years 
ago in Geneva, might serve the Councillor for this type of instruction and I recommend 
wholeheartedly this short work which is, of all those I know on this subject, that which 
proves most convincingly that unlimited despotism is as dangerous for the prince as for 
his subjects, that, on the contrary, political liberty and a royal power limited by funda-
mental laws, conforming more closely to the law of nature, constitute the most glorious 
form of government for kings and the most advantageous for men in general].
 43 Marie- Christine Skuncke, ‘Un prince suédois auteur français: l’éducation de Gustave iii, 
1756– 1762,’ Studies on Voltaire & the Eighteenth Century 296 (1992), 127.
 44 Pièces concernant l’éducation du prince royal, 12:  ‘chaque jour de la semaine, excepté 
le dimanche, depuis dix heures du matin jusqu’à une heure après midi, et depuis trois 
 heures du soir jusqu’à six’ and ‘lorsque S.A.R aura fait assez de progrès dans le droit pub-
lic universel et le droit des gens pour qu’on puisse commencer son instruction dans le 
droit public de la patrie, c’est- à- dire, dans les lois fondamentales de la Suède, on commu-
niquera à Mr le conseiller une instruction particulière sur ce sujet délicat’. [Every day of 
the week, Sunday excepted, from ten in the morning until one in the afternoon and from 
three in the afternoon until six] and [when hrh has made sufficient progress in universal 
public law and the law of the people for his instruction to be begun in the country’s public 
law, that is, the fundamental laws of Sweden, particular instruction on this delicate sub-
ject will be sent to the Councillor].
 45 Hildor Arnold Barton, Essays on Scandinavian History (Carbondale:  Southern Illinois 
University Press, 2008), 17.
 46 Barton, Essays on Scandinavian History, 19.
 47 Ibid., 37.
 48 Skuncke, ‘Un prince suédois auteur français:  l’éducation de Gustave iii, 1756– 1762,’ 
148– 153.
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That said, the question ‘Was Gustav a tyrant or an enlightened prince?’ is 
still subject to debate. During Gustav’s life, his contemporaries’ opinions were 
already divergent on this question. Skuncke points out that Gustav was one of 
the most controversial kings of Sweden. She also describes the tensions around 
Gustav’s education, between his mother, partisan of absolutism, and his edu-
cators, assigned with the charge of teaching him that the present system of 
government in Sweden was the best possible.49 Even though Claude Nord-
mann underlines the ambiguity of Gustav and the complexity of judging of his 
actions during his reign, he mentions at the same time that he was unquestion-
ably ‘one of the most brilliant personalities of the rich eighteenth century’.50 
Gustav was, according to him, ‘a model of the enlightened absolutist’, ‘idealist’, 
‘liberal by inclination’, ‘a Caesarean democrat who conducted a domestic pol-
icy of orders’, ‘levelling, seeking equality for everyone, but following tortuous 
paths’.51 He was also a patron of the arts and letters and allowed his country 
to fully participate in the Enlightenment. The published correspondence be-
tween Scheffer and Gustav helped to spread the image of an enlightened mon-
arch across Europe.52
The assessment of his reign is, however, complex and I will not try to pro-
vide an overview here. I  will simply go on with another of Nordmann’s ob-
servations, that Gustav was a committed person, engaged in the intellectual 
movement of his time, open- minded, but that he was also the victim of a real 
‘disequilibrium between his ambitions and his possibilities’.53 Gustav was the 
one responsible for a law that progressively restricted the freedom of the press 
(1774) but he was also the one who engaged in social egalitarian reforms (1789) 
and he was finally murdered.
Two important limitations that bring into question the unmitigated suc-
cess of Burlamaqui’s education can be inspired respectively by Ingrao’s work 
on Frederick and the Pieces Concerning the Education of the Royal Prince with 
Scheffer’s instructions for educating Gustav. These limitations may justify a be-
lief that Rousseau could have been wrong when he stated that ‘a royal education 
necessarily corrupts those who receive it’ because neither Frederick nor Gustav 
 49 Skuncke, ‘Un prince suédois auteur français:  l’éducation de Gustave iii, 1756– 1762,’ 
125– 137.
 50 Claude Nordmann, Gustave III Un démocrate couronné (Lille:  Presses Universitaires du 
Septentrion, 1986), 1, my translation.
 51 Nordmann, Gustave III Un démocrate couronné, 265.
 52 Skuncke, ‘Un prince suédois auteur français:  l’éducation de Gustave iii, 1756– 1762,’ 
157– 158.
 53 Nordmann, Gustave III Un démocrate couronné, 1.
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seemed to have been corrupted by their Burlamaquian education. At the same 
time, Burlamaqui could have been wrong for having been too confident in the 
possibilities of an education based on the law of nature, which was surely not 
enough to produce either a good prince or a good government. So Burlama-
quian education may have been partly successful but some other elements may 
have prevented it really bearing fruit. Ingrao points out, for example:
[T] he Frederician regime was obliged to contend with preexisting struc-
tures that were essentially inimical to the thrust of its programs: unfavora-
ble demographic and economic circumstances, entrenched  institutions 
that enjoyed lives and constituencies of their own, and existing phi-
losophies of government not wholly compatible with the new ideas of 
 government reformers.54
In truth, this difficulty had already been pointed out by Rousseau, who had 
noticed that the system and the established practice were the core of the prob-
lem, even when the preceptor was not corrupt (or at least when he was not 
entirely corrupt). The prince was not the sole element in need of education – 
the role of bureaucracy was important and the government always functioned 
by consensus.
So, if we allow that Burlamaqui was successful in his attempt to educate 
Prince Frederick using the law of nature, that was still no guarantee of success-
ful reforms for the government because the prince, even the absolutist prince, 
was just an element of the system – the other parts had not all been educated 
using the law of nature. However, this fact did not prevent Ingrao from gather-
ing sufficient quantitative evidence to support the idea that ‘despite its limits, 
failures, and costs, the Frederician regime succeeded in improving the quality 
of life of most Hessians’.55 This means that some seeds of Burlamaquian En-
lightenment may have given good results in this case.
The Pieces underlined another difficulty that could hinder a prince’s educa-
tion. Scheffer emphasized the importance of the condition of the prince him-
self, because reforms could not be undertaken if the prince was not heard, nor 
loved, nor respected by his subjects. He explained:
If Mgr the prince royal, as there is every reason to presume, makes great 
progress in all the areas of science just mentioned, he will certainly be a 
 54 Ingrao, The Hessian Mercenary State, 11.
 55 Ibid., 209.
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very enlightened and highly educated prince, but that is not what makes 
the king’s happiness, nor what makes him worthy of his people’s love. 
That requires more feeling than reason; it requires a high and noble soul, 
a gentle character, a heart filled with benevolence and love for men. To 
provide the young prince these great benefits, we must, while cultivating 
his reason, pay constant attention to his heart and his personality and 
conduct, as far as possible, all his studies in such a way that his heart 
might be touched, purified, imbued with desire for the love, esteem, and 
attachment of men.56
Reason without feeling or more reason than feeling – perhaps in this lay one 
major difficulty that could not be solved by a Burlamaquian education based 
on the law of nature alone. In Emile, Rousseau pointed out what appeared to 
him as a weakness of the law of nature, at least the law of nature as it was 
taught in his time. He said that ‘the entire right of Nature is only a chimera 
if it is not founded on a natural need in the human heart’. As for the law of 
nature, it had to be based on feeling: ‘From this I conclude that it is not true 
that the precepts of natural law are founded on reason alone. They have a base 
more solid and sure. Love of men derived from love of self is the principle of 
human justice’.57 However, this principle of human justice was not to be found 
directly in books. Even less was it to be found in philosophers’ books, because 
they judged others by themselves and gave a wrong description of humanity. 
Reading books was not the best way to feel love for men and benevolence. 
Only a natural feeling such as love of self could lead the way, if it was not too 
far perverted by education.
This difficulty was clearly linked to the point made by Rousseau above, 
namely that princes needed to learn how to become ‘men’. This was even 
more important if it was connected to the importance of deserving the love 
 56 Pièces concernant l’éducation du prince royal, 13– 14: ‘Si Mgr le prince royal, comme on a 
tout lieu de le présumer, fait de grands progrès dans toutes les parties des sciences qu’on 
vient d’énoncer, il sera certainement un prince très éclairé et très instruit ; mais ce n’est 
pas là ce qui fait le bonheur d’un roi, ni ce qui le rend digne de l’amour de son peuple. Il 
faut pour cela plus de sentiment que d’esprit ; il faut une âme noble et élevée, un caractère 
doux, un cœur rempli de bienfaisance et d’amour pour les hommes. Pour procurer au 
jeune prince ces grands avantages, on doit, en cultivant son esprit, porter une attention 
continuelle sur son cœur et sur son caractère et diriger autant qu’il est possible toutes 
ses études de manière que le cœur puisse être touché, épuré, pénétré du désir d’obtenir 
l’amour, l’estime et l’attachement des hommes’.
 57 Rousseau, Emile or on Education, 389, text and note. Rousseau, Émile ou De l’éducation, 
359, text and note.
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of the people. A prince could not be followed if his people did not love him 
and the prince could not deserve the love of his people if he was incapable of 
benevolence and love of men. The process of the prince’s identification with 
the rest of humanity was only possible if the prince did not stay cut off from 
the rest of the world. Too many books, too many hours spent in the classroom, 
and eventually no one on the battlefield to look around and to repeat after 
Rousseau, ‘Pity, indignation swell up in the depths of my heart!’ And what was 
more natural than pity and indignation in the face of the reality of the world? 
It seemed that experience could teach what scholars and jurisconsults could 
never demonstrate in a lecture room. But people living in the real world had no 
choice but to face reality and, surely, a prince who could not face reality with 
his people could never be loved and respected. Princes incapable of feeling 
pity and indignation, incapable of benevolence and love of men were neither 
lovable nor respectable. People needed to love and to respect a ‘man’ before 
they could love and respect a prince.
Burlamaqui did not make the distinction between educating someone to 
become a ‘man’ and educating someone to become a citizen. Maybe it was be-
cause Burlamaqui did not believe that it was part of his role to do so or, more 
likely, he did not agree with Rousseau’s idea that the major role of education 
was to make a child become a ‘man’. Childhood for Rousseau was the moment 
of life to open up to the world and to others. If this opportunity was missed, 
it could be lost forever. Clearly, there is a deeper disagreement here between 
the two philosophers about what was human nature and what was its perfect-
ibility. In any case, it appears that Scheffer tried to combine a Burlamaquian 
education and a Rousseauist one when he wrote his instructions to the prince’s 
preceptor – he wanted to educate Gustav to become both a ‘man’ and a prince, 
assuming that was compatible. Maybe it was, despite what Rousseau claimed. 
But then it was entirely in the hands of the preceptor to succeed in this task – 
certainly a heavy burden for a person.
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 chapter 10
Defining the Law of Nations: the École romande 
du droit naturel and the Lausanne Edition 
of Grotius’ De jure belli ac pacis (1751– 1752)
Simone Zurbuchen
1 Introduction
The single most important Swiss contribution to the law of nations in the 
eighteenth century is Emer de Vattel’s treatise Le Droit des Gens, ou Principes de 
la Loi Naturelle, appliqués à la Conduite & aux Affaires des Nations & des Souve-
rains (1758).1 Unlike Jean Barbeyrac and Jean- Jacques Burlamaqui, whose repu-
tation as outstanding natural law scholars is to a lesser or greater extent linked 
with their being teachers of natural law at the Protestant academies of Lau-
sanne and Geneva, Vattel remained for most of his life an independent scholar 
and towards the end of his life became the chief advisor to the government of 
Saxony on foreign affairs. Had Frederick ii of Prussia been willing to keep his 
father’s promise to found an academy in Neuchâtel, Vattel might well have be-
come a teacher of the law of nature and nations in his native principality, and 
thereby resumed the project of lecturing on natural law conceived by Louis 
Bourguet, who from 1731 to 1742 held the chair of philosophy and mathematics 
sponsored by the town of Neuchâtel and the guilds, and who also lectured on 
natural law.2
As a classic in the field, Vattel’s treatise is well known, and scholars are 
aware that his main reference was Christian Wolff, whose theory of the law of 
 1 Emer de Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle, appliqués à la Conduite & 
aux Affaires des Nations & des Souverains (Londres, 1758). The book was actually printed in 
Neuchâtel in 1757.
 2 On Bourguet see Sophie Bisset, ‘Exploring the parameters of the école romande du droit 
naturel in the Journal helvétique:  the case of Louis Bourguet’s “Four letters on Leibniz”,’ in 
Lectures du ‘Journal helvétique’, 1732– 1782, ed. Séverine Huguenin and Timothée Léchot 
( Geneva: Slatkine, 2016), 315– 328; Sophie Bisset, ‘The reception of Pufendorf and Leibniz in 
the early école romande du droit naturel: Jean Barbeyrac and Louis Bourguet,’ Etudes Lumièrs.
Lausanne, no. 7, février 2019, http:// lumieres.unil.ch/ fiches/ biblio/ 9475/ ; Simone Zurbuchen, 
‘Bourguet, Louis (1678– 1742),’ in The Dictionary of Eighteenth- Century German Philosophers, 
ed. Heiner F. Klemme and Manfred Kuehn, vol. 1 (London: Continuum, 2010), 135– 137.
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nations he wanted to ensure a reception in the polite world. To achieve this, 
he renounced his original idea to simply translate Wolff ’s Jus gentium methodo 
scientifica pertractatum (1749) into French. In order to get rid of the mathe-
matical method the German philosopher applied, he eventually decided to 
write a work of his own. The extent to which Vattel was indebted to Wolff is 
further documented by his critical observations on Wolff ’s work on the law of 
nature.3 While it is most likely that Vattel studied natural law with Burlamaqui 
in  Geneva, he never attested any close affiliation with Samuel Pufendorf ’s the-
ory of the law of nature and nations, which was mainly taught in the Suisse 
romande as well as in other parts of the Helvetic Confederation. Quite to the 
contrary, Vattel showed a great deal of interest in Leibniz’ philosophy, which he 
vindicated in his Défense du système Leibnizien contre les objections et les impu-
tations de Mr. de Crousaz (1741), and he attempted to defend a middle position 
in the famous controversy on the principle of obligation between Barbeyrac 
and Leibniz in his Essai sur le fondement du droit naturel (1747).4 It may well be 
that his endeavour to secure Leibniz from Barbeyrac’s vigorous critique was in-
fluenced by Bourguet, who was also a great admirer of Leibniz, but eventually 
nuanced his position for prudential reasons, when he considered applying for 
Barbeyrac’s position at the Academy of Lausanne upon the latter’s departure 
in 1718.5
So far, much of the research devoted to the Swiss school (or école romande) 
of natural law has focused on natural and politic law. Almost nothing is known 
about the teaching and publishing activities related to the law of nations prior 
to the publication of Vattel’s treatise.6 Curiously, the new edition of Hugo Gro-
tius’ De jure belli ac pacis, which appeared in five volumes in Lausanne in 1751– 
1752, has never been commented upon, although it was later praised as one of 
the best editions of this work.7 In what follows, I will first provide information 
 3 Vattel drafted his Questions de droit naturel, et observations sur le Traité du droit de la nature 
de M. le baron de Wolf in 1753. The book was published in 1762.
 4 On Vattel’s career see Simone Zurbuchen, ‘Emer de Vattel on the Society of Nations and the 
Political System of Europe,’ in System, Order, and International Law, ed. Stefan Kadelbach, 
Thomas Kleinlein and David Roth- Isigkeit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 263– 282, 
and further references there.
 5 Bisset, ‘The reception of Pufendorf and Leibniz,’ p. 5.
 6 For a brief overview, see Peter Haggenmacher, ‘Völkerrecht,’ in Historisches Lexikon der 
Schweiz, accessed 2 January 2018, http:// www.hls- dhs- dss.ch/ textes/ d/ D9619.php.
 7 In his German translation of Grotius’ work, published in 1869, J.H. von Kirchmann stresses 
the originality of the Lausanne edition: ‘Das Werk, das hier zunächst interessiert, “Ueber das 
Recht des Krieges und des Friedens”, ist bisher noch nicht in das Deutsche übersetzt worden. 
Die besten Ausgaben des Originaltextes sind die von Gronow, mit schätzbaren Anmerkun-
gen, von Barbeyrac und von Samuel Cocceji. Letztere ist in Lausanne in 4 Quartbänden 
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about the teaching and the literary production related to the law of nations in 
the Suisse romande and hence the context of the Lausanne edition of Grotius. 
We will see that the distinguishing feature of this edition is the incorporation 
of the extended commentaries on Grotius’ theory of the law of nature and na-
tions by Heinrich and Samuel Cocceji (father and son), which had first been 
published in Breslau (Wratislavia) as Grotius illustratus (1744– 1752).8 Taking ac-
count of the Coccejis’ vigorous critique of Grotius’ dualist account of the law 
of nations, I will proceed, secondly, to a comparative account of the definition 
of the law of nations from Grotius via Pufendorf, Barbeyrac and Burlamaqui 
to Vattel. This conceptual analysis will lead to the conclusion that while the 
Lausanne edition of Grotius was most likely undertaken for commercial rea-
sons, it also strengthened the position of the adherents to Samuel Pufendorf ’s 
naturalist theory of the law of nations, who were predominant in the école 
romande, until Vattel resumed the Grotian tradition in his highly influential 
Law of Nations.
2 The Lausanne Edition of Grotius in Context
It is useful to recall that, in contradistinction to the Academy of Lausanne, 
which created its first law chair in 1711, when Barbeyrac was appointed, its 
Genevan counterpart had established its law school during the Reformation. 
This helps to explain why the law of nature and nations was taught in Geneva 
even before Barbeyrac’s French translations of Pufendorf ’s works became the 
main reference for teaching the subject.9 Indeed, two of the Geneva law pro-
fessors probably began teaching the law of nations on the basis of Grotius’ De 
jure belli ac pacis in the last quarter of the seventeenth century. One of them 
was Philipp Reinhard Vitriarius (1647– 1720), who had studied law with Johann 
Heinrich Boecler at the University of Strasbourg and was professor of civil law 
erschienen. Schon Gr. hatte seinem Werke bei einer späteren Auflage im Jahre 1632 Noten 
beigesetzt. Diese und die von Gronow sind in der Ausgabe von Cocceji mit abgedruckt und 
ihnen sind weitläufige Excurse über naturrechtliche Fragen beigegeben’. See Hugo Grotius, 
Recht des Krieges und des Friedens, transl. J.H.  von Kirchmann, vol. 1 (Berlin:  L. Heimann, 
1869), 14.
 8 Henrici de Cocceji, Grotius illustratus seu commentarii ad Hugonis Grotii de juri belli ac pacis 
libros III, ed. Samuel de Cocceji, 4 vols. (Wratislaviae: Johann Jacob Korn, 1744– 1752).
 9 In what follows, I will focus on the law of nations only. For a general account of the teaching 
of the law of nature and nations in the Swiss context see Simone Zurbuchen, ‘Teaching the 
Law of Nature and Nations in the Swiss Context,’ Etudes Lumières.Lausanne, no. 6, novembre 
2018, http:// lumieres.unil.ch/ fiches/ biblio/ 9472/ .
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at the Academy of Geneva from 1677 to 1682, before he moved to the University 
of Leiden. In Geneva, Vitriarius taught three courses on the Institutes, i.e. Ro-
man law, and one course on questions of law. The latter was dedicated to the 
public law of the German Empire, but perhaps also to the law of nature and 
nations according to Grotius.10 I am inclined to think so because he published 
in 1692 the Institutiones juris naturae et gentium. This book was re- edited sev-
eral times; in 1745 by Marc- Michel Bousquet in Lausanne,11 who also brought 
out the annotated edition of Grotius. In his Histoire de l’Université de Genève, 
Charles Borgeaud indicates that Bénigne Mussard (1657– 1722), honorary pro-
fessor of civil law from 1682 to 1685, was asked to produce the commentary on 
Grotius’ De jure belli ac pacis.12 The teaching of the law of nations was later 
resumed by Burlamaqui, who lectured on the law of nature and nations on the 
basis of Barbeyrac’s translations of Pufendorf ’s works.13
Turning to the Academy of Lausanne, the first text we need to consider is 
the amply annotated French translation of Grotius’ major work on which Bar-
beyrac was working in Lausanne, Du droit de la guerre et de la paix, first pub-
lished in Amsterdam in 1724.14 It was, however, not Barbeyrac himself, but his 
successor to the chair of natural law and history, Charles- Guillaume Loys de 
Bochat (1695– 1754), who rendered prominent the law of nations in the Swiss 
context. Since he is a virtually unknown figure, I will present him here in some 
detail.15
 10 Charles Borgeaud, Histoire de l’Université de Genève. L’Académie de Calvin, 1559– 1798 
(Geneva: Georg & Cie., 1900), 386– 389.
 11 Philipp Reinhard Vitriarius, Institutiones juris naturae et gentium […] ad methodum 
Hugonis Grotii (Lausanne: Antoine Chapuis, 1745). The publisher, Bousquet, closely col-
laborated with the printer, Chapuis.
 12 Borgeaud, Histoire de l’Université de Genève, 507.
 13 In addition to the Principes du droit naturel (1747) and the Principes du droit politique 
(1751), first translated into English by Thomas Nugent in 1748 and 1752, and published 
together in 1763 as Principles of Natural and Politic Law, ed. and with an introduction 
by Petter Korkman (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2006), I will also refer below to the 
Principes du droit de la nature et de gens, ed. by Fortuné- Barthélemy de Félice, 8  vols. 
(Yverdon: [de Félice], 1766– 1768), who referred to Burlamaqui’s lecture notes that sur-
vived in the library.
 14 Hugues Grotius, Le droit de la guerre et de la paix, transl. Jean Barbeyrac (Amsterdam: Pierre 
de Coup, 1724). See Philippe Meylan, Jean Barbeyrac (1674– 1744) et les débuts de l’en-
seignement du droit dans l’ancienne Académie de Lausanne (Lausanne: F. Rouge & Cie., 
1937), 84– 86.
 15 On Loys de Bochat, see Jean- François Poudret et al., L’enseignement du droit à l’Académie 
de Lausanne aux XVIII et XIXe siècles (Université de Lausanne, 1987), 29– 38; Meylan, 
Jean Barbeyrac, 159–1 71, 208– 209; Henry Perrochon, ‘Un savant d’autrefois:  G.- Ch. 
Loys de Bochat (1695– 1754),’ Revue historique vaudoise 49 (1941):  29– 33; [J.A.D. 
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Loys de Bochat first studied philosophy with Jean- Pierre de Crousaz in Lau-
sanne, then theology at the University of Basel. Due to ill health, he needed to 
return home, and he studied law under Barbeyrac. In 1716, he continued his 
study of law at the University of Basel, and in 1717 he defended his disserta-
tion there, De optimo principe.16 In the same year, the chair of natural law and 
history at the Academy of Lausanne became vacant, and both Barbeyrac and 
de Crousaz petitioned the authorities of Berne on behalf of Louis Bourguet’s 
candidacy for the chair. Given that Barbeyrac’s main argument against the ap-
pointment of his former student was that the latter had ‘studied law for two 
years at most’ with ‘no hint of erudition’,17 it is not surprising that the Bernese 
authorities encouraged Loys de Bochat to complete his education abroad, by 
granting him a stipend. Before he began teaching in Lausanne, he studied at 
different universities, notably at Halle and at Leiden.
As professor in Lausanne (1721– 1740), Loys de Bochat became well known 
for the new method he introduced in his public courses on history, whereby 
historical events were considered to be ‘secondary sources of instruction’ and 
there was discussion of ‘how the principles of natural law, of the law of nations, 
of public law, of politics and morality’ were to be applied and developed in var-
ious contexts.18 The branch of history he was most interested in and which had 
so far not been taught at Lausanne was ecclesiastical history. In 1733, the public 
course on natural law was replaced by the course on ecclesiastical history. In 
his private courses, which took up several hours a day, Loys de Bochat dealt 
with natural and civil law. From 1725 onwards, he functioned as assessor of the 
local law court; when he was appointed lieutenant baillival (that is, local substi-
tute of the reeve), he renounced the chair at the Academy. In 1750, he was even-
tually appointed contrôleur général. In addition to his public positions, Loys de 
Bochat founded, together with his friend Gabriel Seigneux de Correvon, the 
journal Bibliothèque italique ou Histoire littéraire de l’Italie (1728– 1734), pub-
lished by Marc- Michel Bousquet in Geneva.19 He also initiated the foundation 
Clavel de Brenles], Eloge historique de Monsieur Charles Guillaume Loys de Bochat 
(Lausanne: Antoine Chapuis, 1755).
 16 Charles- Guillaume Loys de Bochat, Dissertatio inauguralis juridica de optimo principe 
(Basileae: typis Friderici Lüdij, 1717).
 17 Barbeyrac in a letter to Bourguet, 28th May 1717, quoted by S.  Bisset, ‘The reception 
of Pufendorf and Leibniz,’ p. 3. On Loys de Bochat’s nomination see also Meylan, Jean 
Barbeyrac, 159– 166.
 18 Clavel de Brenles, Eloge historique, 9– 10.
 19 On this journal see Francesca Bianca Crucitti- Ullrich, ‘Bibliothèque italique (1728– 1734),’ 
in Dictionnaire des Journaux 1600– 1789, accessed 2 February 2018, http:// dictionnaire- 
journaux.gazettes18e.fr/ journal/ 0165- bibliotheque- italique.
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of the book store of the publishing company Marc- Michel Bousquet & Cie. at 
Place St.- François in Lausanne in 1736, and he became an influential member 
of the Société du comte de la Lippe, a local society founded in 1742 in Lausanne 
that took care of the education of the young earl Simon August von Lippe- 
Detmold.20
It seems that Loys de Bochat got involved with the law of nations when he 
adopted the task of defending the Swiss practice of mercenary service abroad 
against an anonymous critique, first published as a short letter in the Journal 
littéraire de la Haye (1724) and addressed to Jean- Pierre de Crousaz. This cri-
tique was at the origin of a lengthy debate that Loys de Bochat made public 
in a volume entitled Ouvrages pour et contre les services militaires étrangers, 
considérés du côté du droit et de la morale (1738).21 His vindication of Swiss mer-
cenary service is interesting: while clearly motivated by the intention to save 
the reputation of the Swiss abroad as reliable and faithful partners,22 in the 
bulk of his lengthy reply Loys de Bochat deals with those general principles of 
natural law suitable for justifying the Swiss practice and attempts to demon-
strate that these principles are very solid indeed. Once he had published a first 
dissertation in response to the anonymous letter, where he already relied ex-
tensively on the natural law literature available on the subject – notably on 
Gentili, Grotius, Pufendorf and their commentators – he went on reading all of 
the systems of law of nature and of public law subsequently available, as well 
as commentaries on earlier works on that matter, in order to check whether 
any of them questioned the main arguments he defended.23 Hence his first 
dissertation, as well as the subsequent pieces on more specific issues raised by 
a critique (again anonymous) of that work, constitute a kind of bibliography 
of textbooks and dissertationes to which Loys de Bochat referred in order to 
prove his case, that is, to demonstrate that allowing mercenaries to enrol in 
foreign armies as well as serving in mercenary troops as a soldier was legiti-
mate both on juridical and on moral grounds. One gets the impression that he 
 20 Transcriptions of the minutes of this society are available on the website ‘Lumières.
Lausanne’, accessed 2 February 2018, http:// lumieres.unil.ch/ projets/ lippe/ .
 21 Charles- Guillaume Loys de Bochat, Ouvrages pour et contre les services militaires étrangers, 
3 vols. (Lausanne, Genevae: Marc- Michel Bousquet & Cie., 1738).
 22 See Meylan, Jean Barbeyrac, 207– 210.
 23 Loys de Bochat, Ouvrages pour et contre les services militaires étrangers, vol. 1, ‘Préface’, 
xiv: ‘Depuis l’impression de ma Dissertation, il s’est publique quelques Systèmes de Droit 
Naturel & Public, & quantité de Notes sur des Ouvrages qui en ont traité. Je crois d’avoir vû 
tous ces Livres. Aucun n’a touché à la Thèse que je soutiens. N’est- ce point là encore une 
présomption en sa faveur?’.
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had Barbeyrac’s verdict on his poor erudition constantly before his eyes when 
replying to his critics.
Loys de Bochat also adopted a leading role in a discussion launched by the 
Société du comte de la Lippe on the balance of power in Europe and the ques-
tion of whether a preventive war against a neighbouring state which augments 
its power and threatens weaker states by oppression is legitimate according to 
the law of nations.24 His introductory statement to the debate testifies again to 
his profound knowledge of the literature on the law of nations. Hence, he first 
deals with Pufendorf and Grotius, ‘the two restorers of natural law’, and their 
commentators, who would have argued that if a state increases its power and 
is hence in a position to harm its neighbours, this fact alone does not provide 
the latter with a just cause of war. He then considers the seemingly opposite 
position defended by Alberico Gentili, Thomas Hobbes and Nicolaus Hierony-
mus Gundling, with the intention to demonstrate that, all things considered, 
the latter were of the same opinion as the former.
Loys de Bochat’s repeated engagement with questions related to the law 
of nations and just war, which is further attested by a former student’s doc-
toral dissertation on ambassadors,25 help to explain his active participation 
in the new edition of Grotius’ De jure belli ac pacis, published by Marc- Michel 
Bousquet in Lausanne in 1751– 1752. The latter was a very able bookseller, who 
created his first publishing house in Geneva in 1724 with two business asso-
ciates. As we have seen, he published the journal Bibliothèque italique. After a 
breakup with his associates, Bousquet settled in Lausanne upon an invitation 
from Loys de Bochat, where he closely collaborated with the printer Antoine 
Chapuis.26 Bousquet’s business was largely based on the practice of exchange 
with other publishers and on creating networks with reliable customers 
abroad. This is why he travelled all over Europe. In 1750, he went on a tour 
of Italy with the intention of obtaining subscriptions for his publication of a 
Latin edition of Grotius. In the first volume of the edition, we find a salutation, 
signed by Bousquet, in which the publisher thanks the Italian subscribers for 
their prepayments and announces that their names will be published at the 
 24 See Simone Zurbuchen, ‘Théorie de la guerre juste et balance du pouvoir en Europe’, in 
L’Europe en province: la Société du comte de la Lippe (1742– 1747). Actes du colloque orga nisé 
à l’Université de Lausanne du 25 au 26 juin 2009, ed. Béla Kapossy et al. (Lausanne: Lumières.
Lausanne, 2013), http://lumieres.unil.ch/fiches/biblio/5687/.
 25 Abraham Daniel Clavel de Brenles, De exemptione legatorum, a foro criminali ejus ad quem 
missi sunt (Marburg: Phil. Casim. Muller, 1740).
 26 On Bousquet’s publishing companies see Silvio Corsini, ‘Vint- cinq ans d’édition et d’im-
primerie à Lausanne au siècle des Lumières:  le libraire Marc- Michel Bousquet, 1736– 
1761,’ Revue historique vaudoise 120 (2012), 23– 53.
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end of the fourth volume.27 He kept his promise and one finds the list of Italian 
pre- payers there.
What makes the Lausanne edition of Grotius highly original is the incorpo-
ration of numerous annotations and commentaries, which had been published 
before but which were now assembled in the five- volume edition: volumes 1– 4 
comprise the text of Grotius’ work, and on the bottom of each page annota-
tions by Gronovius and by Barbeyrac appear. Heinrich Cocceji’s commentaries 
and his son’s additional remarks follow at the end of each chapter. To this, the 
editors joined, in volume 4, Grotius’ dissertations Mare liberum and De aequi-
tate, indulgentia, et facilitate. Volume 5 contains 12 dissertations of Samuel 
Cocceji, entitled Introductio. In his note of thanks, Bousquet stresses that he 
had to correct thousands of errors contained in the earlier, Breslau edition,28 
and from the address to the reader we can gather that Loys de Bochat reorgan-
ized Samuel Cocceji’s commentaries in order to avoid repetitions.29 A glimpse 
at the dissertations suffices to show that Samuel Cocceji availed himself of his 
father’s comments on Grotius to present his own theory of the law of nature 
and nations, which he had already developed in his earlier writings, and which 
also attest to some disagreement with his father. In the next section, I will pro-
ceed to a selective reading of the Coccejis’ theories of the law of nature and 
focus exclusively on their account of the law of nations. As we will see, they 
unanimously and vigorously rejected Grotius’ account of the law of nations.
3 Defining the Law of Nations
To properly assess the Coccejis’ critique of Grotius, let us first recall that a ma-
jor innovation associated with the law of nations in the seventeenth centu-
ry consisted in ‘a rethinking of the relationship between natural law and its 
less regarded junior partner, the jus gentium’.30 As Stephen C. Neff has shown, 
the pulling apart of the formerly tight bonds between these two kinds of 
law marked ‘the birth of international law in its modern sense’.31 In general 
terms, the distinction between natural law and jus gentium can be described 
 27 Hugo Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis libri tres, vol. 1 (Lausanne: Marc- Michel Bousquet & 
Cie., 1751), ‘Epistola dedicatoria’.
 28 Ibid.
 29 Ibid., lxii.
 30 Stephen C.  Neff, Justice among Nations. A  History of International Law (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 151.
 31 Ibid.
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as resting on three assumptions: first, jus gentium is not derivable from natural 
law, but rests on human experience and free will; secondly, in contradistinc-
tion to the law of nature, jus gentium is exclusively applicable to states as such 
and not to individual persons, or private parties; and thirdly, jus gentium can-
not be conceived independently from natural law, but rather works in a kind of 
partnership with the latter and supplements it in certain respects. The emer-
gence of such a dualist conception of the law of nations was a compli cated 
matter. It was accompanied by the use of sometimes confusing terminology, 
not least because many of the natural lawyers referred back to Roman law in 
order to show that what they had in mind differed from the Roman- law notion 
of jus gentium.32 Francisco Suárez was the first author to introduce a clear- 
cut distinction between the law of nature and jus gentium along the lines just 
described. While Suárez named the positive law between states ‘jus gentium 
proper’, Grotius designated it by the expression ‘voluntary (or volitional) law of 
nations’ (jus gentium voluntarium).33 Although in De jure belli ac pacis the dis-
tinction between Roman- law jus gentium and the voluntary law of nations is 
not spelled out without ambiguities, Grotius clearly followed Suárez in devel-
oping a dualist conception of the law of nations, comprising those parts of nat-
ural law which are relevant for relations between states on the one hand, and 
the manmade law of nations, which arises out of agreement between states, 
on the other. This dualist conception, which exerted a major influence on later 
writers, is known today as the ‘Grotian’ approach to international law.34
Grotius deals with the law of nations in the Prolegomena, assigning it a role 
similar to that of municipal or civil law.35 He first explains that the bodies of 
municipal law arose from the promise explicitly or implicitly made by men, 
who assembled themselves within a group, to conform to the determination 
of that group or those men to whom the authority had been transferred. This 
obligation of men to one another rested on the natural law rule ‘to abide by 
 32 See Neff, Justice among Nations, 151– 153.
 33 Ibid., 156.
 34 Ibid., 159– 160, 163.
 35 Grotius’ concept of the law of nations is a complex matter. The goal of the following 
paragraphs consists exclusively in presenting some of the key elements later scholars 
commented upon in some detail. For a recent account of Grotius’ law of nature, which 
also accounts for Grotius’ earlier writings, see Stafan Kadelbach, ‘Hugo Grotius: On the 
Conquest of Utopia by Systematic Reasoning,’ in System, Order, and International Law. 
The Early History of International Legal Thought from Machiavelli to Hegel, ed. Stefan 
Kadelbach, Thomas Kleinlein and David Roth- Isigkeit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2017), 134– 159.
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pacts’.36 For that reason, nature would have to be considered ‘the great- grand- 
mother of municipal law’. Grotius describes the function of municipal law in 
terms of a reinforcement of natural law when he asserts that the association of 
men and the subjection to authority ‘have their roots in expediency’. For this 
reason, those who prescribe laws ‘have, or ought to have, some advantage in 
view’.37 Grotius then introduces the ‘law of nations’ or ‘the body of law which 
is maintained between states’:
But just as the laws of each state have in view the advantage of the state, 
so by mutual consent it has become possible that certain laws should 
originate as between all states, or a great many states; and it is apparent 
that the laws thus originating had in view the advantage, not of particular 
states, but of the great society of states. And this is what is called the law 
of nations, whenever we distinguish that term from the law of nature.38
Grotius further explains the analogy between municipal law and the law of 
nations in the first book of his treatise, where he introduces the expression 
‘voluntary (or volitional) law’ (jus gentium voluntarium) for designating a kind 
of law which has its origin in the human will.39 Beginning again with munici-
pal law, which he explains in the same way as in the Prolegomena, he then 
introduces two other bodies of human voluntary law, which are respectively 
narrower or broader in scope than municipal law. The former ‘comprises the 
commands of a father, of a master and all commands of a similar character’, 
and the latter is the ‘law of nations’, i.e. ‘the law which has received its oblig-
atory force from the will of nations, or of many nations’. Grotius explains the 
qualification ‘of many nations’ by observing that, with the exception of the 
law of nature, ‘which is also frequently called the law of nations’, hardly any 
law would be common to all nations, and he acknowledges that the voluntary 
law of nations is not necessarily the same in all parts of the world.40 This latter 
remark is in tension with the paragraph in the Prolegomena where Grotius al-
ludes to the advantage of the ‘great society of states’, which seems to suggest a 
universally applicable law of nations, that is, one which is binding on all states.
 36 Hugo Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis libri tres, transl. of the ed. of 1646 by Francis W. Kelsey 
(The Classics of International Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925), vol. 2, ‘Prolegomena’, 
§ 15, 14– 15.
 37 Ibid., § 16, 15.
 38 Ibid., § 17, 15.
 39 Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis, book i, chap. i, § xiii, 44.
 40 Ibid., § xiv, 44.
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Grotius makes it very clear that the voluntary law originates directly in the 
will of nations, and indirectly in the natural law rule to abide by pacts, and 
he also admits that the mutual consent between nations can only be inferred 
from practice. Hence, he likens the law of nations to ‘unwritten municipal law’ 
and describes it – referring to the Church father Chrysostom – as ‘the crea-
tion of time and custom’.41 This body of law would be found in custom and 
in the testimony of those who are skilled in law. While this reference to cus-
tom is coherent with the assumption of an implicit or tacit consent among a 
great many nations, it also contributes to rendering ambiguous his concept of 
the law of nations. For Grotius also uses the notion jus gentium to designate 
the body of law the Romans called the law of nations, that is, the law the Ro-
mans applied not just to their own people but to many surrounding nations 
as well.42 Although at some places Grotius explains very clearly that this Ro-
man jus gentium ‘is not international law, strictly speaking, for it does not affect 
the mutual society of nations in relation to one another’ and is therefore ‘im-
properly’ called ‘law of nations’,43 he also renders ambiguous his own notion 
of the law of nations. This is mainly so because he refers as well to ‘common 
custom’ when explaining the Roman- law use of the term.44 As Neff has aptly 
explained, the Roman- law notion of jus gentium does, however, not arise out of 
agreement between states and therefore does not rest on the will of nations. It 
rather ‘arises out of separate unilateral enactments by states – with the con-
tents of those unilateral enactments “matching up” with one another’.45
In view of the development of the law of nations from the eighteenth to the 
nineteenth century and the constitution of the law of nations as a discipline 
increasingly distinct from the law of nature, Grotius’ dualist conception of the 
law of nations, comprising both the law of nature applied to states and the 
voluntary law governing exclusively the relationship between states, is clearly 
a major innovation. It was, however, challenged by a large group of authors 
who, following Thomas Hobbes’ stripped- down view of natural law and natu-
ral right, contested the very existence of a voluntary law of nations. The lead-
ing figure of this rival school of international thought was Samuel Pufendorf, 
who maintained that natural law was the only law of universal application be-
tween states. In The Law of Nature and Nations, he introduces the discussion of 
 41 Ibid.
 42 On this ambiguity see Neff in his introduction to Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and 
Peace, ed. Stephen C. Neff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), xxxii– XXXiii.
 43 Grotius, De jure belli, vol. 2, book ii, chap. viii, § i, 295.
 44 Ibid.
 45 Neff, introduction to Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, xxxii.
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Grotius’ voluntary law of nations with the following question: ‘Whether or no 
there be any such thing as a particular and positive Law of Nations, contradis-
tinct to the Law of Nature’.46 He first refers to Hobbes’ distinction between the 
natural law of men, and the natural law of states (commonly called the law of 
nations), the precepts of which are the same because, once instituted, states 
assume the proprieties of men. He then fully subscribes to this doctrine and 
denies the existence ‘of any other voluntary or positive Law of Nations, prop-
erly invested with a true and legal Force, and obliging as the Ordinance of a 
superior Power’.47 In Pufendorf ’s view, matters such as the way in which things 
are acquired or contracts, which are commonly referred to the law of nations, 
belong either to natural law or to the civil laws of the countries where they are 
observed. He thus does not deny that there may be agreements among many 
states on such matters, but he contests that ‘it is not proper or fair to consti-
tute these as a peculiar and distinct Species of Law’, for ordinances common 
to many nations would not arise ‘in mutual Covenant or Obligation’.48 They 
rather depend on accidental agreement among legislators, who can alter them 
without advising with their neighbours. In the same context, Pufendorf also 
recalls the Roman- law concept of jus gentium, which included all foreigners, 
while the civil law was proper only to Roman citizens. This kind of law, he in-
sists, had, however, nothing to do with what Grotius called the voluntary or 
positive law of nations.49
Concerning the latter, Pufendorf uses several examples to show that mat-
ters Grotius dealt with under the heading of the voluntary law of nations in 
fact concern the law of nature. Thus, he argues that the persons of ambassa-
dors ‘are sacred and inviolable […] by the meer Law of Nature’,50 because they 
are necessary for the procuring and preserving of peace by leagues and cove-
nants, which are themselves enjoined on men by the law of nations. Further, 
he argues that the right of burial, which Grotius also considers to belong to 
the voluntary law of nations, could very well be referred to the duties of kind-
ness and humanity, which are part of the law of nature.51 Pufendorf proves to 
be highly critical of the many authors who would rank under the title of the 
 46 Samuel Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, transl. Basil Kennett, 4th ed. 
(London: J. Walthoe, R. Wilkin, J. and J. Bonwicke, S. Birt, T. Ward and T. Osborne, 1729), 
book ii, chap. iii, § xxiii, 149.
 47 Ibid., 150.
 48 Ibid.
 49 Ibid., 150– 151.
 50 Ibid., 151.
 51 Ibid., 152.
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law of nations the customs mutually observed by tacit consent among ‘People 
pretending to Civility’. Alluding to examples of rules observed in the conduct 
of war, which Machiavelli described in The Prince, he mocks clement prac-
tices such as exempting certain things or persons from martial violence, or the 
taking of prisoners (who are afterwards released without ransom) instead of 
killing enemy soldiers, as mere niceties allowing those who fight an unjust war 
‘to appear wicked with some kind of Temper and Moderation’.52 In Pufendorf ’s 
view, rules customarily observed in war cannot constitute any law or universal 
obligation, since any party has the right to absolve themselves from restraints 
which rest on tacit agreement. This would explain why one finds such prac-
tices worn out by time and replaced by contrary practices.
Pufendorf ’s ‘naturalist’ account of the law of nations, according to which 
jus gentium is nothing other than the law of nature applied to states, had a 
strong influence in Brandenburg- Prussia, notably on Christian Thomasius and 
his followers Johann Franz Budde and Nicolaus Hieronymus Gundling, who 
taught natural law at the University of Halle, and on Johann Gottlieb Heinec-
cius at the Universities of Frankfurt an der Oder and Halle.53 His rejection of 
the voluntary law of nations was further strengthened by his French translator, 
Barbeyrac, who explicitly secured Pufendorf ’s position in a note to The Law of 
Nature and Nations and also inserted a lengthy comment on the same issue in 
his translation of Grotius’ work. Hence, we read in a note to the paragraph in 
the first book of De jure belli we have been considering above: ‘The Positive Law 
of Nations, distinct from the Law of Nature, is a mere chimera’.54 Barbeyrac goes 
on to explain that he does not wish to deny that all nations have to observe 
certain principles and rules in regard to one another, and that this may well be 
called the law of nations. He insists, however, that these rules are the same as 
those of the law of nature properly so called and that the obligation to respect 
them does not arise, as Grotius held, from the consent of nations. Regarding 
the customs respected by the generality of nations, which are not enjoined 
on them by the law of nature, Barbeyrac does not deny that any given nation 
may be obliged to submit to them as long as it does not give any proof to the 
 52 Ibid., 151.
 53 See Tetsuya Toyoda, Theory and Politics of the Law of Nations. Political Bias in International 
Law Discourse of Seven Court Councilors in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries 
(Leiden, Boston:  Martinus Nijhoff, 2011), 140– 1. Johann Peter von Ludewig, who also 
taught law at the University of Halle, defended however the voluntary law of nations 
(ibid., 140– 141).
 54 Grotius, Le droit de la guerre et de la paix, livre i, chap. i, § xiv, note 3, 56: ‘Le Droit des 
Gens, Positif, & distinct du Droit Naturel, est une pure chimére’.
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contrary. In this case the obligation would, however, arise ‘from this tacit and 
private agreement, without which the Customs in question have no force’.55 
The meaning of this ‘tacit and private agreement’ can be further elucidated 
by what Barbeyrac says in the corresponding note to Pufendorf ’s treatise, to 
which he explicitly directs the reader in his Grotius edition. Here Barbeyrac 
insists on the difference between an agreement and a law: while an obligation 
can arise from (private) agreement, this cannot produce ‘a particular Law dis-
tinct from the natural’. Like any other contractual agreement, an agreement 
to submit to a custom ‘must be referred to that general Law of Nature which 
obliges us to keep all Covenants’.56 In other words, as long as all peoples are 
naturally equal, there is neither a superior nor an inferior, and consequently 
no people can impose law upon another. It is also impossible that all peoples, 
taken together, impose laws on themselves.
Seen against this background of debates on Grotius’ voluntary law of na-
tions, the position defended by the Coccejis amounts to a strengthening of 
the ‘naturalist’ school. In a note to the same paragraph in De jure belli ac pacis, 
which provoked Barbeyrac’s denial of the voluntary law of nations, Heinrich 
Cocceji observed that this whole inquiry was superfluous, because a human 
law that obliges all nations did not exist. There could be no question of the 
civil law in this place.57 And Samuel added in his additional note that he would 
deal at length with Grotius’ system of the voluntary law in the narrower and 
in the broader sense of the term in his fourth dissertation. Commenting on 
paragraph 17 of the Prolegomena, he would demonstrate that there does not 
exist any such jus gentium, that this was an invention of Tribonian, and that 
therefore all disputes about this law are superfluous.58
Only a few scholars have dealt with the Coccejis’ theory of law of nature and 
nations.59 Samuel Cocceji is well known for his politico- juridical career in the 
 55 ‘Ainsi toute obligation vient de cette convention tacite & particulière, sans laquelle les 
Coûtumes, dont il s’agit, n’ont aucune force’. (Ibid.)
 56 Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, book ii, chap. iii, § xxiii, note 2, 150.
 57 Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis libri tres, vol. 1, 58: ‘Tota haec tractatio supervacua est, quia 
jus humanum, quod omnes gentes obliget, non datur : Jus civile autem hujus loci non est’.
 58 Ibid., 59: ‘Systema Grotii de jure gentium voluntario, eoque tum latius patente, tum arc-
tiori, late exposuimus in Dissertatione Prooemiali IV. ejusque compendium exhibuimus 
in not. ad. Proleg. § 17. Simulque demonstravimus, tale jus gentium non dari […] illud-
que inventum esse Triboniani. […] Adeoque omnia, quae hic de tali jure disputantur, 
supervacua sunt’.
 59 For an overview on their career and writings see Oliver Peglow:  ‘Cocceji, Henrich von,’ 
in The Dictionary of Eighteenth- Century German Philosophers (Oxford:  Continuum, 
2011), accessed 3 February 2018: http:// www.oxfordreference.com/ view/ 10.1093/ acref/ 
9780199797097.001.0001/ acref- 9780199797097- e- 0100, and Oliver Peglow:  ‘Cocceji, 
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service of Frederick Wilhem i and of Frederick ii, as well as for his work de-
voted to the reorganization of the juridical system in Prussia. Before embark-
ing on this career, Samuel was, however, like his father Heinrich before him, a 
professor of law at the University of Frankfurt an der Oder, where he had stud-
ied law and obtained his doctoral degree with a dissertation entitled Tractatus 
Juris Gentium, de principio juris naturalis unico, vero et adaequato, which was 
published in two parts in 1702.60 In the first part of the dissertation, he deals 
with fundamental questions such as the very existence of the law of nature and 
the principle on which it rests. Some disagreements with his father notwith-
standing, he subscribes to the latter’s critique of the idea to found the law of 
nature on socialitas and defends God’s will as sole principle of natural law. In 
the second part of the dissertation, he defends his account of the law of nature 
against an anonymous author (who in fact was Leibniz), against Johann Peter 
von Ludewig and against Johann Nicolaus Hertius.61 In 1713, Samuel Cocceji 
published a commentary on Justinian’s Institutes, entitled Jus civile controver-
sum, and in 1740 the Elementa jurisprudentiae naturalis et Romanae, which he 
later included, under the title ‘Novum Systema Justitiae Naturalis & Romanae’, 
in the dissertations appended to the Grotius edition.62
The Coccejis’ pronounced and radical critique of Grotius’ voluntary law 
of nations has only recently aroused scholarly attention. Tetsuya Toyoda at-
tempted to show that Samuel Cocceji rejected the voluntary law with the in-
tention to please Frederick ii, who ‘disturbed the then fragile balance of power 
in Europe’ when he started the First Silesian War (1740– 1741).63 While Toyoda 
Samuel von,’ accessed 3 February 2018, ibid.:  http:// www.oxfordreference.com/ view/ 
10.1093/ acref/ 9780199797097.001.0001/ acref- 9780199797097- e- 0101. In the English- 
language literature, Samuel Cocceji’s natural law theory has mainly been studied with 
an interest in the use Adam Smith made of it in his Lectures on jurisprudence. See Knud 
Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy. From Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 129– 148; Ernest Metzger, ‘Adam Smith’s 
historical jurisprudence and the “method of the civilians”,’ in Smith in Glasgow ‘09, 31 
March- 2 April 2009, Glasgow, UK, accessed 3 February 2018, http:// eprints.gla.ac.uk/ 
25492/ .
 60 Samuel Cocceji, Tractatus Juris Gentium, de principio juris naturalis unico, vero, et adaequato 
(Frankfurt an der Oder: Jeremiae Schreyi Haered. & Joh. Christoph. Hartmann, 1702).
 61 On the controversy between Leibniz and the Coccejis see Hans- Peter Schneider, ‘Die 
wissenschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen Leibniz und den beiden Cocceji (Heinrich 
und Samuel),’ in Humanismus und Naturrecht in Berlin- Brandenburg- Preussen, ed. Hans 
Thieme (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1979), 90– 102.
 62 This was the twelfth dissertation, much longer than the other dissertations.
 63 Toyoda, Theory and Politics of the Law of Nations, 137. Toyoda mentions in the same con-
text (ibid., 139) that Samuel Cocceji published pamphlets legitimizing the Prussain sei-
zure of Silesia in order to obtain the Frederick ii’s patronage.
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seems to acknowledge that Samuel had already mentioned the voluntary law 
of nations in his dissertation of 1702 and again in the Jus civile controversum of 
1713,64 he downplays the continuity between these latter works and the Intro-
ductio, i.e. the 12 dissertations he appended to his father’s commentary on Gro-
tius’ work, where the rejection of the voluntary law of nations became much 
more important. What is more, he erroneously assumes that Samuel would 
have published the dissertation on the voluntary law already in the Elementa, 
which he published in 1740. This seems, however, not to be the case, for the 
latter comprised only the ‘Novum Systema’, which was to become the twelfth 
dissertation.65 Toyoda has, however, a good point when he claims that Samuel 
Cocceji’s critique of Grotius’ concept of solemn war, which rested on the vol-
untary law of nations, proved to be useful for justifying Frederick ii’s conquests 
in Silesia. In the ninth dissertation Cocceji argued, indeed, that a war cannot 
be considered just on both sides and that the justness of the cause of war re-
mains suspended until God determines who has won the war by giving him the 
ultimate victory.66
Let us now have a closer look at Samuel Cocceji’s fourth dissertation, which 
consists of two chapters. Before he gets to a detailed analysis of Grotius’ ac-
count of the voluntary law of nations in the first chapter,67 he introduces the 
jus humanum voluntarium or jus gentium secundarium, which – as the doctores 
would hold – the human nations constituted between them ‘as occasion and 
the necessities of human life required’.68 He goes on to observe that since the 
nations never got together and constituted such a law by common consent, 
it would be difficult to know what this law is and how it can be proved. He 
then recalls how his father proposed to deduce this law (by referring to the 
state of corruption) and how he conceived it himself in his earlier writings, 
where he likened the secondary law of nations to the law the Romans applied 
not just to their own people but to foreigners (extraneos) as well, which they 
admitted to this law ‘out of necessity, and common utility’.69 This explanation 
of the jus gentium implied that there did not arise any obligation between the 
 64 Ibid., 142– 143.
 65 See Metzger, ‘Adam Smith’s historical jurisprudence,’ 11– 12.
 66 Toyoda, Theory and Politics of the Law of Nations, 145– 148. S.  Cocceji, ‘Dissertatio 
prooemialis IX,’ § clxviii, 242– 243.
 67 On various aspects of this chapter see Toyoda (note 66 above), and Walter Rech, Enemies 
of Mandkind. Vattel’s Theory of Collective Security (Leiden/ Boston:  Martinus Nijhoff, 
2013), 83– 95.
 68 S. Cocceji, ‘Dissertatio prooemialis IV,’ § i, 78:  ‘quod usu exigente, & necessitatibus 
humanis’; this expression refers to the Institutes, book i, title ii, 2.
 69 Ibid., § iv, 79.
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nations and that the Roman people could therefore abrogate that law ad libi-
tum and exclude the foreigners from it with the same right as they admitted 
them. Samuel Cocceji eventually adds that this interpretation contradicts the 
definition of the law of nations proposed by Tribonian, who maintained that 
the human nations established this law between them.70 This is in fact the 
main thesis the younger Cocceji defends in the second chapter of the disser-
tation. It rests on an argument about the proper interpretation of the jus gen-
tium in the Corpus juris civilis. He attributes the erroneous definition either to 
Justinian or to Tribonian – who was named by the emperor Justinian as one 
of the commissioners charged with preparing the new imperial legal code – 
and compares it to various other definitions of the law of nations in the Digest 
(or Pandects), which he attributes to Gaius and Hermogenian. Through these 
comparisons, he aims to demonstrate that, according to the Roman jurists, jus 
gentium, properly understood, is the same as jus naturae, which is accessible 
by human reason and does not rest on the nations’ will.71 The secondary law of 
nations, which Grotius called jus gentium voluntarium, was a ‘monster’ which 
originated in an error of Tribonian.72
While we do not know why the Lausanne jurist Loys de Bochat took a spe-
cific interest in the Coccejis’ comments on De jure belli ac pacis, there is no 
doubt that the latter strengthened the ‘naturalist’ account of the law of na-
tions, which remained predominant in the context of the école romande un-
til the publication of Vattel’s Law of Nations. As we have seen above, Samuel 
Cocceji’s rejection of the voluntary law of nations confirmed Barbeyrac’s own 
defence of Pufendorf ’s position against Grotius. Given that Burlamaqui taught 
the law of nature and nations on the basis of Barbeyrac’s French translations 
of Pufendorf ’s works, it comes as no surprise that he also identified the law of 
nations with the law of nature. It is, however, interesting to observe that in con-
tradistinction to Pufendorf, who attached only marginal significance to treaties 
and to customary practices of states as possible source of law,73 Burlamaqui 
explicitly acknowledges treaty law and customary law as parts of the law of na-
tions. We can summarize his teaching in the following way:74 the same law that 
 70 Ibid. The proposition he attributes to Tribonian refers again to the Institutes, book i, 
Title ii, 2.
 71 Ibid., § xxxiii- vi, 91– 92.
 72 Ibid., § xxxi, 91; § xlvi, 100.
 73 Neff, Justice among Nations, 176.
 74 I refer here to Jean- Jacques Burlamaqui, Principes du droit de la nature et des gens. Avec la 
suite du ‘Droit de la nature’ qui n’avait point encore paru, ed. Fortuné- Barthélemy de Félice, 
vol. vi (Yverdon: [F.- B. de Félice], 1768), ‘Principes du droit des gens,’ part i, chap. i, 1– 14. 
Regarding the dissemination of Burlamaqui’s thought, one needs of course to refer to 
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is called natural law when applied to individuals is called the law of nations 
when applied to states. The principle of the law of nations is the general law 
of sociability (sociabilité), which imposes on peoples or on their sovereigns the 
same duties to which individuals are subject.75 Burlamaqui holds that Grotius’ 
view of the positive law of nations – as a kind of human law, which acquired 
its obligatory force as an effect of the will of nations – is in fact ‘a supposition 
destitute of foundation’.76 He develops three arguments against the voluntary 
law of nations: first, since nations are equal and independent from each other, 
only God, their common superior, can impose a law binding them all; secondly, 
if nations establish customs by express or tacit agreements, these practices are 
not obligatory by themselves, neither universally nor forever, since customs do 
not impose on nations any necessity to act always in the same way, and neither 
are other nations obliged to respect them; and thirdly, customs cannot consti-
tute any obligatory rule, since they might be bad or unjust. Burlamaqui men-
tions as examples the profession of corsair or pirate, which was for a long time 
considered legitimate on the grounds of a tacit agreement between nations, 
and the use of poisoned arms in war. As he sees it, these are barbarous prac-
tices, which cannot be part of the law of nations. Customs have to be judged on 
the basis of the law of nature, and nations may be held responsible for respect-
ing them only as long as they do not explicitly renounce them.77
Burlamaqui concludes his critique of Grotius with a proposal to reconcile 
the previous reasoning by distinguishing two kinds of law of nations:  first, a 
law of nations that is universal, necessary and obligatory by itself, and that 
is the same as the law of nature; and second, another kind of law of nations, 
which one might call arbitrary and of liberty, founded on an express or tacit 
convention. This second kind of law is not universal and obliges only those 
who subject themselves voluntarily to it and only as long as they wish to do so, 
insofar as the law of nature requires compliance with contracts.78
If we consider Burlamaqui’s conclusion together with his critique of the vol-
untary law of nations, it presents itself like a blueprint of Vattel’s concept of 
the law of nations. In contradistinction to the former, however, Vattel defends 
the voluntary law of nations instead of rejecting it. Indeed, he acknowledges 
three kinds of law of nations. First is the natural or necessary law of nations 
previous editions, above all to Thomas Nugent’s English translations. See note 12 above, 
and Neff, Justice among Nations, 177.
 75 Ibid., part i, chap. i, § iv, p. 5.
 76 Ibid., § vii, 8.
 77 Ibid., § vii, 8– 9.
 78 Ibid., § viii, 9– 11.
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which results from the application of the law of nature to states or nations. 
Like Barbeyrac in the note on Grotius we have been looking at above, Vattel 
confirms that the law of nations would slightly change when one applies it to 
states instead of individuals.79 The second kind of law of nations is the volun-
tary law; this is the jus gentium voluntarium which Grotius defended and which 
the Pufendorfians and the Coccejis deemed to be a ‘chimera’. The third kind 
of law of nations Vattel acknowledges corresponds to Burlamaqui’s arbitrary 
law of nations, which is founded on an express or tacit convention; this is the 
customary and treaty law.80 The fact that Vattel numbers the voluntary law of 
nations, together with customary and treaty law, among the positive law of 
nations is at the foundation of much dispute about the proper interpretation 
of his concept of the law of nations. While many scholars consider his treatise 
to inaugurate a positivist account of the law of nations, the present reconstruc-
tion of the debates surrounding the voluntary law of nations rather suggests 
that Vattel resumed the dualist conception Grotius had founded by introduc-
ing the jus gentium voluntarium. In fact, Vattel conceived of the law of nations 
as ‘double law’ by distinguishing the natural or necessary law of nations from 
the law of nations properly so called, which originates in the common consent 
of mankind.81 While these two kinds of law are universal, customary and treaty 
law, which also rest on the agreement of nations, are binding only on parties to 
the agreement in question.
This account of the law of nations corresponds exactly to the division Wolff 
indicated already on the title page of his Jus gentium (1749),82 and this work 
was indeed Vattel’s main reference for developing the law of nations. As I men-
tioned in the first part of this chapter, Vattel repudiated, however, the math-
ematical method as well as Wolff ’s top- down strategy for founding the law of 
nations.83 Hence, he rejected Wolff ’s proposal to derive the voluntary law of 
nations from the idea of a civitas maxima, or ‘great republic’. In his view, this 
fiction was neither admissible in itself nor would it ever receive the ‘obedient 
acquiescence of sovereign states’, which claimed and actually possessed abso-
lute independence from each other. Instead of deducing the voluntary law of 
 79 Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, ed. and with an introduction by Béla Kapossy and 
Richard Whatmore (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2008), ‘Preface,’ 9– 10.
 80 Ibid., 15– 17.
 81 Ibid., 17. I have dealt with these matters more extensively in Zurbuchen, ‘Emer de Vattel 
on the Society of Nations and the Political System of Europe’.
 82 Christian Wolff, Jus gentium methodo scientifica pertractatum, in quo jus gentium 
naturale ab eo, quod voluntarii, pactitii et consuetudinarii est, accurate distinguitur 
(Halle: Renger, 1749).
 83 I borrow the expression ‘top- down strategy’ from Neff, Justice among Nations, 181.
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nations from the fiction of a great republic, Vattel develops this law on the basis 
of the distinction of internal and external right, which he also borrowed from 
Wolff. This allowed him to explain how the voluntary law of nations works 
in partnership with the natural or necessary law of nations and supplements 
it in various respects: what nations may do by internal right is stated in the 
natural or necessary law; the voluntary law regulates the domain of external 
right. Whereas the necessary law corresponds to the ‘immutable laws of jus-
tice’, which enjoin an obligation on the conscience of nations, the voluntary 
law indicates what needs to be tolerated in a society of free and independent 
nations.84 Vattel makes it very clear that the voluntary law of nations does not 
rest on the actual consent of nations. The latter are rather presumed to consent 
to it by the law of nature, which obliges them not to infringe on their common 
rights, and especially on the right to decide freely about what justice requires 
them to do or to omit to do when it comes to a dispute between nations. As 
Neff has rightly observed, Vattel has sometimes been ‘misunderstood as a rad-
ical champion of state sovereignty’.85 While it is true that he insisted on the 
legal equality of sovereign nations, he did not, however, renounce the idea that 
the latter remained subject to the natural or necessary law of nations – a law 
he claimed rested on general principles and demonstration. Given that he re-
lied on examples in modern history to illustrate his doctrine and that he used 
the notion of the voluntary law of nations as a flexible tool for showing what 
nations need to tolerate ‘through necessity’ in order to respect each other as 
equal and independent, it seems wholly accurate to place Vattel at the mid-
point between rationalist top- down deduction and a pragmatist bottom- up 
approach to international relations.86
4 Conclusion
As we have seen in section 2 of this chapter, it is not wholly clear for what rea-
sons the Swiss undertook a multi- volume edition of Grotius’ De jure belli ac pa-
cis around the middle of the eighteenth century. After all, they must have been 
aware that this work had already been published many times in Latin, trans-
lated into modern languages and explained in a great number of handbooks and 
 84 Vattel, The Law of Nations, ‘Preface,’ 14– 16.
 85 Neff, Justice among Nations, 197.
 86 Ibid., 182.
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commentaries.87 Although Loys de Bochat, who participated in the prepara-
tion of the edition, certainly had his own good reasons for studying the law of 
nations when he attempted to defend the Swiss practice of mercenary service 
abroad, it remains unclear why he had a special interest in the Coccejis’ highly 
critical commentary of Grotius’ dualist account of the law of nations. Given 
his involvement in the foundation of the publishing company Bousquet & Cie. 
in Lausanne and in light of Bousquet’s subscription campaign in Italy, I  am 
tempted to conclude that this Grotius edition was above all undertaken for 
commercial reasons. Samuel Cocceji’s pronounced and radical critique of the 
voluntary law of nations certainly strengthened the naturalist account of the 
law of nations of Pufendorf and his adherents, who were indeed predominant 
in the Swiss school of natural law. It seems, however, that the Coccejis’ theories 
of the law of nature and nations did not have any further influence in the Swiss 
context. This is certainly due to the immediate success of Vattel’s Law of Na-
tions, which appeared only a few years after the Grotius edition was published. 
Vattel never refers to the Grotius edition in his treatise. So far, almost noth-
ing is known about reception of the Coccejis’ theory of the law of nature and 
nations in the wider European context. As Christoph Link observed, Heinrich 
Cocceji was a well- known expert on public law in his own time. His fame faded 
rapidly, however, because of his son Samuel, who published the commentary 
on Grotius after his death and thus made the father speak through the son. 
What is more, Heinrich’s historical foundation of the jus publicum Romano- 
Germanicum, which was innovative in his own time, was criticized in the nine-
teenth century by representatives of the historical law school and thus fell into 
near complete oblivion.88
In contradistinction, Samuel Cocceji’s theory of the law of nature and na-
tions stimulated a number of controversies in the early eighteenth century. 
He was notably criticized by Leibniz, as well as by von Ludewig and Hertius, 
to whom he replied in the second dissertation of his Tractatus iuris gentium 
(1702). Because Samuel became famous as chief architect of Frederick ii’s law 
reforms, the theory of the law of nature and nations he had developed before 
he embarked on his political career has rarely been studied by contemporary 
 87 See Frank Grunert, ‘The Reception of Hugo Grotius’s De jure belli ac pacis in the early 
German enlightenment,’ in Early Modern Natural Law Theories. Contexts and Strategies 
in the Early Enlightenment, ed. T.J. Hochstrasser and P.  Schröder (Dordrecht,  Boston, 
London: Kluwer, 2003), 92 and note 24.
 88 Christoph Link, ‘Menschenwürde und Gerechtigkeit als Staatszweck. Zum Werk Heinrich 
von Coccejis (1644– 1719),’ in Die Ordnung der Freiheit. Festschrift für Christian Starck zum 
siebzigsten Geburtstag, ed. Rainer Grote et al. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 87– 98.
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scholars. The only notable natural law scholar who showed real interest in the 
Coccejis’ commentaries on Grotius was Adam Smith, and most of the research 
on the Coccejis’ works on natural law has been undertaken to explain this.89 
Regarding the law of nations, I attempted to show in section 3 of this chapter 
that Samuel’s radical critique of the voluntary law of nations, which was first 
introduced by Grotius and marked a decisive turn in the history of the law of 
nations, further strengthened the ‘naturalist’ position of Pufendorf and his fol-
lowers. The originality of Cocceji’s fourth dissertation, which takes issue with 
the definition of the law of nations, rests on his hypothesis concerning the ori-
gin of the voluntary law of nations. As we have seen, he makes use of his exper-
tise in Roman civil law in order to demonstrate that jus gentium proper does 
not rest on the nations’ will. It was beyond the scope of this chapter to examine 
further aspects of the Coccejis’ critique of De jure belli ac pacis. In the Swiss and 
indeed in the broader European context, it was the dualist account of the law 
of nations and the concept of the voluntary law in particular which became 
predominant in the second half of the eighteenth century, mainly through the 
influence of Emer de Vattel’s Law of Nations.
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 chapter 11
Vattel’s Doctrine of the Customary Law 
of Nations between Sovereign Interests 
and the Principles of Natural Law
Francesca Iurlaro
1 Introduction
At the beginning of book ii of his Law of Nations, Emer de Vattel expresses his 
fear that
the following maxims will appear very strange to cabinet politicians: and 
such is the misfortune of mankind, that, to many of those refined con-
ductors of nations, the doctrine of this chapter will be a subject of ridi-
cule. Be it so! – but we will nevertheless boldly lay down what the law of 
nature prescribes to nations. Shall we be intimidated by ridicule, when 
we speak after Cicero? […] The punctual observance of the law of nature 
he considered as the most salutary policy to the state.1
Vattel’s concerns might appear ironic to the contemporary reader, considering 
the immediate success of his book as the standard source for the positive law 
of nations.2
As a matter of fact, scholars have long insisted on the fundamental role Vat-
tel’s treatise played in the emergence3 of international law. However, more re-
cent contributions have also emphasized the inherently normative character 
 1 References throughout the chapter are to the English translation of Vattel’s Droit des Gens 
(1758) edited and with an Introduction by Béla Kapossy and Richard Whatmore: Emer de Vat-
tel, The Law of Nations, or Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of 
Nations and Sovereigns, with Three Early Essays on the Origin and Nature of Natural Law and 
on Luxury (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2008).
 2 On the pervasive reception of Vattel’s Droit des Gens see Elisabetta Fiocchi Malaspina’s 
chapter in this book, and her L’eterno ritorno del Droit des Gens di Emer de Vattel (secc. XVIII– 
XIX): L’impatto sulla cultura giuridica in prospettiva globale (Frankfurt: Max Planck Institute 
for European Legal History, 2017).
 3 Emmanuelle Jouannet, Emer de Vattel et l’émergence doctrinal du droit international classique 
(Paris: Pedone, 1998).
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of Vattel’s doctrine of the law of nations, by insisting on its relationship with 
the modern natural law tradition, embodied in the works of authors like Gro-
tius, Pufendorf and Wolff, whose accounts Vattel challenged and discussed in 
the context of his own doctrinal analysis.
From this latter perspective, the present contribution seeks to address the 
question of the role of custom within Vattel’s doctrine of the law of nations 
by establishing its close interconnection with natural law. In the modern 
age, custom became a powerful conceptual device natural law authors made 
use of in order to demonstrate the existence of norms which spontaneously 
originated from the will of European sovereigns, as a dynamic source of law 
situated between the demands of universality of natural law and the effec-
tiveness required by positive law. Such an important role of custom, as both a 
pragmatic reality as well as a fundamental category of international relations, 
is one crucial, although neglected,4 feature of Vattel’s legal doctrine. While 
seeking to fill this gap in the literature, the main claim of the present chapter 
is that Vattel’s conceptualization of self- interest helps us to explain the role 
of natural law in the legitimization of the formation of custom5 according 
to a criterion of compliance. Notably, as Vattel claims, the foundation and 
compelling principle of natural law lies in the concept of self- interest, which 
is, in his account, the best and the safest means for securing the collective 
interests of nations. From this perspective, providing a close analysis of self- 
interest as a basis for Vattel’s theory of custom serves a double purpose. On 
the one hand, it helps us to understand why custom is such a powerful means 
to reconcile the interests of sovereign nations with collective justice. Indeed, 
according to Vattel, despite being based on tacit consent, the customary law 
of nations allows states to facilitate mutual cooperation by being clearer and 
more explicit about what kind of rules they want to be bound by. Promot-
ing such a state of affairs is, in other words, one of the possible legal options 
states have at their disposal to pursue their own self- interest, only to find out 
 4 Some reference to the importance played by custom in Vattel’s doctrine of the law of nations 
is made by Peter Haggenmacher, ‘Introduction: Le modèle de Vattel et la discipline du droit 
international,’ in Vattel’s International Law from a XXIst Century Perspective / Le Droit interna-
tional de Vattel vu du XXIe siècle, ed. Vincent Chetail and Peter Haggenmacher (Leiden: Brill, 
2011), 1– 48.
 5 The distinction between the formation and the identification of the customary law of na-
tions in Vattel is discussed below. The terms ‘formation’ and ‘identification’, commonly used 
in international legal scholarship, refer to the doctrinal distinction between the process lead-
ing to the formation of customary international law and its subsequent identification by the 
jurist. On this aspect, see M. Wood, First Report on the Formation and Evidence of Customary 
International Law, International Law Commission 65th Session, A/ CN.4/ 663.
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that such interest (as well as that of other states) is best guaranteed by com-
pliance with natural law.
On the other hand, this analysis sheds further light on the debate concern-
ing the allegedly ‘Hobbesian’ foundation of Vattel’s law of nations. It aims to 
show that, by reconceptualizing Christian Wolff ’s notion of perfectio in terms 
of self- interest, Vattel is actually making an anti- Hobbesian claim about the 
natural state of liberty in which all nations live. Indeed, he argues that even if 
such a fictional natural state of liberty did exist, nations would not mutually 
destroy each other, because of the likely terminal consequences of their recip-
rocal aspirations. They would rather be able to govern themselves exclusive-
ly through natural law precisely because custom provides states with a valid 
legal means to secure their individual and collective interests at one and the 
same time.
Although Vattel repudiates Wolff ’s concept of the civitas maxima, the ideal 
of a general society of nations nonetheless plays an important regulatory role 
in his doctrine of custom. He replaces Wolff ’s teleology of perfectio with a more 
pragmatic approach, which takes into account the liberty and independence 
of sovereign states as its fundamental, non- derogable principle.
In order to prove this, I will articulate the analysis in three sections. First of 
all, I will address the question of the relationship between Vattel and Wolff, to 
whose doctrine he explicitly refers, by pointing out both continuity and rup-
tures within Vattel’s reception of Wolff. Secondly, I will take into account the 
distinction made by Vattel between the natural, the voluntary and the conven-
tional law of nations. Custom belongs to the last legal regime, although it is 
closely related to natural law, as I have already pointed out. Finally, I will pro-
vide a sketch of Vattel’s concept of the customary law of nations, by describing 
its general rules and providing examples of different cases and circumstances 
to which they apply.
2 Vattel vs. Wolff: Self- Interest as the 
Foundational Principle of Natural Law
As is commonly known, Vattel declaredly engages in a vulgarization of Wolff ’s 
doctrine but with some significant differences. The most relevant of them re-
gards the question of the application of the law of nature to states. Indeed, ac-
cording to Vattel, Wolff has the merit of having realized that ‘the law of nature 
could not, with such modifications as the nature of the subjects required, and 
with sufficient precision, clearness, and solidity, be applied to incorporated na-
tions or states, without the assistance of those general principles and leading 
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ideas by which the application is to be directed’.6 But what exactly are ‘those 
general principles’ that should lead the application of natural law to the con-
duct of states? Vattel excludes the possibility of relying on a civitas maxima 
both as a political and as a conceptual framework through which such law can 
be applied. Wolff conceived of the civitas maxima as a quasi- political commu-
nity of nations aimed at perfecting each other.7 Quite on the contrary, for Vat-
tel, the fact that the principles of natural law have to be applied to states does 
not mean that it is necessary to coerce them into a political community, since 
by their natural liberty they are already gathered together to live in a natural 
society.8 Furthermore, Vattel argues that natural law is designed for governing 
human individuals, who essentially differ from nations. That is why Vattel in-
sists on the essential feature of states, namely sovereignty, and conceives of the 
application of natural law to them accordingly.9
As a matter of fact, Vattel replaces Wolffian perfectio (i.e. the teleological ori-
entation of human reason as the foundation of obligation) with self- interest. 
From this perspective, it has generally been argued in the literature that, by 
making this choice, Vattel is actually endorsing a Hobbesian view of the law of 
nature and, consequently, of the law of nations.10 However, on closer analysis, 
 6 Vattel, The Law of Nations, 10. According to Hunter, there are two senses in which the word 
‘application’ as used by Vattel in this particular context has been interpreted by scholars. 
The first one is that employed by Jouannet, who implies that ‘application’ refers to the 
‘practical’ application of principles. Such interpretation relies on the view that there is a 
presumption of general acceptance behind and justifying such application (Ian Hunter, 
‘Law, War and Casuistry in Vattel’s Jus Gentium,’ Parergon, 28/ 2 (2011): 92, quoting Emma-
nuelle Jouannet, Emer de Vattel et l’émergence doctrinale, 403– 417). Another interpreta-
tion is that provided by Hunter himself; see below.
 7 Christian Wolff, Jus gentium methodo scientifica pertractatum (Halle: Renger, 1749), § 10; 
on the concept of civitas maxima, see also Nicholas G. Onuf, ‘Civitas Maxima: Wolff, Vattel 
and the Fate of Republicanism,’ American Journal of International Law 88/ 2 (1994): 280– 
303; Georg Cavallar, ‘Vitoria, Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolff and Vattel:  Accomplices of Eu-
ropean Colonialism and Exploitation or True Cosmopolitans?’ Journal of the History of 
International Law, 10/ 2 (2008):  181– 209. Thomas Kleinlein, ‘Christian Wolff:  System as 
an Episode?’ in System, Order and International Law:  the Early History of International 
Thought from Machiavelli to Hegel, ed. Stephan Kadelbach, Thomas Kleinlein and David 
Roth- Isigkeit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 216– 239.
 8 Vattel, The Law of Nations, 14.
 9 Stéphane Beaulac, ‘Emer de Vattel and The Externalization of Sovereignty,’ Journal of the 
History of International Law, 5 (2003): 247.
 10 As argued by Quentin Skinner, From Humanism to Hobbes: Studies in Rhetoric and Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018); Andrew Hurrell, ‘Vattel: Pluralism and its 
Limits,’ in Classical Theories of International Relations, ed. Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumann 
(London: Macmillan Press 1996), 236.
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the way Vattel conceptualizes self- interest shows discontinuity rather than co-
herence with the Hobbesian model, in which self- interest undermines the col-
lective goal of security and justice and only the public person of the sovereign 
can abstract from private self- interest to promote the common good.11
Vattel makes use of the concept of self- interest to provide natural law with 
a solid foundation, and jurists with a useful criterion to identify customary 
norms. In his words, the coercive power of natural law resides in the basic 
motive behind our actions, creating a situation where motives and actions 
coincide (which is a requirement for the fulfilment of an obligation):  ‘each 
individual has as a general and overriding motive his own self- interest, and 
this motive creates the obligation to which he is liable’.12 The link Vattel es-
tablishes here between self- interest and obligation contradicts the Hobbesian 
assumption that self- interest does not provide us with an appropriate reason 
to comply with the law – unless one conceives of the law, as Pufendorf did, 
as the command of a superior.13 Vattel refutes this objection by replying ‘that 
when we say that self- interest provides the foundation or the principle of ob-
ligation, we are speaking of a noble and agreed expediency, which is located 
mainly in the observance and practice of virtue – because this observance and 
practice brings us closer to perfection’ and ‘reconciles us with the good will of 
the Creator’.14 What Vattel means to say here is that this principle of ‘noble […] 
expediency’ brings us closer to true perfection, insofar as it imitates the justice 
of God.15 This imitation produces, according to Vattel, pleasure in our action 
itself16 and, most notably, justice – an outcome that would not be conceivable 
within a Hobbesian framework.
This fundamental change of perspective on self- interest and obligation also 
allows Vattel to conceive of the relationship between states in a different way 
from Wolff: the interest of nations is to pursue their own good in a society to 
 11 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1994), 61. On 
the role of self- interest see Pierre Force, Self- Interest before Adam Smith:  a Genealogy 
of Economic Science (New  York:  Cambridge University Press, 2003); Christopher 
Brooke, Philosophical Pride:  Stoicism and Political Thought from Lipsius to Rousseau 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 69– 75.
 12 Emer de Vattel, Essay on the Foundation of Natural Law and on the First Principle of the 
Obligation Men find Themselves Under to Observe Laws, in The Law of Nations, 754. This 
essay was originally published by Vattel in his Le loisir philosophique ou pieces diverses de 
philosophie, de morale et d’amusement (Dresde: George Conrad Walther, 1747).
 13 Samuel Pufendorf, De iure naturae et gentium libri octo (Lund: Junghans, 1672), book i, 
chap. i, § 3.
 14 Vattel, Essay on the Foundation of Natural Law, 762.
 15 Ibid., 771.
 16 Ibid.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simone Zurbuchen - 978-90-04-38420-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 09/19/2019 09:19:14AM
via University of Lausanne
Vattel’s Doctrine of the Customary Law of Nations 283
which they naturally belong, with no need to rely on the idea of civitas maxi-
ma. From this perspective, self- interest seems to be the most honest of col-
lective interests:  it allows a non- judgemental space in which no nation can 
intrude into the internal sphere of judgment of the other and, by doing so, it 
allows them to pursue their own national and international perfection. The 
perfection of self- interest ideally consists in compliance with natural law; how-
ever, it might be the case that nations do not understand this clearly, resulting 
in a potential conflict of sovereign interests with collective ones. Ideally, Vattel 
argues, self- interest, rightly understood, would not imply this kind of conflict; 
he admits, however, that, in reality, states often pursue what Pufendorf called 
‘imaginary’ interests and thus seek to realize their pretensions to  supremacy.17 
On a more theoretical level, Vattel has faith that the interests of sovereign 
states should not collide with the desire to achieve justice. This claim rests on 
a specific view of the natural state of liberty that will be addressed in the next 
section. Vattel is convinced of the fact that individuals and states, if left in a 
state of nature, are the best version of themselves that they can be. To remem-
ber what their original condition is, one must engage in a fictional reasoning, 
namely to think of states as if they behaved how they are naturally supposed 
to do. The ultimate aim of such faith in the potentialities of sovereign states 
results, at the international level, in the construction of a space of peace and 
security.
To conclude this section, let us come back to the comparison between Vattel 
and Wolff: as a consequence of the way in which he proposes to apply natural 
law to sovereign states, Vattel’s understanding of law as a perfecting device is 
less ‘totalizing’ than that of Wolff. Nonetheless, he maintains in his legal doc-
trine a tendency towards a higher degree of perfection, which cannot always 
be realized by the actual course of events but that nonetheless provides natu-
ral law with a solid principle.
3 Distinguished, Yet Not Treated Separately: Natural 
and Positive Law of Nations
Having made these clarifications, let us now move to the analysis of the im-
pact of Vattel’s reading of Wolff on his doctrine of the law of nations. Vattel 
divides the latter into natural (or necessary), voluntary and conventional law 
 17 An issue brought up by Pufendorf, who referred to this phenomenon as the ‘imaginary 
interests of state’ (Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium, book viii, chap. vi, § 2).
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of nations (i.e. treaties and customs). In order to understand the place and 
importance of the customary law of nations within Vattel’s doctrine, it is im-
portant to highlight the main characteristics of the law of nations as a whole. 
As with the ‘droit des gens naturel’, Vattel claims it is necessary, immutable and 
consists in the application of the principles of natural law to the conduct of 
states.18 As we have said, according to Vattel the application of natural law to 
nations is mediated by the concept of sovereignty and, therefore, produces two 
important effects. On the one hand, natural law promotes general perfection 
of the society of nations; on the other hand, it also has to preserve each na-
tion’s independence, equality and freedom of judgement.
The question of how Vattel seeks to reconcile these two fundamental ob-
ligations is one of the most controversial concerning his thought.19 The co-
existence of these two elements – the independence of sovereign judgement 
and a striving for justice (an outcome of Vattel’s doctrine of self- interest) – 
generates, according to Hunter, a ‘double law’.20 This double law, on the 
one hand, consists in the natural law of nations binding the conscience of 
states; on the other, it consists in the voluntary law of nations, the rules of 
which are deduced from natural law:  ‘since nations are free, independent, 
and equal, – and since each possesses the right of judging, according to the 
dictates of her conscience, what conduct she is to pursue in order to fulfil 
her duties,  – the effect of the whole is, to produce, at least externally and 
in the eyes of mankind [my emphasis], a perfect equality of rights between 
nations, in the administration of their affairs and the pursuit of their pre-
tensions, without regard to the intrinsic justice of their conduct, of which 
others have no right to form a definitive judgment; so that whatever may be 
done by any one nation, may be done by any other; and they ought, in human 
society, to be considered as possessing equal rights’.21 However, as we have 
described, the foundation of such a voluntary law of nations is conceived of 
by Vattel in opposition to that of Wolff (namely, based on a principle of self- 
interest rather than on mere perfectio).22 Indeed, what is relevant here is that 
both the natural and the voluntary law of nations are derived by Vattel from 
 18 Vattel, The Law of Nations, 70.
 19 For a famous positivist interpretation of the Vattelian law of nations see Peter Pavel 
Remec, The Position of the Individual in International Law according to Grotius and Vattel 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960).
 20 Hunter, ‘Law, War and Casuistry,’ 92.
 21 Vattel, The Law of Nations, 75.
 22 Zurbuchen, ‘Emer de Vattel on the Society of Nations and the Political System of 
Europe,’ 268.
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nature;23 perhaps for this reason, Vattel’s account of the voluntary law of na-
tions is particularly confusing.
Instead of presenting here the various proposals for dealing with the re-
lationship between the natural and the voluntary law of nations,24 I expose 
what I  consider to be at the origin of the difficulty in properly understand-
ing how Vattel connected these two kinds of law of nations. This is the (unre-
solved Wolffian) relationship between natural law and perfectio. How should 
we conceive of an international society based on the dichotomy between the 
independence of sovereign nations and the obligation to achieve perfectio? 
This question is further addressed by Vattel in his Dissertation on this ques-
tion: Can Natural Law Bring Society to Perfection Without the Assistance of Po-
litical Laws?25 Vattel says that ‘if men were as they ought to be’, natural law 
itself would be sufficient to bring society to perfection.26 To prove this point, 
he provides an interesting thought experiment:
Let us imagine one thousand people of both sexes, chosen from the most 
rational and virtuous in Europe, and that together they form a kind of 
small republic. Who can doubt that this society would not be better regu-
lated by natural law alone, than has been any other state with the support 
of political laws? These one thousand people will be enlightened enough 
to get to know natural law, and to be convinced that their best interest 
requires that they conform to it exactly. As a result, their society will be 
as perfect a human society as any such can. They will have a body of law, 
just, wise, and complete, which is known to all the members and accom-
panied by sufficient incentives to shape their will. Without the need for 
subordination to the authority of a government, they will acknowledge 
themselves under the obligation of this law that they derive from na-
ture to provide for the common good. They will focus their talents and 
labor on this goal; everyone will compete to preserve order and peace. 
 23 Ibid.
 24 On the debate concerning Vattel’s natural and voluntary law of nations, see Haggenmacher, 
‘Introduction:  Le modèle de Vattel et la discipline du droit international’; Remec, The 
Position of the Individual; Gabriella Silvestrini, ‘Justice, War and Inequality. The Unjust 
Aggressor and the Enemy of the Human Race in Vattel’s Theory of the Law of Nations,’ 
Grotiana, 31 (2010):  44– 68; Charles Covell, The Law of Nations in Political Thought:  A 
Critical Survey from Vitoria to Hegel (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2009), 95– 106.
 25 A translation of this essay, originally published by Vattel in his Le loisir philosophique ou 
pieces diverses de philosophie, de morale et d’amusement (Dresde: George Conrad Walther, 
1747), can be found in Vattel, The Law of Nations, 773– 781.
 26 Ibid., 776.
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If differences arise, they will choose arbitrators to resolve them. And if 
it should happen that one individual, possessed by the force of a violent 
passion, departs from his duty, then the others, whose reason would not 
be obscured by the same clouds, would they not readily and with one will 
restrain him without provoking the least social dislocation? Some might 
vainly object that regulations would be required for trade, for example, 
or for crucial periods of war and epidemic disease, and a sovereign au-
thority to ensure that they are observed. But reason will promote wise 
measures in these instances to the people as we have imagined them, and 
natural law will oblige them to preserve those rules devotedly, as they will 
tend to social benefit. But men are very different from what they ought to 
be and from these one thousand people of whom we have just spoken.27
People do not always know the real content of natural law and are not that well 
informed of the fact that their interests are better pursued by compliance with 
natural law. Thus, according to Vattel, the answer to this problem is to ‘extend 
the knowledge of natural law by making its application easy, and as a result 
reducing it to clearly publicized general rules’ and to establish ‘public author-
ity, and adding a positive obligation to natural obligation, through the means 
of punishment’.28 This passage recalls the paragraph in the Law of Nations in 
which Vattel says that we ought ‘to produce, at least externally and in the eyes 
of mankind [my emphasis], a perfect equality of rights between nations’. Pub-
licity is what helps us achieve this goal. Therefore, Vattel says, ‘in the current 
condition of the human race, natural law cannot bring society to perfection 
without the assistance of political laws’.29 This statement seems to imply for 
Vattel that, whereas the possibility of an international legal order governed 
by a self- legislating natural law sounds unfeasible in his particular historical 
moment, this does not prevent us from knowing that we are in principle ca-
pable of that. To understand this, we must engage in some fictional reasoning, 
by thinking of human beings as if they were in their natural state of liberty; 
additionally, we should promote the signing of agreements among nations to 
secure their reciprocal rights.
As we briefly mentioned above, besides the natural and the voluntary law of 
nations, Vattel introduces yet another kind of law of nations, that is, conven-
tional law, to which treaties and custom belong. Interestingly, for Vattel, cus-
tom plays a fundamental connecting role between the voluntary law of nations 
 27 Vattel, Dissertation, in The Law of Nations, 777.
 28 Ibid., 779.
 29 Ibid.
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(which comprises the rules indicating what nations need to tolerate between 
them in order to respect each other’s sovereignty and independence) and trea-
ties (as proactive means to secure the interests of states and the scope of what 
they can demand from others).
Whereas treaties rely on express consent, custom is based on tacit consent. 
However, Vattel conceives of tacit consent in an innovative way. The fact that 
it is tacit refers to its formation, but not to its identification: in other words, 
nations are invited to publicly express with political statements whether they 
wish to be bound or not by a given custom and to turn them into treaties (see 
above: according to publicity and promotion). Additionally, Vattel says he will 
lay down only some ‘general rules’ that nations are bound to respect with re-
gard to conventions (treaties and customs),30 as I will show in the next section.
To conclude, Vattel adds that the voluntary and the conventional law of na-
tions, taken together, can be called the positive law of nations. Positive law 
must be distinguished, but not treated separately from, natural law: the two 
often overlap, but sometimes they do not. While positive law should not be 
confused with natural law, the latter has nevertheless to remain the guiding 
principle. By so doing, it assures the normative character of the law of nations 
as a whole. However, the following question arises: how is it then possible to 
judge the rightness of a conventional law (a treaty or a custom) if no nation is 
allowed to judge the other? First of all, it is precisely the content of natural law 
(the general rules of promoting perfection and, yet, respecting sovereign in-
dependence of judgement) that provides us with a valid criterion by which to 
understand whether customary rules are compliant with natural law. Secondly, 
Vattel solves this problem by conceding a fundamental importance to pub-
lic statements: through them, nations ‘activate’ their rights – as is particularly 
evident in the customs of war, especially those concerning the declaration of 
war.31 Vattel’s customary law of nations consists precisely in a series of unilat-
eral acts producing effects on others: nations, by stating, refusing or applying 
certain rules without necessarily demanding their respect from others, guaran-
tee themselves freedom and independence, since this secures them from being 
attacked (and from being the object of intrusive judgement of other nations). 
Vice versa, as we will see, there are customs originating from perfect rights 
which are binding on the parties involved – unless they opt out in due time.
 30 Vattel, The Law of Nations, 77.
 31 Silvestrini, ‘Justice, War and Inequality,’ 59; on regular war in Wolff and Vattel, see 
also Pablo Kalmanovitz, ‘Sovereignty, Pluralism, and Regular War:  Wolff and Vattel’s 
Enlightenment Critique of Just War,’ Political Theory 45 (2017): 1– 24.
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4 Customary Law of Nations: Between Facts and Principles
Although the question of Vattel’s method is particularly problematic,32 I think 
that it provides us with some useful insights into the question of custom in 
Vattel. Also, as we have seen, it is difficult to imagine a completely positive Vat-
telian law of nations, and we have emphasized its core normative elements. 
However, my claim is that in Vattel a normative claim about the law of nations 
coexists with a pragmatic method to assess its content, as he says that natural 
and positive law must be distinguished but not separated. This is particular-
ly relevant for Vattel’s doctrine of custom, which contains a coexistence of 
normative judgements and practical considerations. Vattel investigates the 
tension between practice and principles mostly by looking at the historical 
record. He makes massive use of the works of national historiographers and 
memorialists to support his arguments and, quite differently from his prede-
cessors, he expresses here and there his scepticism towards classical history, 
which is no longer conceived of as the repository of perfect and generally ac-
cepted behaviours, as it was in Gentili or Grotius before him.33 Vattel contrasts 
the errors of a past, which is now perceived as far away, with the vivid de-
scriptions of contemporary historians and memorialists.34 This is an interest-
ing aspect, reflecting the changes in the historical discipline, from an erudite 
source of knowledge to a first- person description of events, where accuracy 
is less important than direct witness of and involvement in the facts narrated 
(Vattel himself is author of several Mémoires).35 However, it is worth pointing 
 32 Vattel’s method has been described as the application of general normative principles to 
the study of singular cases of the law of nations. The relationship between the norma-
tivity of the principles of natural law and their pragmatic application to concrete situa-
tions is what makes the Vattelian method problematic, to the point that Ian Hunter has 
even spoken of a ‘casuistic method’. See Ian Hunter, ‘Vattel’s Law of Nations: Diplomatic 
Casuistry for the Protestant Nation,’ Grotiana 31 (2010): 108– 109; see also Luke Glanville, 
‘Responsibility to Perfect,’ 389; Stefan Oeter, ‘Neutrality and Alliances,’ in Vattel’s 
International Law, 336– 337.
 33 On the role of historical examples in Alberico Gentili’s doctrine of ius gentium, see 
Francesca Iurlaro, ‘The burden of reason. Ratio probabilis, consensio omnium and the 
impact of humanitas on Alberico Gentili’s theory of customary international law,’ History 
of Political Thought 38 (2017):  409– 438; on the same topic in Grotius, see Benjamin 
Straumann, Roman law in the state of nature: The Classical Foundations of Hugo Grotius’ 
Natural Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
 34 On the importance of official historiography for modern political discourse, starting from 
Samuel Pufendorf, see Pärtel Piirimäe, ‘Official Historiography and the State in Early 
Modern Europe,’ Storia della storiografia 71/ 1 (2017): 47– 75.
 35 See for example Mémoires pour server à l’histoire de notre tems, par l’Observateur hollan-
dois [Jacob- Nicolas Moreau], rédigez et augmentez par M. D. V [Emer de Vattel] (Frankfurt 
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out an evolution in Vattel’s own thought:  whereas he makes moderate use 
of examples in the 1758 edition, he provides more examples in the revisions 
he drafted and these were included in the posthumous editions of his work. 
This might suggest an increasing need, perceived by the author, to provide the 
reader with examples: although they are not substantial to the argument, as 
he points out many times, they nonetheless provide for us a precious source 
of information on historical customary behaviours which he conceived of as 
established  practice.
Three main claims are made in this section. First of all, whenever possi-
ble, Vattel seeks to provide a conciliation of principles of natural law and state 
practice. Historical analysis is particularly helpful in this respect. This coin-
cidence between facts and principles shows Vattel’s normative commitment 
(subordinated to the structure and divisio iuris we described above) as well as 
his need to give instructions to ‘cabinet politicians’ about customs. This sce-
nario perfectly fits the ‘ideal’ situation described above, in which states are 
pursuing their own self- interest by complying with natural law. Secondly, by 
doing so, Vattel implicitly distinguishes between the process of formation of 
custom and that of identification: whereas the fact that a custom has received 
acceptance depends on its compliance with natural law, its identification is a 
distinct, pragmatic activity in which the jurist or the politician is engaged in 
his daily life. Therefore, and thirdly, whenever facts and principles do not co-
incide, Vattel provides us with a useful set of tools in order to identify and de-
tect customs. He calls them ‘general rules of custom’ and he refers to historical 
analysis for particular occurrences of custom. From the reading of Vattel’s text 
it is possible to extract three general rules to identify international customs: for 
each of them I will provide an example, which will also help us to understand 
the nature and functioning of Vattel’s pragmatic- historical method.
Already in the Preface to his Law of Nations, Vattel anticipates the impor-
tance of custom,36 but it is in his Preliminaries that he gives us a full account 
of what he means by ‘customary law of nations’, i.e. a ‘law founded on a tacit 
consent, or, if you please, on a tacit convention of the nations that observe 
it towards each other’.37 As Wolff did, Vattel also emphasizes the importance 
of custom as a particular source of law (as opposed to the universality of 
and Lepizig:  aux dépens de la compagnie, 1757); Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire de 
notre tems, par rapport à la guerre anglo- gallicane, par l’Observateur hollandois [Jacob- 
Nicolas Moreau], rédigez et augmentez par M. D. V. [Emer de Vattel], 2 vols. (Frankfurt and 
Leipzig: aux dépens de la compagnie, 1757– 1758).
 36 Vattel, The Law of Nations, ‘Preface,’ 17.
 37 Ibid., 77.
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voluntary and natural law of nations). The regionalism of custom38 seems 
to restrict the application of customs to the European civilized nations, by 
constructing a unitary source of obligation that automatically excludes non- 
European customs.39 However, together with the customs adopted by certain 
specific nations (like those concerning the formalities of the declaration of 
war), Vattel also mentions ‘universal customs’ with reference to a specific as-
pect of the laws of embassy, as we will see. It seems, therefore, that there are 
different degrees of application of custom, of course depending on whether 
they coincide with principles and on whether they seek to regulate fundamen-
tal values of the international order, like the independence of sovereign states. 
Also, regional customs seem to be for Vattel particular applications of general 
principles which are now settled as practice; universal customs are, rather, the 
customary expression of the principles of natural law (like that of sovereign 
authority, as we will see).
Consistent with these questions, the analysis in this section seeks to extract 
from Vattel’s Law of Nations some general rules concerning the formation and 
identification of custom which he presents in his examples. These rules con-
cern, as he writes in the above- mentioned passage, both the general function-
ing of custom and the way to assess its legality and compliance with natural 
law. It is possible to identify three situations. The first one, in which Vattel 
claims that there is a convergence of facts and principles, corresponds to the 
ideal situation, in which nations behave how they should do. In this case, cus-
toms are inherently compliant with natural law. However, there might be cases 
of non- compliance and, in order to avoid such episodes, he suggests that such 
customs are turned into treaties, in order to make them perfectly enforceable.
Vattel introduces a second category of customs, those which are by their 
nature ‘indifferent’ as far as their content is concerned, since they origi nated 
from the liberty and will of nations. In this second case, the question of com-
pliance with natural law is not of primary importance, unless customs are 
manifestly against the law of nature, but in that case they would no longer be 
indifferent. In this case, Vattel provides us with three methods of identifica-
tion of customs, consistent with the structure of his legal doctrine: a criterion 
 38 Haggenmacher, ‘Introduction,’ has emphasized the ‘regional’ character of custom in 
Vattel.
 39 On Rech’s pluralist reading of the pre- Vattelian tradition of custom, see Rech, Enemies 
of Mankind, 124; also, on ‘intra- European’ custom see Ian Hunter, ‘The Figure of Man 
and the Territorialisation of Justice in Enlightenment Natural Law: Pufendorf and Vattel,’ 
Intellectual History Review 23/ 3 (2013):  289– 307; Hurrell, ‘Vattel:  Pluralism and its 
Limits,’ 235.
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of non- indifference (similar to but not to be confused with the contempo-
rary doctrine of opinio iuris), acknowledgement by public statement and by 
 violation.
In addition to this, he addresses a fundamental problem: is the violation of 
custom punishable? The answer to this question will call into question once 
again the distinction between internal and external obligations and perfect 
and imperfect rights.
5 Facts with Meaning: Customs Originating in an 
Overlapping of Practice and Principles
The overlapping of facts and principles is a characteristic of most of the cus-
tomary norms mentioned by Vattel. Such an account of custom, normative 
and pragmatic at the same time, might have been influenced by Cornelius 
Bynkershoek, who is frequently quoted in the Law of Nations. He claimed, in 
his De foro legatorum (1721), that custom is made of ratio and usus. Reason is 
what gives meaning to mere usus, namely practice based on repetition.40 I will 
here provide two examples of overlapping of facts and principles, one con-
cerning the custom of declaring war and the other concerning the neutrality 
of  commerce.
Declaration of war is an essential moment of Vattel’s doctrine of war in due 
form.41 In this respect, ‘it is necessary that the declaration of war be known 
to the state against whom it is made. This is all which the natural law of na-
tions requires. Nevertheless, if custom has introduced certain formalities in 
the business, those nations, who, by adopting the custom, have given their 
tacit consent to such formalities, are under an obligation of observing them, 
as long as they have not set them aside by a public renunciation’.42 Here Vat-
tel precisely hints at the ‘regionalism’ of customary formalities concerning 
declaration of war, and he also introduces a fundamental characteristic of 
custom. Vattel thinks that declaration of war is required by the natural law of 
nations (as a way of making the intentions of sovereigns explicit and, therefore, 
 40 As claimed by Kinji Akashi, Cornelius van Bynkershoek:  His Role in the History of 
International Law (The Hague:  Kluwer Law International, 1998), 37. The reference to 
Bynkershoek is explicit in book iv of The Law of Nations, 736, where Vattel discusses the 
laws of embassy regarding the liability of the ambassador in cases of lawsuits.
 41 As it marks the exit from the natural law of nations and the entry into a consensual regime 
of the voluntary law of nations, as argued by Silvestrini, ‘Justice, War and Inequality,’ 60.
 42 Vattel, The Law of Nations, 502.
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accountable), whereas formalities are the object of custom. In order to activate 
such customs, nations can respect them, or opt out from them with a public 
statement, or even violate them, as we will see. What is more important is that 
an internal obligation is turned into a perfect one by statement or action (not 
necessarily by turning it into a treaty). Nations shall manifest their intentions, 
based on their unquestionable judgement, so that other nations know how to 
behave and, most importantly, how the natural law of nations applies to their 
conduct. A similar example concerns the meaning of the declaration: 
When the sovereign or ruler of the state declares war against another sov-
ereign, it is understood that the whole nation declares war against anoth-
er nation: for the sovereign represents the nation, and acts in the name of 
the whole society […]; and it is only in a body, and in her national charac-
ter, that one nation has to do with another. Hence, these two nations are 
enemies, and all the subjects of the one are enemies to all the subjects of 
the other. In this particular, custom and principles are in accord.43
Another example is that of the relationship between war and commerce. Dur-
ing the Seven Years’ War the question of neutrality of commerce was particu-
larly urgent because the idea started to emerge that if the trade of an allegedly 
neutral nation was supporting one of the nations at war, then this would be 
contrary to the law of nations.44 Vattel asserts that the issue needs to be ad-
dressed by distinguishing between neutral goods and military goods: whereas 
it would be a violation of the law of nations to forbid the first, innocent kind of 
commerce, it would be legitimate to forbid the second one, which constitutes a 
breach of neutrality. However, Vattel says that the prevailing custom in his own 
time is to avoid whenever possible the intrusion of neutral nations into the 
commercial affairs of an enemy nation.45 However, how should we treat those 
who help our enemies? They are in principle enemies as well, and therefore 
we can ask them to account for their conduct. However, Vattel suggests that 
this right is exercised with prudence, as it might cause more problems than 
it might solve.46 Additionally, ‘if prudence dissuades us from making use of 
 43 Ibid., 509.
 44 For example, see contributions in War, Trade and Neutrality. Europe in the Mediterranean 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ed. Antonella Alimento (Milano:  Franco 
Angeli, 2011); Oeter, ‘Neutrality and Alliance’; Tara Helfman, ‘Neutrality, the Law of 
Nations and the Natural Law Tradition: A Study of the Seven Years’ War,’ Yale Journal of 
International Law 30/ 2 (2005): 549– 584.
 45 Vattel, The Law of Nations, 511.
 46 Ibid., 518– 519.
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all our right, it does not thereby destroy that right. A cautious nation chooses 
rather to overlook certain points than unnecessarily to increase the number of 
her enemies’.47 This hints at the fictional character of custom, as a ‘virtual’ set 
of rules that needs to be activated (but the existence of which is not depend-
ent on such activation). On the contrary, if nations made use of such right too 
often, ‘the contrary principles would tend to multiply wars, and spread them 
beyond all bounds, to the common ruin of nations. It is happy for Europe, that, 
in this instance, the established custom is in accord with the true principles’.48
Another circumstance arises when a supposedly neutral nation engages in 
illicit trade with another nation’s enemy:  if the situation occurs, do nations 
have a right to confiscate such contraband goods? Vattel contends that ‘barely 
to stop those goods would in general prove an ineffectual mode’; therefore, na-
tions should ‘prevent, as far as possible, the enemy’s being supplied with such 
articles as will add to his strength and render him more dangerous, that neces-
sity and the care for her own welfare and safety authorize her to take effectual 
methods to that purpose, and to declare that all commodities of that nature, 
destined for the enemy, shall be considered as lawful prize’.49 The better meth-
od to achieve this purpose is for a nation to notify the neutral states of its dec-
laration of war, ‘whereupon, the latter usually give order to their subjects to 
refrain from all contraband commerce with the nations at war, declaring that 
if they are captured in carrying on such trade, the sovereign will not protect 
them’. Vattel claims that this rule seems ‘at present’ to have crystallized as ‘the 
general custom of Europe’,50 and quotes as authoritative sources in support 
both Grotius51 as well as two ordinances of the kings of France, issued in 1543 
and 1584.52
Vattel’s passage is quite explicit about what happens before a custom be-
comes a generally established practice: there might be a number of variations, 
eventually resulting in the current state of events, where a particular custom 
is introduced (which historical analysis might even help us to date: as with the 
example of France quoted above). Vattel further says that the custom in ques-
tion is most ‘suitable and compliant with principles of natural law’.53 At the 
same time, he specifies that this current state of affairs is the result not only of 
 47 Ibid.
 48 Ibid., 521.
 49 Ibid., 530– 531.
 50 Ibid., 531.
 51 Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis (Paris, 1625), book iii, chap. i, § 5.
 52 Vattel, The Law of Nations, 531.
 53 Ibid.
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past modifications but also of possible future ones (‘this rule is the point where 
the general custom of Europe seems at present fixed’). However, following his 
argument, it is hard to imagine that a custom so coincident with both ‘mutu-
al duties of nations’ and their respective rights could change in time without 
causing a violation of the principles of natural law it is so agreeable to. This 
tension might be interpreted, on the one hand, as an instance of regionalism, 
i.e. a particular external expression, in a given context and time, of a normative 
principle, which crystallizes over time with no further need of modifications 
once it is fixed. Such an ‘evolutionary’ interpretation might pose the problem 
of considering custom as natural law, and by so doing confusing the two legal 
regimes (an option which Vattel warns us not to choose). On the other hand, it 
is possible to argue that the ‘present custom’ is the best possible option that, in 
the current state of events, nations can strive for, but that it does not exclude 
even better applications of the same principles it expresses. This interpreta-
tion seems in line with Vattel’s thought experiment of the wise 1,000 Europe-
ans governing themselves by only applying natural law: that situation is not a 
cosmopolitan54 society to strive for, but the natural state of affairs of men, if 
only they were as they are supposed to be. If the custom at stake is agreeable 
to that natural state of affairs, then it might be interpreted as the best ‘external’ 
approximation of the natural law of nations.
To conclude this section, it is also worth mentioning that Vattel suggests 
that instances of violations are nothing but confirmations of customs.55 For 
example, the person of ambassadors is inviolable ‘by the universal custom and 
consent of nations’, and although Vattel acknowledges that there have occurred 
some instances to the contrary, ‘a few facts do not establish a custom: on the 
 54 According to Hunter, ‘The actual practice of abstraction through which Vattel “applies” 
the natural law to the conduct of nations is thus not one in which he makes the maxims of 
the latter conform to the principle of the former, or else fails to. Rather it is one in which he 
deploys both principles in order to structure a specialized practice of judgment. Here it is 
the difficulty of applying the cosmopolitan principle of natural law to the self- interested 
conduct of nations that is used to admit a whole series of accommodationist maxims and 
conventions – the voluntary law of nations – that are to be regarded nonetheless as if 
they were imperfect approximations of natural law cosmopolitanism’ (Hunter, ‘Law, War 
and Casuistry,’ 94). In my view, according to what I called Vattel’s fictional reasoning of 
considering men perfect, as they would be if they were following natural principles, they 
should be, rather, looked at as perfect (although maybe temporary) rather than imperfect 
approximations of natural law cosmopolitanism.
 55 Interestingly, a doctrine also acknowledged by contemporary international law, 
as famously expressed by the International Court of Justice in 1986 (Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Nicaragua v. United States of America, 
Merits, Judgment, i.c.j. Reports 1986, para. 186).
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contrary, those to which I allude, only contribute, by the censure passed on 
them, to prove the custom such as I have asserted it to be’.56
Finally, acknowledgement by violation is nothing but a reinstatement of the 
doctrine of the overlapping of facts and principles. To support his claim, Vattel 
here refers to Bynkershoek: ‘it may be seen, in monsieur de Bynkershoek’s treatise, 
that custom coincides with the principles laid down in this and the preceding 
section. In suing an embassador […] the embassador is to be summoned in the 
same manner as an absent person, since he is reputed to be out of the country, 
and his independency does not permit any immediate address to his person in 
an authoritative manner, such as sending an officer of a court of justice to him’.57
6 ‘Non- indifferent’ Customs
This is the first rule established by Vattel:
When a custom or usage is generally established, either between all the 
civilized nations in the world, or only between those of a certain conti-
nent, as of Europe, for example, or between those who have a more fre-
quent intercourse with each other, – if that custom is in its own nature 
indifferent, and much more, if it be useful and reasonable, it becomes 
obligatory on all the nations in question, who are considered as having 
given their consent to it, and are bound to observe it towards each other, 
as long as they have not expressly declared their resolution of not observ-
ing it in future. But if that custom contains anything unjust or unlawful it 
is not obligatory: on the contrary, every nation is bound to relinquish it, 
since nothing can oblige or authorize her to violate the law of nature.58
An interesting parallel is offered by Vattel when he writes, in his Essay on the 
Foundation of Natural Law, that natural law cannot be indifferent: ‘from there 
it follows that natural law is universal. Since it requires us to do all that is most 
suited to our nature, there is no situation in which it can let us down; for in 
every situation in which there is a better option to take, we are ordered to take 
it; and if it were possible to find a case of perfect indifference, no law would 
be of any use in resolving the matter’.59 If natural law provided us with a case 
 56 Vattel, The Law of Nations, 730.
 57 Ibid., 736.
 58 Ibid., 78.
 59 Vattel, ‘Dissertation,’ in The Law of Nations, 775.
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of perfect indifference, no law would serve as a criterion, since it is only nat-
ural law to prescribe for us what is more suitable to our nature (through self- 
interest as the principle of obligation).
Vattel provides an application of what we will call a ‘fictional criterion of 
non- indifference’ in his book iv, on the law of embassy:
and it must be observed here, with regard to things of institution and 
custom, that, when a practice is so established, as to impart, according 
to the usages and manners of the age, a real value and a settled significa-
tion to things which are in their own nature indifferent, the natural and 
necessary law of nations requires that we should pay deference to such 
institution, and act, with respect to such things in the same manner as if 
[my emphasis] they really possessed all that value which the opinion of 
mankind has annexed to them.60
In other words, Vattel suggests that a counterfactual reasoning be applied in 
cases of normative indifference of a given custom. From this mental experi-
ment, we are able to assess that the normative value of a customary rule is not 
directly derived from the principles of natural law but rests on a generally ac-
cepted opinion of mankind which makes such custom meaningful. Of course, 
this does not mean that ‘indifferent customs’ can be inconsistent with natural 
law: rather, Vattel just suggests that the interpreter distinguishes among differ-
ent sources of obligation.
Another question addressed by Vattel is the issue of the abrogation of cus-
tom. He admits that it is possible for a nation to opt out from a custom before 
the moment of its application. In his words, ‘if, in process of time, any nation 
perceives that such custom is attended with inconveniences, she is at liberty 
to declare that she no longer chooses to conform to it:  and when once she 
has made this explicit declaration, no cause of complaint lies against her for 
refusing thenceforward to observe the custom in question. But such a decla-
ration should be made beforehand, and at a time when it does not affect any 
particular nation’.61
In this example, the difference between formation and identification is more 
evident. The fact that custom is a tacit and ‘virtual’ legal regime does not mean 
that nations are a society of mute legal subjects: quite on the contrary, since it 
is unfeasible that they are governed by natural law alone, they have to publicly 
state their position and promote the signing of positive agreements (through 
 60 Vattel, The Law of Nations, 695.
 61 Ibid., 724.
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which they can reciprocally demand rights of one another). Also, the fact that 
the content of custom is normatively indifferent allows us to change it over time.
However, the question once again arises of whether it is possible for sov-
ereigns to opt out from all kinds of customs. Universal customs, like those 
concerning the inviolability of ambassadors, seem to be more cogent than 
‘particular ones’. Vattel provides an example of such universal customs, di-
rectly deriving from the natural law of nations: to prove his point, he quotes 
a number of instances of non- European nations respecting them (Chinese, 
Mexicans, North- American tribes, etc.).62 By so doing, he seeks to prove the 
general acceptance of this customary rule by insisting on the cultural value 
that various and diverse nations have annexed to it.
Interestingly enough, the following passage concerning the inviolability of 
the ambassador is supplied with historical examples, although Vattel declares 
that they do not add any content to the rule, but that he uses them just for 
the sake of explanation. However, historical examples are more abundant each 
time that Vattel is not explicitly making the claim that facts coincide with prin-
ciples. This might suggest that history is essential in ascertaining the value and 
opinion that ‘mankind has annexed’ to a given custom, whereas in cases of fac-
tual overlapping of custom with principles it aims at helping the jurist to de-
duce law from facts, by tracing back their first occurrence in time. The choice 
of historical sources is particularly innovative, if compared with those of Vat-
tel’s predecessors: French historians like François- Eudes Mezeray and Abbé de 
Choisy63 are quoted, as well as Simon Ockley’s History of the Saracens.64 All 
these historiographic references show that the rationale behind the privileges 
to be granted to ambassadors is that it is better to leave an ambassador unpun-
ished than to violate his immunity: therefore, it is better to overlook such in-
stances of violation than to put at risk the necessity of nations to communicate 
and to carry on negotiations.
7 Is the Violation of Custom Punishable?
The possibility of punishing the violation of a customary rule depends on dif-
ferent factors. Most importantly, as a general rule and consistently with his 
 62 Ibid., 721.
 63 Vattel, The Law of Nations, 722.
 64 On the eighteenth- century development of the historical disciplines, as well on memo-
rialists, see Chantal Grell, Pratiques et Concepts de l’Histoire en Europe XVIème– XVIIIème 
siècles (Paris: Presses de l’Université de Paris- Sorbonne, 1990).
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simone Zurbuchen - 978-90-04-38420-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 09/19/2019 09:19:14AM
via University of Lausanne
298 Iurlaro
theoretical assumptions, Vattel seems to suggest that such decision calls into 
question the requirement of compliance with natural law: will such punish-
ment impair the sovereign’s search for perfection and independence of judge-
ment? In principle, therefore, violation of custom is not punishable for Vattel. 
This is particularly evident the case of moderation to be applied in the treat-
ment of hostages, which is, according to Vattel, a custom of nations, settled in 
practice. Its violation, although repugnant to the law of nature, cannot always 
be punished: indeed, ‘all that [the violation of] such a custom can produce, is 
impunity among the nations who practise it. Whoever is guilty of it cannot 
complain that another is so too: but every nation may and ought to declare, 
that she considers the action as a barbarity injurious to human nature’.65 As we 
have stated before, nations can publicly state their position on a given issue, 
by respecting, violating or expressing their support for a given custom. As a 
general rule, therefore, only violations of the voluntary law of nations (which 
rests on the presumed consent of nations) are collectively enforceable, subject 
to certain conditions and moderation. However, as discussed by Toyoda, Vattel 
writes, in a letter to Brühl, that there is a passage in his Law of Nations justifying 
a collective intervention by European nations to punish Frederick of Prussia 
for having introduced those ‘sinister customs of war’ (i.e. the invasion of Sax-
ony with no declaration of war).66 In this case, we can argue that we are deal-
ing with different customs: the one concerning the declaration of war directly 
stems from natural law and calls into question the justice of the cause, which 
substantiates itself in the conduct of a regular war. The Prussian invasion of 
Saxony does not seem to meet these requirements, as the purpose of declaring 
war is to inform neighbouring states about one’s own intentions, once all the 
peaceful methods of dispute settlement have been exhausted. Furthermore, 
Frederick’s act may introduce, if imitated by other countries, a sinister custom 
of war and therefore it might be right to intervene against him. In other words, 
this example shows a conflict between custom and sovereign judgement. How 
do we respond to a violation of custom when, in order to do so, we have to mas-
sively intrude into another sovereign’s judgement? This aspect is controversial 
because it implies, on the one hand, the relationship between states vis- à- vis 
states and, on the other, it calls into question the problem of Vattel’s account 
as politically loaded.67
 65 Ibid., 115.
 66 Tetsuya Toyoda, Theory and Politics of the Law of Nations: Political Bias in International Law 
Discourse of Seven German Court Councilors in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), 170.
 67 Ibid.
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Quite on the contrary, the custom of moderation in war does not concern 
the relationship between states and other states but between states and indi-
viduals:  it does not imply judgement about the justice of the war (duties of 
justice), but rather a general duty of moderation that sovereigns have to fol-
low (duties of humanity). In Vattel’s words, compassion towards a prisoner is a 
custom, but if a sovereign cannot comply with it for reasons of force majeure, 
he may not be charged with violating the laws of war.68 Again, Vattel provides 
historical examples of moderation, taken from contemporary history rather 
than from Roman history. This is quite original, because for early modern ju-
rists Roman leaders were examples of pietas and clementia – a myth that Vattel 
seems not to be fascinated by. Indeed, ancient customs about the treatment 
of prisoners were wrong because they permitted their death: Vattel suggests 
that contemporary customs, instead, especially those of civilized countries like 
England or France, are far better than those of the ancients.69
Unlike universal customs, regional customs can be enforced, because they 
are more formalities than customary rules (they are similar to our contempo-
rary ‘acts of courtesy’). As an instance of this, Vattel quotes the example of the 
honours due to ambassadors: the usage of receiving an ambassador wearing a 
hat, for instance, is a sign of deference due to his persona as a representative 
of the sovereign. To make this point, Vattel mentions that in 1663 ambassadors 
from Switzerland ‘suffered the king of France, and the nobles of his court, to 
refuse them those honours which custom has rendered essential to the em-
bassadors of sovereigns, and particularly that of being covered before the king 
at their audience’.70 Later on, when Louis xv visited Alsace in 1755, the Swiss 
sent no ambassadors precisely because their ‘just demand’ had been rejected. 
Again, the partiality of Vattel’s example is itself insufficient to claim that there 
was a general acceptance of such custom; however, it makes the position of 
Switzerland clear on this issue.
To conclude, and to avoid problems related to punishment, Vattel suggests 
that on many occasions that it is wiser for nations to turn customs into treaties. 
For example, a nation which by long custom trades with another one (such as 
Portugal selling wine to England) and ‘desires any right of commerce which 
shall no longer depend on the will of another, she must acquire it by treaty’.71 
Also, usucapion and prescription are examples of customs which Vattel sug-
gests should be turned into treaties, but, ‘if, in default of treaties, custom has 
 68 Vattel, The Law of Nations, 551.
 69 Ibid., 553.
 70 Ibid., 695.
 71 Ibid., 137.
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determined anything in this matter, the nations between whom this custom is 
in force, ought to conform to it’.72 This passage shows that Vattel does not think 
of custom as an insufficient source of obligation; he just argues that for vital 
matters – those relating to the life of a state – sovereign interests are better 
secured by the signing of a treaty.
8 Conclusion
To conclude this contribution, it is worth further emphasizing that Vattel’s 
doctrine of the law of nations is a constant restatement of the fact that rely-
ing on self- love is the best means for realizing collective interests. The fairer, 
more public and explicit are the rules of the international ‘game’, the better 
will be the outcome. In this perspective, custom plays a crucial role, in at least 
three respects. First of all, it clarifies the relationship between natural law and 
positive law, by insisting on the fact that, as a source of law, custom is both 
compliant with natural law and effective as positive law. Secondly, another im-
portant element is Vattel’s insistence on the added value that nations annex to 
custom, which would otherwise be nothing but a mere usus, carrying no legal 
meaning or obliging force whatsoever. Quite on the contrary, Vattel manages 
to bind the persuasive force of custom into compliance with natural law and, 
ultimately, with the pursuit of self- interest. Thirdly, and finally, Vattel’s concept 
of custom calls into question the idea of an international legal order where 
normative principles coexist with practical considerations of expediency, an 
aspect which makes such theorization particularly illuminating even for con-
temporary debates concerning customary international law.73
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 chapter 12
The Circulation of the École romande du 
droit naturel in Eighteenth- Century Italy
Elisabetta Fiocchi Malaspina
1 Introduction
This chapter investigates how some of the key texts of the so called école ro-
mande du droit naturel were translated, received and used in the Italian con-
text during the long eighteenth century.1 The circulation of Emer de Vattel’s 
treatise on the law of nations, Le droit des gens (1758), will be considered to-
gether with Jean Barbeyrac’s translations of Pufendorf ’s writings and with 
the various editions of Jean- Jacques Burlamaqui’s works.2 The école romande 
had a great influence on the propagation of theories of natural law and law of 
 1 Alfred Dufour termed the natural law teaching and literary production in the French- speaking 
part of Switzerland école romande du droit naturel. Although identifying a ‘school’ within the 
natural law movement may appear problematic, Dufour held this term to be appropriate, 
in the sense of ‘an intellectual movement committed to defend, in connection with one or 
several teachers, a certain number of principles, and to propagate them through speech or 
writing’. According to Dufour, the school was a kind of mediation between the German nat-
ural law theories (represented, among others, by Pufendorf, Thomasius and Wolff) and the 
French ones symbolised, for example, by the works of Montesquieu, Rousseau and Voltaire. 
See Alfred Dufour, Le mariage dans l’école allemande du droit naturel moderne au XVIIIe siècle 
(Paris: Libraire générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1976), 12 (author’s translation), and Al-
fred Dufour, ‘Die Ecole romande du droit naturel – ihre deutschen Wurzeln,’ in Humanismus 
und Naturrecht in Brandenburg- Preussen, ed. Hans Thieme (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1979), 133– 
143. See also: Simone Zurbuchen, ‘Das Prinzip des Naturrechts in der école romande du droit 
naturel,’ Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 12 (2004): 189– 211, and Simone Zurbuchen, ‘Teaching 
the Law of Nature and Nations in the Swiss Context,’ Etudes Lumières.Lausanne, 6 (novembre 
2018), 1, accessed 15 February 2019, http:// lumieres.unil.ch/ fiches/ biblio/ 9472/ .
 2 Besides the Principes du droit naturel (1747) and the Principes du droit politique (1751) I will 
also account for the new and annotated edition of Fortunato Bartolomeo de Felice, Principes 
du droit de la nature et des gens, 8  vols., Yverdon:  [de Félice], 1766– 1768. On de Felice see 
Stefano Ferrari, Fortunato Bartolomeo De Felice. Un intellettuale cosmopolita nell’Europa dei 
Lumi (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2017). On Barbeyrac as translator see: Giulia Maria Labriola, 
Barbeyrac interprete di Pufendorf e Grozio. Dalla costruzione della sovranità alla teoria della 
resistenza (Napoli:  Editoriale Scientifica, 2003); Meri Päivärinne, ‘Translating Grotius’s De 
jure belli ac pacis: Courtin vs Barbeyrac,’ Translation Studies 5, 1 (2012): 33– 47.
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nations on the Italian peninsula, in a context that was marked by the presence 
of very different political regimes.
As is well known, the Peace of Utrecht in 1713, the Treaty of Rastatt in 1714 
and the Hague Treaty of 1720 marked the end of Spanish rule in Italy. As a re-
sult of the Aachen Peace of 1748, the Italian peninsula was fragmented. In the 
north, Piedmont was ruled by the Savoy dynasty, Lombardy was under Aus-
trian rule, the Duchy of Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla were under the control 
of the Bourbon family, while Venice remained independent and Florence gov-
erned by Francis ii of Lorraine. In the south the Bourbons were on the throne 
in Naples with which Sicily was united in 1815.
This peculiar situation constituted the context for enlightened debates on 
natural law, diplomacy and the law of nations. Discussions were often stimu-
lated by texts that came from outside of Italy, and translations, in many cases 
supplemented with annotations, played an important role in arousing interest 
in topics such as social contract, sovereignty, constitutions, or the relationship 
between state and religion. The école romande du droit naturel had a major im-
pact on these debates, as shown by Italian historians and legal historians who 
have investigated the significance of the Italian translations of Barbeyrac, Bur-
lamaqui and Vattel. Antonio Trampus has pointed out, for example, that the 
Italian version of Vattel’s Le droit des gens was considered a benchmark for a 
new political science.3 Indeed, Vattel’s doctrines were discussed and  variously 
adapted to different Italian contexts.4
 3 Antonio Trampus, ‘Il ruolo del traduttore nel tardo illuminismo: Lodovico Antonio Loschi e 
la versione italiana del Droit des gens di Emer de Vattel,’ in Il linguaggio del tardo illuminismo. 
Politica, diritto e società civile, ed. Antonio Trampus (Roma: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 
2011), 81– 108; A.  Trampus, ‘The circulation of Vattel’s Droit des gens in Italy:  the doctrinal 
and practical model of government,’ in War, Trade and Neutrality. Europe and the Mediterra-
nean in seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ed. Antonella Alimento (Milano: FrancoAngeli 
2011), 217– 232; A. Trampus, ‘La traduzione toscana del Droit des gens di Emer de Vattel (circa 
1780): contesti politici, transferts culturali e scelte traduttive,’ in Traduzione e Transferts nel 
XVIII secolo tra Francia, Italia e Germania, ed. Giulia Cantarutti, Stefano Ferrari (Milano: Fran-
co Angeli, 2013), 153– 174; A. Trampus, ‘Le costituzioni italiane prime di Cadice: Vattel e le radi-
ci democratiche italiane,’ in Cadice e oltre: costituzione, nazione e libertà. La carta gaditana 
nel bicentenario, ed. García Sanz et al. (Roma: Istituto per la Storia del Risorgimento italiano, 
2015), 161– 172; A. Trampus, ‘Dalla libertà religiosa allo Stato nazione: Utrecht e le origini del 
sistema internazionale di Emer de Vattel,’ in I trattati di Utrecht: una pace di dimensione euro-
pea, ed. Frédéric Ieva (Roma: Viella, 2016), 93– 106.
 4 See Elisabetta Fiocchi Malaspina, L’eterno ritorno del Droit des gens di Emer de Vattel (secc. 
XVIII– XIX). L’impatto sulla cultura giuridica in prospettiva globale (Frankfurt am Main: Global 
Perspectives on Legal History, Max Planck Institute for European Legal History Open Access 
Publication, 2017), http:// dx.doi.org/ 10.12946/ gplh8.
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In focusing on translation, transfer and reception, this chapter draws on re-
cent methodological reflections in legal history which suggest that a purely sec-
toral approach to legal phenomena should be replaced by an interdisciplinary 
approach, the latter allowing an assessment of law as a dynamic phenomenon 
that needs to be put into context in terms of space and time.5 This manner 
of proceeding will reveal the political nature of translation, with its frequent 
conscious manipulations of text. Processes of translation will be presented in 
three areas of research, or scenarios, related to the propagation of natural law 
and the law of nations. The first scenario deals with the Italian translation of 
Barbeyrac’s works, intended as a tool for mediating Protestant ideas in a Catho-
lic context. The second focuses on the political contexts of the reception and 
translation of Burlamaqui’s and Vattel’s writings. In the third scenario, it will be 
examined how various works of the école romande were used in teaching the 
law of nature and nations in different academic contexts in Italy.
2 First Scenario: Translating Pufendorf’s Works through Barbeyrac
The first translation to be considered in this section is Giovambattista Almi-
ci’s Il diritto della natura e delle genti o sia sistema generale de’ principii li più 
importanti di morale, giurisprudenza, e politica (4 vols, 1757– 1759), published 
in Venice by Pietro Valvasense. Almici was born in Brescia in 1717. He received 
his doctorate utroque jure in Padua in 1751, became assistant to the chief magis-
trate of Crema, then of Val Camonica. The cultural and social context in which 
he lived was that of Brescia Jansenism.6 His younger brother, Pietro Camil-
lo, biblical scholar and theologian, entered the Congregation of the Oratory, 
and was one of the most important Italian critics of the Italian and foreign 
 Enlightenment.7
 5 See Thomas Duve, ‘European Legal History  – Global Perspectives Working Paper for the 
Colloquium European Normativity – Global Historical Perspectives’ (Max Planck- Institute 
for European Legal History, September 2– 4 2013), in Max Planck Institute for European Legal 
History Research Paper Series 6 (2013): 18, accessed 28 January 2017, http:// ssrn.com/ abstract 
=2292666.
 6 Stefania Stoffella, ‘Almici Giovambattista,’ in Dizionario Biografico Giuristi Italiani (XII– XX 
secolo), ed. Italo Birocchi et al. (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2013), vol. i, 45.
 7 Gianni Sofri, ‘Pietro Camillo,’ in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani 2 (1960), 512. He wrote 
Osservazioni critiche sul libro intitolato Dei delitti e delle pene, under the pseudonym of Calli-
maco Mili, in which he strongly criticized the famous work of Cesare Beccaria, rejecting its 
contractualist premises and supporting the divine origin of sovereignty. See Callimaco Mili, 
‘Osservazioni critiche sul libro intitolato Dei delitti e delle pene,’ Nuova raccolta d’opuscoli 
scientifici e filologici 13 (1765): ii– xlvii.
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Almici’s translation of Pufendorf ’s main work (De jure naturae et gentium) 
has been the subject of relevant Italian studies.8 Maurizio Bazzoli suggested 
that Almici might be seen as a sort of Italian Catholic Barbeyrac, because, af-
ter translating Pufendorf, he wanted to publish, in 1771, his richly annotated 
translation of Grotius’s De jure belli ac pacis, but this never happened and it 
remained in manuscript form.9 Almici worked on the French translation of 
Pufendorf ’s text, obviously with the intention to revisit Barbeyrac’s notes. In 
his view, a rectified and illustrated translation was necessary in order to dis-
seminate in Italy, too, a work presenting natural law in a modern, scientific 
way, but without questioning the dictates of Catholicism. In fact, he wished to 
introduce his own version of Pufendorf in order to prevent any dissent from 
the Roman Church. He justified this manner of proceeding in the preface to 
the translation, where he also announced his intention to defend the positions 
of the Catholic Church on, for instance, lying, usury, matrimony, polygamy, 
pacts and duels.10 Despite this, Bazzoli concludes that Almici followed Bar-
beyrac ‘more than it would appear, or, than he out of caution would admit’.11
Almici added a great number of notes to the translation. Interestingly, in 
volume iv, published in 1759, there are countless references to Vattel’s Droit des 
gens, which had been published the previous year. In these notes Almici shows 
great appreciation for the thinking of the jurist from Neuchâtel, and on more 
than one occasion he does not hesitate to support him energetically, particu-
larly on the issue of diplomacy. For example, in his commentary to Pufendorf ’s 
chapter on ambassadors, he refers to Vattel’s now famous definition of the 
 8 Diego Panizza, ‘La traduzione italiana del “De iure naturae” di Pufendorf: giusnaturalis-
mo moderno e cultura cattolica nel Settecento,’ Studi Veneziani 11 (1969): 483– 528; Mau-
rizio Bazzoli, ‘Almici e la diffusione di Pufendorf nel Settecento Italiano,’ Critica Storica 
16 (1979): 3– 100; M. Bazzoli, ‘Aspetti della recezione di Pufendorf nel Settecento italiano,’ 
in Dal “De Jure Naturae et gentium” di Samuel Pufendorf alla codificazione prussiana del 
1794. Atti del convegno internazionale, Padova, 25– 26 ottobre 2001, ed. Marta Ferronato (Pa-
dova: Cedam, 2005), 41– 60; Diego Quaglioni, ‘Pufendorf in Italia. Appunti e notizie della 
prima diffusione della traduzione italiana del De iure naturae et gentium,’ Il Pensiero Polit-
ico 32 (1999): 23– 250; Stefania Stoffella, ‘Assolutismo e diritto naturale in Italia nel Sette-
cento,’ Annali dell’Istituto storico italo- germanico, 26 (2000): 137– 175; S. Stoffella, ‘Il diritto 
di resistenza nel Settecento Italiano. Documenti per la storia della traduzione del De iure 
naturae et gentium di Pufendorf,’ Magistrature et politique 2 (2001): 173– 199, accessed 28 
January 2017, http:// laboratoireitalien.revues.org/ 261.
 9 Bazzoli, Giambattista Almici e la diffusione di Pufendorf, 6.
 10 Ibid., 18. See Giovambattista Almici, ‘Prefazione,’ in Pufendorf, Samuel, Il diritto della 
natu ra e delle genti o sia sistema generale de’ principii li più importanti di morale, giurispru-
denza e politica, rettificato, accresciuto e illustrato (Venezia: Pietro Valvasense, 1757), t. i, i.
 11 Bazzoli, Giambattista Almici e la diffusione di Pufendorf, 22:  ‘le segue più di quanto non 
appaia, o per prudenza, non ammetta’ (author’s translation).
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‘representative character’ of ambassadors and the ensuing ranking of different 
kinds of ministers.12 Vattel’s proposed division of roles was accepted in its en-
tirety by Almici, who observes:
Nowadays various names and titles are given to these government Minis-
ters, that I call Envoys, Residents, Ambassadors. The first two have not the 
character of personally representing their Prince, but they represent him 
only for such matters as they are sent to treat. By contrast, the Ambassa-
dors have the character of representing their own Prince par excellence, 
personally, consequently they have greater dignity.13
This example illustrates how Almici proceeded in order to present to his Ital-
ian readers an up- to- date version of the law of nature and nations: the wide 
use of notes allowed him to account for the most recent publications on vari-
ous subjects.
Pufendorf ’s manual De officio hominis et civis, also translated into French 
by Barbeyrac (1707), had a unique history on the Italian peninsula. Two Italian 
translations were made of this work, one in Venice by Michele Grandi and one 
by Domenico Amati, published by Raymondi in Naples in 1780 and reissued in 
1785. In the Neapolitan context, De officio was practically mandatory reading 
for generations of students during the age of reform. The same is true of Gro-
tius’s De jure belli ac pacis, which was translated into Italian by Antonio Porpo-
ra and published in Naples by De Dominicis in 1777.14
 12 Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the 
Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, ed. Béla Kapossy, Richard Whatmore 
(Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2008), book iv, chap. vi, §§ 70– 74, 691– 692.
 13 ‘Al giorno d’oggi si danno vari nomi, e titoli a questi pubblici Ministri, cioè Inviati, 
Residenti, Ambasciatori. Li primi due non hanno il carattere di rappresentazione per-
sonale propriamente del Principe loro; ma lo presentano solo per quei tai affari, che 
trattare inviati sono; al contrario che gli Ambasciatori hanno il carattere rappresentativo 
del Proprio Principe per eccellenza, personale, onde di maggior dignità sono’ (author’s 
translation). Almici in Samuel Pufendorf, Il diritto della natura e delle genti o sia sistema 
generale de’ principii li più importanti di morale, giurisprudenza e politica, rettificato, accre-
sciuto e illustrato (Venezia: Pietro Valvasense 1759), vol. iv, book viii, chap. x, § 1, 469, 
note 1, also 472, 474, 479, in which Almici develops the character of the representative-
ness of ambassadors with reference to Vattel. For a full discussion on the ambassadors 
within the theories of the law of nations see Miloš Vec, ‘L’ambassade dans la science du 
droit des gens,’ in Les écrits relatifs à l’ambassadeur et à l’art de négocier du Moyen Âge au 
début du XIXe siècle, ed. Stefano Andretta, Stéphane Péquignot and Jean- Claude Waquet 
(Rome: École française de Rome, 2015), 487– 522.
 14 See: Vittorio Conti (ed.), La recezione di Grozio a Napoli nel Settecento (Firenze: Centro 
Editoriale Toscano, 2002).
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Grandi’s translation comprised three quarto volumes, of which the first two 
were published in 1761 and the third in 1767, all by Francesco Pitteri.15 Grandi 
was spurred to attempt his translation ‘having seen published in Italian the 
[…] Great Work of Pufendorf by Mr Giovanni Battista Almici’. Grandi publicly 
questioned Almici’s method of directly modifying the text by making inser-
tions and changes to it. He wished instead to recognize the right, or ‘common 
desire’, of readers to ‘be able to read the opinions of these famous Authors ex-
pounded in the manner in which they were published’.16
Grandi’s translation strategy was completely different from that of Almici. 
His intellectual bent, however, was very clear: although concerned about re-
ligious orthodoxy, he contributed to the circulation of Enlightenment ideas. 
As Bazzoli argues, Grandi made use of Pufendorf ’s fame to consciously dif-
fuse among Italian readers Barbeyrac’s interpretation of the law of nature and 
nations. He stoutly defended Barbeyrac against Almici’s criticisms and, per-
haps with the intention to further support the former’s opinions, he followed 
Barbeyrac’s own practice by adding two of the latter’s essays in an appendix, 
which he also translated into Italian:  the Discours sur la permission des loix 
(1715), and the Discours sur le bénéfice des loix (1716).17
3 Second Scenario: Translation and Use of 
Burlamaqui’s and Vattel’s Works
In the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, Burlamaqui’s natural law theory was trans-
lated on the basis of de Felice’s richly annotated edition Principes du droit de la 
nature et des gens (1766– 1768). As Sandro Landi has shown, the translation was 
begun in Siena in 1772 for the publisher Bindi, but was swiftly halted by Stefano 
Bertolini, an official overseeing printing in Siena.18 Bertolini was convinced 
that Burlamaqui’s text and de Felice’s notes were potentially dangerous, main-
ly for their original theory about the foundation and the limits of royal power, 
and about the prerogatives of princes concerning religion. Indeed, Bertolini 
 15 For further references: Bazzoli, Giambattista Almici e la diffusione di Pufendorf, 46.
 16 Michele Grandi, ‘Avvertimento sopra questa traduzione italiana,’ in Samuel Pufendorf, 
I  doveri dell’uomo e del cittadino:  tali che a lui dalla legge naturale sono prescritti, dalla 
versione francese di Giovanni Barbeyrac tradotti, e con molte aggiunte corretti ed illustrati 
da Michele Grandi accademico di Udine (Venezia: Francesco Pitteri, 1761), vol. i, xi– xii 
(author’s translation).
 17 Bazzoli, Giambattista Almici e la diffusione di Pufendorf, 46.
 18 Sandro Landi, Il governo delle opinioni. Censura e formazione del consenso nella Toscana 
del Settecento (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2000), 254; Trampus, La traduzione toscana del Droit 
des gens di Emer de Vattel, 172.
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justified his decision to stop the printing by saying there were ‘points too 
closely concerning royal rights’.19 There were two particularly delicate issues. 
The first was the contractualist theory of the state, the second the theory of 
‘limited’ monarchy, which Burlamaqui and de Felice elaborated with reference 
to the model of the British ‘constitutional monarchy’.20 At all events, the cen-
sorship was temporary, and Bindi published the translation in 1780– 1782. This 
sudden change of heart was very probably dictated by the broader view on the 
freedom of the press taken by the government.21
In Venice, Giovanni Gatti published in 1780 a translation of Burlamaqui’s 
Principes du droit naturel. The translator was Count Benedetto Crispi, who 
signed the work with his initials, B.C. He wrote in his introduction that it was 
‘well known how passionately the more cultivated Nations of Europe have 
turned to the study of Natural Law, since Grotius systematized it’, and that 
‘among these Italy has distinguished itself not a little, not only with new edi-
tions, translations, confutations of Grotius, of Hobbes, of Pufendorf and of 
Wolff, but also with original works by its expert and most profound authors’.22 
After listing the various European translations of Burlamaqui’s treatise in Eng-
land, Holland and Denmark, he pointed out that he had decided to translate 
the first edition of Burlamaqui’s work (1747) instead of the later version anno-
tated by de Felice because the latter obscured Burlamaqui’s thinking.
Crispi also translated Burlamaqui’s Principes du droit politique (1751). The 
work was published in the same year (1780), again by Gatti. Crispi was an aristo-
crat, famous for his excellent translations from German, English and, above all, 
French. Apart from Burlamaqui’s works, he also translated Gabriel Bonnot de 
Mably’s treatise on the public law of Europe, Il diritto pubblico dell’Europa, which 
was also published by Gatti, in 1784. The Count was a friend and protector of a 
group of Jesuits who, having been expelled from Spain in 1767, had taken refuge 
in northern Italy. Crispi had no hesitation in involving them in his cultural and 
 19 Landi, Il governo delle opinioni, 255.
 20 Ibid.
 21 Ibid.
 22 ‘abbastanza noto, con quanto ardore fiensi rivolte le più colte Nazioni d’Europa allo studio 
della giurisprudenza Naturale, da che Grozio lo ridusse a sistema […] Tra queste si è pure 
distinta non poco l’Italia, non solo colle ristampe, traduzioni, confutazioni [del] Grozio, 
dell’Obbes, del Pufendorf e del Wolff, ma eziandio colle opere originali dei suoi più dotti, 
e più profondi scrittori’ (author’s translation). Conte Benedetto Crispi, ‘Il traduttore a chi 
legge’, in Jean- Jacques Burlamaqui, Principii del diritto naturale di G.G. Burlamachi con-
sigliere di Stato, già professore di diritto naturale e civile in Ginevra (Venezia:  Giovanni 
Gatti, 1780), vol. i, iii– iv.
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editorial exploits.23 Indeed, to the translations of Burlamaqui’s treatises were 
added notes by a former Jesuit, the Catalan Luciano Galissà y Costa, a special-
ist in oriental languages and, from 1782, prefect of the library of Ferrara. It has 
rightly been noted that the aim of Gallissà and Crispi was not merely to present 
these Protestant texts without offence to the Catholic Church, but actively to 
contribute to the circulation and diffusion of Burlamaqui’s theories.24
In his Avvertimento of the translation of Burlamaqui’s Principes du droit na-
turel, the publisher, Gatti, announced an Italian translation of Vattel’s treatise 
on the law of nations. This translation had been done by Lodovico Antonio 
Loschi,25 under the title Il diritto delle genti, ovvero principii del diritto naturale 
applicati alla condotta e agli affari delle nazioni e de’ sovrani, in three octavo 
volumes, republished in 1804– 1805.26 It was based on the edition published in 
Neuchâtel in 1773 and edited by Frédéric Samuel Ostervald.
The Italian edition of Vattel’s treatise, as Antonio Trampus points out, had 
two distinguishing features: respect for the author’s intentions and enhance-
ment by the translator’s notes.27 Indeed, Loschi did not merely translate the 
text, but inserted some explanatory notes, particularly in the first volume. 
 23 Niccolò Guasti, L’esilio italiano dei gesuiti spagnoli. Identità, controllo sociale e pratiche cul-
turali (1767– 1798) (Roma: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2006), 282 and note 75. Guasti 
underlines that for Crispi there is extensive archival documentation and correspondence. 
The Count was an interesting figure who shared ideas and cultural interests with the 
Jesuit emigrants who brought the ideas of the Spanish ilustración with them to Italy. See 
also Trampus, Il ruolo del traduttore nel tardo illuminismo, 95. For the Italian translation of 
Mably’s work see Giuseppe Roggerone, L’abbé de Mably: politico della teologia illuminata 
(Firenze: Centro Editoriale Toscano, 1991), 179.
 24 Francesco Berti, ‘Illuminismo, rivoluzione, modernità:  lo spirito del secolo in alcuni 
significativi scritti dei gesuiti espulsi,’ in La presenza in Italia dei gesuiti iberici espulsi. 
Aspetti religiosi, politici, culturali, ed. Ugo Baldini and Gian Paolo Brizzi (Bologna: clueb, 
2010), 330.
 25 Lodovico Antonio Loschi (1744– 1811) was a scholar and translator who lectured on 
ethics at the University of Modena; he had a minor role in the political life of Napoleon’s 
‘Three- Year Republic’ in northern Italy and in Napoleon’s Kingdom of Italy: Trampus, Il 
ruolo del traduttore nel tardo illuminismo, 81– 108.
 26 Trampus illustrates the stages of publication of the work, noting in particular that the 
licences obtained for printing seem to have been acquired in a short time, that is, between 
1780 and 1781. The manuscript of the first volume was given permission to be printed 
on 22 March 1781, falsely indicating Lyon as the base for the typographer Giovanni Gatti, 
according to the judgement of the reviewer, Gasparo Gozzi; the second volume, later sub-
divided into two books, was granted permission on 22 September 1781, on the basis of 
the favourable judgement of the reviewer, Cosimo Mei; see Il ruolo del traduttore nel tardo 
illuminismo, 92. The 1804– 1805 edition appeared in three volumes, without any addi-
tions or modifications to the previous one.
 27 On Loschi’s notes see Trampus, Il ruolo del traduttore nel tardo illuminismo, 89.
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Loschi’s notes, Trampus highlights, essentially concern comments or criticisms 
of the most obviously anti- clerical positions Vattel defended, for example by 
advocating freedom of religion and freedom of conscience as inviolable hu-
man rights. The translator also made various notes about personal liberties. 
For example, when Vattel describes the duties of the nation regarding its ob-
ligation to construct and maintain public works, as commanded by the sover-
eign, Loschi pointed out in his notes that these works must be proportionate to 
the interest and profit of the nation.28 It should be noted that the notes made 
by Loschi are, in any case, identifiable and do not distort the original text. In 
the Avvertimento, the translator specifically states: ‘a translation can only be as 
beautiful and elegant as its original. It is quite sufficient that the work is recog-
nized as excellent for its method and substance’.29
In the appendix to Il diritto delle genti Loschi included a translation of the 
entry ‘Droit de la Nature, ou Droit naturel’ written by Antoine- Gaspard Boucher 
d’Argis for the Encyclopédie of Diderot and d’Alembert. This seemed important 
to him as it showed ‘in what condition this very noble and very useful science 
was found, when our author began to study it’.30 Boucher d’Argis explained 
that natural law was the ‘science of morals’ (science des moeurs, qu’on appelle 
‘morale’), which comprises certain rules of justice and equity, established by 
human reason among all men. He also stressed that the law of nature should 
not be confounded with the law of nations, for the latter comprises, in addition 
to the rules established by right reason, customs that may conflict with the 
natu ral order. Boucher d’Argis then provided a short historical overview in 
which, starting from Roman times, he mentions the works of the most famous 
jusnaturalists, first and foremost Grotius’s De jure belli ac pacis, and then those 
of Pufendorf and Burlamaqui, but without entering into philosophical, let 
alone juridical, considerations. The content and structure of this encyclopaedia 
entry provoked a great deal of criticism, and the debate as to why Diderot 
wrote another entry, ‘Droit naturel (Morale)’, for insertion in his Encyclopédie 
immediately following that of Boucher d’Argis, is still going on.31
 28 See Trampus, Il ruolo del traduttore nel tardo illuminismo, 100– 101.
 29 ‘una traduzione esser non può bella ed elegante che a misura del suo originale. Basta bene 
che l’opera sia riconosciuta eccellente per metodo e per la sostanza delle cose’ (author’s 
translation). Lodovico Antonio Loschi, ‘Avvertimento del volgarizzatore,’ in Emer de 
Vattel, Il diritto delle genti, ovvero principii del diritto naturale applicati alla condotta e agli 
affari delle nazioni e de’ sovrani (Lyon: 1781), vol. i, vi.
 30 Ibid.: ‘in quale stato [si] ritrovasse questa nobilissima ed utilissima scienza, quando prese 
a trattarla il nostro autore’ (author’s translation).
 31 Luigi Luporini, ‘Per una lettura della voce “Droit naturel” nell’Encyclopédie,’ Studi Storici, 
28, 3 (1987): 679– 697; Peter Schröder, ‘Natural Law and Enlightenment in France and 
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This brief review of Boucher d’Argis’s entry on natural law is essential for 
understanding the climate in which the Italian translation of Vattel’s treatise 
was published. Loschi felt compelled to distance himself from what might be 
dubbed an ‘incomplete’ encyclopaedia entry on natural law, and in response to 
offer the broad, well- conceived treatise of Vattel, which was considered by the 
translator the most accurate work on the law of nature and nations available 
at the time.
Loschi’s translation had an adverse fate in the Kingdom of Naples during the 
French Revolution, being placed on the list of prohibited books. At the time, 
the revision of publications was carried out by Francesco Conforti, professor 
of the history of Catholic Councils at Naples University and theologian at the 
Nea politan court, responsible for controlling the influx of foreign books.32 
Conforti judged Vattel’s Le droit des gens to be ‘seditious, because it recognizes 
the right of the People to reform the constitution and change the government’, 
but he especially railed against Loschi, because in his translation ‘he kept the 
same maxims as were given in the original’.33
Loschi’s was the only Italian translation of Vattel’s work printed in the eigh-
teenth century, but the treatise had been circulating since the time of its first 
edition in 1758 and, thanks to later editions, certainly aroused great interest 
in many parts of the Italian peninsula because of its contributions to a wide 
range of subjects, from academic jurisprudence through applied legal doctrine 
to diplomacy. There are frequent references, for example, in Cesare Beccaria’s 
Dei delitti e delle pene to Vattel’s work, which ‘together with that of Burlamaqui 
seems to constitute one of the main sources for the elaboration of the essay’.34 
Significantly, Alessandro Verri, in ‘Di alcuni sistemi di diritto pubblico’ pub-
lished in the journal Il Caffè (vol. i, 1764– 65), states that Vattel was the only 
Scotland – A Comparative Perspective,’ in Early Modern Natural Law Theories: Contexts 
and Strategies in the Early Enlightenment, ed. T.J. Hochstrasser and Peter Schröder 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), 297– 317.
 32 See Pasquale Villani, Mezzogiorno tra riforme e rivoluzione (Bari: Laterza, 1962), and Anna 
Maria Rao, ‘La stampa francese a Napoli negli anni della Rivoluzione,’ Mélanges de l’École 
française de Rome. Italie et Méditerranée, 102, 2 (1990): 478.
 33 ‘sediziosa, perchè riconosce nel Popolo il diritto di riformare la costituzione e di cambiare 
il governo […] si sono conservate le stesse massime, che si dettano nell’originale’ (author’s 
translation). Villani, Contributo alla storia dell’anticurialismo napoletano, 249.
 34 ‘assieme a quella di Burlamaqui sembra costituire una delle fonti principali per l’elab-
orazione del saggio’ (author’s translation). Gianni Francioni, ‘Nota al testo,’ Cesare 
Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene, edizioni italiane del “Dei delitti e delle pene”, ed. Luigi 
Firpo (Milano:  Einaudi, 1984), 334. See also:  Trampus, Il ruolo del traduttore nel tardo 
illuminismo, 83.
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person ‘who had grasped the truth [of public law] and was the one to peel away 
the illusions and misunderstandings from this science, reducing it to a system 
of ideas, not of words’.35
The illustrious jurist Alberto de Simoni, too, fascinated by the theories of 
the école romande, attempted to translate Burlamaqui and considered Vattel 
to be ‘l’umanissimo’. He made frequent reference to Vattel’s theories in his 
Del furto e sua pena of 1776 and on more than one occasion had no hesita-
tion in calling them ‘absolutely right’,36 an opinion shared by the jurist Paolo 
Risi.37
In a totally different geographical, political and social context, the Droit des 
gens was widely consulted for the defence of the Bishop of Mileto, Giuseppe 
Maria Carafa. In Difesa del vescovo di Mileto e del Collegio dei Greci in Roma 
(1769), the bishop defended the Church’s ownership and rights over the 
Abbey of Trinità of Mileto, which was being claimed by the court of Naples. 
The question was very complicated and of long standing, but the crux of his 
main thesis, overruled by the Court, was the correct interpretation of the Con-
cordat of 2 June 1741 between the King of Naples, Charles of Bourbon, and Pope 
Benedict iv. Carafa argued that the Concordat ought to be interpreted accord-
ing to Vattel’s rules, which were called upon in their entirety by the bishop in 
defence of the Church’s ownership of the Abbey.38
 35 ‘abbia colta la verità [del diritto pubblico] e sia quello che abbia spogliata questa  scienza 
dalle chimere e dagli equivoci riducendola a sistema di idee, non di parole’ (author’s 
translation). ‘Discorso ix: Di alcuni sistemi del diritto pubblico’ appeared, together with 
other writings of Alessandro Verri, in the journal Il Caffè and also published in Alessandro 
Verri, Discorsi vari del conte Alessandro Verri pubblicati nel giornale letterario intitolato Il 
Caffè (Milano: Silvestri, 1818), 349– 375, here particularly 370.
 36 Alberto De Simoni, Del furto e sua pena (Lugano: Agnelli, 1776), 13. De Simoni referred 
to book 1, chap. 13, § 171 of Le droit des gens, where Vattel deals with the degree of pun-
ishment and criticized the practice of punishing simple robbery with death. See Renato 
Pasta, ‘Dei delitti e delle pene et sa fortune italienne: milieux juridiques et lecture “phi-
losophique” ’, in Beccaria et la culture juridique des Lumières, (Actes du colloque européenne 
de Genève 25– 26 Novembre 1995), ed. Michel Porret (Genève:  Droz, 1997), 132; Italo 
Birocchi, ‘De Simoni Alberto,’ in Dizionario biografico dei giuristi italiani (XII– XX secolo), 
ed. Italo Birocchi et al. (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2013), vol. i, 718– 720.
 37 See Stefano Solimano, ‘Paolo Risi e il processo penale (1766),’ in Studi di storia del diritto 
(Milano: Giuffrè, 2001), vol. iii, 440, note 59. About Risi: Stefano Solimano, ‘Risi Paolo,’ 
Dizionario Biografico Giuristi Italiani (XII– XX secolo), ed. Italo Birocchi, et al. (Bologna: Il 
Mulino, 2013), vol. ii, 1694– 1696.
 38 Giuseppe Maria Carafa, Difesa del vescovo di Mileto e del Collegio dei Greci in Roma contro 
un’istanza fiscale ed una scrittura stampata col titolo di Dimostrazione del padronato della 
Real Corona, sulla chiesa e badia della Trinità di Mileto (Napoli: 1769), xxxv– xl.
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From the very beginning, the reception of Vattel’s work in Italy was probably 
linked to the great ability of the author to summarize and systematize natural 
law theory in a way which could prove particularly useful to Italian political 
culture, once it was detached from Vattel’s critical approach to the Catholic 
Church. The specific features of Vattel’s text, and its considerable conceptual 
and lexical modernization in particular, effectively led to new interpretations 
in the light of the political changes that had been triggered by the crisis of the 
ancien régime and by the Seven Years’ War. Le droit des gens portrayed natu-
ral law as a ‘science’, capable of conceptualizing the shift from the analysis of 
mankind in the state of nature to the study of individuals as members of a 
political society.39
In any case, the act of translating became a specific choice, deliberate-
ly aimed at meeting the need to ‘recreate’ Vattel’s doctrine in the context of 
eighteenth- century Italy. Indeed, Vattel’s work was not classified merely as a 
text on the law of nations. On the contrary, it was a sort of political guide to 
foreign affairs for the small states that at the time made up the Italian penin-
sula.40 Legal transfer, understood as a process of cultural translation, could be 
achieved if the very contents and aims of a work were able to adapt and mould 
themselves or  – even better  – to be re- read according to different historical 
and geographical requirements.41 As will be shown below, it was, for example, 
of particular interest in the Italian context that Vattel held the creation of a 
constitution, seen as a fundamental regulation, to be legitimate within a state, 
on condition that it pursued the common good of the citizens and was not im-
posed by outside interference. Having dealt with the essential features of the 
nation- state, he broadens his investigation to the state as an entity able to com-
municate on an international level.42 As Trampus observes, Vattel’s treatise 
‘represents […] a typical example of reproducing a cultural model outside of 
its original historical and geographical context, and adapted again and again, 
with interference from another culture, in new political and  social areas’.43
 39 Trampus, La traduzione toscana del Droit des gens di Emer de Vattel, 153– 154.
 40 Ibid.
 41 See:  Lena Foljanty, ‘Legal Transfers as Processes of Cultural Translation:  on the 
Consequences of a Metaphor,’ Max Planck Institute for European Research Paper series 9 
(2015): 7, accessed 28 January 2017, http:// ssrn.com/ abstract=2682465.
 42 Trampus, La traduzione toscana del Droit des gens di Emer de Vattel, 153– 154.
 43 Ibid.: ‘rappresenta […] un caso tipico di riproduzione di un modello culturale al di fuori 
dell’originario contesto storico e geografico e adattato sempre più spesso, subendo l’inter-
ferenza di cultura terza, in nuovi ambiti politici e sociali’ (author’s translation).
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simone Zurbuchen - 978-90-04-38420-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 09/19/2019 09:19:14AM
via University of Lausanne
316 Malaspina
4 Third Scenario: Translating Barbeyrac’s, Burlamaqui’s and 
Vattel’s Ideas for Academic and Practical Purposes
The Italian peninsula was of prime geostrategic importance during the eigh-
teenth century, and this promoted the adoption and circulation of modern 
doctrines on the law of nations. Italy’s universities continued the tradition of 
the jus commune and harboured a distinct style of Enlightenment thought, and 
the new law of nations was received in this general context. Only in the second 
half of the eighteenth century were chairs of natural law and law of nations 
established in various Italian states, almost always in those which were politi-
cally or culturally dependent on Austria. In many cases the teaching of natural 
law was linked to courses in public law, public universal law and the law of 
nations.44
It is interesting to note that works pertaining to the école romande, in par-
ticular Vattel’s treatise on the law of nations, influenced academic teaching 
when chairs of natural law were established as a result of university reforms 
carried out at different periods. At the University of Pavia the works of Bur-
lamaqui, Barbeyrac and Vattel on natural law were particularly valued. This 
can be seen from indirect references to their works in Institutiones juris natu-
ralis and Institutiones juris publici universalis45 by Jean Baptiste Noël de Saint 
Clair, professor of natural and universal public law, as well as from other refer-
ences in the teaching and writings of Abbot Pietro Tamburini.46
 44 Among many see Giorgio Zordan, ‘L’insegnamento del diritto naturale nell’Ateneo 
Patavino e i suoi titolari (1764– 1855),’ Rivista di Storia del Diritto Italiano 72 (1999): 5– 76.
 45 Gigliola di Renzo Villata, ‘Le droit public en Lombardie au XVIIIe siècle et l’Europe,’ 
in Science politique et droit public dans les facultés de droit européennes (XIIIe– XVIIIe 
siècle), ed. Jacques Krynen and Michael Stolleis (Frankfurt am Main:  Klostermann, 
2008), 583– 612. For the references to Vattel within the Allegationes see Gigliola di 
Renzo Villata, ‘Introduzione. La formazione del giurista in Italia e l’influenza culturale 
europea tra Sette e Ottocento: il caso della Lombardia,’ in Formare il giurista. Esperienze 
nell’area lombarda tra Sette e Ottocento, ed. Gigliola di Renzo Villata (Milano: Giuffrè, 
2004), 64.
 46 Pietro Stella, ‘Pietro Tamburini nel quadro del giansenismo italiano,’ in Atti del Convegno 
internazionale in occasione del 250° della nascita (Brescia, 25– 26 maggio 1989), ed. Paolo 
Corsini and Daniele Montanari (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1993), 193. About Tamburini see 
also: Paola Vismara, ‘Pietro Tamburini e il “dispotismo pontificio”, in Il giansenismo e l’Uni-
versità di Pavia. Studi in ricordo di Pietro Stella, ed. Simona Negruzzo (Milano: Giuffrè, 2012), 
95– 114; Dale K.  Van Kley, ‘From the Catholic Enlightenment to the Risorgimento:  the 
Exchange Between Nicola Spedalieri and Pietro Tamburini, 1791– 1797,’ Past & Present 
224, 1 (2014): 109– 162; Alberto Carrera, Pietro Tamburini ‘Giurista’. Per una storia della 
cultura giuridica giansenista italiana (PhD diss., University of Milan, 2015).
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Vattel particularly attracted scholars because he relied on Christian Wolff, 
whose thinking was often praised in academic circles. In Padua, for example, 
Abbot Matteo Franzoja was teaching natural law in 1773 using Wolff’s Institu-
tiones juris naturae et gentium as his textbook. In Pisa, Giovanni Maria Lampredi 
heavily relied on Vattel.47 Indeed, in his Iuris publici universalis, sive Iuris natu-
rae et gentium theoremata, begun in 1767, there are countless direct and indirect 
references to Vattel’s theories.48 In the third part of that work, entirely devoted 
to jus gentium, Lampredi addresses the complex relationship between natural 
law and the law of nations, with reference to the most important exponents of 
natural jurisprudence. He rejects Wolff’s proposal to found the law of nations on 
the idea of a civitas maxima, and accepts the positions defended, for example, by 
Barbeyrac and Heineccius.49 It seems however that Vattel’s Le droit des gens were 
‘one of the works most used by the Tuscan jurist in the field of law of nations’.50
In 1788, Lampredi published his Del commercio dei popoli neutrali in tempo 
di guerra,51 in which he fervently supported freedom of trade between neu-
tral states  – based on the law of nations and of treaty law  – in response to 
the theses advanced by Ferdinando Galiani.52 This example provides insight 
into the way in which Vattel’s theory of the law of nations was used in a de-
bate regarding the practical diplomatic issue of neutrality. In 1782, Galiani had 
published his De’ doveri e de’ principi neutrali verso i guerreggianti e di questi 
verso i principi neutrali, a work that was well received throughout Europe and – 
which ‘might well be the crowning of his career as political author’.53 He was 
 47 Maria Rosa Di Simone, ‘L’influenza di Christian Wolff sul giusnaturalismo dell’area 
asburgica e italiana,’ in Dal “De Jure Naturae et gentium” di Samuel Pufendorf alla codifi-
cazione prussiana del 1794. Atti del convegno internazionale, Padova, 25– 26 ottobre 2001, 
ed. Marta Ferronato (Padova: Cedam, 2005), 221– 268, particularly 254; Maria Rosa Di 
Simone, ‘Stato e diritto nel pensiero di Gian Rinaldo Carli,’ in Percorsi del diritto tra Austria 
e Italia (secoli XVII– XX) (Milano: Giuffrè, 2006), 139.
 48 Paolo Comanducci, Il Settecento conservatore: Lampredi e il diritto naturale (Milano: Giuffrè, 
1981), 267.
 49 Ibid., 262– 264.
 50 Ibid., 269:  ‘è una delle opere più utilizzate dal giurista toscano in tema di diritto delle 
genti’ (author’s translation).
 51 Concerning Lampredi for a reconstruction of the thought, the context and the doctri-
nal influences:  Comanducci, Il Settecento conservatore; Fabrizio Vannini, ‘Lampredi 
Giovanni Maria,’ in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani 63 (2004): 259– 262. Concerning 
Lampredi, as professor of public law in Pisa, see Giuliano Marini, ‘Dal diritto naturale alla 
filosofia del diritto,’ in Storia dell’Università di Pisa (Pisa: Pacini, 2000), vol. ii, 635– 661.
 52 Paolo Comanducci, ‘Lampredi Maria Giovanni,’ Dizionario Biografico Giuristi Italiani (XII– 
XX secolo), ed. Italo Birocchi et al. (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2013), vol. i, 1138– 1141.
 53 ‘ben potrebbe essere il coronamento della sua carriera di scrittore politico’ (author’s 
translation). Koen Stapelbroek, ‘I significati della neutralità:  la storia del commercio 
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very critical of the position taken by Vattel regarding the neutral states and 
particularly challenged the neutral party’s freedom of trade that preceded the 
distinction between active and passive trade. He rails against the lack of ex-
planations given by Vattel: ‘Arguments or reasons in support of his sentiment 
he gives none, and perhaps he had none in his head. The example of the Swiss 
nation and of others in Europe were all his proof’.54 Galiani describes Vattel’s 
doctrine of neutrality as ‘bizarre’, because ‘he – [Vattel] – himself applauds it 
as a more humane teaching, and capable of diminishing the calamities of Eu-
rope, by extinguishing the sparks of new wars’. He also observes ironically that 
Vattel ‘in his preface announced a book on the Law of Nations and not a work 
of Political Dissimulation, or Christian Patience’.55
Lampredi, in turn, uses Le droit des gens as his main source for contesting 
Galiani’s position. The introduction to Del commercio dei popoli neutrali in 
tempo di guerra comprises a detailed examination of the principles regulating 
trade between neutral states and of the most significant doctrinal positions 
throughout history. Lampredi has no doubt that the most important was that 
of Alberico Gentili, who endeavoured to create ‘a system of justice even amidst 
the clamour of war’,56 and whose ideas had ‘to some extent paved the way for 
mediterraneo in Dei Doveri dei Principi Neutrali,’ in Il linguaggio del tardo illuminismo. 
Politica, diritto e società civile, ed. Antonio Trampus (Roma: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 
2011), 77. See also Koen Stapelbroek, Love, Self- deceit and Money: Commerce and Morality 
in the Early Neapolitan Enlightenment (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008).
 54 ‘Argomenti o ragioni da stabilire il suo sentimento non ne dà, e forse non ne aveva nel 
suo capo. L’esempio della nazione Svizzera e di altre in Europa formano tutta la sua 
prova’ (author’s translation). Ferdinando Galiani, De’ doveri e de’ principi neutrali verso 
i guerreggianti e di questi verso i principi neutrali (Napoli: 1782), 120. Galiani intensifies 
his critique ibid., 120– 121, note 2, where he stresses that giving reasons is all the more 
important when writing about the law of nations, for states cannot refer to any other laws 
than the treaties voluntarily stipulated by them.
 55 Ibid., 123: ‘se n’applaudisce egli stesso come d’un insegnamento più umano, e capace di 
diminuire le calamità dell’Europa, coll’estinguere le scintille di nuove guerre […]’ (author’s 
translation). Ibid., 124:  ‘Egli aveva nel suo frontespizio annunziato un libro del Diritto 
delle genti e non una opera della Dissimulazione Politica, o della Pazienza Cristiana’ 
(author’s translation). In endeavouring to find an explanation for Vattel’s theory, Galiani 
declares ibid., 124, note 2, that he wrote his Droit des gens with the intention to please the 
generous court of Saxony and the Swiss cantons, but, living there, it ‘is less excusable that 
he did not realize that their ancient usage of giving troops to the Sovereigns of Europe has 
nothing to do with his question’ (author’s translation).
 56 ‘un sistema di giustizia anche tra lo strepito dell’armi’ (author’s translation). Maria 
Giovanni Lampredi, Del commercio dei popoli neutrali in tempo di guerra (Firenze: 1788), 
4. See Enrico Spagnesi, ‘The trade of “neutral nations” as viewed by the publicist Lampredi,’ 
in War, Trade and Neutrality. Europe and the Mediterranean in seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, ed. Antonella Alimento (Milano: FrancoAngeli 2011), 233– 246.
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the famous Hugo Grotius who, writing with greater elegance, and adorning 
his Treatise with polished […] erudition, practically banished his Master from 
memory, though he almost entirely followed his own design’.57 As Lampredi 
sees it, Gentili focuses on the problem of trade for neutral nations ‘as an aside, 
and says just enough to conclude that […] it is difficult to disentangle as it 
seems […] that the arguments of the warmonger, who blocks and forbids the 
trade of the neutrals, and the arguments of the neutrals, who say they are of-
fended by this embargo, are both founded in reason’.58 The question was, as he 
wrote, still pending and unresolved, despite the fact that almost two hundred 
years had passed since the publication of Gentili’s De jure belli libri tres. For this 
reason he intended to address the question, while giving great consideration to 
the context in which he lived, the customs of the nations and the reasons that 
were the cause of confusion in the treatment of trade. Attention to practice 
and to the historical and political situation was also a characteristic of Vattel’s 
work, to which Lampredi referred. He cites Vattel, as an author better able to 
give prominence to the law of nations than Wolff. Somewhat confusing Vat-
tel’s role, Lampredi maintained that he spoke more clearly than Wolff when he 
translated the latter into French and thereby ‘removed his abominably scholas-
tic air and adorned him with much less heavy robes’.59
Finally, as far as Giovanni Gatti’s translation of Burlamaqui’s Principes du droit 
naturel is concerned, it was especially well received in Italy, particularly in aca-
demic circles. In 1812, Pietro Antonio Magalotti, professor of natural law in Peru-
gia, was still making great use of Burlamaqui. According to Vittor Ivo Compar-
ato, it was ‘a model of synthesis that did not separate the natural law of Grotius 
from the utilitarianism of Pufendorf and allowed Magalotti to take that middle 
way which time suggested’.60 In the first part of his lectures, Magalotti actually 
 57 Lampredi, Del commercio dei popoli neutrali in tempo di guerra, 6: ‘in certo modo la strada 
al celebre Hugo Grotius, il quale scrivendo con maggiore eleganza, ed ornando il suo 
Trattato di forbita […] erudizione fece quasi scordare il suo Maestro, di cui però seguitò 
quasi totalmente il disegno’ (author’s translation).
 58 Ibid., 5: ‘per incidenza, e dice quanto basta per concludere che […] è difficile da sciogli-
ersi sembrando, dic’egli, che tanto il Belligerante, che impedisce e vieta il commercio dei 
Neutrali, quanto ai Neutrali, che si chiamano offesi da questo impedimento siano fondati 
in ragione’ (author’s translation).
 59 Ibid., 65: ‘ma più chiaramente di lui ha parlato il suo redattore, che traducendolo in lingua 
francese gli ha tolto la disgustevole aria scolastica, e l’ha ornato di vesti assai più leggiadre’ 
(author’s translation).
 60 ‘un modello di sintesi che non separava il giusnaturalismo groziano dall’utilitarismo 
pufendorfiano e consentiva al Magalotti di percorrere quella via di mezzo che i tempi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simone Zurbuchen - 978-90-04-38420-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 09/19/2019 09:19:14AM
via University of Lausanne
320 Malaspina
follows the order and titles of Burlamaqui’s chapters and paragraphs, copying 
them word for word, almost as if he had adopted the work as a textbook. He then 
broadens his sources in the second part, and distances himself from Burlamaqui, 
disputing with him, for example, the delicate question of whether reason was 
sufficient as a foundation for moral obligation, independent of the will of God.61
5 Conclusion
This chapter has presented an overview of the research on the reception of 
Barbeyrac’s, Burlamaqui’s and Vattel’s works in the Italian context, with a focus 
on translation. Translation, of course, is not a passive phenomenon, and the 
end product can reshape the text itself. It is impossible to talk about simple 
copies or works that have very little originality, because in the context in which 
they are used, as in the case of translations of Barbeyrac, Vattel or Burlamaqui, 
they are creative in their own right and, at the same time, they generate cul-
tural and political identity.
In the first scenario, the Italian translation of Barbeyrac’s French version of 
Pufendorf ’s work highlights the role of the translator as a legal, cultural and so-
cial mediator. Almici translates and, at the same time, reflects on the positions 
of Barbeyrac and Pufendorf, also making use of newly published contempo-
rary works, such as Vattel’s Le droit des gens. In the second scenario, it is shown 
how, in other Italian contexts, translations of Burlamaqui and Vattel were vehi-
cles for political reflection and influenced legal practice. In the third scenario, 
translation is discussed in its broadest sense as an instrument for doctrinal and 
academic assimilation of the theories of natural law and law of nations, con-
tributing to the creation of a separate subject that would become international 
law over the nineteenth century.
It has thus been shown that in addition to the famous works on natural 
law and the law of nations in the tradition of scholastic philosophy and moral 
theo logy, there was in eighteenth- century Italy a growing interest in books that 
aimed to spread the ideas of the école romande du droit naturel. This trend aid-
ed the advent of newer and more open- minded theories on natural law and 
the law of nations, which was integral to the Enlightenment understood as a 
continuous process of change.62 There was, therefore, a clear ‘common desire’ 
suggerivano’ (author’s translation). Vittor Ivo Comparato, ‘Il diritto di natura a Perugia tra la 
Repubblica romana e l’Unità,’ Annali di storia delle università italiane 18 (2014): 221– 242.
 61 Ibid.
 62 Bazzoli, Giambattista Almici e la diffusione di Pufendorf, 100.
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across eighteenth- century Italy to make use of Le droit des gens and texts of 
the école romande in adapting natural law and the law of nations at a variety of 
legislative, political and academic levels.
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